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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between the central 
bureaucracy and politics in Mexico. In doing so, it focuses on the causes, 
effects, and implications of the creation of the Secretana de 
Programacion y  Presupuesto (SPP). The theoretical and analytical 
framework used to analyse this ministry is provided by the literature 
stressing the role of institutions. The thesis argues that until the early 
1970s, there was a historically grounded, dual policy-network system 
which reflected a clear-cut separation between economic and political 
management. It is contended that the emergence and operation of the SPP 
contributed to the deterioration of this institutional arrangement, thus 
blurring still further the already tenuous line between the bureaucratic and 
political realms.
It attempts to demonstrate that three mutually dependent factors 
explains this outcome: (i) the highly centralised and politised setting in 
which the bureaucracy operates; (ii) the economic contextual influences 
both external and internal; and (iii) the direction and contents of public 
sector institutional change. The work is divided into seven chapters. An 
introductory chapter reviews the relevant literature on the topic, and 
discusses the analytical framework. Chapter two analyses the historical 
context up to 1970s, while chapters three to six explore key stages in the 
SPP life-cycle. The last chapter discusses the overall implications of 
fifteen years of SPP, and presents the conclusions.
There are three main conclusions to the thesis. First, institutional 
reorganisation in Mexico is far from being cosmetic, for it reflects broader 
political and economic processes. Second, the SPP becoming an 
influential political actor as well as a relevant agent of both elite change 
and economic transformation shows that, under certain circumstances, 
Mexican ministries can enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. Third, 
the lack of a dividing line between administration and politics had 
relevant implications in both goal displacement and exercise of power at 
the margin of the existing electoral system. In Mexico, the lack of this 
dividing line is at odds with a definitive transition towards more 
democratic practices.
On the whole, the thesis suggests that the systematic study of the 
Mexican bureaucracy and its components, still in an embryonic stage, can 
shed light on the operation of the political system and its prospects for 
change.
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Bureaucracy: A servant or a master?
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Almost two decades ago, Peter H. Smith advised would-be public officials about 
how to enter and be successfiil within the Mexican 'labyrinths of power' (1979: 249-269). 
As it turned out, most of his provocative recommendations -based on an ambitious study 
of political recruitment- would have ironically the opposite results. At the time, only a 
clairvoyant would have suggested: whatever your background join the Secretaria de 
Programacion y  Presupuesto (SPP) whenever possible. For this ministry, created two 
years before Smith's book was published, would become an effective stepping stone to 
high office virtually since its inception. As a result, throughout its relatively short 
existence, the SPP produced not only an impressive number of ministers, high-rank 
officials, governors and members of Congress, but three presidents in a row! It should not 
be forgotten that current president Zedillo was this ministry's last head between 1988 and 
1992. Never before had a single Mexican agency different from the ruling party helped 
so many individuals to make progress in their careers.
As table 1.1 reveals, in the last two decades the Mexican ruling elite has gone 
through significant changes in its composition. They include an increasing presence 
within the executive branch of individuals with higher academic credentials, of 
economists, and of graduates from private universities. These clear signs of elite 
transformation refiect a new perception of how to preserve government legitimacy, and 
different preferred guidelines for decision-making from those before the 1970s. Though 
in Mexico the composition of the ruling elite is greatly determined by the incumbent 
president, there is "a need for greater emphasis on the role of institutional change" in the 
process (Centeno and Maxfield 1992: 63). In this thesis, we argue that the 1976
14
TABLE 1.1 Educational background of the central high-rank officials, 1970-1994
(Percentages o f selected samples)^’^
Echeverria L6pez Portillo De la Madrid Salinas
(N=392) (N=52I) (N=60I) (N=483)
Level o f Study 
Undergraduate degree 72.65 62.99 50.91 44.30
Master's degree 14.98 23.17 31.12 37.06
Doctoral degree 7.76 10.97 15.47 17.19
No degree 4.61 2.87 2.50 1.45
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Main field of study 
(undergraduate leyel) 
Law 31.71 24.54 21.II 19.67
Economics 7.76 17.24 15.48 19.57
Engineering 26.53 17.44 17.06 17.44
Military degree 2.91 1.82 3.79 5.81
Accounting 4.85 8.72 8.85 5.42
Business administration 0.32 I.4I 4.58 4.84
Others 25.92 28.83 29.13 27.25
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Main Uniyersities attended 
(undergraduate level) 
UNAM 66.34 65.31 57.03 47.48
IPN 4.85 4.05 6.31 6.58
ITAM I.6I I.2I 2.37 5.42
UIA 0.00 1.83 3.32 5.03
El Colegio de México 0.32 0.81 1.26 1.35
U. Anahuac 0.00 0.40 0.32 1.16
ITESM 0.32 0.60 2.37 0.97
Others 26.56 25.79 27.02 32.01
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Graduate studies by country 
Master's level
Mexico 33.82 42.59 39.56 46.46
United States 35.29 26.54 31.46 34.00
Great Britain 7.35 10.49 12.46 9.09
France 13.23 8.02 8.41 6.73
Others 10.31 12.36 8.II 3.72
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Doctoral level
United States 12.50 25.93 34.40 48.19
Mexico 58.33 48.15 31.18 28.71
France 16.66 14.81 18.28 13.25
Great Britain 0.00 3.70 8.60 6.02
Others 12.51 7.41 7.54 3.83
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
The samples include only president, secretaries (including heads of departamento administrative), 
under-secretaries, oficiales mayores, and directores generates. See the source for an explanation of the 
samples's characteristics and the methodology.
Source: Excerpts from Galindo (1993, tables Bl: 570, B3: 573, B6: 585; B7: 593, and B8: 598).
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administrative reform, including the creation of the SPP, is closely linked to the rise of 
the 'techno-bureaucratic elite' to power.
In a context of growing political centralisation having the presidency as its main 
beneficiary, the across-the-board adoption of a variant of the planning-programming- 
budgeting (PPB) technique enhanced not only the role of the highly-trained bureaucrat 
in policy-making, but that of the SPP as the most effective institutional path to high 
office. Because of the latter fact alone, many relevant events that have occurred in 
Mexico since December 1976 cannot be dissociated from the acronym SPP, The 1977 
confrontation between Carlos Tello, the first head of this ministry, and the finance 
minister Moctezuma Cid over economic policy was the first indication that the SPP had 
emerged to play an influential role. This fact was further confirmed by this ministry's part 
in consolidating state intervention during the 1978-1981 oil boom, and in tackling the 
economic crisis that followed. More significant, the SPP would play a relevant role in 
directing the country's shift to a market-orientated system especially after 1986.
Excluding external factors', it could be contended that the similar perceptions, 
values, and ideological orientations of presidents de la Madrid and Salinas, together with 
the overwhelming power of the Mexican presidency, could explain policy shift as well 
as policy continuation. This superficial view, however, leaves unanswered many 
important questions. Why did the SPP serve as a platform for the presidency in the first 
place? How, and why, did it happen that so many influential policy makers had operated 
within the SPP or had been a product of it? Why did a "statist" agency become a 
"privatist" agency (Erfani 1995: 127-128)?
From a broader perspective, the influential political role of the SPP revives an old 
academic debate (Eisenstadt 1958: 100): Is bureaucracy a servant or a master, an 
independent body or a tool? According to George W. Grayson, the Mexican presidency 
uses bureaucracy as a subordinate instrument (in Grayson 1990: 16). This extended view, 
however, seems to be at odds with the certain degree of autonomy exercised by some 
ministries and their policy makers as observed by some scholars (Teichman 1988; 
Centeno 1994; Greene 1994). As this thesis will argue, these antagonistic observations
' It has been convincingly argued that the shift towards trade liberalization was the result o f a 
combination of five factors, namely, the 1982 economic crisis, international pressures, the global resurgence 
of neoliberalism, the institutional arrangements o f the Mexican state, and the policy makers' predisposition 
(Greene 1994).
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are reflections of the same phenomenon: the institutional arrangements of the Mexican 
state. These arrangements are summarised by the word presidentialism. This term was 
early coined by Loewenstain (1949) to characterise regimes such as the Mexican in which 
the president plays a paramount role within the political system.
In exploring the Mexican political setting, scholars normally focus on either the 
presidency, the country's most important political institution, or group politics. Regarding 
political and economic processes, they usually centre their attention on the economic 
environment and state-society relationships. Little attention is still paid to the institutional 
and bureaucratic settings within which those processes take place. This thesis contributes 
to filling this gap by examining the relationship between bureaucracy and politics in 
Mexico from an institutional perspective. While focusing on the life-cycle of the SPP, it 
attempts to answer a central question: What explains this agency's becoming an 
influential policy and political actor? The hypothesis examined argues that it was the 
result of its concentrating strategic institutional resources in a deeply institutionalized and 
"highly centralized bureaucratic system" (Sloan 1985: 11).
What will be interesting is to see why presidentialism allowed, and fifteen years 
later ended, this unprecedented resource concentration? Equally interesting will be to see 
the manner in which this phenomenon altered the existing institutional and political 
arrangements of the Mexican state. According to Octavio Paz (1990: 88-94), the post­
revolutionary state created two parallel bureaucracies: The first was composed of 
administrators and technocrats, and the second was made up of professional politicians. 
Miguel Angel Centeno goes further by arguing that "Mexico had a powerful 'double vice 
presidency': The interior ministry "was in charge of politics", while the finance ministry 
"managed the economy" (1994: 77).
Using a policy-network approach to these issues, the thesis contends that the 
priority given by government to political stability and economic growth, together with 
functional differentiation, was responsible for the early institutionalisation of two 
distinctive policy networks in charge of achieving each of those goals. Two key features 
used to characterise these networks: a limited interaction between them, and a clear-cut 
division of both labour and personnel.
Figure 1.1 shows the basic configuration of the 'dual policy-network system' 
between 1958 and 1976. As this thesis will show, two innovations introduced by the 1976
17
administrative reform had the effect of altering this institutional arrangement in a 
significant way. They are the full adoption of cabinet meetings, and the creation of the 
SPP. As a result, the latter agency emerged as a strategic liaison between the presidency 
and the federal and local bureaucracies. The causes and institutional and political 
implications of these developments are derived from an examination of the empirical 
evidence provided by a wide-array of documentary primary sources and by some 
interview material as explained in Appendix 1.
FIGURE 1.1 Policy Networks, 1958-1976 
(Key institutional components)
Economic Policy Network Policy Network for Political 
Control
Guidance ministries SHCP (finance) Gobernacion (political control)
Quasi-Guidance ministries
Secretariat of the Presidency 
SEPANAL (national property) 
SIC (industry and commerce)
SDN (defence)
PRI (elections) 
SRE (foreign relations)
Specialised Agencies
SCT (communications) 
SOP (public works) 
SRH (hydraulic resources) 
SAG (agriculture)
SSA (health)
ST (tourism) 
Economic Parastate Sector
STyPS (labour) 
SRA (agrarian reform) 
SM (navy)
PGR (general attorney) 
DDF (Federal District) 
SEP (education) 
Welfare Parastate Sector
The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the 
major theoretical frameworks addressing both politics and bureaucracy. Special emphasis 
is placed here on the Latin American case. The following part examines in greater detail 
the institutional models relevant to the purpose of this thesis, and discusses the analytical 
framework that will be used. The final part outlines the structure of the thesis.
1.2 APPROACHES TO THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY
As March and Olsen underline, there are two conventional ways of looking at 
politics in advanced democracies (1996). Until very recently, society-centred ways of 
explaining politics and governmental activities were specially characteristic of the 
pluralist perspective predominant in political science (Skocpol in Evans et al. 1993: 4).
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The early 1980s witnessed a sudden renewed academic interest in the state. As a result, 
alternate state-centred political theories began to be proposed. This new approach was a 
reflection of the more general view that political institutions matter. Each of these broad 
perspectives provides two distinctive sets of approaches to the relationship between 
bureaucracy and politics. This section discusses the theoretical and empirical implications 
of these approaches in the Latin American context.
Broad theoretical perspectives
In its most general formulation, pluralism sees 'the state' as a neutral arena within 
which societal interest groups contend or ally with one another to shape public policy 
decisions.^ It reduces the political process to the activity of groups and parties competing 
in a virtual structural 'vacuum'. Regarding interest representation, this theory rests on the 
assumption that individual preferences are transmitted to policy makers through the 
electoral system. As a result, it presupposes a neat separation between politicians and 
bureaucrats (see Goodin 1982). Theoretically at least, the latter constitutes an 
instrumental, neutral corps at the service of the former. Often, however, pluralist scholars 
found not only that "governmental leaders took initiatives well beyond the demands of 
social groups or electorates", but also that "government agencies were the most prominent 
participants in the making of particular policy decisions" (Skocpol in Evans et al. 1993: 
4).
Findings of this sort being difficult to accommodate within a pluralistic theoretical 
fi-amework may account for a long-lasting debate over the extent of bureaucracy's 
influence on policy-making in the Western democracies. At the core of which is still the 
question: "Do their democratically-elected political leaders retain much influence over 
their unelected bureaucrats?" (Hammond 1996: 107). The relevance of this question has 
been enhanced by the fact that the evidence tends to confirm the importance of modem 
bureaucracies (Putman 1976: 208). Even more, a universal process of gradual 
displacement of political power from the legislatures to the executives, and from there 
to bureaucracy have been noted (Heady 1991: 190). Today, a bureaucratic encroachment
 ^For a summary of the pluralistic approach, see excerps from both Smith and Newton in McGrew 
and Wilson (1982). A comparative discussion of this approach can be found in March and Olsen (1989: 
Chapter one) and Kerremans (1996).
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upon the political realm is suggested by terms such as political mandarins (Dogan 1975) 
and political administrators (Heclo and Wildavsky 1981).
A way of dealing with these deviations from the classic democratic model has 
been looking at their positive consequences to the modem society. Thus, the need of high 
levels of technical expertise to successfully deal with complex problems is often used "as 
a rationale for the increasing prominence of bureaucrats in the policy-making process" 
(Wake Carroll 1990: 346). Moreover, the view that high-rank officials "are indeed 
enmeshed" in this process is often taken for granted (Riccucci 1995: 219). Yet, older 
academic concerns about the potential dangers of unregulated power concentration in the 
hands of the bureaucracy, growing bureaucratisation of social life, and displacement of 
the goals of the polity by the bureaucracy have not paled. Echoing these concerns, 
Neustad portrayed "the American President as trapped by a permanent government more 
enemy than ally" in his influential book Presidential Power published in 1960 (cited in 
Krasner 1972: 159). Similar views involving this and other developed countries are not 
difficult to find in more recent literature.
Although the interest in bureaucracy is of long standing in modem sociology, it 
was not until the works of Weber, Michels and Mosca that the topic became "a focus of 
independent major analysis" (Eisenstadt 1958: 99). While Weber brought this institution 
to the limelight by depicting it as the epitome of rationality and efficiency, Michels was 
more concemed with the problem of "usurpation of power by bureaucracy".^ Despite 
dealing with different themes, the works of both scholars have some points in common. 
On the one hand, Michels does not ignore the vital role of bureaucracy as a technical 
arrangement in the implementation of public policies. On the other hand, Weber 
frequently alludes to bureaucracy as a powerful independent body threatening modem 
society and individual liberties. The rise of socialism mostly explains Weber's dilemma.
The so-called Weberian ideal type represented a major starting-point of the 
sociological approach to bureaucracy. Put very simply, this model characterises this 
institution as the most efficient form of organisation because of "its technical superiority 
over any other form of organization" (Weber 1946: 214). This superiority stems from 
bureaucracy's intrinsic attributes, namely, a hierarchical order, a clear division of labour.
 ^ Mosca, on the other hand, was the first to treat the bureaucratic state as a distinct type of  
political system. For a brief discussion of the works o f these authors see Eisenstadt (1958).
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a set of rules governing operations, and a meritocratic system that protects bureaucrats 
from arbitrary dismissal (Heffron 1989: 5). Though Weber's prediction that bureaucracy 
would become a dominant form of organisation in the developed world proved right, his 
model must still be regarded as prescriptive. For it tells us how bureaucracy should be 
organised to attain high degrees of efficiency rather than how it operates in the real world. 
This qualification is important since post-Weberian theoretical and empirical research on 
bureaucracy has repeatedly emphasized not only the obstacles hampering its ideal 
performance, but also its inherent dysfunctions.'^
Bureaucratic theorists have traditionally considered it essential to focus on three 
central issues: the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political leaders; the 
relationship between the former and its clienteles; and the limits of legitimate 
bureaucratic power (Eisenstadt 1958: 102-103). In essence, they seek to find out who 
does decide in society, legitimately or not. Models of decision making are abundant. 
According to the so-called rational choice models, for example, in any organisation 
decision-makers behave as rational actors when selecting alternatives. Each choice is 
made after a comprehensive analysis of pros and cons. One problem of this and other 
rational models is that they are prescriptions of how decisions should be made rather than 
descriptions of what actually happen (McGrew and Wilson 1982: 49-52). Besides, they 
leave out "too much of the rich lore of bureaucratic life that makes its study fun" (Goodin 
1982: 23).
Allison's classic study of the Cuban missile crisis (1971) represents an important 
contribution to positive or 'realpolitik' analysis. His governmental politics model assumes 
that decision making is "the resultant of various bargaining games among players in the 
national government". In other words, decisions result from operating procedures and 
bureaucratically shaped politics rather than from rational actors. More significantly, it 
suggests that there may be a 'forced' departure from the goals of the mass electorate that 
the elected political leaders should advocate and achieve. Krasner considers this 
bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy -he ironically calls "Allison Wonderland"- 
misleading because "it obscures the power of the President", and dangerous because "it 
undermines the assumptions of the democratic politics by relieving high officials of
See, among others, Crozier (1964), Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), Krasner (1972), Peters 
(1984), Campbell and Peters (1988), and Heady (1991).
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responsibility" (Krasner 1972: 160). Clearly, there are strong prescriptive elements in 
Krasner's view of bureaucracy.
The Weberian ideal type provides a useful theoretical frame to find out how real- 
world bureaucracies score when compared with it. It is a cliché to note that the European 
bureaucracies are the best approximation to this model.^ For they are characterised by a 
well-rooted merit-based civil service, high technical and specialisation capabilities 
maximised by a neat division of labour, and a relatively marked degree of political 
neutrality. Yet the media has never stopped reporting on an almost daily basis cases of 
inefficiency, red tape, waste, political bias, and corruption. The realities beneath the news 
may explain the long tradition that the theory aimed at discovering methods for 
improving performance and effectiveness within organisations has in the developed 
world. When public bureaucracies are at stake, however, there are broader theoretical and 
practical issues involved in their departure from the ideal type.
As noted by Minogue (1983: 73), there are two problems for the models of 
'perfect administration' which want to exclude politics. First, "the internal world of the 
organisation cannot be isolated from the world external to the organisation". Second, their 
assumption that internal organisation does not involve politics is unsustainable, for 
organisations "contain groups of people, and individuals, who will compete with each 
other to control and manipulate resources, policies, practices", and of course the 
organisation itself.
Understanding governance requires study of the political institutions most 
involved in national policymaking (Hammond 1996: 107). Though this view has 
traditionally been endorsed by pluralist/elitist-orientated political scientists, they do not 
normally focus on those institutions, but on the personnel behind them and/or on the 
processes they are involved in. In recent years, however, the view that organisation of 
political life is important has reappeared in political science (March and Olsen 1989: 1). 
From this perspective, the role of institutions needs to be reexamined. Drawing heavily 
from earlier organisation theory, the so-called new institutionalism^ opposes the
 ^ As will be discussed later, the bureaucracies o f the so-called 'pacific dragons' or 'newly 
industrialising countries' have more recently added to the list.
 ^ March and Olsen define new institutionalism as an approach to political science that 
"deemphasizes the dependence o f the polity on society in favor o f an interdependence between relatively 
autonomous social and political institutions" (1984: 738).
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pluralistic/elitist models by arguing that the institutional setting, and the organisational 
processes that take place within it, shapes individual and collective decision-making and 
policy outcomes (see March and Olsen 1984; Kerremans 1996).
In essence, the central argument of the institutional approach develops around the 
idea that political action is not chaotic, that "the institutionalization of action through 
rules reduces . . .  ambiguity and affects politics" (March and Olsen 1989: 21). Clearly, 
the notion of 'rules' is one of the most important elements on which this perspective is 
built. Allowing from some adjustments, its definition coincides with the earlier notion 
of'standard operating procedures' used, among others, by Weber and Allison. Thus, rules 
are routines, conventions, procedures, roles as well as broader cultural dicta and social 
norms which influence the political activity of individuals within organisations. On the 
whole, this normative framework is thought to be independent of individual actors and 
capable of surviving them.
From a broader perspective, the emergence of the institutional approach is mostly 
responsible for making it "fashionable to speak of states as actors and as society-shaping 
institutional structures" (Skocpol in Evans et al. 1993: 6). By regarding the state as an 
actor in its own right, the so-called statist theory expanded and, to some degree, amended 
"traditional pluralist conceptions of the organization of societal interests" (Atkinson and 
Coleman 1992:155). However, as frequently happens, fashionable paradigms foster "new 
concerns with phenomena they had originally de-emphasized conceptually" (Skocpol in 
Evans et al. 1993: 4). Thus, recent scholarly work has begun to reveal the shortcomings 
of the statist theory. Among the major criticisms is the reductionist view of the state. 
According to Moon and Prasad, for example, this theory "fails to uncover the complex 
and dynamic internal working of the state structure by depicting the state as an internally 
cohesive, unitary actor" (1994: 364).
In any event, some applications of the institutional approach to the policy-making 
process have given room to "models in which the institutions of the state are understood 
to have considerable autonomy" (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 155). The political and 
institutional structure in a particular polity will show the potential for autonomous or 
restrained political action (Price Boase 1996: 290). It applies to specific institutions and 
public organisations.
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Most public bureaucracies in developing countries score much less favourably 
when compared with the ideal type. However, though they are often reputed as clientelist 
and essentially non-Weberian, some of their constituent agencies have traditionally 
showed technical levels comparable to their counterparts in the West. How can these 
hybrid systems be better approached? What are their theoretical and practical political 
implications?
Development and bureaucracy in the developing world
The difficulties of using either pluralist/elitist or Marxist approaches to explain 
amd describe peripheral 'atypical' political systems or 'imperfect' democracies led to the 
development of more indigenous theoretical frameworks. In the mid-1960s, Juan J. Linz 
(1970) developed the notion of authoritarianism to describe Franco's rule over Spain. In 
doing so, he provided a seminal theoretical model to characterise a form of governance 
conceptually and empirically distinct firom democracy and totalitarianism (see Linz 1975). 
The temptation of classifying most underdeveloped countries as authoritarian was 
difficult to avoid. Relevant variations in their internal structures and relations with 
society, however, soon exhibited the difficulties in placing these countries under a single 
heading. More recently, a twofold typology distinguishing between the so-called 'newly 
industrialising countries' (NICs) and the less developed has been proposed, which reflects 
the broader changes in the dominant theories and research agendas already discussed.
Until the 1980s, scholars attempted to explain why economic development "did 
not occur, occurred slowly, or occurred in a distorted, dependent form" (Donner 1992: 
398). In this context, a debate between "modernization and dependency theory about 
whether capitalism promoted or perverted development" emerged (Clark and Chan 1994: 
332). Institutionally speaking, modernisation theory held that state interference and 
traditional institutions were responsible for underdevelopment. By contrast, dependence 
theory contended that the dynamics of capitalism had created its own social and political 
institutions. The impressive economic performance of the NICs challenged the 
assumptions of both theoretical perspectives. As a result, many scholars are now focusing 
on "the political bases of development rather than underdevelopment" (Donner 1992: 
398).
The rise of statist theory, in turn, generated a more specific debate over whether 
the market or the state is the key factor in explaining the economic success of the NICs
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(Clark and Chan 1994: 333). According to Rueschemeyer and Evans (in Evans et al. 
1993), "effective state intervention" is an integral part of successful capitalist 
development. Two conditions, in their opinion, are sine qua non for this intervention to 
be effective: a certain degree of "relative autonomy" from the dominant class and a well- 
developed, internally coherent bureaucratic apparatus. Based on these ideas, Evans (1995: 
12) proposes two "historically grounded" ideal categories to characterise the developing 
countries. In his view, predatory states (e.g., Zaire) live at the expense of society but 
without providing much in return apart from repression. Conversely, developmental states 
(e.g., Korea, Taiwan), though also extracting from society, play a relevant role in 
facilitating industrial transformation and development.^
Evans's theory of embedded autonomy (1995) focuses on the kind of bureaucracy 
in charge of the state apparatus and its relation with society. It holds that predatory states 
do not have bureaucracies along the ideal type, while those of their counterparts 
approximate that model to an extent comparable with the European bureaucracies. For 
the developmental states also have a highly selective meritocratic system of recruitment 
and promotion, and long-term career rewards that give bureaucratic apparatuses both 
corporate coherence and a certain degree of'autonomy'. Within the model, however, the 
latter concept does not mean insulation from society. On the contrary, a happy marriage 
or 'embedded autonomy' between a quasi-Weberian bureaucracy and a pro-developmental 
society, together with "a favorable international context" (Evans 1977: 59), explains the 
economic success of the NICs.
What is the story of the less developing countries (LDCs)? To begin with, not 
only do most of these countries lack formal civil services, but in some of them spoils 
systems still prevail. At the best, scattered 'pockets of efficiency' can be found as in the 
Brazilian case (Geddes cited in Evans 1995: 61). Thus, their bureaucracies are often 
described as highly clientelistic.* The fact that bureaucratic organisations everywhere 
provide "a perfect habitat for clientelistic politics" (Clapham 1982: 26) is thought to be 
enhanced by the lack or weakness of democratic institutions. A similar effect results from
’ For an extensive discussion o f this typology see Evans (1995: Chapter 3).
* The concept clientelism involves "a long-lasting relationship o f exchange between unequals" as 
characterised by Christopher Clapham (in Clapham 1982: 4-29). For a further discussion, see LaPalombra 
(1965), Peters (1977), Eisenstadt and Lemarchand (1981), and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984). On Mexican 
bureaucratic clientelism, see Poitras (1973), Grindle (1977b) and Kelley (1981).
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the way both resources and jobs are allocated within government: Resource allocation 
responds more to political factors than to technical ones, while appointments are 
frequently subjected to political rather than merit-based criteria. The latter practice may, 
im turn, account for high rates of bureaucratic turnover. Can these non-Weberian features, 
as Evans argues, explain at least partly the failure of development strategies in the LDCs?
If the answer is yes, it poses an even more relevant question: Why have these 
countries constantly failed to build a modem, efficient, Weberian-like bureaucracy 
despite numerous attempts to do so? In the 1950s and 1960s, efforts at administrative 
reform were enthusiastically encouraged and backed by international aid agencies and 
other bilateral programmes (Caiden 1991:13). Partly because of these experiments, some 
bureaucracies in the LDCs have gradually become closer to the ideal type. It is so in 
terms of better academic credentials, lower rates of turnover, and improved technical 
infrastmcture. In countries such as Brazil, Mexico, India and Israel, 'efficiency pockets' 
have not only expanded, but multiplied across-the-board. Moreover, meritocratic systems 
of recruitment and promotion, though usually still informal, are today much better rooted 
than some decades ago. Nevertheless, the economic performance of their countries can 
hardly be compared with that of the NICs. This fact makes it necessary to look again at 
the political bases of underdevelopment.
In the 1970s, the prevalent orientation was to consider both the polity and its 
organisational stmctures (including bureaucracy) as a reflection of the society, not the 
other way round. Focusing on the Latin American case, Jorge I. Tapia-Videla challenged 
this paradigm by arguing that the emergence of the corporate-technocratic state led to 
"dramatic transformations, affecting the workings of public bureaucracies and the larger 
societal frameworks within which they operate" (1976: 631-632). According to him, in 
the postwar period, Latin American countries "came to share the basic assumption of the 
prevalent developmental schemes, namely, that socioeconomic development depended 
to a large extent upon an adequate administrative apparatus" (1976: 632). While 
enhancing the role of bureaucracy, these schemes not only ignored the structural features 
of the state, but considered many of its institutions and practices as 'pathological' in 
nature. His central argument is that the resulting tensions were "resolved with the 
emergence of the new corporate-technocratic state" (1976: 633).
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Tapia-Videla's theoretical model has two major implications. First, developmental 
strategies can affect the structure of the state, but without necessarily replacing it.^  Thus, 
traditional and 'modem' features characterise the corporate-technocratic state. Second, the 
kind of state stmcture may account for the absence, or existence, of a Weberian-like 
bureaucracy. Here, it should be borne in mind that the theory of embedded autonomy 
attempts to explain the economic success of countries in which there are old bureaucratic 
traditions (see Evans 1995:47-60). In the case of the NICs countries, as Evans notes, civil 
services along Weberian lines are not a product of recent development models, but a part 
of the traditional state stmcture. This may account for their successful performance. What 
needs to be seen, however, is whether the development of a Weberian bureaucracy can 
reduce the predatory character of the state in countries different from the NICs ones.
In the Latin American context, the features of the state stmcture used to include, 
and in some cases still include, the following: overwhelming executive dominance 
(Carpizo 1979:16-18), limited political pluralism (Linz 1970: 255), absence or weakness 
of democratic institutions (Remmer 1989), deep-rooted corporatism (Malloy 1977; Sloan 
1985:4), pervasive clientelism (Rothstein 1976), and high vulnerability vis-à-vis external 
agents (Hamilton 1982: 15-23). In this context, bureaucracy came to play a relevant role 
as a channel for upward social mobility, a source of patronage, a vital prop for current 
regimes, a source of employment, and a key interest articulation/representation agent 
(Tapia-Videla 1976: 633). According to some scholars, the origin of these features can 
be traced as far as the Iberian colonial years (e.g., Sloan 1985: 3). Conversely, the 
bureaucratic-authoritarianism theory argues that authoritarian regimes were not the 
result of "vestigial features of traditional societies", but of economic processes 
supposedly leading to democracy (O'Donnell 1973: 95).*°
The Mexican case, in particular, challenges the latter view if its regime is 
considered authoritarian as Linz (1975: 275) and others did.** As Reyna contends, the
® Transformations o f the state structure and state policy are usually linked to broad-scale political 
mobilisations and/or crises in the process o f capital accumulation (Canak 1984: 14),
The same has been argued regarding specific state structural features as clientelism in the 
Mexican context (e.g., Rothstein 1979).
" Following the well-known repression of students in 1968, Rafael Segovia regarded the Mexican 
as an authoritarian regime following Linz's conceptualisation (quoted by Needier 1990: 46). By the early 
1980s virtually all literature endorsed this view (Purcell and Purcell 1980: 204), though the regime did not 
totally fit the authoritarian model as recognised by many scholars (Camp 1980c: 208; Hamilton 1982: 35; 
Smith 1984: 36).
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institutionalisation of an authoritarian political structure in Mexico took place well before 
the crisis of industrialisation (in Reyna and Weinert 1977, see also Cothran 1994). 
Though this phenomenon was rare in Latin America, it cannot plausibly be concluded 
that the political institutions of other countries in the area were entirely the result of these 
countries' development strategies. As the corporate-technocratic state theory argues, the 
latter did not have the effect of replacing the existing structure of the state, but that of 
disrupting and further distorting its institutional arrangements. This phenomenon was 
particularly clear regarding the relationship between politics and bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy and politics in Latin America
In Latin America, the interaction of the traditional structural features of the state 
and the developmental model adopted magnified virtually all of the bureaucratic 
dysfunctions discussed at the beginning of this section. The full acceptance of the 
Keynesian critique of the self-regulating capitalist economy was a major stimulus towards 
state intervention in the developed world (Cawson 1978). By the 1940s, most Latin 
American countries found themselves in a process of expansive state-led industrialisation. 
This pattern of development enhanced not only executive dominance even further, but 
the role to be played by bureaucracy. In this context, a powerful state bureaucracy was 
thought to be sine qua non of development and modernisation. The potential dangers 
associated with this institution becoming the major political actor were not predicted. 
Moreover, once apparent, they were "never solved in a satisfactory way, either at the 
theoretical or the practical plane [level]" (Tapia-Videla 1976: 632).
From a technical perspective, greater state intervention in the economy and the 
consequent expansion of the public sector made the shortcomings of bureaucracy in 
achieving its developmental goals increasingly apparent. Again, imported theoretical 
conceptions were attempted to tackle this problem. In 1961, the Alliance for Progress was 
established by the US at Punta del Este, Uruguay. Within this framework, international 
aid organisations "made demands to create or strengthen existing planning capabilities 
and to prepare long term plans" (Benveniste 1972: 41) in exchange for economic 
assistance. This time the assumption was that central planning would correct the 
inefficient expansion and operation of the state bureaucratic apparatus. At the same time, 
the United Nations' BCLA became both a centre for planning theorists and an influential 
training centre. These developments reflected a different tone in the developed world
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itself. In the United States, for instance, the 'revolutionary' Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting (PPB) technique was eventually adopted by president Johnson in 1965 (see 
Wildavsky 1974: Chapter 6).
The adoption of formal planning and its techniques had relevant political 
implications. To begin with, it not only brought to the fore a new category of public 
official: the planner, but led to the creation of planning institutes. As the extensive 
empirical data gathered by Caiden and Wildavsky (1990) shows, these organisations, 
whatever their structure, had severe disruptive effects on the existing policymaking and 
budgeting processes virtually everywhere. At the core of the problem was their 
coexistence with the traditional ministries of finance. As these scholars soon discovered, 
two major agencies with claims on the budget create immediately problems of power. 
More relevant, since they do not usually share the same policy perspectives, both cannot 
get their way.
According to an official from Nepal: "Planners have been more ambitious and 
wanted to spend more than the ministry of finance." Similarly, a Ghanaian one expressed: 
"Planning wants to see development and expansion. Finance wants to hold all 
development expenditures down". Finally, the dream of planners was put by a Costa 
Rican as follows: "We always wished that the ministry of finance would just concentrate 
on raising revenues and leave setting of priorities to the planning office." (Caiden and 
Wildavsky 1990: 241-243).
Although finance ministries are normally in a stronger position in the struggles 
to control the budget, some factors worked in favour of the fledgling planning bodies. 
They include the prevalent view that the imperfections of budgeting were the reverse of 
the virtues of planning, and chief executives' logical preference for plan rhetoric over 
austere, balanced budgets. Apparently, the more intense the clashes between 'finance' and 
'planning', the more serious their negative consequences over the entire policy-making 
process. Not surprisingly, policy incoherence usually followed these institutional 
rivalries. It was particularly the case of countries having powerful finance and planning 
institutions, as Brazil did in the 1950s. In this case, the president solved the problem "by 
lending his ear to one or another of the two as his fancy might lead" (Daland 1967: 30). 
Even more dangerous, chief executives receiving contradictory bureaucratic advice often 
gave them a chance to make their own decisions.
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Evidently, the institutional separation between budget and planning enhanced two 
artificially differentiated, extreme courses of action. They were financial orthodoxy and 
the risks of stagnation, and expansion and its potential for inflation and financial chaos. 
The temptation of following the second option was difficult to avoid as planners began 
to reach not only the ear of the chief executives, but also the highest echelons of 
government in many Latin American countries. A first indication of the first phenomenon 
was the rise of the so-called 'Chicago boys' in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1960s 
and early 1970s.
Up to the early 1980s, a common characteristic of most developing countries was 
a substantial direct state intervention in the economy. One of the most popular 
explanations emphasizes the political influence of the so-called "techno-bureaucratic 
elite" in the process of development (Duvall and Freeman 1983: 571). However, 
considering this elite as a reinforcing product of the latter process is more plausible. 
Decades of state-directed import-substitution industrialisation "led to the emergence of 
technocratic roles" within the state apparatus (Linz 1975: 297). The incumbents of these 
roles, in turn, developed powerful vested interests in the state's active entrepreneurial role 
simply because it meant better income and quality of life for them (Duvall and Freeman 
1983: 573). Baer, Newfarmer, and Trebat emphasize the political significance of this 
development by noting that "the technocrats and public managers form an 'independent 
state' relatively free from the influence of private sector interests, and allocate resources 
in a way that expands their own power and wealth" (quoted by Canak 1984: 11).
As William L. Canak (1984) argues, the Latin American state has been 
traditionally analysed using two major theoretical frameworks: 'bureaucratic- 
authoritarian' and 'state capitalist'. While the first theory does not really deal with the 
issue of bureaucratic interests, the 'state capitalism' theory argues that "capital 
accumulation in the periphery leads to the emergence of an autonomous set of state 
interests vis-à-vis national and international capital and 'dominated' classes within the 
nation" (Canak 1984: 5). In the extreme, this view holds that the state, including the 
entire political process, has been captured by its 'techno-bureaucratic elite' (e.g., Centeno 
1990, 1993). Because this claim seems to be supported by numerous Latin American 
cases, the question of why and how that development occurred should be addressed.
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In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the rise to power of the 
'techno-bureaucratic elite' was the result of the interaction of structural, contextual, and 
institutional factors. They included not only regime stability'^, task complexity, country 
position in the world system, regime legitimation via performance criteria, and 
institutional autonomy of technocratic state agencies (Centeno 1993), but also the lack 
or weakness of democratic institutions. The importance of this structural factor cannot 
be overemphasized. In a milieu characterised by executive dominance and limited 
accountability, the underdevelopment of democratic practices paved the way for state 
technocracy reaching power. An important factor in the process was the Latin American 
bureaucracies becoming the natural and most vocal representative of the private sector 
at the political level. This system of interest representation had the effect of displacing 
key bargaining processes from the political/partisan arenas to the bureaucratic one, thus 
further weakening the already tenuous fence between administration and politics.
International factors also played a fundamental role in the rise of technocracy. 
Duvall and Freeman (1983:585) plausibly argue that the political effects of broad "cycles 
of foreign capital and technology" are crucial to understand the dynamics of the 'techno- 
bureaucratic elite'. For those cycles account for this elite being "over- and under­
compensated for its support". Considering that the elite under discussion is not 
monolithic, as the institutional rivalries between 'finance' and 'planning' suggests, it can 
be argued that those cycles may have similar effects within the elite itself. It is confirmed 
by the fall of the nationalist-populist technocratic wing and the rise of the neoliberal one 
in the 1970s. A more specific, though equally important, factor involves "the support of 
powerful external actors such as the international creditors" during the 1980s (Centeno 
1993: 317). Again, to understand the impact of this factor on bureaucracy and its 
components it is necessary to look at the institutional division of labour.
Because of the debt crisis, the 1980s was a disastrous decade for virtually all 
Latin American economies (Philip 1993: 555). The deliberate move towards a "slim" 
state that followed challenged the view that "slowed growth promotes the expansion of 
the state sector" (Duvall and Freeman 1983: 585). By the mid-1980s, many of these 
countries began to embark upon radical trade liberalisation reform after decades of
In general, as Centeno notes, "technocrats can only flourish in those regimes that have 
established a relatively stable political environment either through consensus or repression" (1993: 324).
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protectionism (see Agosin and Ffrench-Davis 1995). Even before, a wave of 
démocratisation started transforming an increasing number of Latin American states. 
These developments not only exhibited the failure of populist governments, but also the 
importance of external factors. Fashionable development formulae were, as usual, 
'proposed' to cope with widespread economic crisis.*  ^While focusing on Mexico, Malory 
Greene (1994) offers the innovative concept of transnational epistemic communities to 
explain how these ideas were conveyed from the international system to the domestic 
political arena through a technocratic elite educated abroad.
From a broader perspective, the outcomes of the developments aforementioned 
so far tend to confirm the validity of the core of the corporate-technocratic state theory 
(Tapia-Videla 1976: 634-635), which considers this kind of state having the following 
key features: (i) new alliances between the state and foreign capital, domestic business 
linked to the world economic systems, and the upper sectors of the working class; (ii) 
extensive power over the major societal forces by probusiness regulatory and re­
distributive policies; (iii) the technocratic argument that political, social and economic 
problems should be handled by technical considerations as a source of legitimacy; (iv) 
a demand for political and social demobilisation pointing in the direction of 
"depolitization of the polity"; (v) extensive use of traditional authoritarian and 
corporative mechanisms to achieve economic modernisation; and (vi) a substantial 
adjustment of the bureaucratic apparatus to make it consonant with the new role of the 
state.
To briefly recapitulate, in a context of limited pluralism, capitalism and 
bureaucracy "found each other and belong intimately together" (Weber quoted by Evans 
1995: 29). The increased use of bureaucracy with political purposes, in turn, reinforced 
the patrimonial and clientelist character of the state. Crucial to the rise of technocracy to 
power were the imperfections of the Latin American democratic systems and the 
importance accorded to technical credentials by the prevalent development theories. It is 
not still conclusive that the latter theories have radically changed the traditional structural 
features of the Latin American state. Evans argues that "imposing different policies on
As Castafieda (1993: 48) argues, Latin America has been an outstanding importer o f  ideas, 
ideologies, theories, and social doctrines since independence.
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a state apparatus without changing the structure of the state itself will not work" (1995: 
30).
The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed significant changes in the views of the role 
o f the state, and also of its nature. In the Latin American case, for instance, the extended 
belief that strong central planning under an authoritarian rule is sine qua non of rapid 
economic growth was refuted by Dick (1976). For he empirically demonstrates that 
underdeveloped democratic countries are more capable of achieving this goal than their 
authoritarian counterparts. More recently, Remmer (1989) arrives at the same conclusion 
when exploring the effects of the debt crisis on policy performance in Latin America. 
According to the newly developed conceptions of the state, the role of this institution 
implies a restructuring of the ruling elite (Evans 1977: 63). This restructuring has actually 
taken place in Latin America, but not through democratic means. Thus, at least one 
question remains unanswered: Do technocratic elites inhibit the development of 
democratic institutions or will they eventually facilitate this process?
It is a fact that a recent wave of démocratisation has either replaced or challenged 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in Latin America. However, as Jonathan Fox 
argues, more intense political competition "is necessary but not sufficient for the 
consolidation of democratic regimes" (1994: 151). It still seems clear not only that today 
many Latin American bureaucracies are powerfiil actors, but that the bureaucratic setting 
is the most important political arena. Nevertheless, the systematic study of these issues 
remains an underdeveloped academic topic. As will be argued next, the emerging theories 
of institutions will ultimately prove to be of greatest use in exploring them. Elites are 
important, but their activity takes place within a given political and institutional setting. 
To understand the role of bureaucracy, the state needs to be deconstructed.
1.3 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The central premise of this thesis is that an understanding of the complexity of 
Mexican politics requires a greater knowledge of the individual institutions that are 
eventually responsible for the outcome of that politics. In this respect, the thesis 
acknowledges the limitations of using a single model in analysing those institutions. As 
already suggested, each model has its particular strengths and weaknesses in explaining 
complex political phenomena. Therefore, it is thought that the use of a suitable
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combination of various theoretical models can produce better results. The proposed 
theoretical and analytical framework to explore the role of the SPP draws heavily from 
the institutional perspective.
Bureaucracy and the policy-networks theory
As said earlier, the new statist theory neglects the role of the state's constituent 
elements. According to Moon and Prasad, the state structure is composed of "several 
distinguishable dimensions: executive leadership, executive-bureaucratic nexus, intra- 
bureaucratic dynamics, and bureaucratic constituents" ( 1994: 365). This thesis attempts 
to explore each of these issues directly involving the SPP. The theoretical perspective 
adopted is the institutional one. Though this perspective comprises various theoretical 
constructions and models, it shares some basic assumptions. First, "political institutions 
are more than simple mirrors of social forces", for they define the framework within 
which politics takes place (March and Olsen 1989: 18). Second, institutions represent a 
collection of formal and informal rules, routines and operating procedures capable of both 
shaping individual behaviour and affecting political processes. Third, organisations are 
the basic structural units into which private or public institutions can be divided.
Four, there is not a meaningful separation between an organisation and its 
personnel: Agencies' rules, roles and procedures affect and can be affected by the 
individuals who work in them (Harmon and Meyer 1986: 14). Five, organisations can be 
treated as political actors in their own right (March and Olsen 1989: 17). Six, 
organisations are "creatures, captives, and controllers of the environments in which they 
operate" (Heffron 1989: 56). Seven, by definition political and bureaucratic action takes 
place in an organisational context (Harmon and Meyer 1986: 27). Eight, performance of 
organisational routines and rules can influence distribution of power. Finally, distribution 
of'resources' between organisations is a source of both routines and power.
How can individual public organisations be approached? The fragmented 
authoritarianism model is a recent component of the institutional approach. This 
theoretical framework was developed by Lieberthal (1992: Chapter 1) to analyse 
economic reform in post-Mao China. Its central characteristic is the view of bureaucracy 
as composed of fiinctional bureaucratic clusters. These clusters "identify the core organs 
that have nationwide hierarchies and that exercise strong executive power". In brief, it is 
argued that authority below the very peak of the political system is "fragmented and
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disjointed". The fragmentation in bureaucratic units, functional division of labour and the 
processes of bargaining are considered structurally based. It is believed that in China 
fragmentation "grew increasingly pronounced" because of the late 1970s reforms, thus 
altering the balance between centralisation and decentralisation. Three not-mutually- 
excl'usive dimensions are proposed to study this process: Value integration; structural 
distribution of resources; and processes of decision making and policy implementation. 
In this context, it is thought that the first two dimensions influence the latter processes.
Evidently, the fragmented authoritarianism model echoes not only some of the 
literature on bureaucratic politics already discussed,’'* but in particular the institutional 
framieworks associated with the power-dependence theory. In any event, the major merit 
of this model is to combine the notion of bureaucratic authoritarianism with the most 
developed policy-network models to deal with a specific phenomenon of political 
transition.
As far as the Mexican case is concerned, historical evidence suggests not only that 
the constituent components of the central bureaucracy have been fairly different from one 
another, but also that there has been "a rather severe compartmentalization in the 
bure:aucracy, a notable degree of department or agency autonomy, and a weak spirit of 
inter-agency cooperation" (Shafer 1966: 69), How can these particular features be better 
analysed? Regarding their causes, the literature on patron-client bonds seems to provide 
somie insights. According to Clapham, for instance, the competitive nature of 
bureaucratic clientelism leads to "a high degree of factionalism and fragmentation" (in 
Clap)ham 1982:11), However, the fact that bureaucratic clientelism operates by definition 
within an organisational setting makes it necessary to look at the institutional dimensions 
of the former phenomenon, such as agency orientations and above all resource allocation.
Regarding the relationships between the SPP and other public organisations, the 
thesis will use the theoretical notion of policy networks. In the early 1980s, R,A.W, 
Rhodes developed a framework originally designed to explore central-local relationships 
in Britain, This model, known as power-dependence theory, is based on five propositions: 
(i) Any organisation is dependent upon other organisations for resources', (ii) 
organisations have to exchange resources to achieve their goals; (iii) although decision-
For instance, Peters argues that "bureaucracies are generally highly fragmented and divided 
political institutions" (1977: 204).
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making within organisations is constrained by other organisations, the dominant coalition 
retains some discretion; (iv) the dominant coalition employs strategies within knovm 
rules o f  the game to regulate the process o f exchange', (v) the relative power potential of 
interacting organisations is a product of the resources of each organisation, of the rules 
of the game and of the process of exchange between organisations. (Rhodes 1981: 98) 
The relatively neat dividing line between central and local authorities enhanced 
the analytical power of the concept of policy community, originally, a key element of this 
model. This notion was later redefined by Rhodes himself and others, and has been used 
since then to explore much broader issues such as cross-national and comparative studies 
by an increasing number of scholars (e.g., Wilks and Wright 1987; Wright 1988). As the 
research field grew, a more general concept developed, namely, that of policy network. 
According to Benson, a policy network is "a cluster or complex of organizations 
connected to each other by resource dependencies" (quoted by Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 
12-13). Today, the concept policy community is understood as a variety of policy network 
characterised by more stable relationships (see Rhodes 1986).’^
Some important theoretical implications can be drawn from the power- 
dependence theory. First, no organisation can exercise "monopolistic power" (Rourke in 
Rourke 1986: xi), for none of them has sufficient resources "to ensure that its will is 
imposed on others" (Thain 1987: 70). Second, power is, therefore, shared by all the 
existing organisations. These principles, in particular, can shed new light on the 
unquestioned dominating role of the Mexican presidency. Third, resource distribution is, 
by definition, uneven, for there could not be two organisations or networks doing the 
same. Broadly speaking, resources are defined as "everything" organisations can use in 
successfully achieving their goals. More concretely, the literature distinguishes, among 
others, the following: constitutional-legal, hierarchical, financial, political and 
informational (Rhodes 1985: 2). Apart from the lack of clear definitions, some of the 
listed 'resources' are in practice difficult to quantify (e.g., political). This question is 
relevant because organisations usually do not use one kind of resource, but rather a 
complex mixture of them.
For recent reviews of the literature on policy networks and policy communities, see Akinson and 
Coleman (1992) and Kenis and Schneider (1991), and Marsh and Rhodes (1992).
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Either organisations or policy-networks may be considered as units of analysis. 
However, both approaches have disadvantages as noted by Rhodes himself: While the 
first sets arbitrary analytical limits, the second limits the links to be studied (1980: 295- 
96). It is hard to find a definitive solution to these problems, for what is internal and 
external stems not from reality, but from the researcher's standpoint (Simon et al. in 
Rourke 1986:17). And different perceptions of the real world will surely emerge whether 
an organisation, a policy-network, or a set of policy-networks is selected.
In broader terms, it has been argued that significant changes in the real world have 
led to the emergence of a "centreless or polycentred society" characterised by highly 
organised social life, increased functional differentiation and policy specialisation, 
decentralisation and state fragmentation, blurring of boundaries between the public and 
private realms, and internationalization of policy domains (Kenis and Schneider 1991: 
34-36). There are evident advantages in exploring these changes from a 'policy-network' 
perspective. This fact, however, should not obscure the theoretical limitations of the latter 
and those of the institutional perspective as a whole. First, by replacing individuals with 
institutions, this perspective may have reproduced the reductionism of the 
pluralistic/elitist models. Second, because of focusing on organisations and their 
interactions, the properties of the structural context and those of the environmental forces 
affecting those interactions are usually neglected.
According to Atkinson and Coleman (1992), transactional analysis should include 
the structural conditions in which interaction occurs. That is why they have proposed a 
typology of corporative, state-directed, collaborative and pluralistic policy networks 
based on the distribution of organisational and ideological resources. This approach 
widens considerably the policy role of organisations: More than being mere policy 
advocates, particularly those organisations holding technical knowledge and "those with 
appropriate organizational qualities, are capable of sharing in the exercise of political 
power" (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 162).
The analytical framework
While focusing on the SPP, the thesis explores empirically two main institutional 
relationships, namely, those between the presidency and the ministries, and those 
between ministries. In doing so, the proposed analytical framework underlines the 
importance of dealing with three central issues: (a) The way those entities stand in
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relation to one another {institutional linkages)', (b) the manner resources are distributed 
and functions specified between them {distributional features)', (c) the impact of 
environmental non-bureaucratic factors on the two first issues {contextual factors). The 
still tremendous discrepancies between the legal framework and the political practices in 
Mexico (Scott 1964: 262; Vernon 1963: 11) pose some initial problems in exploring 
these questions. It is especially clear when trying to determine the basic hierarchical 
linkages between public organisations apart from the presidency.
The view that in Mexico the presidency stands at the top of the political and 
bureaucratic hierarchies provides a preliminary way of looking at institutional linkages. 
More complex problems, however, immediately emerge when the second issue is 
introduced into the analysis. To deal Avith them, a continuum built upon the power- 
dependence theory is proposed. The extended belief that the Mexican president 
concentrates extensive powers and exerts monocratic control over the decision-making 
process provides an extreme hierarchical picture of the presidential-ministerial 
relationship in terms of distributional features. The implications of this hypothetical 
picture can be summarised as follows: (a) The more 'resources' the presidency 
accumulates, the fewer of them are available to the ministries; and (b) the broader the 
functions or tasks performed by the presidency, the smaller and narrower the ministerial 
scope for action. For analytical purposes, the opposite hypothetical picture marks the 
other end of the continuum.
Dunleavy and Rhodes' core executive typology, developed to review the literature 
on the role of British Prime Minister, is of help in distinguishing some intermediate 
points in the continuum. According to these authors, the notion of core executive is 
defined "functionally to include all those organizations and structures which primarily 
serve to pull together and integrate central and government policies, or act as final 
arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government 
machine" (1990: 4). Borrowing from their typology, we distinguish four hypothetical 
images: (a) Presidential government is seen as president exercising monocratic 
authority'^; (b) cabinet government emphasizes the importance of the cabinet as the focus
The presidential cliques image (which according to Dunleavy and Rhodes means that the 
president's authority is a collective attribute o f his group o f  advisers) is considered as a variation o f  
presidential government.
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of the decision- making process; (c) ministerial government underlines the strength of 
political and administrative 'departmentalism' as a counterbalancing force on president's 
influence; (d) fragmented authoritarianism^^ stresses the fact that the president, the 
cabinet, and the ministries operate in different policy areas.
The Mexican core executive used to include the presidency and two master 
'policy networks' (see figure 1.1 above). The economic policy network is defined to 
comprise the agencies seeking growth in the economy, while the policy network for  
political control is to include the agencies involved in preventing, solving or eradicating 
political conflict.** These networks are defined in terms of both institutional linkages and 
differentiated distributional features. The hierarchical linkage between the presidency 
and the networks is conceived to be vertical, while that between the heads of the latter 
horizontal. A wider array of specific smaller bureaucratic clusters falls within each of the 
master policy networks. To identify and characterise the specific organisations heading 
and making up the latter, the framework resorts to the concept of cabinet. As a result, 
ministries are classified as cabinet agencies, while other public organisations (e.g., 
decentralised bodies) as non-cabinet a g e n c ie s .Although legally Mexican ministries 
have the same rank, evidence suggests that it is not the case. These antagonistic views 
represent the ends of a continuum, useful in explaining the institutional linkages between 
ministries in terms of distributional features.
To analyse differences between cabinet agencies, we make use of two notions of 
Riggs' theory of prismatic society (1964). Accordingly, it is considered that 'functional 
diffusion' takes place when an agency performs many broad functions, and 'functional 
differentiation' when an agency performs a limited number of specialised functions. The 
proposed typology distinguishes three kinds of cabinet agencies: (i) guidance ministries 
are entitled to lay down rules or to establish criteria that affect the operation of the 
government as the whole (e.g., budget allocation, national security, comprehensive
We prefer to use this concept which comes from the fragmented authoritarianism model, rather 
than that o f segmented decision used by Dunleavy and Rhodes.
'* This grouping is much more amalgamated than that proposed by Bailey (in Grayson 1990). This 
author proposes five bureaucratic clusters in analysing the evolution o f Mexican bureaucracy, namely 
central guidance, control, economic development, social welfare and foreign relations.
In essence, this classification acknowledges the importance 'access to the president' has in the 
Mexican context as well as the reputed higher status o f ministries vis-à-vis other administrative 
organisations. Within the framework, 'access to the president' is regarded as a political resource available 
mainly to the ministries.
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planning); (ii) specialised ministries are those involved in the implementation of specific 
policies or programmes (e.g., public works, education); (iii) quasi-guidance ministries 
represent an intermediate category defined by its own title (e.g., industry and commerce). 
This classification is used in analysing not only networks composition, but also 
institutional linkages between individual organisations.^®
The same basic principles discussed above are used in exploring intra-ministerial 
relationships. For instance, the units of a single ministry can be seen as making up 
"cellular" bureaucratic clusters. Similarly, those principles are useful in exploring the 
relationship between executive structures/organisations and other institutional actors 
(e.g., the Congress, the ruling party) within a context of policy networks.
Regarding contextual factors, the framework distinguishes between broad 
environmental influences^' and the process of bureaucratic interest 
representation/articulation ('clientela' relationships). In dealing with the latter process, it 
is assumed that bureaucracy and societal interest groups are able not only to coexist but 
6Ven to cooperate quite effectively (Peters 1977: 192). What should be determined is the 
particular way of accommodation and the factors influencing it. The possible types of 
interaction the framework underlines are societal groups' leverage/penetration, 
partial/total influence (the extent of their leverage/penetration on the bureaucratic 
apparatus), and the system's closeness/openess (the degree of bureaucratic resistance to 
leverage/penetration). In this context, bureaucratic constituencies are social groups or 
institutions, either domestic or foreign, "with which agencies have close and mutually 
rewarding relationships" (Rourke in Rourke 1986:4). The fi*amework considers 'clientela' 
relationships not only as a bureaucratic resource, but also as an external influence
Considering the scope of this work, it should be stressed that only the institutional 
linkages, the distributional features, and the contextual factors having a relevant 
connection with the SPP will be extensively discussed. On the whole, their selection
At this point, it is worth noting that the framework considers the notions o f  policy network' and 
'bureaucratic cluster' as synonymous concepts.
These influences include 'sporadic influences' (e.g., changes in the oil prices, the Chiapas 
uprising), and 'structural environmental factors'. The latter allude to the structural features o f the domestic 
economic, political and social setting as well as foreign permanent influences.
“  In characterising what we call contextual factors the framework borrows from Aldrich (1979) 
on general environments; LaPalombara (1965) on clientela/parentela relationships; and Downs (1967), 
Peters (1989), Riggs (1964), and Tullock (1965) on the politics o f interest group influence on bureaucracy.
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relies entirely on the insights provided by the in-depth analysis of that agency as if it were 
a closed system in combination with a general knowledge of the existing environments. 
The description of the 'meaningful' events and phenomena identified in this way will 
serve to build inferences and, in turn, to construct a general explanation of the role of the 
SPP. At the first research level, this detective world^ required a broad and flexible 
analytical framework not only to consider as many dimensions or ways of looking at the 
SPP, but also to include emerging relevant data (and to exclude facts that turn out to be 
unrelated to the case under study). At the second research level, a framework with those 
characteristics was also necessary to analyse the data presented and to relate and organise 
the resulting inferences.
Obviously, by leaving aside many phenomena and processes, the comprehensive 
study o f a single agency reduces the potential for generalisation. However, this limitation 
is believed to be compensated by bringing to the fore normally unobserved data and by 
using a virtually novel approach to some aspects of Mexican politics. A final remark is 
flêCêssary. The use of an institutional perspective does not mean that individuals or 
groups are irrelevant. Rather, it attempts to emphasize that their action, coalitions, 
conflicts, grouping, and so on take place not in a vacuum, but in a given organisational 
context.
The argument rephrased
The thesis argues that until the early 1970s, though the national policy-making 
process remained highly fragmented and disjointed (Shafer 1966), the Mexican central 
bureaucracy was organised around two distinctive, identifiable policy-networks. 
Structurally based, this arrangement, we call 'presidential government', implied the 
existence of a particular set of institutional linkages, distributional features, and interest 
representation mechanisms, and fulfilled at least four basic purposes. First, it allowed the 
presidency to concentrate and exercise extensive political and policy powers. Second, it 
facilitated presidential control and surveillance over bureaucracy, and beyond. Third, it 
allowed the president to judge and settle intra- and extra-bureaucratic disputes over 
policy. Four, it confirmed the president's role as the supreme interest-articulating factor.
This analogy has been used by several scholars to refer a research technique in which the 
'detective' must constantly make decisions regarding the relevance o f various data when building a 'crime' 
explanation (Yin 1981: 61).
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It is contended that the 1976 administrative reform contributed to modify the 
'presidential government' arrangement, though in a way not immediately apparent. 
Institutionally, two key 'innovations' are thought to be at the core of this crucial change, 
namely the introduction of a collective mechanism to discuss specially economic policy 
issues and the inception of the SPP. First, the holding of regular cabinet meetings 
weakened the decision-making and arbitration roles of the presidency, while it enhanced 
the role of the ministers, and their ministries, in shaping policy. Second, the 
overwhelming concentration of powers in that agency not only dramatically altered the 
existing institutional linkages and distributional features, but also had unexpected side- 
effects. Conceived as a presidential instrument for political control over an influential 
bureaucracy, this agency soon became a powerful and partially autonomous bureaucratic 
agent vis-à-vis the presidency itself.
The thesis hypothesizes that the dual policy-network system began to be replaced 
by an unstable, loose single policy-network system, whose leadership was disputed by 
two agencies, the SHOP and the SPP. In this respect, the thesis attempts to prove that, at 
least between 1982 and 1988, the latter agency not only encroached on the traditional 
domains of the SHCP, but also on those of Gobernacion and the ruling party. It is argued 
that the absorption of some 'resources' traditionally in the realm of the policy network for  
political control lead to the gradual dismantling of this network work rather than to its 
institutional replacement. This fact was particularly evident after the demise of the SPP 
in 1992.
These outcomes contrast with the explicit objectives of the 1976 administrative 
reform in the sense that they sought to affect exclusively the economic policy-making 
process by reorganising the economic policy network. Regarding this question, it is 
argued not only that the developments under discussion reduced presidential room for 
manoeuvre in economic policy matters, but also they encouraged public policy to be 
bureaucratically rather than presidentially shaped. In other words, it is suggested that 
they accelerated an ongoing process of the bureaucratisation of politics. '^* In this context, 
we understand by bureaucratisation an increased blurring of the political and bureaucratic
This idea was first suggested by Schaffer (1980). It is worth noting that the liturature normaly 
prefers the concept of'politization o f  bureaucracy' (e.g., Riggs 1970). Although they may be taken as 
synonymous, relevant differences in terms o f dépolitisation o f the issues in the hands o f bureaucracy and 
goal displacement can be drawn from each o f them.
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realms as well as a heightening of the influence of bureaucracy in the policy-making 
process.
Another hypothesis the thesis sets out to test is that change in the distributional 
features and/or the contextual factors are the most important causes of variations in the 
instntutional linkages. The 1976 administrative reform clearly showed the president's 
ability to manipulate distributional features, thus altering institutional linkages. What 
needs to be seen is the role of endogenous variables {contextual factors) in that process. 
The thesis argues that, apart from presidential action, changes in the economic structure 
may have the same effect. The development of a vigorous domestic private sector since 
the 1940s not only enhanced its ability to influence public policy, but also favoured the 
consolidation ofparentela and clientela relationships (as defined by LaPalombara 1965: 
306'307, 252), between central government and this sector. Within the dual policy- 
network system, the interests of the private sector were mostly represented by some 
agemcies within the economic policy network through patron-client relationships.
Bureaucratic interests inside this network (resulting from state intervention) as 
well as the relative 'closeness' of the policy network for political control (derived from 
role (Considerations) limited the leverage/penetration points available to the private sector. 
The establishing of cabinet meetings made apparent these counterbalancing forces and 
favo ured their confrontation. Because of distributional features, the SPP emerged not 
only as a relevant actor in these meetings, but also as the most important guidance 
ministry. Whether intended or not, this agency was eventually 'captured' by the 
bureaucratic forces it was supposed to control. In addition, it is thought that a complex 
combination of broad environmental influences greatly decided the overall role of the 
agency.
Although the death of the SPP reaffirmed again the ability of the president to 
manipulate the public sector, it is believed that this measure failed in its purpose of 
reestablishing 'presidential government' along the old lines, thus suggesting the 
irreversible nature of the process. As things stand today, the emerging system can be 
better described as one of 'fragmented government'. Institutionally, it is composed of a 
tiny, highly integrated, hermetic 'policy community' in charge of most of the decision 
making and a plurality of less integrated and disjointed instrumental bureaucratic entities.
43
Recent events seem to have shown the fragility and transitional nature of this 
arrangement.
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE
The thesis is divided into seven chapters, of which, this introductory one is the 
first. Chapter Two provides a brief historical overview of the evolution of the central 
bureaucracy in the period 1940-1970. Special attention is paid here to both the main 
traits o f the political system, including the key ’rules' governing its operation, and the 
inward-orientated developmental strategy followed since 1940. The central argument is 
that the dramatic impact of that strategy on government's structure and operation had 
significant institutional and political implications. Regarding administrative reform, the 
chapter argues that in Mexico this policy does not have a cosmetic nature, though 
incremental change rather than innovation characterises the period under study. It justifies 
devoting one fiill chapter to trace the historic antecedents leading to the creation of the 
SPP in 1976.
Because of the importance that presidential cycles have in the Mexican setting, 
it has been argued that they represent useful analytical categories in their own right 
(Schmidt 1991). Acknowledging this fact, chapters three to six are essentially organised 
around these cycles. The title of each of them suggests the link between specific political 
and/or economic contextual factors and the key stages in the SPP life cycle, namely, its 
emergence, rising years, powerful years, and declining years. A lengthy, empirically- 
based analysis of each of those stages attempts to demonstrate the suggested link.
Chapter three contextualizes the birth of the SPP by focussing on the historical 
continuities towards statism which reached their peak in the 1970s. We argued that as a 
reaction to the shortcomings of the 'stabilizing development' strategy, president 
Echevema (1970-1976) attempted to return to the deficit financing policies of the post­
revolutionary governments until 1958. At micro-level, the argument developed 
throughout this chapter is that the 1958 administrative reform, Echeverria's spending 
spree, and Lopez Portillo's creation of the SPP are three linked stages of a continuing 
process towards statism. It is argued that strong bureaucratic interests, which were 
consolidated by decades of state-led industrialisation, played a relevant role in directing 
this process.
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Chapter Four discusses the impact that becoming an important oil exporter during 
the international oil crisis had on the federal bureaucratic apparatus. The analysis argues 
that this particular context, together with presidential support and resource concentration, 
worked in favour of the SPP. For it eased this ministry's rapid consolidation as a major 
liaison between the presidency and the central and local bureaucracies. From a political 
perspective, it is contended that the 1981 unexpected drop of oil prices and bureaucratic 
coalition behaviour (greatly encouraged by cabinet meetings) not only ended the head of 
the oil industry's presidential ambitions, but also paved the way for the head of the SPP 
getting the presidential nomination.
Chapter Five examines the polices proposed by SPP-president de la Madrid to 
tackle the economic crisis triggered by the short-lived oil boom. The chapter makes the 
point that the way government handled the debt problem put the central government 
expenditure on a disastrous course. In addition, it argues that policy incoherence and 
economic mismanagement stemming from the separation between planning and finance 
aggravated the effects of the crisis. Presidential ambitions, apparent since at least 1984, 
surrounded the eventual adoption of radical pro-market policies. In this context, resource 
concentration played a crucial role in the SPP's high capacity to successfully adapt to 
changing environments. Finally, the chapter argues that, as six years before, international 
factors and domestic coalition politics greatly decided the succession process.
Chapter Six explores the broad context surrounding the SPP declining years, 
which led to its eventual end in early 1992. Here, the central argument is that the way 
SPP-president Salinas carried out his economic and social policies rather than the policies 
themselves is at the heart of the SPP decline. In other words, a strategy of further 
centralisation of political power in the office of the presidency had the effect of this 
agency losing control over its strategic institutional resources. From a broader 
perspective, this political strategy enabled president Salinas not only to impose his 
economic programme in a record time, but to prepare well in advance his own succession. 
This time, the SPP would emerge as the major institutional casualty of both presidential 
actions.
The final chapter concludes the thesis by summarising and integrating the major 
themes and the partial conclusions developed in the previous chapters. Besides focusing 
on the broad implications of fifteen years of the SPP, it discusses their relevance in
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explaining some key economic and political developments taking place immediately after 
the death of that agency. The chapter ends by briefly addressing a key issue in the future 
of the country, namely, the relationship between technocracy and democracy.
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The Mexican bureaucracy: A historical 
frame of reference
The Mexican political system is essentially a product of the 1917-1940 period 
(Enriquez in Philip 1988: 9). Two are the key features of this system: the presidency and 
the ruling PRI (Cosfo Villegas 1975b). Despite this fact, the paramount role played by the 
former institution has been the most important agreed point on Mexican politics. Early, 
Karl Loewenstein (1949) regarded Mexico as having a system ofpresidencialismo puro. 
This term attempted to characterise "a political system in which the president is extremely 
powerful, perhaps far more powerful than all other political institutions combined" 
(Cothran in Schmidt 1991 : xxv). Here agreements end, and major differences start. Since 
the late 1950s, several contrasting interpretations of the Mexican political process began 
to be proposed as underlined by the Needlemans (1969). Most of them depict bureaucracy 
as a presidential instrument.
The extensive powers of the Mexican president, with the virtual lack of a system 
of check and balances, led easily to the image of an all-powerful, quasi-omnipotent 
presidency. Even more, it was often thought that in Mexico the president was virtually 
the government (Tannenbaum 1951: 84; Tucker 1957: 1957). Gradually, optimistic 
pictures provided by a pluralistic approach to Mexican politics’ were replaced by those 
stressing the dark side ofpresidentialism. Considering the regime as authoritarian became 
fashionable. The overwhelming attention given to the presidency by these approaches 
alike had the effect of either neglecting or obscuring the role play by bureaucracy within
‘ See especially Tannenbaum (1933 and 1951). Efforts at finding 'orthodox' democratic traits can 
also be found in the works o f Cline (1953), Scott (1964) and Padgett (1966). Vernon would even note 
"great diffusion o f political power" in the Mexican society (1963: 13-14).
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the political system. In other words, it was often ignored that a powerful presidency is 
"only one component" of the state apparatus (Cothran in Schmidt 1991: xxv).
In any discussion of Mexican political institutions it is imperative to keep the 
ecomomic context in mind (Bailey in Grayson 1990: 15). Historically, the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1917) marked an important stage in the country's economic path. As 
a reaction to dictator Porfirio Diaz's development strategy, an ambitious socioeconomic 
programme was incorporated into the 1917 Constitution. Formally, liberalism and social 
welfare emerged as potentially conflicting projects (Bailey 1988: 90). At first, the social 
aspirations of the Revolution dominated the political agenda. However, they gradually 
faded out as economic growth along capitalistic lines became government's top priority. 
Like many other Latin American countries, Mexico was launched in the late 1930s into 
a process of industrialisation. Because of its state-led nature, this strategy had a dramatic 
impact on government's structure and operation.
This chapter analyses the role of the Mexican federal bureaucracy in the period 
1940-1970. Its main purpose is to provide a basic frame for future reference and 
comparison, while identifying some links between politics and economics. Section one 
explores the key political institutions as well as the rules and practices associated with 
them. After summarising the economic strategy, the following section analyses its impact 
on the public sector. Section three explores the federal bureaucracy's growing 
participation in the national policy-making process. The final section discusses the rise 
of the government technocrat. The argument is that industrialisation not only fostered 
government growth, but also strengthened the agencies in charge of its implementation. 
We will argue that these developments had important institutional and political 
implications.
2.1 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND RULES
In the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917), the most powerful 
sectors of the winning army fought each other for the control of the country. This in­
fighting not only surrounded the emergence of the Mexican political system, but greatly 
shaped its eventual features. Formally, the main sources of the political institutions and 
'written' rules making up this system are the 1917 Constitution and the creation of the 
National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929. However, a parallel set of'unwritten'
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practices rules would also develop/ Apart from cultural and historical continuities, 
contextual factors account for this development.
The powerful presidency
There is no doubt that the 1917 Constitution favoured the emergence of a 
powerful presidency.^ However, the particular circumstances surrounding this process 
also determined this institution's eventual broad and characteristic scope for action. 
Violent factional in-fighting characterised the years following the triumph of the 
Revolution. After the assassination of president Carranza in 1920, general Alvaro 
Obregon assumed the political control of the country. Yet, the main obstacle to a strong 
central leadership continued to be the existence of a plurality of active military factions. 
Between the 1920s and 1930s, the issue of their demilitarisation was at the top of the 
presidential agenda. Since the achievement of this goal meant strengthening the political 
role of the armed forces 'loyal' to the president, the dépolitisation of the Mexican military 
as a whole became also a target to ward off the permanent threat of insurrection."*
In particular, president Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940), himself a military man, 
substantially contributed to the displacement of the last caudillos (revolutionary army 
leaders) from the national political arena, and the subordination of the military to the 
presidency. These goals were achieved through centralising political power in the 
presidency in combination with a rough system of rewards and punishments in which 
control of the budget played a relevant role.
Mexico's budgetary system was a product of its emerging political system (Scott 
1955: 19). The strategic importance of presidential control over the national budget 
cannot be overemphasized. This control allowed presidents since Obregon to 
substantially decrease military expenditure.^ Besides, it would allow them to greatly
 ^On the evolution o f this system o f rules and institutions see Serrano (in Serrano and Bulmer- 
Thomas 1996) and Whitehead (in Harvey and Serrano 1994). For an extensive discussion o f the extra-legal 
powers o f the presidency see Carpizo (1979) and Philip (1992).
 ^Although there are many theories about the sources o f presidential supremacy, most o f  them are 
variations o f Scott's view that this supremacy stems from the deep-rooted tradition o f a strong executive, 
broad constitutional powers, and control o f the official party (1964: 256).
On the post-revolutionary role o f the Mexican military, see Camp (1992), Lieuwen (1968), 
Lozoya (1984), Ronfeldt (1984), and Williams (in Camp 1986: 143-158).
 ^During the Obregôn years, the projected military expenditure fell from more than 60 percent to 
less than 40 percent o f the total budget, while the figure decreased to around 23 percent during the Cârdenas 
years (Wilkie 1967: 100-106).
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influence the direction of broader public expenditure and investment. A significant excess 
between actual federal expenditures and projected expenditures during the Cardenas's 
years marked the beginning of a pattern observed till the early 1970s (see Wilkie 1967; 
Cothran and Cothran 1986). Moreover, the excess was spent in secrecy. This practice, 
called budgetary secrecy, was used to increase the power of the presidency, to satisfy the 
demands of competing groups in the revolutionary coalition, and to pursue goals either 
semi-secret (e.g., military weakening) or at variance with government's 'revolutionary' 
image (Cothran and Cothran 1988: 323-327).
A real danger of reproducing the Porfirian dictatorship characterised the period 
1928-1936 as proved by Obregon's reelection and Calles's Maximato^ The way Cardenas 
solved his ovm succession, including his retirement in 1940, is at the heart of the non- 
reelection principle becoming fact (Calvert 1969: 113). In a context of presidential 
supremacy and one-party system, the application of this principle had significant 
implications. First, presidential politics was strictly delimited by the six-year term 
(sexenio). Second, as the power of each president grew and declined, a distinctive pattern 
of political events began to develop within this temporal framework. Third, it 
underpinned the development of an even more intricate sexennial policy cycle (see Story 
1985). Finally, by pacing the political process as a whole, the sexenio provided 
predictability to political action.
Since the 1940s, the presidential transition emerged as the most important event 
of sexennial political 'calendar'. In this regard, two unwritten rules emerged. First, the 
political system granted the incumbent president the 'right' to choose his successor. This 
distinctive succession mechanism (see Cosio Villegas 1975a) became not only an 
additional source of presidential power, but the very cornerstone of Mexican 
presidentialism. Second, since 1929 all presidents, with just one exception^, have 
occupied that office after being ministers. Because of the president's virtually unrestricted 
appointing power, this practice allowed him to limit presidential ambitions to a 
manageable arena by placing hopefuls in the cabinet (Padgett 1966: 139). Presidential
 ^After the murder o f president-elect Obregôn, outgoing president Calles was able to dominate 
Mexican politics from 1929 to 1936. On this period, known as the Maximato, see Mayer (1978), while a 
good summary can be found in El Financiero (Informe Especial 153,24/4/93).
 ^The only exception is Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930-32) who was ambassador in Brazil. Interesting 
enough is the fact that even in this case he was about to become head o f Gobernacion immediately before 
the presidential nomination, which did not happen for reasons which are still unclear (Mayer 1978: 55-56).
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capacity to influence the destiny of individual actors is at the heart of discipline becoming 
"a distinctive feature of the Mexican political class" (Serrano in Serrano and Bulmer- 
Thomas 1996: 6).
The ever-ruling party
The creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929 was crucial 
to the stabilisation of the emerging regime. It is significant that the proposal to form this 
party had come not from president Portes Gil, but from ex-president Plutarco Elias Calles 
(1924-1928). This fact suggests the institutional weakness of the presidency at the time. 
The birth of the PNR is associated with Calles's wish to continue dominating the political 
scene (Story 1986: 20). By creating his own political machinery, Calles could also 
override the influential Mexican Labour Party.* His experience as head of Gobernacion, 
the interior ministry, during the Obregôn years was a fundamental factor in the way the 
PNR was conceived. This job had placed him in direct contact with the main problem of 
the first post-revolutionary governments, namely, the permanent threat of armed 
insurrection.^ In addition, Gobernacion's emerging institutional 'resources' allowed him 
not only to eliminate foes, but also to build crucial political alliances. This situation 
helped his bringing together most of the revolutionary organisations -both military and 
civilian- in March 1929.'°
At first, the PNR gave room to two potentially conflicting forces. On the one 
hand, this party's heterogeneous membership encouraged its autonomy and democratic 
functioning. On the other hand, its delimiting the dominant political arena favoured 
central control. The 1932 reorganisation of the PNR brought to a halt the further 
development of the first possibility. By centralising decision-making within the party, this 
reform weakened the power of the local actors in selecting candidates (Story 1986: 21), 
while easing Calles's absolute control over the PNR. As a result, the latter began to serve 
two purposes. First, it allowed its creator to dominate the machinery of government, 
including the presidency itself, firom 'outside'. The appointment of ex-president Portes Gil
* After 'unveiling' Calles as presidential candidate in 1924, the Mexican Labour Party became the 
dominant political party. The presidential aspirations o f its leader, minister Luis N. Morones, explains this 
party's opposition to Obregôn's reelection. See Rojas (1975), Mayer (1978), and Story (1986: Chapter 2),
’ During this period, Calles faced the insurrections o f both Francisco R. Serrano and Amulfo R. 
Gômez following their opposition to Obregôn's reelection.
Not surprisingly, Morones' labour support organisations were deliberately excluded from that 
event symbolically held in the city o f Querétaro where the 1917 Constitution had been promulgated.
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as head of the PNR in 1930 illustrates our point. Second, it made possible the co-optation 
of many potentially dangerous military leaders by offering them attractive posts in 
government in exchange for their demilitarisation and subordination to the Jefe Maximo.
President Cardenas forcing Calles to leave the country in 1936 left the PNR 
leaderless. There were two alternatives: either dismantling this party, or taking advantage 
of its growing institutionalisation. Wisely, Cardenas opted for the second. After purging 
Calles's supporters from government, he took control of the party by appointing his 
private secretary Luis I. Rodriguez as its head. These historic decisions would bring the 
PNR under the aegis of the presidency. At this point, the party became not only an 
inseparable part of the government machinery, but an additional source of presidential 
power. Following a substantial reorganisation along corporatist lines, the PNR was 
renamed Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938, and its members organised 
around four functional sectors: military, agrarian, labour, and new 'popular' (mostly 
composed of federal bureaucrats).
The first casualty of the president's power to influence the selection of party 
candidates was the military sector. At first, uniformed men were granted many 
governorships and congressional posts (rather than more attractive cabinet positions), and 
later their number was considerably reduced.*' Apart from providing a clear indication 
of the steady decline of the military's political role (Williams in Camp 1986: 144), the 
arrival of civilian Miguel Aleman to power in 1946 showed that the party's nonmilitary 
organisations had broadened considerably the regime's support bases. It might have 
allowed candidate Aleman to promote a substantial reorganisation of the PRM. As a 
result, it adopted its present name: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
Ever since, the symbiosis between this party and government has become 
increasingly apparent. Instrumental in character, the functioning of the PRI further 
reflected the subtleties of the sexennial cycle. For instance, an 'unwritten' rule was that 
the party's head during the presidential campaign, who was appointed by the outgoing 
president, occupied a cabinet position in the incoming administration. Similarly, most of 
the state elections were gradually fixed to take place during the third and fourth years of
" Camp (1980b), for instance, found out that between 1935 and 1946 only 12 percent o f the 
cabinet posts were held by military officers, while this percentage dropped to nil in the period 1946-1952. 
He also documented that the percentage o f military governors decreased from 48 in 1935-40 to 13 in 1947- 
52.
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the sexenio, that is, when presidential power reaches its peak (see Bailey 1988: 92). 
Because of their impact on the next administration, rules of this kind assured a smooth 
handover of power by regulating and pacing the exercise of presidential power.
Time consolidated the ruling party's core functions: recruitment of political elites, 
control of mass organisations, allocation of material rewards to its members ('distributive 
populism'), and electoral legitimation (Serrano in Serrano and Bulmer-Thomas 1996: 9). 
These roles not only encouraged political actors to participate within the party, but also 
inhibited the development of other political parties (Knight in Harvey 1993: 37). As the 
party in power reinforced its hegemony, the Mexican regime perpetuated its character as 
a one-party system}^ The PRI scope of influence, however, was far from being absolute, 
for two key societal actors were excluded from its structure: the Catholic church and the 
business community.
An instrumental bureaucracy?
Since the Cardenas years, the presidency has played a dominant role in the 
national political arena. This fact gave early scholars the impression that both the federal 
legislature and judiciary and the local government were subordinated to the presidency.'^ 
Moreover, according to ex-president and ex-party leader Portes Gil, the PRI was also "a 
subordinate of the Chief Executive" (quoted by James and Edna Wilkie 1976: 583). The 
federal bureaucracy was not the exception. By looking at the constitutional framework, 
some observers made clear the various mechanisms available to assure its compliance 
(e.g.. Tucker 1957; Carpizo 1979). In Scott's view, the president had "a wide choice of 
pressure tactics to assure a reasonably docile and cooperative administration" through the 
existence of "vertical lines of control working at every level and upon every unit of 
government" (Scott 1964: 259).
Besides, it was often argued that the president could integrate a submissive 
cabinet by exercising his unlimited discretionary power to appoint and remove ministers. 
Beyond this normative framework, the relevant role that camarilllas has traditionally 
played in staffing Mexican government provided an additional explanation of a docile 
bureaucracy. The fact that the 'president's men', the most powerful camarilla during the
For a comparative discussion o f the dynamics o f one-party systems, including the Mexican, see 
Huntington (in Huntington and Moore 1970).
Vernon (1963: 11); Brandenburg (1964: 141); Scott (1964: 261-278).
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six-year period, were given the key public ministries assured a high degree of loyalty and 
discipline to their leader.
A strong presidency has traditionally shaped scholars' views about the federal 
bureaucracy. The former institution was early perceived as all-powerful on three 
accounts, namely power concentration, policy-making, and interest articulation. First, it 
was contended that the real concentration of authority in Mexico was in the office of the 
president.Moreover, there was a tendency to perceive this authority as ever increasing 
(Padgett 1966: 161). Second, the president was considered the ultimate source of policy 
decisions (Scott 1964: 272; Brandenburg 1964: 5). In addition, it was often believed that 
his key decisions could not be questioned, let alone reversed. Finally, there was 
agreement in that the presidency was the single most important, and "authoritative, 
aggregating agency in the Mexican political system" (Padgett 1966: 155), and the 
ultimate arbiter if a dispute arose within government (Vernon 1963: 11-13).
As the president was the most influential institutional actor, the bureaucratic 
apparatus was thought to play a fairly limited role on policy matters. In this context, the 
main task of high-rank officials was that of "assisting the president in the performance 
of his duties" (Scott 1964: 281, the stress is ours). Even recognising that policy might be 
originated "anywhere on the bureaucratic ladder", according to this view there was no 
chance of "significant policy change" without presidential consent (Brandenburg 1964: 
5).
However, while admitting the extensive powers of the presidency, the same 
scholars quoted above provided some scattered evidence of a less instrumental federal 
bureaucracy. According to Brandenburg, the best exponent of the omnipotent-president 
model, some "outstanding cabinet members" did participate in setting "the over-all 
economic and political orientation of the nation" within the small "inner council" of the 
ruling elite (1964: 3-5). Other scholars thought that precisely because of concentrating 
such a power, the president has no choice but to delegate some of his authority. As 
Tucker put it, there were so many things to do that simply "the President does not have 
time to supervise effectively the work of all the ministries" (1957: 140).
Tucker (1957: 102); Vernon (1963: 11); Scott (1964: 256 and 259).
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In the same vein, Scott wrote that the president was no longer in face-to-face 
contact with all the major power factors, so that he "must rely more and more upon the 
machinery that has evolved in the presidency" (1964: 279). The extent of presidential 
delegation of authority to bureaucracy was, however, a source of contradictory 
statements.*^ In any event, scholars seemed to agree in one central point: The president 
tended to rely heavily upon, at least, some key ministries in carrying out his duties. There 
was also little doubt that, in general, the administrative bureaucracies intervened in the 
solution of a "multitude of problems" on day-to-day basis (Scott 1964: 279).
What explains these contradictory views of bureaucracy? The most plausible 
explanation relates to both the gradual consolidation of the Mexican political system and 
the dramatic economic transformations the country was going through. Most scholars, 
however, were more concerned about how the political system worked than about how 
it was evolving. Two major features characterise Mexico's transition since the 1940s. 
First, a gradual process of power centralisation in the office of the presidency took place. 
Second, a strategy of state-led industrialisation led to an impressive growth of federal 
public expenditure. Both developments had a relevant impact on both the political 
process and the institutional actors involved in it. Despite his "extraordinary efforts" to 
keep his growing power intact, the president became increasingly incapable of 
maintaining direct control over the bureaucratic apparatus (Tucker 1957: 140-146).
The paradox was that, in order to exercise control, the chief executive had to 
delegate authority. Padgett provided one of the best interpretations of these developments. 
According to him, it was possible
". . .  to view the growth o f governmental activity as distributive insofar as the President 
vis-a-vis other government officers is concerned. In this sense, then, the Mexican 
President experiences a relative decline in power to act which presents the grand paradox 
o f the presidential role in modem Mexico (1966: 161)."
In other words, the more prerogatives the presidency accumulated because of both 
centralisation and government expansion, the higher its dependency upon the federal 
bureaucracy. Observations of this kind led to the extreme idea that the picture of an all- 
powerful presidency was in fact a mirage (Needlemans 1969: 1025). Two are, in our
For instance. Tucker could not avoid writing down that "there is much dispersion o f functions 
among agencies, but authority and power are highly centralized through the prevailing presidential- 
ministerial relationship" (1957: 141). Similarly, in Scott's view, the president could always withdraw the 
power he has granted, for delegation was done through "the extra-legal mechanism o f the presidency more 
than the formal process o f law" (1964: 261).
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view, the major contributions of Padgett’s work. First, he made clear that, apart from the 
president, there were other institutional actors who had a relevant involvement in the 
policy making process.'^ Second, by marking a clear dividing line between the presidency 
and the federal bureaucracy, he challenged the view that in Mexico the president was "the 
government" (Tannenbaum 1951: 84; Tucker 1957: 109-110). In order to tackle the 
question of the role of the federal bureaucracy, we need to explore the impact of 
government's economic strategy on the federal public sector.
2.2 PUBLIC SECTOR GROWTH AND BUREAUCRACY
Government's clear shift to a model of rapid state-led industrialisation in the early 
1940s can hardly be understood without considering two key international events, 
namely, the Great Depression and World War II. For both of them had the effect of 
reinforcing the view of a strong state stemming from the Mexican Revolution. Higher 
state intervention in the economy, together with an increasing emphasis on industry, 
explains not only public sector growth, but also the particular way this growth took place. 
In combination, these environmental factors are responsible for shaping the features and 
role of the Mexican central bureaucracy up to the mid-1980s. Part of this institution 
becoming a major economic agent would have, in turn, a significant impact on the 
operation of the political system as a whole.
The ISI strategy^^ and public investment
The 1917 federal constitution incorporated the ideal of a strong interventionist 
state (Hamilton 1982: 3). Accordingly, it granted the state extensive powers for economic 
and social reform. Between 1917 and the early 1930s, however, government action was 
essentially focused on institutional and economic reconstruction rather than on carrying 
out social change. By paving the way for the Keynesian theory, the Great Depression 
further encouraged a more active role of the state in the economy. While carrying out a 
radical social programme, president Cardenas (1934-40) made extensive use of the
In his view, for example, "ministers directly concerned with a policy proposal, some o f the top 
interest group leaders, and interested member o f the coalition’s inner circle sit down with the President to 
work out the final policy statement" (1966:157).
” For extensive accounts o f this strategy see, inter alia, Ortiz Mena (1970), NAFINSA (1971), 
Carmona et al. (1990), Reynols (1978), Solis (1981), Levy and Skely (1987: Chapter 5), Enriquez (in Philip 
1988), and Teichman (1988: Chapter 2).
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increasing strength of the Mexican presidency to achieve this goal. Domestically, a shift 
towards industrialisation was favoured by the economic shortcomings of the ejido and 
the improved support mobilisation by the PRM (Shafer 1966: 48). Cardenas's emphasis 
on investment in irrigation, communications, and other public works laid the foundations 
of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), the development strategy adopted by the 
government since 1940.
To materialise higher state participation in the economy, the Bank of Mexico 
(founded in 1925) was transformed into a modem central bank in 1932, while Nacional 
Financier a (NAFINSA) was created two years later to provide funds for industrial 
development. During Cardenas administration, the railroads and the oil industry were 
nationalised, and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) started operating. By cutting 
imports and favouring exports. World War II was a decisive driving force in Mexico and 
many other developing countries embarking on a path toward industrialisation. More 
significant, this event enhanced the import-substitution character of the process.
It is agreed that in Mexico the period 1940-1970 represents a cmcial stage in the 
country's industrial evolution. Because of the 1954 devaluation and its effects on the 
strategy, this period is generally divided into two well-defined phases (Enriquez in Philip 
1988: 11; Solis, 1991: 169). Both of them, however, share two elements: a growing 
emphasis on public investment in industry and a fiscal policy favouring private capital 
accumulation. As a result, by 1950 industry accounted for 21.5 percent of total output, 
rising to 29.4 percent in 1970 (Lustig 1992: 14). Leaving social and political 
considerations aside, the major casualty of these policies was agriculture and other 
primary activities.
At the beginning of the Avila Camacho administration (1940-1946), the finance 
minister Eduardo Suarez announced that Mexico would manufacture "a good portion of 
the articles which she now imports, in order to reduce . . .  her outlays abroad" (quoted by 
Gil 1992: 27). The favourable conditions generated by the war were seen within and 
without government as a great opportunity for the country to become a modem industrial 
society. In 1942, Altos Hornos de México was created to produce "all the steel" required. 
In this way, Mexican government began its first serious investments in manufacturing 
enterprises. Heavy public investment in basic infrastmcture, with a set of miscellaneous 
fiscal and financial incentives, was gradually set in motion to promote private investment.
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Obviously, industrialisation needed not only abundant resources, but time to yield 
results. Continued investment in irrigation and agriculture since the 1930s explains why 
the latter was the most dynamic sector between 1940 and 1955 (Solis 1991: 169). Due 
to the external demand for agricultural products and manufactures, Mexico's exports 
doubled between 1939 and 1945 (Vernon 1963: 95). This situation helped financing 
industrialisation by increasing the country's import capacity. Driven mostly by the 
agricultural sector, the real GDP grew at annual rates of 6.2 per cent from 1941 to 1951. 
However, since industrialisation was partly achieved through deficit financing, the result 
was severely inflationary (Reynolds 1978: 1006). Pressures on the exchange rate led to 
three devaluations of the currency during the Aleman's years. More worrying, in 1952 and 
1953 economic growth sharply declined.
To tackle this problem, incoming president Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) gradually 
reduced general public investment, while increasing the proportion of that devoted to 
industry (mostly at the expense of agriculture). Investment in state-owned industrial 
enterprises meant more cheap goods and services to stimulate the private sector. Low 
taxation and abundant subsidies, together with deficit financing, caused the devaluation 
of the peso in April 1954.
This devaluation had disastrous economic and political effects (Vernon 1963: 
110; Enriquez in Philip 1988: 12). At the time, a substantial and disruptive outflow of 
short-term funds was regarded as one of its most visible causes and effects (Sedwitz 
1956: 33). The severity of this capital flight forced government to adjust again not only 
its economic strategy, but the way of financing it. On the one hand, though public 
investment was reduced even further, the single-minded emphasis on industrial growth 
became even more marked after 1954. On the other hand, government began relying 
heavily on foreign borrowing to finance public deficit. This is explained by the fact that 
neither price increases in the goods and services provided by the state, nor a tax reform 
was intended. For instance, the net ordinary revenues of both the federal and local 
governments rose from 9.9 percent of the GDP in 1950 to only 10.2 percent in 1960 
(Alejo in Wionczek gr a/. 1971: 131).
Since economic growth steadily declined from 1954 to 1959, government was 
forced again to rectify its economic policy. At the beginning of the Lopez Mateos 
administration (1958-1964), some important policy changes were carried out. First,
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government geared its monetary policy toward price and exchange rate stability. It was 
thought, at least within some bureaucratic circles, that ecolnomic stability (or the lack of 
inflationary pressures), was sine qua non for restoring economic growth. Second, the 
inward-orientated production of intermediate and capital goods was greatly encouraged. 
Third, regarding the public sector, economic policy was based on the idea that deficit 
financing of public expenditure was if not the ultimate cause for inflation, at least the 
main one. This set of policies characterising the second stage of the ISI strategy would 
be christened by the finance minister Antonio Ortiz Mena (1969) as 'stabilising 
development' {desarrollo estabilizador).
At the core of this strategy was the aim of using domestic savings not only for 
financing the public sector, but also for fostering private investment (Enriquez in Philip 
1988: 18-19). This goal, however, was only partly achieved between 1958 and 1970, for 
government had to resort to heavy foreign indebtedness to finance growing public 
deficits. Mostly because of Lopez Mateos's stepping up public investment, president Diaz 
Ordaz (1964-1970) inherited a public debt 150 percent higher than his predecessor 
(Teichman 1988: 38). Continued heavy investment in industry, together with modest 
government revenues, accounted for the Mexican public debt rising from $810 million 
in 1960 to $4,262 million in 1970. In general, the era of'stabilizing development' gave 
industrialisation its ultimate impetus. It is illustrated by the fact that in the period 1965-70 
industry took the historic figure of 40 percent of total public investment (Levy and 
Székely 1987: 134).
Measured in terms of economic growth and control of inflation, the outcomes of 
the 'stabilizing development' strategy are remarkable. In a context of a more stable 
performance of the world markets (Aspe 1993: 11), the GDP grew up at annual rates of 
7 percent between 1960 and 1970 (Looney 1985: 5), while inflation stayed below 3 
percent (Basahez 1991:164). However, the economic strategy had also a number of side- 
effects. At the institutional level, it was associated not only with the public sector rapid 
growth, but with the way this process took place.
Industrialisation and government expansion
In the period 1917-1934, the federal government grew in strength rather than in 
size (Vernon 1963: 69). A trend towards public sector growth, however, began to emerge 
after 1934. Together with the 1917 constitution, the Keynesian thought, fashionable after
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the Great Depression, represented a strong argument for both active state intervention in 
the economy and public sector expansion. An innovation was introduced by granting 
most of the newly created agencies a semi-autonomous character. The distinction 
between these agencies (called parastate entities from now on) and the traditional 
ministries provides two completely different pictures of government growth. As table 2.1 
reveals, the total number of Secretarias de Estado and Departamentos Administrativos 
(called here ministries because of their in-line character) increased little after 1917, while 
remaining practically constant from 1958 onwards.
TABLE 2.1 Number of the federal ministries, 1917-1982
(Selected years)
1917 1932 1935 1940 1946 1958 1976 1982
Secretarias 7 7 8 11 13 15 16 18
Departamentos 5 6 7  4 2 3 2  1
Total 12 13 15 15 15 18 18 19
The table only includes the agencies considered secretariats and administrative departments by 
the corresponding organic laws. As a result, 1917 does not consider the Government for the Federal 
District. For similar reasons, neither the Department for Military Industry, created in 1947, nor the attorneys 
are computed for 1958 onwards.
Source: José Attolini (in Aportaciones, 1976: 65-67), the federal organic laws o f 1958 (DOF 
24/12/58) and 1976 (DOF 29/12/76), and Proceso Legislativo (n.d.: 19-20).
As the same table suggests, one of the few major qualitative transformations 
affecting the agencies under discussion was the steady transformation of departamentos 
administratives into secretariats. In theory, the former had been conceived by the 
constitution-makers as technical entities, while the latter as ministries in the Western 
sense. However, the impossibility of drawing a clear dividing line between them, with the 
use of the parastate formula, explains the trend observed.** A less visible quantitative 
change was the internal growth of some ministries.*^
Since 1982, the Departamento del Distrito Federal (DDF), in charge o f  the government o f the 
country's capital, is the only survival department.
Although the total number o f federal civil servants went up from 278,698 in 1959 to 394,204 
in 1964, the ministries for finance and education absorbed two thirds o f this increase (Alejo in Wionczek 
et al. 1971: 107), while the other third went mostly to the largest decentralised agencies.
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Differently, table 2.2 shows the explosive growth of the parastate sector after 
1 9 4 0  20 ^  careful look at the manner in which this sector grew provides a link between 
this process and the ISI strategy. It shows that the parastaste sector growing 6.8 times 
between 1940 and 1970 was the result of the creation of entities directly related to 
industrial promotion and its financing, rather than with social welfare or agriculture (see 
Carrillo Castro, table 2, in Empresas Publicas 1978: 20). In particular, the rapid 
proliferation of state-owned credit institutions formed reflected the high priority the first 
post-revolutionary governments gave to economic promotion. This trend did not change 
despite the objectives of the public enterprise broadening considerably since the Avila 
Camacho years.^'
TABLE 2.2 Number of parastate entities, 1921-1982 
(Selected years)
1921 1930 1940 1950 1959 1970 1976 1982
Number o f agencies 2 12 57 158 259 391 854 1,155
Source: Carrillo Castro (in Empresas Publicas 1978: 17) and Marum Espinosa (in Alonso et al, 
1992: 204-209).
It could be argued that the rapid growth of government machinery had both the 
purpose and effect of strengthening the role of the Mexican state (Ruiz Massieu 1980: 
105-106). This statement, however, obscures various relevant developments. First, it is 
clear that the main beneficiary of public sector expansion was not Mexican government 
as a whole, but the federal executive branch. This situation aggravated the traditional 
imbalances not only between this branch and its counterparts, but also those between 
federal and local government. Public expenditure is a good indicator of this phenomenon. 
Between 1947 and 1964, federal government (excluding the DDF), was responsible for 
about 90 percent of the national public expenditure (Alejo in Wionczek et al. 1971: 90).
Interesting enough is the fact that president Avila Camacho created more parastate entities than 
president Cardenas whose pro-interventionist orientation is often stressed (see Ruiz Massieu 1980: 197- 
199).
This practice began in 1944 when the state bought the Estudios Churubusco-Azteca, thus 
becoming film producer.
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Most of this percentage corresponded to the executive branch, for the budgets of the 
federal legislature and judiciary have always been marginal.^^
Second, inside the federal executive branch the impact was not even either. The 
marked differences in the rates of growth between the central and parastate sectors had 
the effect of eventually altering the balance of power between them. The following fact 
makes our point clear: The amount of public investment channeled through the parastate 
sector went from 42 percent in the period 1939-1945 to 54 percent in the period 1949- 
1960 (Wionczek in Flores de la Pena et al. 1986: 31). This development would modify 
the role and status of the conventional ministries.
Third, within the parastate sector there were even more marked contrasts. A 
careful look at the entities entering this domain confirms the existence of enormous 
differences between entities in terms of status, size, and budget requirements. Therefore, 
the quantitative picture of this sector as a whole leads to misleading conclusions. 
Moreover, government economic and investment policies would deepen those initial 
differences even fiirther, thus giving the parastate sector its long-lasting characteristics. 
Inevitably, the impressive amounts of resources devoted over the years to a handful of 
parastate entities dealing with industrial promotion would eventually bring them to the 
fore. Regarding the credit institutions, this was the case of NAFINSA (Tucker 1957:207- 
209).^  ^In broader terms, however, the trinity of PEMEX, CFE and the Railroads were the 
true stars of the ISI strategy (see Philip 1884).
Beyond a doubt, the huge share of the budget allocated to the entire parastate 
sector corresponded to this trinity virtually since its early inception. This way of 
allocating resources was not accidental considering that oil, electricity and transportation 
are essential inputs to industry. Interesting enough is the fact that the multiplication of 
parastate entities from 1940 to 1976 did not alter this basic picture. Rather the increasing 
emphasis on investment in oil and electricity enhanced it as will be seen in due course.
These branches together received, on average, about one percent o f the annual federal budget 
during the 1960s (calculation based on data from NAFINSA 1977, table 6.30: 363-365).
The amount o f credit canalised mainly to industry by this institution, for instance, increased from 
$506 million in 1955 $o $2,892 million in 1968 (NAFINSA 1971, table 85: 356).
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2.3 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
The early institutionalisation of the Mexican political system is at the core of a 
long period of sustained political stability (Calvert 1969: 112-113; Cothran 1994; 
Whitehead in Harvey and Serrano 1994: 112-114)?"* Emerging institutions and rules 
played a crucial role in consolidating the regime, in regulating group politics, and in 
providing a frame for sustained economic groAvth. Although a strong presidential 
institution greatly contributed to these outcomes, they cannot be fully understood without 
considering the emergence of two complex institutional networks in charge of the 
management of politics and economics respectively. The evolution of this dual 
arrangement implied a substantial delegation of presidential authority, and also a 
permanent process of allocation and re-allocation of institutional resources among the 
agencies making up the two networks. In essence, it explains their distinctive features.
The network for political control
Up to the 1970s, observers usually considered the interior ministry {Gobernacion) 
to be the chief cabinet ofifice.^^  The context of violence during the 1920s and 1930s sheds 
light on this preeminence. This particular context, together with the priority given to 
political stability, encouraged the emergence of a refined machinery for repression and 
political control. At first, this machinery was virtually limited to that of the Defence 
Ministry (SDN). This agency's potential for disruption, however, was proved by most 
uprisings being organised by ex-high rank SDN officials (e.g., Serrano in 1928; Cedillo 
in 1938). Concentration of strategic military resources, in a context of weak institutions, 
was at the core of the problem. Presidents after Obregôn sought to neutralise the salient 
role of the SDN by favouring the emergence of new institutional poles of power. The 
appointment of Calles, former war minister, as head of Gobernacion in 1920 proved 
decisive to achieve this goal.
By delegating considerable authority to Gobernacion, president Obregôn 
enhanced considerably its counterbalancing role. Overt confrontations between this 
agency and the SDN characterised the period 1920-1924, mainly because of the growing
A different interpretation is provided by Purcell Kaufman and Purcell (1980).
For instance, Tucker (1957: 139), Camacho (1977: 619), and Needier (1990: 93).
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involvement of Gobernacion in matters of 'national security'?^ Presidential ambitions 
added fuel to the fire. Calles's selection as the presidential candidate by Obregôn greatly 
influenced the future roles of both ministries. As president and later as Jefe Maximo, he 
continued the strategy of getting the military out of politics by further strengthening the 
role of Gobernacion.
The PRM introduced new and more sophisticated mechanisms into the emerging 
apparatus for political control, while broadening considerably this party's scope for 
action. Central control over its heterogeneous membership was achieved in various steps. 
First, a massive enrollment was further encouraged. Second, the emergence of a limited 
number of coordinating mass organisations, a development promoted by the state, eased 
the control of large social sectors by fi*agmenting and counterbalancing their political 
activity. Outstandingly, they included the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and 
the National Peasant Confederation (CNC).^^ Third, generous political and material 
rewards to their leadership and a more extensive system of "distributive populism" 
consolidated the ruling party as an efficient corporative control machinery. Earlier and 
less visible changes in the structure of the federal public sector had announced this 
development.^* Because of their sharing the same clienteles, the control machineries of 
both government and the ruling party became not only intertwined, but inseparable.
President Aleman introduced two important changes affecting the network for 
political control. First, he created the Estado Mayor Presidencial, a military corps 
charged with the personal security of the president and his family. This measure would 
contribute to the consolidation of Mexican presidentialism, and to the further decline of 
the military. It was assured by both keeping the Estado Mayor Presidencial outside the 
formal structure of the SDN and including its budget in the presidency's payroll. Second, 
he established the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS) under the umbrella of 
Gobernacion. Formally, the DFS was charged with national security and political
^  According to Rojas (1975: 259), Calles was behind the death o f Benjamin Hill, Obregon's close 
friend and his first minister o f war. The novel La Sombra del Caudillo by Martin Luis Guzmân, first 
published in 1929, dramatically illustrates the troubled relationship between the SDN and Gobernacion at 
the time.
With the support o f president Cârdenas, the CTM was formed in 1935, thus bringing together 
about 3,000 unions and 600,000 workers; and so was the CNC in 1938 by uniting the ejidatario leagues 
already operating in each state (Story 1986: 24-25).
For instance, the Labour Department was created in 1932, while Agrarian Department in 1934. 
During Cârdenas administration, both agencies were several times reorganised along clear corporatist lines.
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intelligence functions. The later creation of the Directorate for Political and Social 
Investigations improved considerably Gobernacion's intelligence-police apparatus. 
Working usually in tandem, these bureaux were "to observe and infiltrate organisations 
formed outside the realm of the PRI, and, where necessary, to imprison, kidnap, torture, 
and murder adversaries" (Reding 1989: 707).
Moreover, they also observed the behaviour, and spied the background out, of 
political leaders and politicians working inside the system. Like in Fouche's days, little 
having the slightest political implication seemed to escape from the 'ears and eyes' of 
Gobernacion's extensive nationwide investigatory network.
A steady concentration of extensive strategic resources explains Gobernacion's 
key institutional role. Apart from its intelligence powers, this agency became the main 
presidential channel for conducting most of the legal and extralegal relations with the 
states and municipalities, the federal Congress, the PRI, and the opposition parties (see 
Tucker 1957). The threat posed by the regional military leaders may explain not only 
"much of the political control exercised so ruthlessly over state governments by the 
Secretaria de Gobernacion" during the 1920s (Scott 1964: 272), but also much of the 
manner in which central-local relationships were carried out afterwards. For instance, this 
agency retained, clearly until the mid-1970s, its powers to intervene in the removal of 
governors and to influence the fixed allocation of federal funds at local level, when a 
'political' problem arose.
Legally, Gobernacion advised the president on the need for legislation, and served 
as a liaison between the executive and the federal congress. These relations, however, 
were far more complicated, for they involved the ruling party and the registered 
opposition parties. As noted by Scott, the law tended "to centralize the whole party 
system in Gobernacion" (1964: 153). This arrangement assured government's control 
over the elections and the hegemony of one-party system.^^
By the 1950s, the highly sophisticated, and efficient, network for political control 
was fully institutionalised. Led by Gobernacion, this network included a set of
Gobernacion had the function of approving the registration o f new parties and the cancellation 
o f  granted registrations. Distribution o f  financial funds to the leaders o f the registered opposition parties 
was an effective stick-and-carrot mechanism to assured both their compliance and a legitimising democratic 
image. Taxes (derechos) on gambling, deliberately kept out the formal budget, was one source o f  these 
funds.
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heterogeneous ministries connected to each other by 'resource dependencies', which 
stemmed from their involvement in the same broad function of political control/^ Some 
examples illustrate our point. Gobernacion used to play a more important role in foreign 
relations than it is usually thought, thus having a close link with the ministry formally in 
charge of this function: the SRE. A tacit agreement between the US and Mexico that 
allowed the latter the right to dissent in foreign affairs (Serrano in Serrano and Bulmer- 
Thomas 1996: 7) could have enhanced Gobernacion's powers having an impact on 
foreign policy, such as that of expelling 'unwanted' foreigners and drugs control. 
Similarly, the technical limitations of other law enforcement agencies, together with 
Gobernacion's broad powers on national security, paved the road for this ministry to 
intervene in the solution of selective police problems such as kidnappings and bank 
robberies. It favoured its de facto authority over the federal and local attorneys and police 
units.
In particular, the 1954 devaluation triggered many opposition movements (see 
Pellicer and Reyna 1978; Gil 1992: Chapter 2). It put to the test not only the corporatist 
government-PRI machinery, but also that for repression. On the one hand, the dealing 
with labour demands made apparent the symbiosis between the largest unions' leaders and 
both the labour sector of the PRI and the Labour Ministry (STyPS).^' These institutional 
links had made possible an efficient control of the demands for higher wages, the 
occurrence of strikes, and the registration of new unions (Bortz 1987:106-107). A similar 
mechanism was in force regarding the PRI-controlled peasant organisations that involved 
the Agrarian Department in controlling the land-distribution process. When negotiations 
failed, Gobernacion was always nearby to arbitrate disputes or to use selective repression 
when necessary.
Government's sophisticated apparatus for political control, however, could not 
prevent popular discontent steadily growing. As in other Latin American countries, the 
Cuban Revolution served as a catalyst (Gil 1992: 34-35). The process reached its peak 
in October 1968 when a peaceful student demonstration was ruthlessly repressed by the
The possibility of grouping together Gobernacion, the SDN, and the ministries o f Navy (SM), 
and Foreign Relations (SRE) for anlytical purposes was first noted by Tucker (1957: 173).
In 1946, president Alemân transformed the Labour Department into Secretaria del Trabajoy  
Prevision Social (DOF 13/12/56), thus suggesting the importance o f organised labour within his economic 
strategy and the country's corporative system.
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military. Although the great significance of this dark episode has been extensively studied 
(e.g., Camp in Rodriguez 1993; Shapira 1978: Chapter 2), some points need to be 
emphasized to understand better the operation of the network under scrutiny. First, the 
gravity of the 1968 events represented a turning point in the role of the military within 
the political system (Williams in Camp 1986: 144-145). At the time, they created 
dangerous tensions between the heads of Gobernacion and the defence ministry unseen 
in over 30 years. Second, those events further consolidated the repressive role of the DFS 
and also the fame of its director at the time, namely Fernando Gutierrez Barrios^^.
As a whole, the network for political control used to have four main distinctive 
features. First, it was better characterised as a policy network than as a policy community 
(see chapter one). More precisely, various sub-policy networks and 'issue networks' as 
well as a 'territorial community' (DDF) can be distinguished within this network.”  In 
other words, there were usually low levels of both agency integration and stability of 
relationships. Yet, variable 'resource dependencies' kept the network together and 
relatively articulated especially on an issue basis. These institutional linkages determined 
a complex system of check and balances which constrained the action and performance 
of individual institutions. For example, despite the decline of the army, the SDN never 
lost control of its core military 'resources', which meant that Gobernacion, despite its 
powerful intelligence resources, did not have the troops when required.”
Second, because of being headed by the presidency (usually acting through 
Gobernacion), the network tended to have a marked vertical structure. In other words, 
presidential delegation of power, with its holding of fundamental legal and political 
resources, may explain Gobernacion preeminence within the network. Third, this 
network was deliberately excluded from economic decision making. Four, not only were 
there high rates of both turnover and personnel mobility within this network, but more 
important the latter produced all the presidents from 1940 to 1970.
After joining the DFS in 1952, this ex-military man was appointed director o f this bureau by 
Echeverria in 1964, and promoted to under-secretary o f Gobernacion by the same person in 1970.
” For the definition o f the concepts used here, see Rhodes (1985: 17-19) and Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992: 13).
During the late 1950s and 1960s, the use o f the military even for police purposes was not rare. 
They include actions against the following sectors o f civil society: students in Mexico City 
(1956,1960,1968), Michoacân (1966), and Sonora (1967); organised telegraphists and railwaymen in 
Mexico City (1958-59); peasant leaders in Morelos (1962); and teachers in Guerrero (1967).
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The economic-policy network
In the same way that the preeminence of Gobernacion was observed, Vernon 
would note that the finance ministry (SHCP) stood out as primus inter pares (1963: 12), 
Allowing for the existence of two differentiated policy networks, both observations are 
not antagonistic. The 1910 Revolution did not affect the dominant role of the SHCP in 
the economic policy making since the independence years. Though the industrialisation 
process led to the creation of many economic agencies, it did not challenge the finance 
ministry's status until at least the 1958 administrative reform. The advantages of this 
agency over its competitors explain this fact. Apart from being one of the longest-lived 
and most stable bureaucratic organisations in Mexico, the SHCP had a key asset, namely, 
its institutional resources. As virtually everywhere, this ministry was charged with the 
control over public money and, more important, over its allocation. For these reasons, the 
post-revolutionary economic policy network had to evolve having the SHCP as its 
cornerstone.
According to Gross, instead of establishing a single, central planning agency, 
president Cardenas opted for a "flexible network of central guidance institutions" 
composed of three powerful entities, namely the SHCP, the Bank of Mexico, and 
Nacional Financier a (in Shafer 1966: xvi). Even though this observation is essentially 
correct, it should be added that the higher status of the first institution, both de jure and 
de facto, was never in question. Early, this trinity developed as a 'policy community' in 
which the main actors "sometimes in conflict, often in agreement. . .  [were] in touch and 
operating within a shared framework" (Heclo and Wildavsky quoted by Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992: 8).
Because of its control over the budget, the SHCP soon took on the leadership of 
sectoral sub-policy networks dealing with economic development such as those for 
industry, public works, and agriculture. From the mid-1940s onwards, the articulation and 
operation of economic policy network as a whole improved notably. However, as both 
the state intervention in the economy augmented and the structure of this network became 
increasingly complex, problems such as lack of coordination and overlapping of functions 
began to emerge. In any event, the network retained its basic distinctive features until 
1976 as will be discussed in the next chapter.
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To sum up, as compared with its counterpart, the economic policy network was 
characterised by (i) its much more dynamic development; (ii) its better integration, and 
more stable and permanent internal relationships; (iii) its stronger and more horizontal 
'resource dependencies' as more policymaking centres emerged; (iv) its lower rates of 
internal turnover and personnel mobility; (v) its early development o f  efficiency pockets' 
in many key areas; (vi) its organisation around technical professions; (vii) its isolation 
from political influences, including the succession process.
Professions, ideology, and policy networks
As defined by Dunleavy, "professions are 'special occupations' with relatively 
high degrees of internal specificity and identity" (1981: 8). In Liebman's view, they do 
exert an ideological influence "because they provide a social and physical environment 
within which students with similar backgrounds and interests group together" (quoted by 
Camp 1975: 142). The same can be said regarding public organisations, for their 
institutional roles can also affect the attitudes and values of the individuals who work in 
them (Harmon and Mayer 1986: 14). Furthermore, it can be argued that professions 
concentrating in certain ministries or agencies for a long time may enhance the 
socialisation role of both professions and public organisations. Evidence supports the 
validity of this statement in the Mexican context.
Lawyers becoming the dominant professional cluster in power explains their 
presence at the highest echelons of the Mexican government, and their high degree of 
mobility within it. This picture, however, did not last long. Functional specialisation 
gradually divided lawyers into three main groups. First, the 'technicians' were made up 
of the law experts traditionally recruited by the judicial branch. Second, the 'generalists', 
the group really in power, tended to concentrate heavily within the network for political 
control where they moved with ease from one agency to another. This was not accidental, 
for their prime goal since the 1930s had been displacing revolutionary, military men fi*om 
their power reserves. This pattern was greatly encouraged by the ascending path to the 
presidency inaugurated by lawyer Aleman in 1946, and reproduced by his three 
successors (see Story 1986: 126-131). Pragmatism may explain empowered lawyers' 
eclectic ideological beliefs and their loose use of the Revolution's imagery.^^
For a extensive discussion o f the ideology o f Mexican political leaders see Camp (1984: Chapter 
7) and Suârez (1987).
69
Last, but not least, the lawyers with financial experience composed a more 
identifiable and cohesive cluster. The fact that most of them had made their way to the 
top predominantly within the bank of Mexico and the SHCP -the key agencies of the 
economic policy network- is responsible for influencing both their fields of expertise and 
way of thinking. At first at least, their economic views were difficult to harmonise. For 
example, they usually endorsed a bold strategy of industrial development and expansion 
within a 'mixed-economy' frame, while sharing the more conservative values attributed 
to treasury officers elsewhere. Two events 'tuned up' their views, thus improving their 
cohesiveness as a group. They were the 1954 devaluation and the twelve-years tenure of 
Antonio Ortiz Mena as head of the SHCP (1958-1970). At this point, it is convenient to 
bring government economists into the picture.
Formal education is one of the most important sources of ideology. According to 
Leopoldo Solis, the study of economics in Mexico inherited from the UN AM's Law 
School "the humanistic tradition which became linked to a Marxist ideology and the 
rejection of mathematics and quantitative methods" (1971: 60). Up to the 1960s, 
however, Marxist economists were a tiny minority within government; a much larger 
number was willing to subscribe to the 'mixed-economy' notion with increased emphasis 
on the importance of the public sector (Vernon 1963: 137). Moreover, it was observed 
that economists in the industrial sector put priority on industry, those in agricultural 
services on agriculture, those in the central bank on monetary and fiscal restraints, and 
so on (Vernon 1963: 137).
Like education, major economic crisis or events may have an immediate impact 
not only on predominant paradigms, but also on organisational settings.^^ By favouring 
the adoption of control of inflation as a prime goal, the 1954 devaluation had the effect 
of polarising both government economists and agencies. On the one hand, this policy 
enhanced the traditional role of the finance ministry in limiting expenditures and avoiding 
inflation at all rates. On the other hand, it united the spending agencies in the defence of 
their budgets. External factors deepened this attitudinal gap, important per se in context 
of government expansion. In the late 1950s, the development of the structuralist current 
by Prebisch, under the auspices of ECLA, gave those in favour of expansion a doctrinal
For instance, his opposition to the balanced-budget tenet took Alberto J. Pani to the SHCP in 
1932 (Ibarra and Alberro 1989: 152).
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tool. By contrast, the officials linked to the SHCP and the Central Bank were more 
willing to accept the doctrines adopted by their external 'clienteles': the international 
financial institutions.
What is worth stressing here is not the debate between monetarists and 
structuralists becoming fashionable, but its institutional implications. Apart from 
encouraging differences over public policy, the debate divided the economic-policy 
network into two identifiable groups, the agencies in charge of the 'stabilising' strategy 
and those that benefitted from government growth.
2.4 THE RISE OF THE GOVERNMENT TECHNOCRAT
What is commonly described as technocrat is a product of every country that has 
undergone some form of economic transformation (Centeno 1993: 308). Though Mexico 
went through such a transformation since the 1940s, the emergence of the technocratic 
phenomenon only began to be discussed very recently. Vernon (1963) is among the first 
to have distinguished two different kinds of public officials, namely politicians and 
technicians. Still, it was thought that technicians lacked a fundamental element to be 
regarded as technocrats: power. The term technocrat began to be used as scholars noted 
that technicians were attaining middle-rank offices (e.g.. Camp 1972). By the early 1970s, 
however, engineering had emerged as the second most important profession after law. 
Similarly, the presence of trained economists in government "doubled in each 
administration from 1952 until it reached 18% of Echeverria's cabinet" (Levy in Camp 
1986: 25).
Government growth and the rise of the técnico
Many reasons account for government technicians becoming an essential element 
in the decision-making process (see Centeno 1993). To begin with, their field of expertise 
was enhanced by both the rapid introduction of new functions into the public realm and 
the intrinsic complexity of some of those fimctions^ .^ Government technicians gathering 
around certain agencies, together with their low inter-agency mobility, encouraged not 
only further specialisation, but also the emergence of 'bureaucratic clusters' organised
It is clear that the technics of oil extraction, dam building or financial management, for example, 
are usually beyond the easy understanding o f non-experts.
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around professions. These factors allowed their gaining gradual control over important 
segments of the policy-making process. As noted by Vernon, at first, the power of 
government technicians stemmed less from their powers to shape policy directly, and 
more firom their capacity to choose the alternatives (1963: 137). This was enhanced by 
the fact that political leaders used to be 'generalists’ as opposed to experts.
As recognised by president Calles, one central constraint on the implementation 
of the economic programme was the lack of technically-trained "human resources" 
(quoted by Ruiz Massieu 1980: 95). This constraint became more apparent when 
PEMEX, the CFE, and the mushrooming financial institutions started operating.^* In 
particular, experts on economics and engineering were urgently demanded by these and 
new agencies. Two measures were taken to tackle this problem. First, the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) offered the country's first degree-granted 
programme on economics in 1929. Second, during Cardenas administration, the Instituto 
Politécnico Nacional (IPN) was created, and so was the National School of Economics 
(ENE) as a UN AM's full-fledged branch. The small number of technicians produced by 
the educational system, together with the weakness of the private sector, explains why 
most of them were eagerly recruited by government.
As a result, holding a university degree became gradually a sine qua non for 
joining government at confianza level.^  ^In this context, the kind of degree held was not 
irrelevant. The arrival of Aleman to power in 1940 had the effect of consolidating UN AM 
as the main source of government officials and the law profession as the dominant one 
(Camp 1976a). This fact gave scholars the impression that técnicos were bound to 
middle-rank positions within government (e.g., Vernon 1963: 149; Camp 1971 and 
1972). This view was not totally accurate. As showed by Camp (1975), an impressive 
number of ENE's directors, professors, and graduates began early occupying high-rank 
posts, and even cabinet portfolios.'^® Considering the size of this school and the tiny
Regarding PEMEX, most of the its senior technical staff were foreign and left the country 
following the 1938 expropiation (Philip 1982: 329).
”  Federal bureaucrats are legally divided into two main groups: trabajadores de base and 
trabajadores de confianza. The second group has higher status than the first one and its members enjoy 
much better salaries and possibilities o f promotion, though there are also higher risks o f dismissal (see 
Torres 1992: 40-41).
For instance Mario Souza, Secretary of Industry (1940-46) and Ramôn Beteta, head o f the 
SHCP (1946-52). It is worth nothing that they also held law degrees from UN AM and had taught at the 
ENE.
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number of graduates'*’, this fact is outstanding. An interesting symbiosis may be partly 
responsible for the future success of government economists.
Not only had the ENE begun as a part of the UN AM's Law School, but the 
presence of lawyers teaching economics continued to be relevant for quite a few years 
(Camp 1975). This was so because of the virtual lack of university-trained economists 
in Mexico. The economic knowledge of these teachers came not only from teaching itself, 
but from practical experience. Amid a lawyer-dominated environment, this knowledge 
would have helped them to make their way to the top. Outstandingly, they include 
Antonio Carrillo Flores, head of NAFINSA (1945-52) and the SHCP (1952-58); and 
Gilberto Loyo, head of the Secretaria de Economia (1952-58). What is important to 
emphasize here is that they represented the birth of a hybrid profession that would 
dominate the leadership of the main economic ministries and agencies until the 1970s.
Providing some qualifications, the view of técnicos being bounded to middle 
levels was not totally baseless. As said earlier, the 'new professions' tended to gather 
around specific ministries. Economists, for instance, concentrated in the Secretaria the 
Bienes Nacionales e Inspeccion Administrativa (Tucker 1957: 128), and the Secretaria 
de Industriay Comercio (SIC) (Camp 1975:147). As a result, a clear connection between 
specialities and organisation profile emerged. This fact, which exhibited rational signs 
in the way government was dealing with its pressing technical problems, often gave low- 
and middle-rank técnicos, the feeling of being bounded or constrained. Frequently, 
however, high-rank technicians themselves were responsible for the promotion 
'bottlenecks'. Saturation, together with low rates of turnover, may have aggravated the 
situation.
To briefly recapitulate, though camarilla considerations may have favoured the 
recruitment of technicians and their rapid promotion, state growing intervention in the 
economy needs to be seen as a more decisive factor. The emerging link between 
professions and organisational settings is relevant for agencies organised around 
occupations tend to function as interest groups, thus encouraging politics (Heffron 1989: 
202). A good example is the so-called '1938 generation' of engineers which after 1938 
took full control of PEMEX's technical areas (see Philip 1982: Chapter 17). In a way not
Up to 1952, there were 56 teachers at the National School o f Economics, while the number o f  
students enrolled did not exceed 250 (Camp 1975).
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immediately apparent, the industrialisation strategy in practice since the 1940s would 
gradually alter the role of professions within government. As demonstrated by Cochrane 
(1972), technicians got around 50 percent of the posts in Diaz Ordaz's cabinet.
Thus, what happened in the years to come would have more to do with the 
balance of power between professions acting within specific organisational settings rather 
than with camarillas or individual political abilities. As a result, the discussion of the first 
issue is by far more relevant than that of the role of the técnico vis-à-vis the politico in 
isolation from those settings.
Presidentialism and the economic-policy network
In the period 1946-1970, the policy network for political control was the only 
institutional path to the presidency. Presidential efforts at keeping the bureaucracies 
associated with the economic-policy network under control characterised this period. This 
was so because the ISI strategy gradually brought to the fore the agencies dealing with 
its implementation. This fact had important implications in terms of power allocation 
within the public sector. Two examples involving PEMEX illustrate our point. According 
to Antonio Bermudez (PEMEX's director from 1946 to 1958), he continued the 
expansion of the Azcapotzalco refinery in 1955, against the decision of some ministers 
to stop it; even more, he authorised a price increase of oil products in November 1958 
without consulting president Ruiz Cortines (quoted by Philip 1982: 339-340). As noted 
by Vernon, in the 1950s, the larger decentralised agencies represented already an 
important source of economic power (1963: 12).
As the federal executive branch grew, so did the problems of central control and 
coordination. Until 1946, the presidency resorted to a combination of three general 
mechanisms for controlling the operation of the economic-policy network, namely, direct 
personal supervision, legal regulation, and delegation of authority to existing ministries. 
In particular, authority was increasingly delegated regarding the control of highly 
technical areas (Tucker 1957: 125, 2 0 1 ) Gradually, the finance ministry was granted 
powers to oversee the financial operation of the parastate sector as a whole.
That was the case of the fledgling banking system, including the central bank, whose supervision 
was given to the SHCP since the 1930s. A complex legislation soon consolidated the supervisory role o f  
this ministry on this matter.
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By establishing the Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales e Inspeccion Administrativa 
(SEBINAL) in 1946 (DOF 13/12/46), president Aleman substantially changed 
government's approach to the problem of central control. The creation of this ministry as 
a watchdog of the parastate sector suggests not only the increasing difficulties in 
controlling this sector, but the issue reaching the presidential agenda. Paradoxically 
enough, this innovative formula would introduce serious deficiencies into the control 
function, the most important being resource diffusion. At the heart of the problem was 
the way powers were allocated. In late 1947, the Ley para el Control de Organismos y  
Empresas de Participacion Estatal was published. This federal law gave the SHCP 
extensive powers over the operation of the parastate sector, including that of technical 
inspection. That is, the very function indicated in the name of SEBINAL. This accounts 
for this ministry's limited success.
Making full use of its legal powers, the SHCP created the Comision Nacional de 
Inversiones in 1948. However, this commission, charged with programming public 
investment, "never functioned more than formally" in its two-year existence (Wionczek 
in Flores de la Pena et al. 1986: 32). The main reason was strong bureaucratic opposition 
to the finance ministry SHCP exercising additional powers (Shafer 1966: 53). This 
frustrated experiment was responsible for modifying again the supervisory mechanism 
this time towards direct presidential involvement.
Following the 1954 devaluation, the SHCP investment commission was replaced 
by the Comision de Inversiones now under the direct dependency of the president. It was 
set up with the exclusive purpose of studying, evaluating and determining priorities 
among public investment projects."*^  The commission was criticized "for having satisfied 
itself with the mere job of sorting out the investment projects prepared by the numerous 
state agencies and enterprises" instead of trying to implement multi-year investment 
planning (Looney and Frederiksen 1982: 4). In any event, three main reasons account for 
the success of this commission in achieving its formal objectives. First, its institutional 
location and the presidential support to its director Raul Salinas Lozano gave the 
commission authority. Second, being a technical unit the decision-making corresponded 
to the president, which prevented cabinet rivalries. Last, but not least, the commission
For a description of the organisation, functions and achievements o f  this commission as seen 
by its director see Salinas Lozano (in Aportaciones 1976: 327-332).
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was "careful not to infringe on the prerogatives of the Finance Ministry" (Benveniste 
1970: 83).
This successful experiment, together with the never-ending problems associated 
with an explosive public sector expansion, is responsible for a more ambitious attempt 
at presidential control over the economic-policy network. In December 1958, president 
Lopez Mateos carried out the most comprehensive reform up to that year. As a result, the 
Secretaria de la Presidencia (SPre) was created. The central purpose of this ministry was 
"to serve not only as a liaison between the presidency and other federal agencies on 
political and economic matters but also as the main economic agency" (Wionczek in 
Flores de la Pena et al. 1986: 42). According to Pichardo Pagaza, the lack of a 
coordinating organ at cabinet level, "a weakness of all presidential regimes", was at the 
core of the decision (1972: 20). Although this view provides some insights, the lack of 
that organ in the Mexican context should not be taken for granted.
In Mexico, the coordination of both agencies and policies has traditionally been 
highly centralised in the hands of the president. It explains his titanic efforts at personal 
supervision, despite the increasing difficulties imposed by a context of big government. 
This persistent practice sheds light on Tucker's observation that the president's private 
secretaries "have become almost ministers without portfolio" (1957: 140). Sharply put, 
what president Lopez Mateos did when creating the SPre was to provide that portfolio 
in an effort to overcome the limitations of presidential supervision. Its links with the 
presidency explains why this ministry would become a powerful political actor almost 
since its inception. As a result, its three successive heads: Donato Miranda Fonseca 
(1958-1964), Emilio Martinez Manatou (1964-1970), and Hugo Cervantes del Rio (1970- 
1975) were reputed as strong presidential pre-candidates (Camp 1982). The SPre's high 
political status, however, contrasted with this agency's "modest technical role" (Wionczek 
in Flores de la Pena et al. 1986: 43).
To supervise the parastate sector, the 1958 administrative reform created a more 
technical ministry: the Secretaria del Patrimonio Nacional (SEPANAL). What is relevant 
about this change was not SEBINAL being renamed SEP ANAL, but the fact that the 
latter ministry did receive from both the SHCP and the Secretaria de Economia most of 
their control powers over the powerful parastate sector. This concentration of functions, 
in a context of the parastate sector's growing in both size and importance, proved
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fundamental to the rapid consolidation of SEP ANAL as a key ministry during the 1960s 
and 1970s.
Bureaucratic balance of power
Because of its severity in reallocating functions, Lopez Mateos's comprehensive 
public sector reorganisation gives important insights into the existing balance of power 
within the economic-policy network. As a whole, the reform suggests the salient position 
reached by the bureaucratic clusters favouring government interventionism. For example, 
their power to shape policy may, partly at least, account for Mexico's decision not to join 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1950, the emphasis on industry 
rather than on agriculture, and the implementation of programmes such as the tax- 
exemption scheme for 'new and necessary industries'. It should be stressed, however, that 
the 1958 administrative reform did not go unnoticed. On the contrary, it encountered 
fierce resistance from "older departments and agencies" (Shafer 1966: 101).
In broader terms, the 1958 administrative reform made apparent the fact that the 
ISI strategy had produced two antagonistic sets of institutionally-grounded bureaucratic 
interests within the economic policy network. The first set gathered around three main 
agencies: NAFINSA, SIC, and SEP ANAL after 1958, and was in favour of increasing 
state-led industrialisation along 'import-substitution' lines. While the second set nestled 
in the SHCP and the central bank, and advocated financial discipline and moderation. 
Ironically enough, the economic policies of 'stabilising development', designed and 
promoted by the SHCP, would have the effect of aggravating the intrinsic tensions 
between the institutional blocks under discussion. Furthermore, these policies would also 
contribute to government's structuralists'*'* gaining momentum during the 1960s and the 
1970s. From a political perspective, the 1958 presidential reform proved instrumental to 
the former development.
As noted by Vernon, since 1958 the Secretaria de la Presidencia allowed many 
technicians to jump "the fence into the higher and lusher pastures of the politicians" 
(1963:137). This was so because of this ministry's institutional links with the presidency. 
The political significance of the ascending path to political office inaugurated by the SPre
The terms structuralist and monetarist will be frequently used in this thesis with the only 
purpose of identifying bureaucratic clusters within the federal government. As a result, their meanings do 
not necessarily coincide with the conventional definitions o f the bodies o f theory involved.
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stemmed from this fact. In other words, the SPre established the foundations of a virtual 
bridge between the presidency and the economic-policy network. The first beneficiary of 
this new ascending route was the structuralist bureaucratic cluster. SEP ANAL would 
played a similar role in the rise of this cluster, though for different reasons.
In these adverse conditions, what saved the SHCP from losing control over the 
macro-economic policy process?*^ Even more important, what explains its growing 
strength? The combination of this agency's four major sources of power provides a 
plausible explanation. They are control over the national budget (which was greatly 
enhanced by government expansion); support from its influential domestic clienteles; 
access to foreign sources of credit; and the development of an informal, but effective 
internal civil service'^ .^ A couple of examples illustrate the strategic importance of these 
institutional resources. First, Lopez Mateos's inauguration seemed a signal for every 
"agency to exercise its autonomy to the full" (Vernon 1963: 118). Government finances 
being gradually brought back under control suggests the power of the SHCP to restore 
financial discipline. Second, the way the 'stabilising development' strategy was financed 
enhanced the importance of foreign credit, and consequently the role of the SHCP in this 
field.
To sum up, by the 1960s the ISI strategy had produced both a powerful private 
sector, and a set of influential pro-business bureaucratic interests. However, as this 
chapter has argued, the same strategy also encouraged the emergence of equally 
influential pro-statist forces within government. Presidentialism, together with contextual 
factors, would have a decisive impact on this fragile balance of bureaucratic power.
CONCLUDING NOTE
As still stands today, the Mexican political system is a product of the 1917-1940 
period. Military challenges had a paramount impact in shaping the main features of that 
system. It was not until the Cardenas years that the presidency emerged as the most
Tucker early noted that the SHCP intervened in the work o f the other agencies to a greater 
degree than its counterpart in the United States (1957: 154).
The major features o f this civil service traits can be summarised as follows: personnel went 
through a usually long process o f in-office training before reaching the highest echelons o f the ministry; 
recruitment and promotion were increasingly based on technical and merit considerations; foreign training 
was encouraged. A clear division o f labour emerged. For instance, lawyers (who dominated the agency) 
were in charge o f Public Credit, while accountants of Expenditures.
78
important political institution. In this context, not only the PRI, but also the central 
bureaucracy came to be the most important pillars of Mexican presidentialism. An early 
process of institutionalisation triggered by political instability played a fundamental role 
in consolidating a strong presidency. In addition, this process implied the development 
of a peculiar set of well-rooted rules and practices, both written and unwritten, governing 
political behaviour both individual and collective.
Presidential stress on political stability and economic growth, together with 
functional differentiation, is responsible for the development of two distinctive policy 
networks. They differed not only in their roles and personnel composition, but also in the 
rules regulating their operation. During the period under scrutiny, the network for 
political control, in charge of managing politics, provided the only path to the presidency. 
By contrast, the economic-policy network was deliberately excluded from the succession 
process. This division of labour, including the mechanism of succession to the 
presidency, may have eased economic reconstruction since the 1940s.
Since 1940, government adopted a bold strategy of state-led industrialisation to 
achieve fast economic growth. Public sector growth, however, was aimed primarily at 
easing private capital accumulation rather than at strengthening the role of the state in the 
economy. This strategy is directly associated with significant quantitative and qualitative 
changes affecting mostly the composition and operation of the economic-policy network. 
These changes had important political implications. By bringing the agencies in charge 
of the implementation of the economic strategy to the fore, increasing state 
interventionism favoured the development of'technocratic roles'. Resource redistributions 
had a significant impact on the institutional balance of power within the economic-policy 
network.
Though public sector growth strengthened presidentialism, it did not come 
without costs. A long list of efforts at keeping the rising economic bureaucracies under 
presidential control characterised the period 1946-1958. Ironically, Lopez Mateos's 
administrative reform would have the effect of favouring the rise of the government 
technocracy that had gained momentum because of government expansion. By the 1960s, 
the ISI strategy had generated two institutionally grounded, antagonistic bureaucratic 
blocks within the economic-policy network. The key difference between them was the 
source of their power. Still, these developments did not have a visible impact on the
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policy network for political control, mostly because of its insulation from economic 
policy-making.
As it will be discussed in the next chapter, in the late 1960s Mexico approached 
a new and difficult stage in her evolution. Growing dissatisfaction with the performance 
of the country's economy, together with clear signs of political instability, demanded 
again the adjustment of the economic model. Higher presidential involvement in the 
economic policy-making being government's response would have not only relevant 
bureaucratic consequences, but also unexpected political implications. It is here that the 
SPP comes into the picture.
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Consolidating state intervention: 
The emergence of the SPP
The ISI strategy accounts for dramatic transformations of the country's economic 
and social structure. To begin with, the single-minded emphasis on industry, together 
with the geographical concentration of this sector, was a major driving force for Mexico 
moving rapidly from an agrarian to an urbanised society.* This phenomenon would exert 
increasing pressure on public expenditure for urban infrastructure, schooling, housing, 
and health. Urbanisation and better health services are linked to the country's population 
going from 19.6 million in 1940 to 49.3 million in 1970 (data from Wilkie 1985: 880). 
In addition, the development strategy, and in particular the protectionist policies set out 
during its implementation, fostered the emergence of a politically vigorous, though 
economically inefficient, indigenous business community. Each of these developments 
had a dramatic impact on the structure and role of the central bureaucracy.
To a great extent, the high degree of political stability enjoyed by the country until 
the late 1960s was the result of both sustained economic growth and the regime's 
corporatist machinery for political control. The 1954 devaluation put this "marriage of 
finance and order" (Centeno and Maxfield 1992) to an acid test. Government's response 
to the political effects of this event was traditional populist rhetoric and selective 
repression in combination with substantial adjustments to the ongoing economic policies. 
Control of inflation became an article of faith. Despite the success of the so-called 
'stabilising development' strategy (1958-1970) in achieving economic growth and price 
stability, there is agreement that it aggravated many structural problems. The major
‘ Between 1940 and 1970, the urban population increased from 35 percent o f the total population 
to 58.6 percent (Ryal 1985: 370).
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criticism is directed to its negative effects on income distribution. For the gap between 
the rich and the poor broadened considerably, despite high rates of economic growth.
It has been noted that the "genius" of the Mexican political system is that "it 
contains antagonisms of principle, leaving contradictions unresolved" (Needier 1990: 7). 
Government's repressive response to student protests in 1968 crudely exhibited the 
increasing incapacity of the Mexican state to maintain conditions for private capital 
accumulation, while appearing to "side with subordinate groups and classes in the class 
struggle" (Hamilton 1982: 285). Similar to the 1954 devaluation, the 1968 events were 
followed by renewed populist rhetoric and a departure from the central tenets of the 
ongoing economic strategy. This time the policy shift pointed towards a more active role 
of the state in the economy. Both international and domestic factors explain this shift. 
They include prevalent developmental schemes, global recession (Duvall and Freeman 
1983: 585), domestic historical interventionist trends, and pro-statist bureaucratic 
interests. In these conditions, the 1968 political crisis acted as an important catalyst.
This chapter argues that president Echeverria (1970-1976) attempted to go back 
to the deficit financing policies characterising the first stage of the ISI strategy, while 
advancing considerably the role of the state in the process. The emphasis on industry 
during the 'stabilising development' era, however, not only remained untouched, but 
public expenditure in this sector became more marked than ever before. As far as the 
central public sector is concerned, Echeverria's statist economic policies had the effect 
of accelerating the trends analysed in the previous chapter, thus magnifying bureaucratic 
dysfunctions already apparent. In this context, the creation of the SPP in 1976 needs to 
be seen as a crucial stage in the state-led industrialisation process that began in 1940. The 
central argument developed throughout the chapter is that there is a direct connection 
between three main issues, namely, the 1958 administrative reform, Echeverria's statism, 
and the emergence of the SPP.
To contextualise the birth of the SPP, section one provides a brief overview of the 
Echeverria administration. Here, special attention is paid to the bureaucratic dimensions 
of the shift towards statism, and the selection of Lopez Portillo as the PRI presidential 
candidate. Section two looks at the effects of both increased public expenditure and 
public sector growth on bureaucracy. Section three discusses the 1976 administrative 
reform. The focus here is on the antecedents and rationale of the reform cornerstone: the
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SPP. Finally, section four contrasts the expected role of this fledgling ministry with the 
initial practical problems it faced.
3.1 THE ’SHARED-DEVELOPMENT' EPISODE
Until the early 1970s, the role of the Mexican president in the economic 
policymaking process had normally been limited to endorsing the broad goals and policy 
guidelines of the ISI strategy as established by the finance ministry. President Echeverria 
inaugurated an era of higher presidential intervention in that process. Besides, his 
economic policies are usually considered as a sharp departure from those of the 
'stabilising development' era.  ^ As far as control of inflation is concerned, there was 
certainly a clear-cut policy shift. However, as a whole, Echeverria's economic policies fit 
well into the general industrialisation trends observed since the 1940s. As before 1954, 
his stepping up public expenditure had the central purpose of achieving high rates of 
economic growth through industrialisation, without paying much attention to the risks 
often associated with expansion.
Echeverria and the legacy of desarrollo estabilizador
The administrations of presidents Lopez Mateos (1958-1964) and Diaz Ordaz 
(1964-1970) were "periods of relatively conservative economic policies favouring the 
private sector" (Reynolds 1978: 1006). To be sure, high rates of economic growth were 
achieved, but not without costs. The way this outcome was attained provoked, or at least 
aggravated, various structural problems. They include mounting dependency on foreign 
imports and investment (Looney 1985:9-13); a growing trade deficit which was financed 
by foreign capital (Reynolds 1978: 1007-1009); high rates of tariff protection and 
restrictions on imports which posed severe problems for industrial development (Solis 
1971: 6); and a deliberate system of low taxation that increased pressures for public 
borrowing. In addition, the financial policies during the 'stabilising development' era were 
a major cause of foreign public debt growing from $810 million in 1960 to $4,262 
million in 1970 (Levy and Székely 1987: 138).
 ^Echeverria's both sexenio and policies have been extensively studied. Specialised works include 
Blair (1977), Solis (1981), and Tello (1983) on economic policy; Martinez Nava (1984) and Arriola (1988) 
on the state-private sector relationships; Aguilar-Barajas (1989) on industrial decentralisation; Shapira 
(1978) on foreign policy; Grindle (1977a) on authoritarian traits; Suârez Farias (1989) on political elites; 
Schmidt (1991) on the presidential institution; Cosio Villegas (1974) on the president's personal style.
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Another problem generated by government's commitment to industrialisation was 
the dangerous neglect of the agricultural sector (see Solis 1991: Chapter 4). As shown in 
figure 3.1, by 1958 the volumes of agricultural production began to stagnate after this 
sector had showed annual growth rates of 7.4 percent between 1940-1955. The decline 
of agriculture would have serious implications in terms of both income distribution in 
rural areas and further migration to the few industrial poles. In broader terms, this capital- 
intensive pattern of industrialisation is associated with a very skewed distribution of 
income (Ramirez 1993:176). In 1969, for instance, the highest 10 percent of the Mexican 
households took 51 percent of the total income, while the lowest 60 of them received only 
20 percent of that income (data from Tello 1983: 18). Not surprisingly, by late 1960s, 
many Mexican scholars were detailing the high social costs of the 'Mexican Miracle'.^
FIGURE 3.1 Index of the volumes of manufacturing and agricultural
production, 1940-1975 
(1950=100)
1,000
800
600
400
200
1940 1946 1952 1958 1964 1970 1975
Agriculture Manufecturing 
Source: NAFINSA (1977: 107 and 146).
Earlier signs of social unrest had been provided by the teachers' demonstrations 
in 1958, the railroads workers' strike in 1958-59, and the medical interns' protests in 1964 
(see Gil 1992: 30-34). The likelihood that these developments occurred because of the 
1954 devaluation shed light on the selection of labour minister Adolfo Lopez Mateos as
^For instance, Padilla (1989), Carmona et al. (1990), Wionczek et al. (1971), and Aguilar and 
Carmona (1972).
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the PRI presidential candidate in 1957. For various reasons, this choice resembles that of 
the interior minister Echeverria in 1969. In both cases, the population's purchasing power 
had been severely affected, and an atmosphere of social dissatisfaction surrounded the 
succession process. Moreover, selective repression was a common feature in dealing with 
growing opposition during both administrations.
The economic policies of the ‘stabilising development’ era did not emerge from 
the brains of the presidents between 1958 and 1970, but from those of the SHCP 
economic technicians led by minister Ortiz Mena. During this period, this ministry 
became a crucial liaison between government and the domestic business community. As 
the presidential transition approached, the latter sector not only regarded Ortiz Mena as 
the best candidate to succeed Diaz Ordaz, but pushed hard to make it possible. The 
massacre of students in the eve of the 1968 Olympic Games, however, hampered this 
possible course of events. This benchmark in Mexican history was an starting point for 
change. Roderic Ai Camp distinguishes seven political effects stemming from the 
Tlatelolco events (in Rodriguez 1993: 247-252). One of them is worth noting here: the 
revival of the populist thread in government economic-decision making.
From a narrower political perspective, the 1968 repression is difficult to dissociate 
from the process of presidential succession. However, president Diaz Ordaz publicly 
assuming all the responsibility for the decision has usually diverted the attention from the 
domestic political and bureaucratic context. To begin with, 1968 was a crucial year in the 
selection of the PRI presidential candidate. The fact that most criticism from both 
students and scholars was directed to the flaws of the political system rather than to those 
of the economic model did not benefit the interior minister's presidential aspirations. The 
conflict getting out of control might do so, and this is what actually happened. 
Echeverria's personal participation in the decision making during the 1968 events, 
however, remains a controversial issue."* What seems to be clearer is that the adverse 
climate generated by the brutal response to the demonstrators, with its immediate political 
consequences, made the selection of minister Echeverria a rational, almost logical 
decision.
'* Jâquez, for example, contends that Echeverria not only isolated and kept the president 
uninformed during the 1968 events, but also that he advocated the use o f repression (in Proceso 884, 
11/10/93: 6-11). The view that the interior minister played a marginal role is suggested by Scherer (1986: 
20,43-44).
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One of the major political consequences of that 1968 crisis was the presidency's 
dramatic loss of legitimacy. The way candidate, and later president, Echeverria dealt with 
this problem was to dissociate himself from the government he had so diligently served. 
A fracture only comparable with that between Cardenas and Galles broadened the gap not 
only between Echeverria and his predecessor, but between their administrations.
The Echeverria years
Apart from his concern about the need for "a more democratic society", one theme 
dominated president Echeverria's inaugural speech of December 1,1970. It was the flaws 
of'stabilising development', especially that of income maldistribution. As he put it, "the 
excessive concentration of income and the marginal position of large groups of 
population threatens the harmonic continuity of development" (quoted by Solis 1981: 
199). By offering to build "a vast and solid popular alliance" on a more egalitarian basis, 
the president intended to reestablish a working relationship with the alienated leftist 
sectors within and without government. His metamorphosis "from repressive secretario 
de gobernacion to progressive, democratizing president" had begun (Shapira 1978: 71). 
And so had, at least rhetorically, the era of'shared development', for president Echeverria 
started his administration with essentially good relations with the business community 
despite his inflammatory discourse (Bailey in Camp 1986: 123).
Echeverria's first budget represented an unsurmountable obstacle to any attempt 
at expanding the economy, let alone at redistributing income. The austerity programme 
underpinning this budget led in 1971 to the lowest rate of economic growth since 1959 
(see Blair 1977: 125; Tello 1983: 48). His future budgets would show, however, a 
dramatic departing point from this short-lived experiment. The total federal government 
expenditures went from 11.5 percent of GDP in 1972 to 14.6 percent in 1975 (as 
compared with 9 percent in 1971) (Reynolds 1978, table 3: 1009). It meant that president 
Echeverria had decided to abandon the financial and monetary stability that had 
characterised the 'stabilising development' era. Not surprisingly, it brought the brief 
'honeymoon' between him and the private sector to an end. Nevertheless, the latter sector 
could successfully oppose almost all the government's actions considered against its 
interests (Martinez 1984: 170).
Though public expenditures were going up, revenues failed to keep pace. Two 
weeks after Echeverria's inauguration, a proposal of tax reform provoked the angry
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reaction of the private sector (see Green 1981: 82-83; Tello 1983: 44-45). Influential 
business leader Roberto Guajardo complained that the government had broken the 
"healthy" rule of consulting the business organisations when taking decisions that could 
affect their interests. Eventually, a diminished tax law proposal was sent to Congress for 
approval. A very similar history characterised the 1972 and 1975 attempts at tax reform 
(see Solis 1981: 72-76; Martinez 1984: 190-196). Apart from the business opposition, 
these outcomes were the result of the weak support government gave to the reforms. As 
Elizondo wrote, "Echeverria never wholly supported the [tax] reform, and important 
government agencies were openly against it, which made the position of business 
stronger" (1994: 187). The most important of these agencies was the SHCP.
Not surprisingly, total federal revenue, as percent of the GDP, increased from 8.02 
in 1971 to only 10.37 in 1975 (Reynolds 1978, table 3: 1009). This two-point increase 
was the result of taxes affecting mainly the middle class (Shapira 1978: 31-32). To tacke 
the lack of enough fiscal revenue, government resorted to money supply^ and, above all, 
to external borrowing to finance public sector growing deficits. Inflation jumped from 5.6 
percent in 1972 to 24 percent in 1974. A healthier option could have been raising public 
sector prices. However, the policy of subsidised oil products was kept virtually 
untouched, thus aggravating public finances even further.
As time went by, Echeverria's policies began resembling those of the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, "when the economy was overheated to expand infrastructure and 
production capacity" (Reynolds 1978: 1015). This time, however, the external context 
was particularly adverse. World-wide inflation and economic recession in 1973 and 1974 
meant higher prices and a weak export demand. Moreover, between 1972 and 1974, the 
annual rates of interest charged by the US banks had gone up fi-om 5.25 to 10.81 percent, 
and remained high during 1975 and 1976 (SALA 24, 1985, table 3227: 807). 
Furthermore, as table 3.1 revels, between 1971 and 1974, Mexico became an importer of 
crude oil, precisely when international prices were going up.
On the political side, the panorama was not promising either. In June 1971, six 
months after the beginning of the sexenio, a student demonstration was repressed in 
Mexico City by the Halcones, a paramilitary group reportedly on the DDF's payroll.
* Money supply annual rates increased from 21 percent in 1971 to 24 percent in 1975 (Blair 1977:
125).
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Resignations of high-rank officials and an official inquiry could not repair the early 
political damage done to the regime's credibility. Despite efforts at coopting some 
activists in the 1968 events and the following "softening of the system" (Gil 1992: 38), 
government hard-line response had the effect of spurring opposition outside the system. 
Thus, more politically relevant than the emergence of some leftist parties was that of 
urban and rural guerrillas. It triggered a permanent, though usually invisible, highly 
repressive government response.
TABLE 3.1. Mexico oil trade and crude oil international prices, 1964-1982 
( Trade oil in thousands o f barrels and oil prices in dollars per barrel)
Exports Imports
Year Crude Refined Crude Refined Price
1964 7,621 9,545 577 2,606 1.80
1965 4,800 15,045 0 1,255 1.80
1966 0 17,057 0 3,525 1.80
1967 0 17,984 0 3,624 1.80
1968 0 16,094 0 3,619 1.80
1969 0 16,263 0 8,652 1.80
1970 0 22,413 0 9,312 1.80
1971 0 17,079 672 17,088 2.23 (a)
1972 0 9,448 10,776 16,291 2.48
1973 0 8,699 23,613 24,159 3.62 (a)
1974 5,804 6,659 6,557 16,019 11.45 (a)
1975 34,382 2,568 0 18,152 11.25
1976 34,470 1,220 0 9,285 11.50
1977 73,736 1,652 0 3,466 12.35 (a)
1978 133,247 673 0 10,616 13.57 (a)
1979 194,485 3,701 0 9,877 30.50 (a)
1980 302,957 17,543 0 5,429 36.00 (a)
1981 400,778 24,206 0 3,705 35.50 (a)
1982 544,614 15,357 0 3,017 33.00 (a)
(a) means average annual price.
Source: On oil trade,Wilkie (1988, table 3518: 932); on oil prices, Jenkins (1986, table 1: 3).
The violent climate during Echeverria's first years in office is responsible for a 
turning point in the role of the military within the political system. Contrasting with its 
steady decline in previous decades, the military began to regain influence during the 
1970s as its involvement in both anti-guerrilla and anti-drug campaigns grew (see 
Williams in Camp 1986: 144-146). The same conditions also enhanced the role of 
Gobernacion's police-intelligence apparatus. Since December 1970, former DFS's 
director Gutierrez Barrrios had been appointed under-secretary of national security.
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Besides, two appointments deserve special attention, namely those of Javier Garcia 
Paniagua, who had succeeded him as director of the DFS, and that of Miguel Nazar Haro 
as his deputy director. This triumvirate was "the force behind the formation of the White 
Brigade, a clandestine paramilitary police unit that was responsible for the 'disappearance' 
of thousands of opponents of the regime between 1972 and 1980" (Reding 1989: 708).
As noted by Yoram Shapira (1978: 71-72), the abundant domestic difficulties 
being faced by president Echeverria are responsible for his second political 
transformation, namely "from domestic reformer to foreign policy innovator". This shift, 
beginning with his first grand tour in early 1973, allowed him to divert attention to a 
"less conflict-prone" arena. Evidently, foreign policy was used by the president "as a 
major source for internal revolutionary legitimation".^
President Echeverria versus the Finance Ministry?
During the ‘stabilising development’ years, the SHCP consolidated an enormous 
power and a considerable degree of autonomy over economic policy-making. While 
presidents Lopez Mateos and Diaz Ordaz opted for backing the economic policy options 
offered by the SHCP, president Echeverria decided to alter this course of action by 
participating actively in the realm of economic policy and public finances (Bailey 1984: 
79; Ibarra and Alberro 1989: 159), thus inaugurating what Zaid (1990) first called 
economiapresidencial. This unprecedented move has at least three possible explanations, 
which are not necessary mutually exclusive. First, Echeverria may have reacted to the 
financial group leaded by Ortiz Mena because it was associated vrith the economic 
strategy, and its shortcomings. Echeverria's inaugural speech provides a clear criticism 
of the way the economy had been managed by the financial group of the SHCP:
"It is not certain that there is an inevitable dilemma between economic expansion and 
income distribution. Those who preach that we have to grow first in order to distribute 
later are mistaken or lie because of their own interests." (quoted by Solis 1981, Appendix 
B :200)
A more political interpretation is related to the succession battle. It was only 
logical that the winner got rid of the other serious contenders for the presidential 
nomination. They included the secretary of the Presidencia Emilio Martinez Manatou, 
and Ortiz Mena whose candidature had been visibly supported by the private sector. A
 ^It is worth noting that exactly one decade earlier, president Lôpez Mateos had visited Yugoslavia 
and Poland in a "move designed to achieve similar objectives" (Shapira 1978: 41-42).
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different political interpretation is related with the momentum gained by the government 
structuralists represented by Horacio Flores de la Pena, himself an outspoken critic of the 
SHCP's policies (Lopez Portillo 1988: 350). His appointment as head of SEP ANAL was 
a clear victory for those advocating expansion of public spending. Former dean of the 
UN AM's ENE, he was linked not only with the reformist academic circles of UN AM, but 
also with the progressive wing within government. During the tenure of Eduardo 
Bustamante (1958-1964), SEP ANAL housed most government structuralists. Because 
most radical members of the Bustamante's team were shifted out of that ministry in 1964, 
the appointment of Flores de la Pefia, Bustamante's student at UN AM, meant the revival 
of the reformist thread in SEP ANAL.
In the last months of the Diaz Ordaz administration, Ortiz Mena was replaced by 
lawyer Hugo B. Margâin at the SHCP. According to the latter, the replacement had the 
purpose of allowing the preparation of the 1971 Budget to be carried out by personnel of 
the incoming administration (Margâin quoted by Ramirez in Colmenares et al. 1982: 
116). It seems to be clear that the finance minister Margâin was neither a member of Ortiz 
Mena's inner circle, nor of that of president Echeverria. Having served as director general 
in the SHCP's revenue branch for twelve years, he had left that agency as early as 1959, 
that is, one year after Ortiz Mena's arrival at this ministry. During the Lopez Mateos 
administration, Margâin occupied high posts in the more progressive SIC ,^ and in the 
following administration he was appointed ambassador to the US where he stayed till late 
1970. This balanced background, with his links with the domestic and foreign capitals, 
made him a good candidate for the SHCP.®
Margâin had two main tasks, namely, to get approved a 10 percent tax on luxury 
goods and to cope with the economic stagnation observed in 1971. For the reasons 
already discussed, he failed to achieve the first task as the original list of items to be taxed 
was drastically trimmed. Clearly, failing to cope with economic stagnation had more 
complex causes. Domestically, president Echeverria had promised to reduce the deficit
’ It has been observed that, before 1970, there was "a good deal o f political bickering" between 
the SHCP and the SIC, stemming from the more progressive 'import-substitution' approach o f the latter 
(Solis 1981:45).
* A more radical interpretation o f this appointment is provided by Erfani. In her opinion, it was 
influenced by "large-scale private business preferences", which reflected the lack o f president-elect's 
autonomy regarding private investors in 1969 and 1970 (1995: 110). This interpretation fails to 
satisfactorily explain Margain's resignation in 1973.
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of the balance of payments and to control inflation (see Whitehead 1979-1980). 
Externally, apart from effects of the recession in the US, Nixon's ten percent tariff on 
imports decreed in August 1971 had a significant negative impact on the performance of 
the Mexican economy (Basanez 1991: 172).
In any event, the growth slowdown and the rise of unemployment caused by the 
austerity experiment not only discredited the SHCP and its head, but enhanced the 
alternate strategy being proposed by SEP ANAL. Certainly, since his first day in office, 
Flores de la Pena and his team had begun to advocate the need for both major economic 
changes and expansionist spending policies in order to reactive the economy. Persuaded 
by him and other influential neo-Keynesians that the SHCP's policies were the main cause 
of the economic setback, president Echeverria shifted his economic strategy. This shift 
was reflected by the 1972 Budget, and publicly announced in mid-1972. Julie A. Erfani 
describes these institutional developments as follows:
"Luis Echeverria's presidency became a battleground between two rival central 
secretariats, Patrimonio [SEPANAL] and the Treasury [SHCP]. This battle was less a 
product o f the president's own personal initiatives to reform the economy than o f the 
initiatives o f reformist technocrats who were spurred to action by economic and political 
crisis and eager to take advantage o f crisis conditions to undercut the Treasury's 
inordinate governmental authority." (1995: 102)
Stepping up public spending raised the problem of how to finance it. The failure 
to carry out a comprehensive tax reform in 1972 not only increased the ongoing tensions 
between the presidency and the SHCP, but led to Margain's eventual firing in May 1973. 
This decision would generate Echeverria's famous expression that "the economic policy 
is made at Los Pinos". By underlying this fact, the president was implicitly recognising 
that in the past that policy had been produced by SHCP without great presidential 
involvement. As this agency's grip on economic policymaking and on control of public 
spending was weakening, Echeverria's government faced growing private sector 
opposition.
3.2 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND BUREAUCRACY
The Echeverria administration is associated with both high rates of public 
spending and a striking expansion of the government's apparatus. Besides, it is usually 
asserted that spending on social programmes considerably increased, thus marking an 
important departing point from previous administrations. In this section, we argue that.
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despite the inflammatory rhetoric and the turmoil that characterised this sexenio, 
Echeverria's general economic strategy not only followed the general trends of state-led 
industrialisation going on, but accelerated them. This fact being reflected by the expanded 
government structure intensified the institutional and bureaucratic trends discussed in the 
previous chapter.
Towards industrial statism
In the aggregate, the growth of the federal public sector during the Echeverria 
years is notable. As a result, the number of people employed by government increased 
from around 530,000 in 1970 to 900,000 in 1976 (Solis 1981: 145). And bigger 
government meant higher budgets. Regarding the latter, some comments are at point. 
Because of the austerity programme, public expenditure as percent of the GDP decreased 
in 1971 (as compared with that in each of the previous six years). This was so despite an 
astonishing 81 percent excess of actual over projected expenditures (see Cothran and 
Cothran 1988, table 9: 334). Interesting enough is the fact that from 1972 onwards the 
gap between actual and projected expenditures settled down to about 'normal' budgetary 
practices in a developing country.® For instance, the percent change from projected to 
actual gross central expenditure (excluding the parastate sector) dropped to 41.1 in 1972, 
and to 14.4 in 1973 (Wilkie 1985: 872).
TABLE 3.2 Federal expenditure by type of emphasis, 1953-1976 
(Average percentages by administration)
Economic Social Administrative
Ruiz Cortines (1953-58) 53 14 33
Lopez Mateos (1959-64) 39 20 41
Diaz Ordaz (1965-70) 41 21 38
Echeverria (1971-76) 45 24 31
Source: Cothran and Cothran (1988: 332).
 ^The end of the budgetary-secrecy era is associated with Wilkie's classic book on Mexican federal 
expenditures published in 1967 (Wilkie 1985: 864; Cothran and Cothran 1988: 335).
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Table 3.2 shows that central government's economic expenditure grew steadily 
in the period 1959-1976, and so did social expenditure in the period 1953-1976.*° 
Because its headings are too broad, these trends can lead to misleading conclusions. A 
clearer picture of the spending policies and priorities of the Echeverria administration is 
provided by the way funds for public investment were allocated. As table 3.3 reveals, 
beginning in 1941, there is a clear trend towards higher investment in industry at the 
expense of other sectors (especially communications and transport). During the 
Echeverria years, industry took 40 percent of the total investment, that is, the same 
percentage devoted to that sector by the Diaz Ordaz administration. The same table also 
shows that Echeverria's social investment was actually lower than that of his two 
predecessors, while investment in agriculture increased from 14.5 percent in the period 
1941-1970 to only 15.6 percent in the period under discussion. In combination, these 
facts suggest no major shift from the development priorities of the 'stabilising 
development' era. As in the past, federal expenditure was used to achieve industrial 
expansion rather than income redistribution.
TABLE 3.3 Public sector investment by selected sectors, 1941-1982 
(Percentages of total investment by administration)
Communications Defence and
Agriculture Industry and Transport Social Administration
Avila Camacho (1941-46) 15.7 10.2 51.6 12.9 1.8
Alemân (1947-52) 22.0 18.9 40.2 13.3 0.2
Ruiz Cortines (1953-58) 13.0 30.2 36.3 14.3 3.0
Lôpez Mateos (1959-64) 10.6 37.5 24.9 24.2 2.8
Diaz Ordaz (1965-70) 11.0 40.0 22.0 25.0 2.0
Echeverria (1971-76) 15.6 40.0 21.7 19.0 2.8
Lôpez Portillo (1976-82) 19.8C) 51.8 15.1 10.4 2.3
Since 1981, this figure includes investment for regional programmes in the past regarded as 
social investment.
Source: Levy and Szekely (1987, table 5.2: 135), calculations based on official figures.
The kind of parastate entities created during the Echeverria years tells us 
interesting things about how government expansion took place. Figure 3.2 shows that the
The table being analysed is based on Wilkie's data and classification o f expenditure. Roughly 
speaking, economic expenditure includes industry, commerce, agriculture, tourism and investment; social 
expenditure education, health, welfare, and urban infiastructure; and administrative expenditure public debt, 
current expenditure, and wages. See table 1-4 in Wilkie (1967: 13) for details.
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number of enterprises owned or controlled by the state {empresas de participacion estatal 
mayoritaria) steadily grew from around 150 in 1971 to around 400 in 1976. Regarding 
the decentralised entities {organismos decentralizados), a similar trend is observed after 
1974. The creation offideicomisos (roughly trusts), however, followed a totally different 
pattern. This pattern reflecting the presidential cycle may be explain by the fact that to 
form a fideicomiso there was virtually no other formality than the president's decision to 
do so. President Echeverria used this particular sort of entities with clear political 
purposes. Apart from serving as a means for personal enhancement, their creation, usually 
on the spot throughout the abundant presidential trips around the country, was one of the 
most apparent ways the president bypassed the traditional expenditure control of the 
SHCP. Yet, what worried observers the most was the first patterns mentioned, since they 
involved more substantial and permanent allocation of public funds.
FIGURE 3.2 Parastate entities registered in SEP ANAL, 1971-1976
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Source: Em presas Publicas (1978: 23).
Because its rate accelerated, government industrial expansion during the 
Echeverria administration aggravated the institutional imbalances discussed at length in 
the previous chapter. By 1972, for instance, central government was involved in about
94
50 percent of the twenty largest industrial national enterprises (Carrillo Castro in 
Empresas Publicas 1978: 21). The analysis of the about 850 parastate entities existing 
at the end of the administration shows, beyond doubt, than more than half of them were 
directly connected with industrial development and its financing (see table 3.4 below). 
To be sure, various important welfare institutions and agencies to promote agriculture 
were created. However, as in the past, emphasis on industry further consolidated the role 
of two components of the 'familiar trinity', namely the CFE and PEMEX.
At the beginning of the Echeverria administration, Mexico became importer of 
crude oil for the first time since 1965 (see table 3.1 above). By 1973, there were various 
indicators that oil might be used, in the near future, to finance development. Following 
the oil discoveries in Tabasco and Chiapas in 1972, PEMEX's total investment increased 
significantly (see Philip 1982, table 17.5: 355). As result, in 1975, the oil production 
reached 700,000 barrels per day (as compared with 240,000 bpd in June 1974). It allowed 
the export of a substantial amount of crude after that year (see again table 3.1). Another 
indicator that the issue of increasing oil exports was in the presidential agenda is provided 
by Echeverria's declaration in mid-1974 that Mexico would become a member of OPEC 
"if it was officially invited".
In a context of international oil prices going up since 1972, a more active oil 
policy was not only rational, but tempting. There was, however, a severe constraint. To 
further increase oil production huge investments were necessary. Even having easy access 
to the resources required, it is clear that the results of such a, policy would not be seen 
during the Echeverria administration, but during that of his successor.
Lôpez Portillo in the presidential race
After the resignation of Margâin, CFE director Lopez Portillo was appointed head 
of the SHCP in May 1973. The rationale of this appointment cannot be understood 
without considering the new finance minister's background. Although Echeverria and 
Lopez Portillo were friends since their adolescence and classmates at UN AM, they 
followed totally different careers. While the former early joined government, Lopez 
Portillo opted for becoming a practicing lawyer, and virtually by chance became a public 
servant. During Lopez Mateos’s presidential campaign, he joined the PRI's Consejos de 
Planeaciôn Economica y  Social, under the direction of Guillermo Rossell (Lopez Portillo 
1988: 258-261). These bodies had been established with the purpose of preparing the
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national plan of the incoming administration. When Rossell was appointed Oficial Mayor 
at SEP ANAL, Lopez Portillo became his legal advisor in 1959, and later head of Federal 
Boards of Material Improvement in the same ministry until 1964. It is worth bearing in 
mind that the head of SEP ANAL was reformist Eduardo Bustamante.
During the Diaz Ordaz administration, Lopez Portillo was legal director (1965-68) 
and under-secretary (1968-70) in the secretary of the Presidencia. Fate had again placed 
him in a pro-statist organisational environment. Between 1965 and 1970, he headed the 
newly created Comision de Administracion Publica (CAP). This commission was aimed 
at carrying out an extensive study of the already congested federal public administration 
and at proposing the reforms that could improve its operation. As we will see later, the 
works of the CAP were of paramount importance not only in shaping Lopez Portillo's 
views of the public sector and its problems, but also in strengthening his emerging 
camarilla.
The arrival of Echeverria in the presidency was good news for Lopez Portillo who 
was appointed under-secretaiy of SEP ANAL in 1970. Interesting enough is the fact that 
he not only returned to this ministry, but his new boss Flores de la Pena was personally 
and ideologically linked with his previous one at the same ministry. One year later, Lopez 
Portillo was appointed head of the CFE, the second most important agency in the 'familiar 
trinity'. After about fifteen years of working in agencies favouring state intervention, 
Lopez Portillo became head of the SHCP in 1973. It was not accidental at all. His 
working experience had given him the opportunity of observing the frequent bureaucratic 
battles between the SEP ANAL, the ministry of the Presidencia and the SHCP, which 
were invariably won by the last agency (Lopez Portillo 1988: 276).
Gradually, Lopez Portillo became convinced of the necessity of curbing the 
SHCP's influence over public spending and investment. Moreover, his later heading 
government's newly created commission for administrative reform gave him a unique 
opportunity to develop a strategy to achieve that goal. Therefore, it does not come as a 
surprise that if president Echeverria wanted to neutralise the influence of the SHCP, as 
he did, Lopez Portillo was the best candidate to replace Margâin. There is, however, some 
debate on the role played by Lopez Portillo as finance minister.
According to Erfani, his "restrictive" monetary policies counteracted the 
"expansionist" spending policies that the administration was pursuing in accord with the
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plans of Flores de la Pena (1995: 104-105). Moreover, she provides a suggestive 
"deadlock" model to explain the period 1973-1976 (ibid: 115-116). In our view, her ideas 
overemphasize the issue under discussion. To begin with, Lopez Portillo did have to 
adapt to his new role. In his memoirs, he recognises the strong influence that the SHCP 
organisational setting had on him (1988: 363). Moreover, his being a potential pre­
candidate to the presidency explains his prudence in dealing with the private sector, and 
his unwillingness to get involved in a radical tax reform. However, it is a fact that during 
his tenure both public spending and government expansion flourished. Therefore, it is 
hard to deny that Lopez Portillo "deferred to Echeverria's wishes in fiscal matters" (Bailey 
1984: 79).
In September 1975, José Lôpez Portillo was chosen to stand as the PRI's 
presidential candidate. Many hypotheses have been offered to explain this fact. 
Interestingly enough, most of them suggest president Echeverria trying to influence the 
future.'* In addition, two more specific factors might have influenced the succession 
process. First, despite the risks of disorganisation and inefficiency, the Echeverria 
administration carried out no administrative reform to organise and give support to the 
impressive expansion of government structure (Tello 1983: 198). Therefore, the next 
administration could hardly avoid dealing with this issue. Second, using oil to finance 
development was already on the presidential agenda. From this perspective, by firing 
Flores de la Pena from SEP ANAL in January 1975, Echeverria would have hoped to calm 
the business community, while hiding his real statist candidate. Last, but not least, he was 
convinced that key problems for the next administration would be economic, not political. 
This view was confirmed by the economic developments that took place during the last 
year of the administration.
As the end of the presidential administration approached, the economy as a whole 
not only did not improve, but got eventually out of control. After 22 years of a stable rate 
of exchange, the peso was devalued from 12.5 to 26.50 pesos per US dollar between 
August and October 1976. Some key economic indicators illustrate the prevailing 
situation at the end of 1976. The growth of GDP decreased to 4.2 percent (as compared
" For instance, in Reynolds' view, the choice o f Lôpez Portillo "created the conditions for a policy 
bridge between the two periods", thus confirming the rumour that another sexenio o f similar policies was 
needed to consolidate Echeverria's reforms (1978: 1016). Similarly, Bailey thinks that Echeverria "sought 
a personal confidant who was a competent administrator and a weak politician" (1988: 38).
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with 8.5 in 1972), while the annual rate of inflation rose to 27.2 percent (as compared 
with 5.5 in 1972) (Basanez 1991: 158 and 164). In 1976, there was a capital flight of $4 
billion, and public sector deficit reached 9.9 percent of the GDP (Ramirez 1989: 83-84). 
By the end of year, the public debt had risen to over $22,000 million. (Keesing's 1977: 
28169).
Though assessing president Echeverria's policies remains a highly controversial 
i s s u e , o n e  point seems clear: The objectives of more egalitarian and independent 
economic growth were not sorted out. This was so despite a more active role of the state 
in the economy, higher levels of public expenditure, and the various social policies 
implemented. By 1977, 60 percent of the population shared only 23.8 percent of the 
national income, while the top 10 percent of the population 40.6 percent (Ramirez 1989, 
table 4.1: 73). Echeverria's "reformist rhetoric exceeded his ability to deliver: his tax 
reforms proved modest" (Felix 1977:136). Not surprisingly, his stormy presidency ended 
in an atmosphere of social tensions, private sector resentments, speculation, and even 
rumours of a military coup d'etat. As Bailey notes, Echeverria had destroyed an old order 
without constructing a new one (1980: 30).
It is unlikely that president Echeverria had foreseen this end of administration 
when he selected Lopez Portillo. What seems more likely is that this choice sought to 
perpetuate his policies. In other words, in the president's eyes at least, neither Cervantes 
del Rio nor Moya Palencia -the two politicians reputed as front-runners- had the 
qualifications or the experience to continue making the economic policy at Los Pinos. As 
things turned out, neither did Lopez Portillo. In any case, he assured the continuity of the 
‘shared development’ strategy, this time along more explicit presidential ‘indicative 
planning’ lines.
According to Reynolds, the Echeverria's years marked a period of'destabilising development' 
rather than o f 'shared development' (1978: 1016). Tello considered them as a period o f 'shameful 
(vergonzante) stabilising development' (1983: 208). A less critical view is provided by Blair to whom, 
deficit financing was inflationary, but it was not clear that public spending was "excessive" given the 
massive unemployment (1977: 126). Similarly, Camp states that today Mexico's political problems did not 
began with Echeverria's deficit spending policies, for the roots o f  the former extend much deeper (in 
Rodriguez 1993: 246).
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3.3 THE 1976 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
Intentional public sector reform is a common practice in Mexico (Pardo 1992: 
148). Nearly all post-revolutionary presidents have succumbed to the temptation of 
adjusting the bureaucratic apparatus to fit their government programmes. Without 
congressional resistance, it has been a relatively easy task. As elsewhere, these usually 
piecemeal changes have sometimes been supplemented by more grandiose, and more 
explicit, efforts to review and reorganise the administrative machinery of government 
(March and Olsen 1989: 69). In Mexico, the 1976 administrative reform that brought the 
SPP to life is probably the best example of such rare actions. Echoing the prevalent 
development theories, this reform was justified by incoming president Lopez Portillo as 
follows: "To organise the country, we first require to reorganise the government". (Lopez 
Portillo 1976: 4)
Planning and the creation of the SPP
There is a direct link between the 1958 and 1976 administrative reforms, for a 
planning ministry with budgeting powers was nearly created by the first of these reforms. 
Instead, the Secretaria de la Presidencia (SPre), a ministry with much less ambitious 
powers, was eventually set up. Eduardo Bustamante, head of SEP ANAL between 1958 
and 1964, provided in 1966 a crucial piece of information, which sheds enormous light 
on the real objectives of Lopez Mateos's reform (Bustamante in Flores de la Pena et al. 
1986: 121-122). According to him, he himself was responsible for proposing to president 
Lopez Mateos the creation of a Secretariat for Planning and Budget. However, though 
the project was initially approved by the president in December 1958, it suffered two 
substantial changes. First, the agency's name was changed to give the new ministry "more 
authority". Second, "minutes before the corresponding iniciativa was sent to the 
Congress", its powers over budget preparation were suppressed because of pressures of 
"vested interests". Institutionally, these interests had a name: the SHCP.
Tracing the history of planning in Mexico depends entirely on the definition of 
the term adopted. In a strict technical sense, economic planning up to the early 1970s 
never went "beyond the level of well-intentioned attempts" (Solis 1971: 56). Yet a 
remarkable continuity in government's efforts at the attainment of openly stated
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objectives can still be found (Gross in Shafer 1966: x). It was particularly clear regarding 
sectoral planning in irrigation, transportation, education, and electricity (Looney and 
Frederiksen 1982: 5). These abundant attempts implied carrying out planning of an 
indicative and pluralistic nature (Shafer 1966; Solis 1971). However, the success in 
integrated national planning was, on the whole, modest. As Vernon noted, plans often 
represented "sterile quantitative exercises" of the sort of those promoted by the Alliance 
for Progress (1963: 8).*^
If Mexican planning had an indicative nature and its results were limited, why was 
national planning associated with a high rate of agency mortality''^? One plausible 
political explanation is that planning implied controlling environments and agents, that 
is, exercising political power. In a context of high power concentration in the hand of the 
president, the issue of who-controls-who was not irrelevant. As noted by Benveniste, in 
Mexico early planning was used by presidents as an "attempt to maintain their influence" 
over their successors (1970: 81). Much more important, national planning had often 
implied real delegation of presidential power to some ministries and bodies. Thus, since 
the president could not do everything, questions such as who-receives-what, who-sets- 
the-objectives, who-supervises-who not only caused considerable tension within the 
public sector, but led to agency mortality.
Under the 1958 institutional arrangement, the Comision de Inversiones became 
a unit within the SPre. In its new organisational setting, the commission's previous 
success in programming public investment was to decline. While the prior advantages 
were lacking, the disadvantages of a more political ministerial environment were obvious. 
This is at the heart of the SPre failing to prepare a sound national plan. The need for this 
plan for foreign aid negotiations explains what followed. In 1962 president Lopez Mateos 
established an inter-ministerial commission for the "immediate formulation of short- and 
long-term national economic and social development programmes" (DOF 2/3/62). It was
The Plan de Acciôn Inmediata (the most ambitious effort at national planning up to this time), 
for example, was kept in complete secrecy and served only for international aid negotiations (Benveniste 
1970: 85-86).
As emphasized by Gross (in Shafer 1966: xi-xii), the list o f agencies dealing with planning being 
created and soon abolished is endless. Apart from the cases discussed above, earlier casualties include the 
National Economic Council (1928), the National Planning Commision (1930), another National Economic 
Council (1933), Cârdenas's Advisory Committee for Planning, Gobernaciôn's Planning Division (1938), 
and the Federal Commission o f Economic Planning (1942).
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composed of the SPre and the SHCP. This fact meant not only that the former ministry 
had lost full control over its planning functions, but that the latter had reasserted its 
authority on economic matters. Though only two meetings were held (Pichardo 1972:20- 
21), the 'commission' (read the SHCP) produced in only three months the Plan de Acciôn 
Inmediata in mid-1962.
The creation of the inter-ministerial commission under discussion represented a 
backwards movement. In addition, it made once more evident the traditional lack of 
coordination between ministries in Mexico (Shafer 1966: 69). This problem should not 
be neglected, for it represented a reflexion of the highly politicized setting in which 
agencies operated. Sharply put, it was related with a system of marked division of labour 
by specialities, the ongoing system of presidential-ministerial relationships on individual 
basis, and the ministers' logical political expectations. These features had been at the core 
of the inter-ministerial coordinating formula often failing to achieve its full objectives 
(Tucker 1957: 146). At the time, the use of specialised control ministries was producing 
magnified results, for the lack of coordination between them went far beyond the scope 
of the ministries involved.
Of course, there were many other factors hampering national planning. They 
include dispersion of administrative resources for planning and function overlapping. In 
addition, there were technical obstacles such as poor statistics, insufficient research, lack 
of technical criteria, and scarcity of technicians (Flores de la Pena quoted by Solis 
1971:57). As planning became fashionable, Mexican scholars began to discuss these 
problems, and to propose possible solutions.
As argued in chapter one, the 1960s were particularly favourable to the notion of 
economic planning as a condition for both development and modernisation. This explains 
why both academics and government officials were eager to discuss the innovative 
conceptions in fashion. Mexico was not the exception. In April 1965, a national seminar 
on socioeconomic planning was organised under the auspices of the ENE.'^ The 
importance, and orientation, of the event is suggested by the names of two participants: 
Horacio Flores de la Pena and Eduardo Bustamante. It is worth bearing in mind that 
almost simultaneously to this seminar, the CAP began to operate. The influence of the
Even before, the UNAM's School o f Law had organised a seminar on the same topic in August 
1964 {Memoria 1964).
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former on the works of the latter is suggested by the participation of Fernando Solana and 
Pedro Zorrilla, two future CAP's members, in the seminar (see table 4.1 in the next 
chapter).
The participants in the academic event under discussion arrived at two general 
conclusions. First, national planning must be adopted. Second, the public sector had to 
be reorganised accordingly, and a planning body needed to be created. However, one 
point remained controversial, namely, the administrative nature of the "central planning 
organ". Three views on this issue were proposed: (i) the establishment of a commission 
along the lines of the Comision de Inversiones\ (ii) the creation of a planning ministry in 
charge of the elaboration of the budget but not of its execution; (iii) the broadening of the 
power of the existing SPre (Flores de la Pena et al. 1986: 13).*^  After the seminar, the 
CAP began to develop a variant of the last proposal. In essence, this formula coincided 
with Bustamante’s earlier proposal of creating a ministry for planning with control over 
public spending.
Rationale of the 1976 administrative reform
It has been suggested that it is unlikely that the 1976 administrative reform would 
have been carried out, if Lopez Portillo had not become president (Del Villar in Proceso 
12, 22/1/77: 6-13). This statement is not totally exact, for the impressive growth of the 
public sector during the Echeverria years made a comprehensive administrative reform 
almost inevitable. Moreover, the evidence already discussed supports the view that Lopez 
Portillo's reform was not an isolated project responding exclusively to personal 
preferences, but the logical culmination of a policy of institutional reform whose roots 
could be traced to the mid-1940s. Though Lopez Mateos's reform marked a crucial stage 
in this process, its success was fairly limited. To begin with, the SPre, one of its major 
contributions, never became an efficient technical agency in its own right (Wionczek in 
Flores de la Pena et al. 1986).
More significant, the reform had produced three ministries with supervisory and 
control functions: SHCP, SPre and SEP ANAL. However, because of the notorious lack 
of coordination between them, it seemed as if a supra-machinery was required to 
coordinate the existing one. It was precisely to find solutions to this and other problems
For a further discussion of these views, see Pichardo (in Flores de la Pefia et al. 1986: 97-110) 
and Pichardo (1972: Chapter 5).
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that the CAP was set up in 1965. Its conclusions, presented some years later in a 
document entitled Reporte sabre Reforma Administrativa, were very simple indeed.'^ The 
‘efficiency triangle’ (as the institutional trinity aforementioned was called) was actually 
an inefficiency triangle. It was argued that weak coordination impaired not only effective 
central programming and planning, but also presidential control over bureaucracy. And 
the major identified cause for this was the overwhelming de facto dominance of the 
SHCP over the other two control ministries. Thus, to make the ‘efficiency triangle’ work 
this dominance should be reduced.
Partly because of the 1968 events and partly because of the arrival of Echeverria 
in the presidency (Cuevas 1987: 245-246; see also Carrillo Castro 1980: 116-119), the 
CAP recommendations had to wait for better times to be fully implemented. Despite this 
fact, they never faded away in the mind of their key architect: Lopez Portillo. On the 
contrary, his experience as finance minister further convinced him that if "an authentic 
[administrative] reform was wanted, even considering all the risks involved, it had to 
begin with the Secretarîa de Hacienda" (Lopez Portillo 1988: 286). Eventually, his 
reaching the presidency gave him the long-awaited opportunity to take from the SHCP 
its spending functions and transfer them to an empowered SPre, that is, the plan that had 
been frustrated in December 1958.
In his inaugural speech, president Lopez Portillo announced the broad lines of his 
administrative reform as follows: (i) One ministry in control of public spending would 
be in charge of programming and planning development; (ii) a national plan to be 
produced by this ministry would be the articulating framework of the various sectoral 
programmes and their objectives; (iii) for purposes of control and coordination, the 
parastate entities would be grouped into sectors (Lopez Portillo 1976: 6-7). The reform 
had two explicit goals: efficiency and honesty. Consonant with these basic ideas, a torrent 
of laws and fiats was approved in the first months of the administration, to give legal 
support to the reform (see Bases 1977).
The 1958 Ley de Secretarias y  Departamentos de Estado, regulating the structure 
and function of the federal executive branch, was substantially modified and renamed, 
thus becoming Ley Organica de la Administracion Publica Federal (LOAPF) (DOF
For a more extensive account o f the works o f the CAP, see Carrillo Castro (1980),
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29/12/76). This law introduced various significant institutional innovations into the 
operation 'efficiency triangle', thus altering the existing institutional linkages and 
distributional features within the executive branch. To begin with, it abrogated the SPre 
and created the SPP as the ministry responsible for public spending and national 
planning. As a result, the role of the SHCP was reduced to that of tax collection and 
credit raising. On the other hand, SEP ANAL was transformed into Secretarîa de 
Patrimonio y  Fomenta Industrial (SEPAFIN) as a result of being given the power to 
intervene in the industrial sector as a whole. This was done to the detriment of the former 
ministry of industry and commerce which became simply Secretarîa de Comercio.
TABLE 3.4 Parastate entities by sector in January 1977
OD EPMay EPMin Fid Total
Sectors:
Industrial (SEPAFIN) 10 218 42 22 292
Financial (SPP/SHCP) 2 80 3 64 149
Human Settlements (SAHOP) 48 6 0 52 106
Agricultural (SARH) 11 54 5 22 92
Communications (SCT) 4 47 6 9 66
Commerce (SC) 8 30 0 3 41
Education (SEP) 15 13 0 13 41
National security (Gobernacion) 3 18 0 8 29
Fisheries (DP) 0 22 1 4 27
Tourism (ST) 1 12 2 9 24
Welfare (SSA) 17 0 0 1 18
Labour (STyPS) 3 0 0 3 6
Total 122 500 59 210 891
The table does not include IMSS, ISSSTE, INFONAVIT, DIF and CONACYT for these 
parastate entities are linked directly from the presidency,OD= Organismos descentralizados; EPMay= 
Empresas de participaciôn estatal mayoritaria; EPMin= Empresas de participacion estatal minoritaria; 
Fid=Fideicomisos.
Source: Calculation based on the 'Acuerdo por el cual se agrupan las entidades paraestales par  
sector es definidos' (DOF 17/1/77).
Apart from this redistribution of resources at ministerial level, the LOAPF also 
altered in a significant way the central-parastate relationship. In principle, the direct 
supervision of the latter was not assigned to one ministry, but to most of the ministries 
on a sectoral basis. In January 1977, a fiat made public the resulting sectoral grouping of 
the parastate entities. Table 3.4 summarises the changes introduced by this fiat by 
presenting the sectors created as well as the number and kind of entities comprising each
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of them. The same table also shows, in brackets next to the name of the sector, the 
ministries responsible for the coordination of each sector. These ministries were 
designated as "cabezas de sector" (sector heads). As the table reveals, SEP AFIN was 
charged with the coordination of around 33 percent of the total entities, including 
PEMEX and the CPE. More significant, apart from heading the financial sector, both the 
SPP and the SHCP were given the higher rank of "dependencias globalizadoras" 
considering their normative functions being related to whole administrative apparatus. 
Legally, it placed these ministries in the centre of the new sectorisation scheme.
Article six of the LOAPF gave the president the legal right to call meetings with 
any number of ministers in order to define or evaluate policy matters. In other words, it 
established the legal base for cabinet meetings. The importance of this change cannot be 
overemphasized, for it represented a radical departure from well-rooted political- 
bureaucratic practices. In the past, it was customary that the president held frequent 
sessions with each minister on individual basis (Scott 1964: 280; Padgett 1966: 159). In 
other words, collective decision making was virtually nonexistent. The consequences of 
holding cabinet meetings would be immediately felt as will be discussed later in this 
chapter.
Regarding national planning, the logic of the reform was to formulate a six-year 
plan, to translate its specific programmes into operating budgets, and to implement them 
through the restructured public sector. Thus, there was an attempt, as noted by Bailey, "to 
move away from the market-orientated style of SHCP toward a style of goal-based 
budgeting grounded in medium-term planning" (1984: 80). To regulate this variant of the 
PPB system, the Ley de Presupuesto Contabilidady Gasto Publico and the Ley General 
de Deuda Publica were enacted (DOF 31/12/76). There was, however, a problem. The 
effectiveness of PPB, the leading analytical technique of the 1960s, was not only being 
questioned, but the American government had stopped using it in 1971 (Schick 1973).
The SPP: A ’presidential liaison*
Beyond doubt, the most significant change introduced by the LOAPF was the 
creation of the SPP. For the logic of the entire institutional arrangement it established 
conceived this ministry as its cornerstone. It was early noted that the "importance of this 
new secretariat to the government can be seen in the powers it possesses" (Rorem 1978:
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384). As no other agency, the SPP gathered not only new functions, but also duties 
formerly attributed to other ministries. Among others, it was given the responsibilities of 
developing national, sectoral and regional economic and social plans; formulating the 
public spending programme; supervising all the expenditures and evaluating their results; 
and dictating practices of outside audits for all the public administration (see LOAPF, 
article 32). Clearly, the fact that functions which had previously been "diffused among 
several secretariats" were now concentrated in one raised important questions about the 
preeminence of the SPP.
Paradoxically, article 10 of the LOAPF came to establish for the first time that 
ministries had legally the same rank. It was naive to consider that the existing ministerial 
pre-eminences could be affected by decree or fiat. Similarly, it was often pointed out that 
the grouping of parastate entities into sectors did not mean political dependence, for they 
were to maintain their relative autonomy. These legal statements were no more than pure 
rhetoric which overshadows the real aims of the reform. In brief, the creation of the SPP 
had the purpose of strengthening the role of the presidency in controlling bureaucracy, 
and also in directing the country's development process. As noted by Rorem, "it would 
appear that the government is attempting to control bureaucracy through an on-going 
focusing of the intent behind government action" (1978: 387).
In essence, what president Lopez Portillo wanted was to replace the "efficiency 
triangle" with a single, central ministry. As Bailey put it, the SPP was to replace this 
triangle with "a straight-line concept" (1988: 71). It meant a direct link between this 
ministry and the presidency. Politically speaking, this hierarchical arrangement had the 
central purpose of stepping up the 'présidentialisation' of the economy, while allowing the 
presidency a more direct control of the central bureaucracy.
Legally, the SPP was granted the power to intervene in most areas of the federal 
public sector operation. A complex combination of legal powers and lines of 
subordination allowed this ministry to participate not only in the work of its counterparts, 
but also in that of the parastatal sector through its broad budgeting, supervising, 
accounting, and planning functions. As a result, the SPP emerged as the overall 
coordinator of the federal bureaucracy. Obviously, it meant an encroachment on the 
traditional domains of both the SHCP and the former SEP ANAL. Moreover, the
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programming units created within the ministries and main parastate entities since 1971 
would serve as institutional links in the SPP's chain of command.
Although legally and politically the SPP was subordinated to the presidency, there 
were some potential risks in creating a super-ministry in a highly centralised, presidential 
context. Again Rorem gave some insights: "Perhaps the President's authority to establish 
his ovm technical support group is one method of insuring that one secretariat does not 
assume disproportionate powers." (1978: 384).
To begin with, paraphrasing Lopez Portillo, the SPP has to organise itself to 
reorganise the central public sector. This was relevant for, in the logic of the reform, this 
agency was not only an outcome, but a key implementing mechanism of the 
administrative reform. The structure of the SPP followed the general pattern applicable 
to that of all ministries (see figure 3.3 below). Immediately below the secretary there were 
three under-secretaries responsible for the same number of core functions, namely 
programming, budgeting, and evaluation. Almost at the same hierarchical level there was 
a chief administrative officer {Oficial Mayor) and two general coordinators concerned 
with specific programmes. In each state, an SPP's representation was to be created. What 
would prove crucial in the first years of the agency, however, was not this particular 
organisational arrangement, but the origin of the SPP's constituent parts as will be seen 
later.
Evidently, such an ambitious institutional reform could not be implemented in a 
short period. Aware of this situation, the reformers conceived the process of 
administrative reform as permanent, and taking place at various stages. In general, the 
explicit objectives of the programme of reform for the period 1976-82 were: (i) to adopt 
programming; (ii) to establish a better personnel system; (iii) to improve coordination 
between federal and local levels of government; and (iv) to improve justice 
administration (Memoria 1981: 49). In any event, the first stage of the reform was crucial 
to the success of the complete project.
3.4 REALITY VERSUS THEORY: THE SPP CRITICAL YEARS
As the cornerstone of the 1976 administrative reform, the SPP had the 
responsibility of putting to the test not only the reform's theoretical foundations, but more 
important their suitability within the Mexican context. Therefore, crucial to the success
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of the reform was not only that this agency began to operate at once, but also that its 
operation stuck to the original plan. While the first situation did happen, there were from 
the very beginning relevant timing and operational deviations from what was assumed 
by the reformers. These problems contrasted with the overwhelming presidential support 
for the reform. This section explores the main deviations and the initial problems faced 
by the SPP. In doing so, special attention is paid to the broader context being responsible 
for or associated to them.
Defining the economic model: Planning versus finance
Before Lopez Portillo took office, one event would greatly affect the future of the 
still unborn SPP. At the beginning of his political campaign, Lopez Portillo appointed 
Moctezuma Cid head of the PRI's lEPES and charged him with giving the administrative 
reform its final shape. According to Bailey, he designed the SPP with the expectation of 
heading it (1980: 46-47). In Granados Chapa's view, since Moctezuma Cid was sure of 
heading the SPP, he took important powers away from the SHCP {La Jornada 7/1/92:1). 
José Ramon Lopez Portillo, a key witness to these events, not only confirms these 
rumours, but sheds further light on the issue: "Until the last moment, Moctezuma Cid was 
Lopez Portillo's candidate to the SPP, while Carlos Tello was so to the SHCP". 
According to him, Moctezuma and Tello's ideological orientations could balance the role 
to be played by both agencies: "A rightist would have to look for growth and expansion, 
while a leftist would have to keep expenditures down." A few days before his 
inauguration, however, Lopez Portillo changed his mind. On the verge of the Alliance for  
Production, he became convinced that the appointment of the leftist Tello at the SHCP 
might have a negative effect on the business community.**
In December 1976, Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid was appointed head of the 
SHCP, while Carlos Tello Macias went to the SPP. It is worth noting that both had 
participated in CAP and knew each other well. However, their appointments were 
responsible for their long-lasting relationship deteriorating rapidly "to the point of 
hatred".*^ Broader environmental factors are responsible for transforming an explicable
Interview with José Ramôn Lôpez Portillo (London, 1/12/95).
As noted by Caiden and Wildavsky, the intrinsic tensions between finance and planning are 
reinforced by the attitudinal differences o f the kind o f personnel recruited: "The finance ministry is likely 
to get accountants, lawyers, and low-level technicians on their way up. ..  The planning commission is likely 
to include economists and other men with advanced degrees whose rationale is to overcome the faults o f
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dispute over jurisdictions into a more complex national issue. The effects of the economic 
crisis of 1976, with the possibility of national planning, had the effect of reviving a key 
economic debate: The orientation of the country's development. Moreover, the holding 
of cabinet meetings, virtually since the beginning of the presidential administration, 
provided an ideal forum for discussion. The emergence of the views of the already 
polarised factions within government was inevitable.
Contrary to the spirit of the administrative reform, during 1977 not only was there 
total lack of cooperation between the SHCP and the SPP, but their relationships became 
increasingly conflictive. Besides the expected institutional rivalry between finance and 
planning agencies (Caiden and Wildavsky 1990: 239-263), economic and institutional 
factors did add fuel to the flames. Not only was the whole Economic Cabinet polarized 
around two antagonistic positions termed monetarista and estructuralistc^^, but the key 
actors were easily identifiable: SPP (planning) versus SHCP (finance). The former, with 
Patrimonio, strived for growth and expansion, while the latter. Bank of Mexico, 
Commerce and NAFINSA favoured a conservative stabilising strategy, along the lines 
set by the IMF. This polarization was apparent from the first meeting of the Economic 
Cabinet held just eight days after the presidential transition (Lopez Portillo 1988: 492).
At first, president Lopez Portillo was convinced that these antagonistic positions 
within the Cabinet might help him to take decisions, for they could provide concrete 
alternatives from which a final decision could be drawn (1988: 496-97). In practice, the 
mutually excluding nature of such competing claims made it difficult to conciliate or 
balance them. In institutional terms, favouring either of the two antagonistic positions 
could have had the effect of deepening the differences and, in turn, the cabinet disunity. 
This situation was hampering the president's power of decision on economic matters. 
Moreover, there was a risk that he could become a mere witness of the process rather than 
a key actor. In April 1977, after four months of cabinet confrontations, Lopez Portillo had 
a private meeting with Moctezuma and Tello in which he scolded them "for casting doubt 
on the utility of the Economic Cabinet" (1988: 561).
the regular apparatus.. .  Bureaucrats probably have been educated at home, planners abroad." (1990: 241) 
The existence o f those two strategies was not new in Mexico as noted by Basâfiez (1991: 82), 
who traced its origin back to the creation o f the Bank o f Mexico in 1925, However, the debate about their 
feasibilily in Mexico was a feature o f the mid-1970s. See Reyes Heroles (1975: 297-303 and 486-492).
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Despite the presidential warning, during the following months the situation not 
only did not improve, but worsened as the rivalry between both agencies became more 
intense (idem: 579-80). More important, Moctezuma and Tello were sending conflicting 
messages to the foreign financial institutions, domestic economic agents, and public 
opinion trying to be on good terms with their own clienteles (see Proceso 55, 21/11/77: 
6- 8).
The discussions on the 1978 Budget caused insurmountable differences about its 
size. While Moctezuma proposed a budget of about $35,500 millions, Tello proposed one 
of $41,000 millions. It confirmed the view that "the major item of controversy" between 
finance and planning agencies "is likely to be the size of the total budget" (Caiden and 
Wildawsky 1990: 240). By November 1977, the Tello-Moctezuma rivalry reached its 
peak, and so did the president's anger which was violently expressed during the Cabinet 
meeting held on November 17 (Lopez Portillo 1988: 648-49). Later that day, Carlos Tello 
submitted his resignation, and the president, besides accepting it, "provoked" that of 
Moctezuma. By taking "the sourest and most painful" decisions until then, Lopez Portillo 
lost simultaneously two of his closest associates. It was the epilogue of 24 stormy 
sessions of Economic Cabinet.
The explanation of the previous events, of course, varies from one actor to 
another. According to the president, the cabinet struggles were simply the result of 
"personal matters and human relationships".^* By contrast, in Carlos Tello's opinion, his 
resignation was an ultimate protest against "the contracting {contraccionistd) policy 
orchestrated by the Hacienda authorities supported by the International Monetary 
Fund."^^ Moreover, in his view, there was a real dispute for the country's ideological 
leadership, a thesis later developed in the book La Disputa por la Nacion (1981). 
Moctezuma has kept silence since then.
In any event, the resignations, "amputations" as Lopez Portillo called them, had 
two relevant consequences. First, they cast serious doubts on the merit of having 
separated revenues from expenditure. Second, they affected the next presidential 
succession. The acceptance of this fact by Lopez Portillo himself (1988: 651-52) means
This interpretation is repeated various times in Lôpez Portillo's memoirs (1988: 561 and 686). 
Text o f Tello's resignation published by all national newspapers next day (e.g., El Nacional, 
18/11/77: 8).
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that he had thought, as early as 1977, of either Moctezuma or Tello to succeed him. If the 
changes restored presidential authority over economic policy, they did not end the central 
problem, for confrontations would continue, though involving new actors. Before dealing 
with this issue, let us explore other problems faced by the SPP.
The SPP internal problems
One of the most relevant internal problems faced by the fledgling SPP was related 
to a weak coordination between its constituent parts (Bailey 1980: 5). In essence, this 
problem stemmed from the way the agency was structured and originally staffed (Bailey 
1984: 86). The defunct SPre contributed with its central structure which came to integrate 
the SPP programming branch, while the SHCP with that of the budgeting branch. By 
contrast, evaluation was a virtually new area. Apart from the difficulties of joining 
together units in the past unrelated, the central problem was that, with the structures, the 
personnel working in them was transferred too. In a context, where it was not accidental 
that agencies were usually staffed on camarilla basis, combining alien personnel clusters 
was a source of severe coordination problems. Thus, the SPP's leadership had to deal with 
numerous small equipos (teams) linked by both diffuse authority lines and different, if 
not opposed, interests (see Grindle 1977b). Although this situation involved the whole 
structure of the SPP, there were important differences in the way each of its main 
components was affected.
As far as the budgeting branch is concerned, the fact that the former SHCP's 
budget team was transferred almost intact to the SPP considerably reduced the possibility 
of coordination problems within this area. On the contrary, the under-secretariat of 
programming was by far the most heterogeneous in terms of both structures and 
personnel. Because of its small size and limited role, the under-secretariat of evaluation 
was the less affected by internal coordination problems. Considering the protagonist role 
that would be played by the budgeting branch, let us explore in more detail its original 
composition.
As figure 3.3 shows, the Subsecretarla de Presupuesto was made up by five 
general directorates, four of them being closely related with the various stages of the 
annual expenditure-budget. Except for that of the directorate of Inversiones Publicas, the 
personnel of the other areas was brought from the SHCP. More important, the head of 
this under-secretariat, Miguel Rico, was an expert on budget matters with a long-career
FIGURE 3.3 SPP Organisation Chart, 1977
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Source: Reglamento Interior de la SPP  (D O F 23/3/77), and Manual de Organizaciân General de la SPP  (D O F 18/7/77).
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in the SHCP. These features gave this area a clear advantage over its counterparts. 
Stability was further enhanced by low rates of turnover between 1977 to May 1979. 
Paradoxically, this special situation encouraged not only coordination bottlenecks within 
the SPP, but more importantly a clear departure from the notion of goal-based budgeting 
on which the whole administrative reform was based.
It was clear that the success in the introduction of the new planning system 
depended on making the programming-budgeting mechanism work without delay, 
evaluation lagging behind. In other words, the key point was to routinize, as soon as 
possible, a process in which long-term programming were linked with the annual 
programme and the way of financing it. In practice, it required a high degree of 
coordination among three general directorates, namely Programming, Public Investment 
and Expenditure, the first being at the centre of the process (see figure 3.3). However, 
with cluster fragmentation, four main factors made such coordination virtually 
impossible: (i) lack of both experience of goal-based budgeting and well-defined 
procedures; (ii) permanent pressures stemming from the urgency of having the annual 
budget ready; (iii) the fact that the three areas were ascribed to two different under­
secretariats; and (iv) attitudinal differences stemming from the background of the 
personnel involved.
The initial tasks of the under-subsecretariat of programming were enormous. 
After creating the preliminary methodologies and procedures for long-term programming, 
it had to formulate a variety of harmonious general programmes for the whole public 
sector based on both external and internal agency consultation and agreed macro- 
economic considerations. Apart from time pressures, stemming mainly from the annual 
operative programme, the under-subsecretary Pascual Moncayo internally had to 
coordinate individuals brought from CONACYT (Julio Boltvinik), the Bank of Mexico 
(Alejandro Castillon), and the SHCP (Carlos Vidali). Moreover, in early 1978, Pascual 
Moncayo himself was replaced by Alfonso Cebreros, and only Alejandro Castillon, the 
General Director of Economic and Social Policy (DGPEyS), stayed in office until May 
1979.
The early problems of the under-secretariat of evaluation had a different source. 
Because until 1976 public programmes were weakly evaluated, the simple announcement 
of the creation this area originated strong across-the-board opposition within the public
113
sector. As noted by Bailey, agencies "preferred to do their own evaluating, if such must 
be done, and were reluctant to pass along information that might become ammunition for 
one or another political group" (1980: 51). Apart from problems of jurisdiction, this 
under-secretariat was confronted with a deeply ingrained problem in Mexico, namely, 
corruption. Though Evaluation managed to exercised influence because of president 
Lopez Portillo's strong support for this area, continued bureaucratic resistance explains 
the powers of the National Evaluation System being transferred to the Presidency, though 
the apparatus remained within the SPP in January 1978.
In this context, it is not surprising that Miguel Rico's team of budgeters had taken 
control of the complete planning-budgeting process. As a result, the idea of expenditure 
as a function of programming was gradually superseded by the SHCP's traditional budget 
approach. In these conditions, it was only logical that the budgeting under-subsecretary 
eventually did its own annual resource-based programming without consulting the other 
areas (Bailey 1980: 50). It was so, despite various efforts to improve coordination among 
the three SPP under-secretariats (Hernandez 1993:154). However, it is worth noting that 
the rise of Miguel Rico's team did not go undisturbed. During 1977, their conservative 
approach to programming was opposed by minister Carlos Tello and under-secretary 
Eduardo Pascual. Not without internal and external resistance, they managed to formulate 
the 1978 Budget, including a five-year general programme for the public sector, 
according to programmatic criteria. Nonetheless, Tello's resignation favoured the trend 
towards SHCP-like budgeting within the SPP.
Garcia Sainz and the consolidation of the 'Budget Team'
In late 1977, Ricardo Garcia Sainz and David Ibarra were appointed heads of SPP 
and SHCP respectively. The fact that neither of them were members of the Lopez Portillo 
inner circle is striking considering the importance of both agencies. It was specially 
surprising regarding the SPP, considering the importance that Lopez Portillo granted to 
this agency. It was true that Rosa Luz Alegria and José Ramon Lopez Portillo, both 
closely linked to the president, had occupied key high-rank position withing the SPP 
since December 1976. However, they were not in a position that favoured their 
controlling the agency's decision making. The most plausible explanation is that Lopez 
Portillo, after losing Moctezuma and Tello, did not find better candidates within his fairly 
small camarilla.
114
In theory at least, the appointment of Garcia Sainz offered some advantage over 
other possible candidates because of his bureaucratic experience. If in late 1977 the 
central presidential interest was oil, Garcia Sainz's job since December 1976 as under­
subsecretary of Control of Government Properties and Industrial Development (the 
second post in importance in SEP AFIN) had put him in close contact with not only 
PEMEX, but the whole parastatal sector. So a more programmatic approach to priority 
public investment could be expected. Second, although not being really his friend, the 
president knew him well, or thought so. In practice, the first advantage, if really expected, 
proved to be nonexistent, while the lack of strong ties between them showed, in turn, the 
importance those ties carry in the Mexican context in successfully carrying out public 
policies.
Like Garcia Sainz, Ibarra was an outsider to the agency he was appointed to. He 
was appointed mainly because of both his ECLA's background and his having headed 
NAFINSA, a centre of structuralist theoreticians. Thus, considering Ibarra's background 
and Garcia Sainz's reputed probusiness orientations, it can be argued that the role played 
by the SHCP and the SPP during 1977, interchanged after that year {Proceso 793, 
13/1/92: 15). Let us focus on the impact of the changes on the SPP.
Though the arrival of Garcia Sainz at the SPP provoked, as expected, some 
personnel turnover within the agency, the budgeting key team remained literally 
untouched. The fact that annual Budget was in process of approval carried a great weight 
in that decision. The new minister, not being himself an expert on budget matters, was 
forced to rely heavily on that team. In any event, despite bringing some programming 
experts from SEP AFIN to key positions in the SPP structure^^, Garcia Sainz never tried 
to neutralise the budget cluster's influence. Instead, as figure 3.4 reveals, the only effect 
of his arrival was a substantial expansion of the agency. Therefore, the president began 
to complain about the traditional budgeting practices taking place within the SPP, asking 
Garcia Sainz in several occasions for a radical policy change. "^* The fact that the many 
presidential instructions to stress programming had been disobeyed shows not only how
For instance, the appointments o f Alfonso Cebreros, former SEP ANAL under-subsecretary 
(1976), as programming under-subsecretary; Jorge Izquierdo, an expert on petrochemical matters, as 
programming director; and, Gustavo Cortez as director o f purchase normativity.
This is a constant theme in Portillo's memoirs between January 1978 and May 1979 (1988:677, 
691,719, 723, 736, and 741).
FIGURE 3.4 SPP Organisation Chart, 1978-1980
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difficult it was to change the budget team's "emphasis on control, legality, and fiscal 
prudence" brought from the SHCP (Bailey 1980:46), but also the disproportionate power 
of this group.^^
As early as February 1978, it was clear to the president that the SHCP was taking 
"non-authorized" measures to delay public expenditure to control inflation (Lopez 
Portillo 1988: 691-92 and 793). Since the Tesorena (Paymaster's Office) remained under 
the jurisdiction of the SHCP, this could be easily done by simply delaying pay orders 
authorized by the SPP, as actually happened. The fact that there is no evidence of visible 
conflicts between the SPP's budget team, the agency responsible for producing these pay 
orders, and the Tesorena for the delays supports the hypothesis of collaboration between 
the this team and the SHCP: If the first failed to stop some unwanted programmes, it 
could be done later by the second. If true, it meant not only that the SHCP traditional 
control over public expenditure was far from being over, but that it has been extended to 
a section of the SPP structure.
The permanency of the Rico team until 1979, despite its activities' being overtly 
against a presidential project, made apparent, in a context of lack of highly specialised 
corps, the SHCP's main source of power: Its technical human resources. Since it is 
certainly difficult to think from where else new blood could have been drawn, we do 
think that the president had no choice but to rely on former finance personnel to 
implement a reform which, if successful, would substantially reduce the power of the 
SHCP. The analysis of the strained relationships between this agency and the SPP, 
particularly during 1977, sheds light on the external problems in introducing the national 
planning system, and on the associated crucial role internally played by the SPP's budget 
team in the process.
By early February 1979, president Lopez Portillo began thinking about replacing 
Garcia Sainz. According to his memoirs, his candidates were Miguel de la Madrid, Rosa 
Luz Alegria and Romero Kolbeck (1988: 808). By the same time, though for completely 
different reasons, he also decided to replace two key members of his network for political 
control, namely Reyes Heroles {Gobernacion) and Santiago Roel (Foreign Relations)
The complaint made in mid-1978 by the Baja California's Governor Roberto de la Madrid, 
Lôpez Portillo's close friend, that Miguel Rico was unilaterally modifying approved programmes illustrates 
very well our point {Proceso 87, 3/7/78: 31).
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(1988: 812). Eventually, in mid-May, 1979, he fired the three Secretaries simultaneously. 
Nothing similar had occurred in Mexico since Cardenas. In the case of Garcia Sainz, the 
deciding factor was his lack of support for COPLAMAR, a presidential social 
programme.^^ In Lopez Portillo’s words, "he was weighted down by the burden" {no pudo 
con el paquete) (1988: 837). For the second time, the 1976 administrative reform had 
been seriously put at risk by the SPP's leadership.
CONCLUDING NOTE
The ISI strategy transformed the federal bureaucracy into the most critical sector 
in the process of development. A context of weak democratic institutions paved the way 
for bureaucracy becoming a major political actor. As a result, the political process 
steadily moved from the ruling party to the bureaucratic arena. The rapid expansion of 
the public sector during the Echeverria administration catalysed these trends, thus 
magnifying existing institutional dysfunctions. This move towards a more active role of 
the state in the economy has complex causes. Domestically, they include political factors 
such as the 1968 legitimacy crisis, but also bureaucratic ones. Echeverria's policies not 
only made apparent, but further consolidated the existence of an autonomous set of 
bureaucratic interests advocating statism. The selection of Lopez Portillo as the PRI 
presidential candidate in 1975 is the best evidence of the strength reached by these 
interests.
Government stepping up public expenditure since 1972 exacerbated another 
problem: state-business relations. In other words, the 1972-76 economic strategy had the 
effect of shattering the government-private sector alliances built during the 'stabilising 
development' era. This problem was aggravated because the ISI strategy had increased 
the private sector's power to influence the economy. These developments had relevant 
bureaucratic implications, for they upset the delicate equilibrium between the agencies 
advocating private and state interests. A sharp bureaucratic polarisation leading to policy 
incoherence characterised the Echeverria years. Apart from statist interests gaining 
momentum, the resulting balance of power was greatly influenced by president
On the COPLAMAR issue, see “Indigna al Présidente la simulaciôn oficial” in Proceso 120, 
19/2/79: 26-27).
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Echeverria's search for legitimacy via public spending. Thus, presidential populism 
served as a framework for the rapid emergence of the 'corporate-technocratic state'.
The 'shared development' era is responsible for relevant changes in the 
policymaking process as presidential involvement in economic policy matters 
substantially increased. Historic centralisation trends were encouraged by the public 
sector apparatus becoming unmanageable. Tensions between the presidency and the 
finance ministry partly explain the initial impetus behind the creation of the SPP in 1977. 
Using Erfani's words, this agency was "representative of the institutionalization of a new 
technocratization of economic decisionmaking to replace the highly visible political in­
fighting between statist reformism and monetarist orthodoxy" (1995: 140). Yet, it could 
not prevent it as proved by the Tello-Moctezuma affair and the internal coordination 
problems within the SPP having essentially the same origin.
From a broader political perspective, the 1976 administrative reform, including 
the creation of the SPP, represented the peak of a process of concentration of political 
power in the presidency greatly exacerbated by bureaucratic factors. As we will discuss 
in the next chapter, contextual external factors associated with the international oil crisis 
would have a significant effect in shaping the specific features of the Mexican 'corporate- 
technocratic state'.
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Administering the oil wealth: 
The rise of the SPP
When president Lôpez Portillo took office on December 1, 1976, the Mexican 
government was facing, in his own words, the "worst economic crisis in the history of the 
country" (Lôpez Portillo 1976: 5). Besides, the last months of the Echeverria 
administration were marked by political unrest virtually in all social quarters. Like 
'stabilising development', 'shared development' had fallen into disrepute. Yet the 
Echeverria administration laid the foundations of a new economic strategy based on oil 
for export. Because of Lôpez Portillo's expansionist oil policy, the share of oil exports in 
total exports increased from 22.3 percent in 1977 to 72.5 percent in 1981 (data from 
Lustig 1992, table 1-5: 23). As noted by Levy and Székely, oil became "the most 
important new factor affecting Mexican politics and the development model" (1987: 
226).
Restoring confidence was incoming president Lôpez Portillo's top priority. His 
appeal for national reconciliation summarised in the campaign slogan "we all are the 
solution" gave room to the most elaborated concept of Alliance for Production. Unlike 
his predecessor, Lôpez Portillo offered the private sector a star place in the achievement 
of his economic programme. The expectation of Mexico becoming an oil power played 
an important role in cementing government's alliances not only with the business 
community, but also with the organised labour and even the opposition. A political 
reform aimed at widening the presence of the opposition parties in the Congress was soon 
set in motion.
In this chapter, we argue that the adoption of an expansionist oil policy was at 
odds with the central objectives of the 1976 administrative reform, since there is a general 
contradiction between long-term planning and the inherent unpredictability of oil. In
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other words, the fact that world oil prices and geological issues are subject to variation 
makes it virtually impossible to set reliable quantitative goals and objectives. In addition, 
the political and bureaucratic effects of the emphasis on oil shattered the institutional 
arrangement envisaged by the reform. From the very beginning, the rising status of 
PEMEX upset the hierarchical relation that should exist between the control ministries 
and the major spending agencies.
Yet, because of both borrowing and oil revenues, the SPP had plenty of financial 
resources to work with, "thus lending credence to its claims of planning for 
socioeconomic welfare" (Erfani 1995: 138). This fact, together with presidential backing, 
allowed this fledgling ministry to overcome the abundant problems threatening its 
survival as discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, the abundant legal, institutional, 
and financial resources available to the SPP paved the way for its concentrating important 
political resources. A skillful use of each of them by de la Madrid, the SPP third head, 
explains the key role played by the SPP in the bureaucratic coalition that ended Diaz 
Serrano's presidential ambitions. In essence, the combination of resource holding and 
international events accounts for de la Madrid becoming the PRI presidential candidate 
in 1981.
The central purpose of this chapter is to analyse the oil policy and its impact on 
the federal bureaucracy. As expected, special attention is paid to the contextual factors 
directly related with the SPP. The first section explores both the origin of the export- 
orientated oil strategy and the historical trends regarding the role of PEMEX. For the sake 
of the argument, the following section focuses on causes and effects of the appointment 
of de Madrid as head of the SPP. Section three concentrates on the relationship between 
PEMEX and the Economic Cabinet, while the final section on the succession struggle. 
Here, it is argued that international factors, together with coalition behaviour involving 
the federal bureaucracy, determined the succession process.
4.1 PLANNING DEVELOPMENT AND THE OIL BOOM
President Lopez Portillo inherited from his predecessor an unpopular three-year 
austerity programme designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also the 
option that might be used to overcome the policy constraints imposed by it. By mid-1978, 
the 'oil card' had allowed Mexico to repay the IMF loan. Sooner than expected, the
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country was engaged in a bold oil-for-export strategy. The introduction of an integral 
system for the planning and coordination of the national economy, together with the 
initial over-enthusiasm triggered by the expectations of future oil wealth, explains Lopez 
Portillo's obsession with having a national plan. The reputed virtues of planning obscured 
the fact that the unpredictability of commodity exports and planning goals do not suit 
each other.
From austerity to 'planned* oil boom
As discussed in the previous chapter, the period 1973-1976 provides many 
indicators of a relevant shift in Mexico's oil policy. Higher investment in exploration 
suggests government's awareness since the Diaz Ordaz years of a future shortage 
(Grayson 1980: 46-47). In fact, it led to the discovery of potentially rich oil fields in 
Chiapas and Tabasco. However, as PEMEX general director Antonio Dovalf Jaime put 
it in March 1973, the main problem in raising production was not technical, but financial 
(quoted by Philip 1982:352). Higher investment in the industry yielded almost immediate 
results, thus supporting his view. By 1975, Mexico was exporting crude oil on a 
significant scale for the first time in decades. This fact needs to be put into a historical 
perspective. Since 1938, government's top priority had been to fill the internal demand 
for oil and gas, and only when possible exporting the surplus. In other words, up to the 
mid-1970s, oil production had been decided by the needs of rapid domestic 
industrialisation, rather than by external factors.
Oil production well above the country's requirements was the result of a deliberate 
policy. Mexican authorities being outspoken about 'oil discoveries' before the 1973-74 
world energy crisis suggests that "Mexico had an independent interest in selling oil" 
(Levy and Székely 1987: 230). A stronger indication, however, was the fact that 
PEMEX's investment doubled between 1974 and 1976, despite the economic crisis of
1976. These facts made it unlikely that president Echeverria did not know about the 
country's oil potential as has been suggested even by his successor.* Though admittedly 
its exact size was a subject for considerable debate.^ To be sure, the production of oil for
' According to Lôpez Portillo, president Echeverria did not know about the real oil reserves 
because the information was kept secret by the PEMEX's technicians (1988: 705).
 ^In October 1974, the Washington Post estimated the new oil fields at 20 billion barrels. Minister 
Flores de la Pefia called the reports exaggerated, while PEMEX general director stated that, while the 
deposits where the largest yet found in Mexico, it would not be possible to estimate their size accurately.
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export was a highly sensitive political issue in Mexico. At the time, there was extensive 
resistance particularly within PEMEX to an export-orientated strategy (see Philip 1982: 
354-355; Teichman 1988: 56-59). This radical position was associated with the 
nationalisation of the oil industry in 1938, and represented a reaction to the intensive oil 
exploitation carried out by foreign companies before that event.
In any event, the attitude of Dovali Jaime towards oil exports rapidly softened. In 
his annual speech of March 18, 1973, he summarised the oil policy as follows: "The 
national oil resources should be destined only to the satisfaction of our needs, no matter 
how seductive the offers from abroad may look.. ."  (quoted by Philip 1982: 354). Three 
years later, however, he would declare in the same annual celebration that "we have 
identified more than thirty new structures besides those being developed in the area of 
Chiapas and Tabasco . . . [they] will surely give us excess volumes of oil to export". 
Moreover, he stated that "we will move [the export prices]. . .  to take advantage of the 
fluctuations of the international market. . ."  {El Gobierno Mexicano, separata 20, March 
1976: 54). Sharply put, international prices of more than eleven dollars per barrel proved 
difficult to resist even for some conservationist technicians.
The historic volumes of crude exported by PEMEX in 1975 and 1976 should be 
interpreted as a substantial, though cautious departure from the traditional oil policy 
insofar as external factors greatly influenced their size. Therefore, it can be argued that 
president Echeverria not only deliberately laid the foundations of an expansionist, export- 
oriented oil policy, but selected his successor having this alternative in mind. Almost at 
the same time Dovali Jaime read his last annual report, the PRI presidential candidate 
Lopez Portillo set up a technical committee charged with the central task of finding out 
the country's real oil reserves "using more modem techniques" (Diaz Serrano quoted by 
Philip 1982: 357). Paradoxically enough, the magnitude of the economic crisis of late 
1976 favoured the idea that its effects "could be overcome much sooner with greatly 
expanded oil production than without it" (Levy and Székely 1987: 230).
To deal with the effects of the late-1976 devaluations, Mexican government had 
no choice but to ask for foreign financial help. In September 1976, the United States 
authorized short-term loans for $600 million; on October 28,1976, just one month before
(Keesing's 1974: 26824)
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the presidential handover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to the use by 
Mexico of fund resources equivalent to about 837 million special drawing rights over a 
three-year period (Keesing's 1977: 28170). The terms of the negotiations with the IMF, 
however, were kept in secrecy. Although not being especially onerous (Teichman 1988: 
59), the agreement with IMF imposed policy constraints, and touched highly sensitive 
political issues. At bureaucratic level, it would further polarise government's two major 
wings, structuralists and monetarists, while triggering off a more radical debate over the 
country's development strategy.
On December 22,1976, Jorge Diaz Serrano, the new PEMEX general director, 
announced that proved oil reserves had increased from 6.3 billion barrels to 11.2 billion 
barrels. In March 1977, he provided details of his Six-Year Plan, which allowed for an 
increase in oil production from around 1.1 millions of barrels per day to 2.2 in the period 
1977-1982. In addition, it called for doubling the country's refining capacity, and for 
tripling the production of basic petrochemicals in the same period (Teichman 1988: 60). 
To achieve these goals, an investment of around $15.5 billion was estimated. Because of 
the upward trend of world prices, PEMEX planning exercise had the effect of giving 
credence to Diaz Serrano's expansionist strategy, while consolidating his institutional 
leadership.
If the Echeverria administration was adversely affected by international factors, 
the opposite can be said regarding that of Lopez Portillo, at least till 1981. As argued by 
minister Oteyza in early 1977, financing development was the country's main bottleneck 
{Proceso 25, 23/4/77: 11). However, abundance of oil reserves, amid the world energy 
crisis and abundance of petrodollars, meant virtually unlimited access to foreign credit. 
Despite the IMF's conditions, there was no problem in assuring the necessary resources 
to start almost immediately the ambitious programme of PEMEX. By the end of 1977, 
the amount of crude exported more than doubled Echeverria's historic record. The era of 
'planned' intensive oil exploitation for export had begun.
Table 4.1 presents the main economic and public financial indicators during the 
Lopez Portillo administration. It is clear from there that the 'oil card' produced impressive 
results in aggregate output and investment during the four years of the oil boom. Total 
GDP, for instance, grew at an annual average of 8.4 percent between 1978 and 1981.
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Similarly, employment expanded at 5.7 percent at year in the same period (Lustig 1992: 
20).
Because of oil, the relationship between government and the domestic private 
sector was as good as during the 'stabilising development' in the period 1977 to mid-1982 
(see Arriola and Galindo 1984). It was so despite some worrisome economic indicators 
such as growing inflation and financial deficit and balance of payments deficits (see table 
4.1). In June 1979, all the business chambers, including the influential Business 
Coordinating Council (CCE), publicly regarded the results of the Alliance for Production 
as "highly positive" (Arriola and Galindo 1984: 119-120). When in 1980 PEMEX 
reached its production goals for 1982, Diaz Serrano became a serious contender to 
succeed Lopez Portillo not only in the eyes of the observers, but in those of the president.
TABLE 4.1 Selected economic and public financial indicators, 1976-1982
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
A. GDPC) 4.24 3.44 8.25 9.15 8.32 7.95 -0.54
B. Inflation 27.2 20.7 16.2 20.0 29.8 28.7 98.8
C. Balance o f payments -4.22 -1.96 -2.62 -3.62 -3.88 -5.23 -2.98
D. Federal spending 20.07 20.09 19.58 19.02 20.45 24.78 37.43
E. Public Investment 40.59 41.32 45.66 44.94 54.29 50.25 48.41
F. Financial deficit 9.1 6.3 6.2 7.1 7.5 14.1 16.9
G. Primary deficit 4.6 2.2 2.2 2.7 3.0 8.0 7.3
H. Operational deficit 4.1 2.6 3.4 3.8 3.6 10.0 5.5
Annual percentage change; As percentage o f GDP; As percentage o f the total investment.
Source: A, B, D, E, Basâfiez (1991:158,164); C, NAFINSA (1981:271 and 1986:240); F, G, H, NAFINSA 
(1990, cuadro 13.29: 632).
The continued rise of international oil prices gave government planners the 
impression that oil was a way out of Mexico's economic and political woes (Teichman 
1988: 56). This was so, it was thought, if the destiny of the oil wealth was carefully 
planned. Contrary to the spirit of the 1976 administrative reform, PEMEX began 
'planning' even before the SPP, or in fact any other ministry. More relevant, PEMEX's 
sectoral planning would substantially influence the national planning process as a whole. 
In any event, because of the unexpected drop of oil prices in 1981, Mexican planners 
painfully had to learn that long-term planning and the behaviour of the world commodity 
markets were incompatible.
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The oil strategy and the Economic Cabinet
The way president Lopez Portillo integrated his first cabinet reflected his 
structuralist orientation. Personnel linked to the Secretaria de la Presidencia and 
SEP ANAL accounted for more than 50 percent of the total composition of his first 
cabinet.^ The fact that Lopez Portillo had spent most of his bureaucratic career in these 
two ministries suggests the institutionally-grounded character of his camarilla. This 
phenomenon was associated with his being the first president produced by the economic- 
policy network. In SEP ANAL (1958-64) had worked Rossell de la Lama (Tourism) and 
Pedro Ojeda (Labour); in the SPre (1965-70) Moctezuma Cid (SHOP), Carlos Tello 
(SPP), Solana (Commerce), Mujica (Communications), and Martinez Manatou (Health); 
and in SEP ANAL (1970-73) Oteyza (SEP AFIN) and Rafull (Fisheries). An interesting 
fact is the overwhelming presence in cabinet of Lopez Portillo's former associates at 
CAP. Table 4.2 attempts to illustrate the importance of this commission in shaping the 
president's inner circle. This particular composition sheds light on the priority that 
administrative reform had in the presidential agenda.
A careful review of these appointments reveals that president Lopez Portillo 
essentially used his inner circle to staff the economic-policy network."* This selection 
criteria confirms his view that the main problems of his administration were in the 
economic realm, not in the political one (Lopez Portillo 1988: 472, 694). During 1977, 
the quarreling between Tello and Moctezuma Cid prevented both the SPP and the SHCP 
from taking the leadership of the Economic Cabinet. This fact, together with the oil 
strategy, favoured SEP AFIN (before SEPANAL). After the sectorisation of the parastate 
sector, this ministry remained in charge of coordinating and controlling the powerful 
industrial component of this sector. Besides, the industrial functions of the former 
ministry of commerce and industry were transferred to SEP AFIN in December 1976, thus 
increasing considerably its institutional resources.
 ^Excluding the Secretariats o f National Defence and Navy over which the president's appointing 
power is very narrow. Lôpez Portillo, for instance, admits that he did not even know general Félix Galvân 
Lôpez before appointing him as defence minister (1988; 474).
The integration o f the policy network for political control followed a different pattern as will be 
seen later in this chapter.
TABLE 4.2 Posts held by key members o f the Comision de Administracion Publica (CAP), 1965-1982
Name
Position in the 
Commission (1965-1970)
Post in the Echeverria 
Administration (1970-76)
Main post in the Lôpez Portillo 
Administration (1976-1982)
Emilio Martinez Manatou 
José Lôpez Portillo
Carlos Vargas Galindo 
Alejandro Carrillo Castro 
Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid
Carlos Tello Macias
Fernando Solana Morales 
Emilio Mujica Montoya
Leopoldo Ramirez Limôn 
Guillermo Vazquez Herrera 
Pedro Zorrilla Martinez
Miguel Duhalt 
Bernardo Sepulveda Amor 
Enrique M. Loaeza
Institutional responsible 
President
Secretary
Technical Secretary 
Commissioner
Commissioner, 1968-1970
Commissioner, 1965-1966 
Commissioner
Commissioner 
Commissioner, 1966-1970 
Commissioner, 1967-1970
Adviser 
Legal Adviser 
Auxiliary
None
-Subsecretario at SEPANAL, 1970-1972 
-Director General o f the CPE, 1973 
-M inister o f Finance (SHCP), 1973-1975
-Adviser to the Ministry o f  the Presidency, 
the SHCP, and CONASUPO, 1970-1974 
-Oficial Mayor at the SHCP, 1974-1975
-Subdirector General o f Credit (SHCP), 1970-75 
-Subsecretario at the SHCP, 1975-76
-Subdirector o f  Planning at CONASUPO, 1970-1976
-Director o f Planning at the National Railroads, 1971 
-Adviser to Lôpez Portillo at the SHCP, 1973-75 
-Director Genera\ at SEPANAL, 1975-76
-Director General at Gobernaciôn, 1970-1971 
-Oficial Mayor at the DDF, 1971-1972 
-Attorney for the Federal District, 1972-1973 
-Governor o f Vwevo Ledn, 1973-1979
Advisor to the head o f the SHCP, 1971-1975 
Auxiliary to Lôpez Portillo, 1970-1975
Minister o f  Health (SSA)
President of Mexico
Legal Advisor to the President
Administrative Studies at the Presidency
Head o f  the SHCP 
Head o f  PEMEX
Head of the SPP
Head o f  the Central Bank
M inister o f  Commerce
M inister o f  Communications 
and Transportation (SCT)
Director General at the SHCP 
Director General at the SHCP 
None
Oficial Mayor at Commerce 
Director General at the SHCP 
General Director o f  Airports (ASA)
Source: Carreflo (1975); Samuel I. del Villar,"Reforma Administrativa: Vieja Carta de 
Lôpez Portillo" (in Proceso 12, 22/1/77: 6-13); Camp (1982).
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As head of SEP AFIN, president Lôpez Portillo appointed José Andrés de Oteyza, 
a 34-year-old economist with graduate studies in Cambridge. His appointment 
represented a triumph of the structuralist wing within government. Moreover, he would 
become its head during the Lôpez Portillo administration. Oteyza belonged to Flores de 
la Pena's inner circle at SEPANAL, when his "intelligence and technical skills" attracted 
the attention of the under-secretary Lôpez Portillo. With the support of both Flores de la 
Pena and Lôpez Portillo, the career rise of Oteyza was meteoric: From being a modest 
under-director in 1970, he was appointed director general at SEPANAL in 1972, head 
of FINAZA (a sugar-related parastate entity) in 1974, lEPES coordinator during the 
Lôpez Portillo's presidential campaign, and minister in December 1976.^
Apart from camarilla considerations, the combined reasons aforementioned 
account for Oteyza becoming the most influential minister during the Lôpez Portillo 
administration. Institutionally, SEP AFIN would play an outstanding role in the policy­
making and planning processes. According to the administrative reform, this agency was 
the 'cabeza de sector'of the industrial parastate sector. Thus SEP AFIN was responsible 
for designing the country's industrial policy, and for serving as a liaison between the 
presidency and the industrial state-owned enterprises, including PEMEX. Before 
analysing the relationships between SEP AFIN and PEMEX, it is important to know who 
was appointed as director of the latter.
The new head of PEMEX was one of Lôpez Portillo's oldest friends.^ Besides, he 
had headed the committee of oil experts set up to study "the oil question" during the 
presidential campaign. Giving him this task was not an arbitrary decision. Engineer Diaz 
Serrano was an experienced, successful expert on oil drilling. His being a contractor for 
PEMEX since the mid-1950s was at the core of his wealth. This also allowed him having 
a good knowledge of the agency's internal operation, and no few contacts among its 
managers and technicians. Despite this impressive background, one fact made this 
appointment exceptional: he had never been a government official. Sharply put, he was 
an outsider.
 ^Oteyza's career should be contrasted with that o f Rafull (Fisheries), his boss between 1970 and 
1971, who, though he was Lôpez Portillo's friend, did not have the same technical qualifications.
 ^An example illustrates this friendship. In 1965, Diaz Serrano, already a successful entrepreneur, 
offered Lôpez Portillo (who was unemployed after resigning his post at SEPANAL) a very well-paid 'job' 
as his adviser working one day per week (Lôpez Portillo 1988: 305-306).
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The appointment of Diaz Serrano in December 1976 was an unmistakable signal 
that oil for export would be used not only to face the effects of the crisis, but to finance 
development. As a result, it was only logical this strategy brought to the fore not only bis 
director, but also PEMEX as institution. Moreover, it is clear that this agency would play 
a more active role in the policy-making process. However, more fundamental questions 
remained unclear: How did the new role of PEMEX affect the institutional arrangement 
established by the 1976 public sector reorganisation? To what extent did this role alter 
the bureaucratic balance of power?
Pemex the star
In any semi-industrialised country with plenty of oil, the oil industry is almost 
certain to be a key sector. While it applied and still applies to Mexico, it needs to be 
underlined that not only the ISI strategy, but also the dynamics of the political system 
determined the particular character of PEMEX. Thus, this state monopoly became both 
an important political instrument and a crucial agent in the process of development. 
Something similar applies to the CFE. Providing cheap energy for rapid industrialisation 
bad demanded continued, and rising, investment in the oil and electricity state-owned 
industries. By the early 1970s, the key power of PEMEX and the CFE resided more in the 
sensitive impact that its performance bad on the whole socioeconomy, than in the huge 
financial resources they dealt with. Yet, both ingredients would gradually strengthen the 
institutional role of both agencies.
Mostly because of world oil prices, PEMEX would emerge as the true star of three 
and a half decades of increasing emphasis on industry in the period 1974-1981. For 
instance, it was estimated that in 1977 the largest twenty-seven parastate entities, PEMEX 
and the CFE being at the top of the list, were responsible for 90 percent of the spending 
of the whole parastate sector (Rico in Empresas Publicas 1978: 100). Obviously, the oil 
boom would further skew this already distorted picture. In 1978, PEMEX and the CFE 
were authorised about 54 percent of the total budget allocated to those twenty-seven 
parastate entities, while PEMEX alone about 38 percent (see Federal Budget 1978, DGF 
30/12/1977). By 1981, this agency was responsible for 60 percent of the total public 
investment, while the CFE for 20.7 percent (calculation based on data from Philip 1984, 
table 2: 30).
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Holding such amounts of resources made the head of these agencies, whoever 
they were, influential, powerful civil servants. Sharply put, the reason for this is the 
clientelistic nature of the Mexican political system. Not surprinsingly, from December 
1976 to March 1979, the political star of the director of PEMEX rose rapidly. Did the 
personal attributes of Diaz Serrano enhance this situation? Allowing for the 
organisational setting and environmental factors, the answer is yes. In 1977, doubling oil 
production amid austerity was in good part due to Diaz Serrano's management skills and 
determination. Thereafter, a $1,200 million-loan, agreed 'with 74 international banks on 
November 8, 1977 would trigger the Mexican oil boom 1978-81.^ By the end of 1978, 
oil production had doubled again, and export revenues were pouring in. Successive 
announcements of 'potential' oil finds increased proven reserves to around 40 billion 
barrels by January 1979. The oil policy becoming the cornerstone of the entire economic 
strategy placed PEMEX at the centre of the policy-making process.
Except for bureaucratic experience, Diaz Serrano brought together all the 
ingredients for successful performance in government as identified by Riccucci (1995). 
First, apart from possessing technical expertise, he showed extraordinary political skills. 
Diaz Serrano not only maintained, but improved his relationship with the president, while 
being an effective player in some domestic circles. His political ability helped him to 
build support from, and alliances with, the oil union, the PEMEX technicians*, the 
industrial sectors of the business community, and some sectors of the federal bureaucracy. 
Moreover, he had offered a clear, consistent, feasible oil strategy. Diaz Serrano's 
determined, strong-willed personality further assured that, in his hands, the strategy 
would be successful. In brief, good political instincts, entrepreneurial skills, and 
resolution allowed him to take advantage of contextual opportunities, and PEMEX's 
institutional resources and in turn increase them.
The early launching of the six-year oil plan paved the way for his dominating the 
design and implementation of the oil policy. In 1977, oil revenues proved crucial not only
’ This seven-year loan reportedly represented the largest single loan ever obtained by Mexico 
(Keesing's 1978: 28779). It is worth noting that negotiations were kept secret. About one month before the 
agreement, journalist Manuel Buendia (1985: 18-21) revealed that PEMEX was negotiating a loan o f  $590 
millions, that is, about half o f the actual loan.
* Before the arrival o f Diaz Serrano, conservationist technicians were a majority within PEMEX, 
while the pro-export technicians were a small dissident faction. Reversing this picture was the result o f both 
the purge o f managers carried out in early 1977 and the internal effect o f oil revenues.
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to overcome the worst effects of the crisis, but to assure the success of Lopez Portillo's 
overall political priorities. At first sight, it was hard to dissociate the name of Jorge Diaz 
Serrano from these developments. However, some qualifications are at hand. To begin 
with, PEMEX becoming a key policy actor during the Lopez Portillo administration was 
not because of Diaz Serrano, but because the significant revenues this agency was 
generating. In a clientelist environment, these revenues were crucial to cement alliances 
with not only with PEMEX's contractors and beneficiaries, but with the system's 
abundant clienteles, including some quarters of the Left. In general, the rising star of Diaz 
Serrano confirmed the importance of holding strategic institutional resources at the right 
time. In much narrower terms, it also suggested the relevance of personal factors such as 
the access to the president, derived from friendship ties.
With the president's support for an oil expansionist strategy, besides the factors 
aforementioned, the power of PEMEX and his director expanded rapidly. Paradoxically, 
this fact threatened the very foundations of Lopez Portillo's administrative reform for 
various reasons. First, the autonomy required by PEMEX to implement its programme 
shattered the control mechanism based on the grouping of parastate entities. After all, the 
largest industrial enterprises had never been ordinary parastate entities. Second, Diaz 
Serrano's access to the president hampered the exercise of SEPAFIN's supervisory 
powers. Third, several factors reduced the financial control of the SHCP over PEMEX. 
They included dependence on revenues from oil exports and relative agreement with the 
expansion programme. To make things worse, the SPP -the cornerstone of the reform- 
was not working as expected.
In brief, the emerging picture of the federal public sector was very different from 
the theoretical arrangement conceiving the SPP atop the economic-policy network. 
Instead, Diaz Serrano was emerging as an influential de facto minister, thus altering not 
only the balance of power within the cabinet, but the traditional distribution of power 
within the federal public sector as a whole. His sui generis position gave him one key 
advantage: Without being formally a member of the Economic Cabinet, he could avoid 
its stormy sessions and procedures. As noted by Teichman, oil policy was made "largely 
by the president and Diaz Serrano with little or no consultation of the Economic Cabinet" 
(1988: 67). It seemed as if PEMEX had replaced the SPP as the cornerstone of the 
economic-policy network.
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Despite its oversimplification, this picture describes fairly well the role played by 
PEMEX in the hectic period 1977-1978. A succession of foreign and domestic events and 
developments taking place during and immediately after that period would gradually alter 
the power relations and linkages between the major institutional actors. One of those 
events was the firing of Garcia Sainz, the second head of the SPP, and his replacement 
by Miguel de la Madrid.
4.2 THE ARRIVAL OF DE LA MADRID AT THE SPP
Appointing de la Madrid as head of the SPP on May 16, 1979 proved to be a 
crucial presidential decision because of its long-lasting political consequences. At the 
time, it meant the last chance to make the 1976 administrative reform work as planned 
because of time constraints imposed by the presidential cycle. Considering Lopez 
Portillo's interest in the issue, whoever selected to the post would have many advantages 
on his side. What made de la Madrid's appointment interesting was the appointee's 
financial background. In brief, the new SPP's head had spent most of his bureaucratic 
career working for the SHCP. This fact was clearly at odds with the president's animosity 
towards this ministry. The purpose of this section is to explore both the causes of this 
appointment and its impact on the SPP.
De la Madrid: A ’Trojan horse*?
As already discussed, up to early 1979, a long list of factors had foiled the success 
of Lopez Portillo's administrative reform. After the firing of Garcia Sainz, therefore, the 
prospects for the SPP were not regarded highly. If Lopez Portillo wanted, as he did, to 
save his reform, he needed to select the right man for the SPP. For this reason, the 
selection of de la Madrid sheds enormous light on bureaucratic politics in Mexico. 
Contrary to a widespread belief, de la Madrid was neither a member of Lopez Portillo's 
inner circle, nor his close friend. To be sure, the president had been de la Madrid's teacher 
at UNAM. Furthermore, in 1973 Lopez Portillo became de la Madrid's boss at the SHCP. 
Despite these facts, their old relationship never developed into a solid friendship.
In essence, the distant relationship between Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid is 
associated with their different bureaucratic careers. Until 1973, they came to work in 
agencies between which there was a great deal of institutional bickering. Moreover, since
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1965, de la Madrid had become member of the exclusive club of lawyers-witb-fmancial- 
experience that operated in the SHCP's credit branch since the 1950s. Simultaneously, 
Lopez Portillo developed at the Secretaria de la Presidencia a plan to reduced the 
inordinate power of the SHCP's elites. Their encounter at the SHCP was sheer accident. 
By then, as table 4.3 shows, de la Madrid was a prominent member of the 'credit cluster' 
led by lawyer Mario Ramon Beteta. As head of the finance ministry, however, Lopez 
Portillo did not disturb this cluster, but neither promoted de la Madrid^. During the 1975- 
1976 presidential campaign, Beteta was appointed head of the SHCP, and de la Madrid 
took his place. This fact further showed that the former, nobody else, was the main 
mentor and patron of the latter.
TABLE 4.3 Key SHCP high-rank officials, 1958-1979
Secretario 
David Ibarra Mufioz (1977- )
Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid (1977) 
Mario Ramôn Beteta (1975-76)
José Lôpez Portillo (1973-75)
Hugo B. Margâin (1970-1973) 
Antonio Ortiz Mena (1958-70) 
Subsecretario de Esresos 
Miguel Rico Ramirez (Dec. 1976)
Ramôn Aguirre Velâzquez (1976)
Carlos A. Isoard (1970-76)
Enrique Caamano Mufioz (1958-70)
Subsecretario de Crédita 
Miguel de la Madrid (1975-79) 
Mario Ramôn Beteta (1970-75) 
Jesùs Rodriguez y R. (1958-70) 
Ï
Director General de Crédita 
Jesùs Silva Herzog (1978-79) 
Miguel de la Madrid (1972-75) 
Jesus Silva Herzog (1970-72) 
Mario Ramôn Beteta (1964-70)
1
Dirrector General de Eeresos 
Miguel Angel Dâvila M. (1975-76) 
Ramôn Aguirre V. (1971-75) 
Miguel Rico Ramirez (1970-71)
Subsecretario de In^resos 
Guillermo Prieto Fortun (1978- ) 
Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza (1976-78) 
Carlos Tello (1975-76)
Francisco Javier Alejo (1974-75) 
Gustavo Petricioli (1970-74) 
Francisco Alcalâ Q. (1964-70) 
David Romero C. (1961-64) 
Eduardo GarduAo (1958-61)
Estudios Hacendarios/ Planeacion Hacendaria 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1978-79)
Francisco Gil Diaz (1976)
Héctor Hemândez Cervantes (1970-1975)
Source: Camp ( 1982); Diccionario Biogràfico ( 1984).
When president-elect Lopez Portillo chose his main associates in late 1976, he did 
not include de la Madrid in the list, nor had he any plans for him (José Ramôn Lôpez
 ^Sometime during this period, Lôpez Portillo apologised to de la Madrid for not having promoted 
him, the latter answered : "Do not worry about me. 1 am not in a hurry. 1 just want to be in the race" (Lôpez 
Portillo 1988: 365).
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Portillo, interview, London, 1/12/95). One additional fact may explain why. During the 
1974-75 succession process, the latter supported not his formal boss' aspirations, but 
those of Moya Palencia, the head of Gobernaciôn}^ Despite being a logical candidate, 
credit under-secretary de la Madrid was discarded as Moctezuma Cid's successor in late
1977. Deliberately, David Ibarra, an outsider, was appointed head of the SHCP.
Considering these antecedents, why then did president Lopez Portillo consider de 
la Madrid as a candidate for the SPP? Many factors accounted for this complex decision. 
Two of them deserve special attention. First, the president had already drained his inner- 
circle reserves, and had very few suitable candidates. Aware of the importance of his 
decision, he took more than three months analysing various options from which to chose. 
Second, the advice of Oteyza, one of his most influential associates, proved decisive in 
the decision making. According to José Ramôn Lôpez Portillo, the candidature of de la 
Madrid to the SPP was proposed, and strongly supported by Oteyza (interview, London, 
1/12/95).” Because of their different backgrounds and political orientations, this is an 
interesting fact.
Objectively, Oteyza's proposal offered some advantages over the president's 
known candidates: Rosa Luz Alegria and Romero Kolbeck (Lôpez Portillo 1988: 808). 
Ironically, the 'proved' technical capabilities of de la Madrid and his team might assure 
the rapid implementation of the administrative reform. In addition, their background 
could also soften the tensions between the SHCP and the SPP.’^  Therefore, it was 
worthwhile taking the risks of using the 'technical resources' of the former to make the 
latter work. Two additional factors should be bom in mind. First, the administrative 
reform was one of Lôpez Portillo's great "cards". Its abortion would have meant the overt 
recognition of a failure. Second, it was almost the middle of the presidential term, and 
time was running short to deliver what had been offered.
In this context, it was not difficult to persuade the president that giving de la 
Madrid enough room for action, together with presidential support, was sine qua non for
This statement is supported by two facts. First, de la Madrid appointed Manuel Bartlett, who 
was a member o f Moya's inner circle, as his adviser in 1979. Second, Moya himself was a confidential 
advisor to de la Madrid after 1982.
' ' The same source told me that after being appointed head o f SEPAFIN, Oteyza had thought about 
bringing de la Madrid as his under-secretary.
At the time, Lôpez Portillo was convinced that the relationship between those agencies was 
intrinsically conflicting (Procejo 793, 13/1/92: 15).
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the SPP to succeed. Apart from allowing the new SPP's minister free hand in staffing the 
agency, Lopez Portillo appointed Carlos Salinas as technical secretary of the Economic 
Cabinet on July 26,1979. Since Salinas was a key member of de la Madrid's inner circle 
at the SPP, this appointment was the best indication that president Lopez Portillo, as he 
put it, had decided to give the head of the SPP "and his team all the relative 
responsibility" (1988: 864-865). The crucial position Salinas was placed in proved crucial 
in the SPP gaining the leading role it was expected to play in policy making.
Beyond doubt, the arrival of de la Madrid at the SPP would play a fundamental 
role in the consolidation of this agency. However, it should be stressed that less apparent 
institutional factors greatly contributed to that outcome. Clearly, de la Madrid did not 
receive a newly-born agency. Despite its youth and the problems already described, the 
SPP had considerably improved its administrative structures, and had begun to exercise 
some of its extensive powers. In brief, what de la Madrid took charge of was not an 
ordinary fledgling ministry, but a potentially powerful ministry.
The consolidation of the SPP
Even though the resignation of Tello in late 1977 caused a high personnel 
turnover within the SPP, some qualifications are in order. First, there was a substantial 
carry-over of middle- and low-rank officials. Second, the turnover mostly affected 
support units rather than core ones. Third, it was practically limited to Tello's inner 
circle.'^ One example illustrates our point. Sergio Mota Marin, Tello's chief adviser, was 
appointed by Garcia Sainz head of the Sistema Nacional de Informaciôn, where he and 
his team remained until late 1982. This unit was responsible for producing the national 
statistics and cartography. High levels of permanency were even clearer in the budgeting 
and evaluation branches of the SPP. The developments described played a fundamental 
role in the rapid consolidation of this agency. As a result, despite adjustment and 
technical problems, it could be hard to deny that there were significant institutional 
advances in the operation of the SPP for such a short period (see Memoria 1977 and 
1978).
In particular, that was the case of the SPP's apparatus for regional investment and 
coordination with the local governments. By creating the Coordinacion General de
These statements are based on the analysis o f the SPP personnel between 1977 and 1979 (see 
Appendix 2). Bailey (1984: 86) provides a different interpretation.
135
Delegaciones in late 1978, Garcia Sainz laid the foundations of a nationwide network 
made up by the SPP offices already operating in each state (compare figures 3.3 and 3.4 
in chapter 3). As discussed in future chapters, the importance and political implications 
of this network would be felt in the years to come.
To be sure, the key problems the SPP faced when de la Madrid was appointed 
were located in two areas: planning and evaluation. On the one hand, neither Tello nor 
Garcia Sainz was able to produce a sound national plan. At technical level, this fact was 
related to the lack of the required methodology and institutionalised procedures. At 
political level, national plan making was severely hampered by sharp cabinet and extra­
cabinet disagreements about the course for economic development. Without clear agreed 
objectives, programming was simply not possible. On the other hand, evaluation was 
from the outset fiercely resisted by most quarters of the federal bureaucracy.
Thus, while evaluation became virtually nominal, the programming-budgeting 
function was dominated by the 'budget team'. Despite some efforts at programming, the 
1978 and 1979 annual spending budgets were prepared mostly with "a strict accounting 
orientation in ledger rather than program terms" (Bailey 1984: 86). All these problems 
would receive special attention during de la Madrid's tenure.
TABLE 4.4 The SPP personnel and their SHCP background, 1976-1981
(Percentages o f selected samples)
Tello/Garcia Sâinz De la Madrid
(N=75) (N=52)
First post in the SHCP 15 45
Last post in the SHCP 26 52
In SHCP any time 30 75
SHCP dominant in career 15 40
Source: SPP 1 (see Appendix 1).
In contrast to his predecessors, de la Madrid was given practically a free hand in 
staffing the SPP. Consequently, he replaced most of the high- and middle-rank officials 
with personnel totally identified with him. What is interesting is not this fact, but the 
bureaucratic background of the individuals brought by de la Madrid. Table 4.4 shows that 
75 percent of them had worked for the SHCP at least once in their career. In addition, it
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demonstrates that about half of them were brought directly from the SHCP.*'  ^Like de la 
Madrid himself, 40 percent of his team had spent most of their careers in that particular 
agency. A fairly different personnel profile characterises the administrations of Tello and 
Garcia Sainz. This table suggests the importance of institutions in the composition of 
camarillas within the economic-policy network.
After the arrival of de la Madrid, only very few high-rank officials stayed in 
office. This was the case of Rosa Luz Alegria and José Ramôn Lôpez Portillo, 
presidential appointees, and Sergio Mota Marin. Even Rico and his team, the famous 
'budget team', left the SPP for good. He was replaced by his former associate in the 
SHCP, Ramôn Aguirre Velazquez (see table 4.3 above). With him a younger group of 
budgeters arrived. To Programming was appointed Francisco Labastida Ochoa, who had 
been Director General of Fiscal Promotion of SHCP since 1976. Under the formal 
direction of Labastida Ochoa, Carlos Salinas became head of the Direccion General de 
PoUtica Economica y  Social (DGPEyS). From the SHCP also came Eduardo Pesqueira 
{Coordinador de Delegaciones), Bernardo Sepulveda (advisor), and Francisco Rojas 
{Control de Gestion). The size of the SPP allowed de la Madrid to bring some of his old 
personal friends to the SPP, such as Lugo Verduzco {Oficial Mayor), Manuel Bartlet 
(advisor), and Gonzalez Avelar (Public Relations). All the officials mentioned would 
become ministers in the following administration.
The approval of the SPP's second Reglamento Interior in early 1980 (DOF 
28/2/80) led to a radical reorganisation of the SPP. It represented an important stage in 
the consolidation of the agency. As shown in figure 4.1, during de la Madrid's tenure the 
SPP structure grew considerably, in particular at the middle and low levels. Less apparent 
changes illustrates de la Madrid's approach to one of the key problems of the agency. To 
avoid centralised decision making and power concentration in the budgeting division, the 
general directorates of Inversiones Publicas and Egresos were transformed into four units 
on sectoral basis (see figure 4.1). The logic of this change was that it would favour 
programme-orientated budgeting and sectoral programming. In addition, the Direccion
This percentage goes up if Ramôn Aguirre's camarilla is considered. In December 1976, de la 
Madrid's mentor Beteta was appointed head of SOMEX, a state-owned credit institution under the SHCP's 
sphere o f influence. Aguirre and his closest team followed him there, before arriving at the SPP in May 
1979.
FIGURE 4.1 SPP Organisation Chart, 1980-1982
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General de PoUtica Presupuestal, a normative area in charge of the design of budgeting 
policy, was created.
Up to 1979, a central matter of concern to the President was the SPP's incapacity 
to produce a national plan articulating his programmes.'^ The lack of a plan had been 
made more notorious by other agencies launching many sectoral plans. Bearing in mind 
that to Lopez Portillo a national plan meant the best indicator of the success of his 
administrative reform, de la Madrid gave top priority to its elaboration {Memoria 1979: 
25-27). The working logic was to ascribe the task of plan making, called 'plan integration' 
at the time, to a single unit. The unit selected was not the programming division, formally 
in charge of planning, but one of its directorates, namely the DGPEyS. With the total 
support of de la Madrid, this macro-economic think-tank, directed by Carlos Salinas, 
gained stature, autonomy, and power as a result. This situation generated explicable 
tensions between Salinas and his formal boss: the under-secretary Francisco Labastida. 
It should not be forgotten that the former was technical secretary of the Economic 
Cabinet.
Less than a year after de la Madrid's appointment, the Plan Global de Desarrollo 
(POD) was officially launched on April 15,1980.Weeks before this event, the 1980 SPP's 
Reglamento Interior institutionalised the 'plan integration' function of the DGPEyS. 
Planning, rather than programming, had become one of key functions of the SPP. Before 
going further, it is important to turn the analysis into the broader institutional and political 
implications of the arrival of de la Madrid at cabinet.
4.3 BUREAUCRACY AND THE DEFEAT OF PEMEX’S STRATEGY
The adoption of an export-orientated oil strategy had important effects on the 
federal bureaucracy. For the first time, PEMEX became an influential actor in the 
national policy-making process. In brief, this development implied a substantial change 
in the existing distribution of institutional resources which, in turn, affected the 
traditional operation of the economic-policy network. Moreover, it also challenged the
During the Tello's months as head o f the SPP, a social-orientated project o f Programa 
Quinquenal (1978-82) was elaborated (see Proceso 71, 13/3/78: 16-17). In early 1979, Garcia Sâinz 
presented a first version o f a global plan. To his misfortune, the document was severely criticised by both 
the president and the media (Lôpez Portillo 1988: 816 and 820).
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developing arrangement introduced by the 1976 administrative reform. Not surprisingly, 
the more active role PEMEX began to play since December 1976 triggered strong 
bureaucratic reactions. At first, opposition was limited to the actors directly affected, later 
it would extend to broader sectors of the federal bureaucracy. By mid-1981, Diaz Serrano 
was not any longer director of PEMEX.
Coalition building: Oteyza versus Diaz Serrano
With the appointment of Diaz Serrano, PEMEX adquired its strongest director 
since Antonio Bermudez (1946-58) (Philip 1982: 357). And so did SEPAFIN with the 
appointment of Oteyza. From the outset, the theoretical hierarchical relationship between 
both agencies was replaced by one between peers. For the success of Diaz Serrano in 
convincing the president of the merit of his expansion programme improved the 
institutional status of PEMEX. Moreover, the early launching of an oil plan by this 
agency provided basic policy guidelines difficult to alter, which reduced the role of the 
economic cabinet in designing economic policy. As a result, the unfolding debate within 
government was not about increasing oil for export as advocated by the PEMEX director, 
but about the limits of production, the pace of exploitation, and the destination of the 
revenues. On these specific issues, Diaz Serrano and Oteyza held completely different 
views. In this context, confrontation between them became inevitable.
It is worth noting that the expectations generated by the 'oil card' are responsible 
for modifying the traditional institutional orientations of the key agencies directly 
concerned with the oil policy. With Diaz Serrano, PEMEX changed its traditional 
nationalist, cautious, inward-orientated approach to oil exploitation for a bold, expansive, 
export-directed strategy. Surprisingly enough, SEPAFIN, in the past the most active 
proponent of state intervention, adopted a moderate stance vis-à-vis PEMEX's plans. 
Even the conservative SHCP appeared to endorse expansion which essentially meant 
stepping up public spending. Beneath the surface, it was greatly the reflection of more 
fundamental realignments of social forces, including bureaucratic clienteles, triggered by 
the oil option. In these conditions, not only would agency adaptability determine agency 
survival, but coalition politics were called to play a relevant role in the resultant balance 
of power.
As noted by George Philip, "support for expansion was fairly wide" (1982: 360). 
With the presidential backing, it was not difficult for Diaz Serrano to build strong
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alliances with the economic agents directly benefitting from his expansionist programme. 
They included domestic private industrialists, domestic and foreign bankers, and even 
foreign entrepreneurs seeking to supply the Mexican oil industry with their products. 
Domestically, a key supporter of expansion was the influential Monterrey Group. These 
coalitions not only were consonant with Lopez Portillo's appeal for his Alliance for  
Production, but helped to forge it. Additional sources of support came from the union of 
oil workers, and also from important sectors of the federal bureaucracy. More 
specifically, they included the spending agencies, those with political clienteles, and 
above all the ruling party.
Various reasons account for the SHCP becoming, at least temporally, a supporter 
of PEMEX's expansion. First, the ambitious oil investment programme benefitted the 
SHCP's clienteles. Second, oil revenues could postpone the need for a radical tax reform, 
a measure traditionally opposed by this ministry. Third, as oil revenues grew, so did the 
importance of PEMEX as a taxpayer.'^ Fourth, as under-director and later director of 
NAFINSA, David Ibarra had been closely linked to the oil strategy. Moreover, as head 
of the SHCP since late 1977, he could advance his personal economic conceptions, and 
also his political aspirations.
From the outset, Oteyza became the strongest critic of PEMEX's inordinate 
expansionist plans. Essentially as a reaction to Diaz Serrano growing influence, he called 
for a moderate use of the oil reserves. In doing so, he gained the support of the more 
nationalist wings of government, and that of leftist intellectuals and academics. Because 
of the weakness of these groups, however, Oteyza's viewpoints did not threaten the 
programme of the director of PEMEX at least in the period 1977-1979.
In 1978, well before schedule, government paid the IMF loans, thus getting rid 
of a source of domestic discomfort. At the end of that year and mostly because of oil, the 
GDP grew 8.25 percent as compared with 3.44 percent in 1977 (see table 4.1 above). Not 
surprisingly, the undeniable success of Diaz Serrano in implementing his all-out oil 
programme improved his relationship with the presidency. In December 1978, Lopez
See Teichman (1988: Chapter 4) and Levy and Szekely (1987: Chapter 7) for an extensive 
discussion of the alliances built around PEMEX's expansionist programme as well as o f those opposing it,
A deliberate policy o f taxing away a substantial part o f PEMEX's income is responsible for this 
fact. As noted by Teichman, taxes paid by PEMEX, as a percentage o f the total federal taxes, went from 
5 percent in 1976 to 24.9 percent in 1981 (1988: 66).
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Portillo agreed to give Diaz Serrano direct access to him to discuss the oil policy 
{acuerdo directo), and also autonomy to PEMEX "in the adequate way" (1988: 785). This 
deferential treatment further shattered the very foundations of the president's 
administrative reform, while deepening the rivalry between Diaz Serrano and Oteyza. To 
the fortune of the head of PEMEX, oil prices would reach unprecedented levels in 1979 
because of the Iranian crisis. Despite these facts, many developments would eventually 
favour the claims of Oteyza.
Since mid-1977, opposition leader and journalist Heberto Castillo began a 
systematic campaign against PEMEX's expansionist policy in the newly-born magazine 
Proceso}^ His central arguments were that since oil is a non-renewable resource its 
exploitation should be stretched as long as possible, and that producing oil derivatives 
rather than raw oil should be government priority. Evidently, Castillo did not ask for 
more than a return to the traditional oil policy. His merit, however, was opening the oil 
policy to public debate as well as unifying the Left against Diaz Serrano's plans. In March 
1978, some leftist political parties and organisations protested, for the first time, against 
"the irrational exploitation of Mexico's resources" (Teichman 1988: 84). Although there 
is no evidence of an alliance between Oteyza and Castillo, it is clear that the campaign 
of the latter politically benefitted the former. Moreover, some of Castillo's concerns 
would be echoed by the SEPAFIN's industrial plan released in April 1979.
Although Oteyza's industrial plan did not alter the oil strategy as delimited by the 
earlier six-year oil plan, it made apparent PEMEX's major institutional weakness, 
namely, its being an specialised agency, formally without ministerial rank. In other 
words, PEMEX, however powerful, was institutionally no more than a parastate entity 
with fairly narrow objectives. By contrast, SEPAFIN was not only a fully-fledged cabinet 
agency, but a key one within the economic-policy network. Thus, its launching of a plan 
for the entire industrial sector, which regarded oil as a means rather than an end, was a 
reminder of PEMEX's intrinsic constraints in designing policy. For this very reason, Diaz 
Serrano was never considered a cabinet member. Initially an advantage, this began to 
handicap his performance as the Economic Cabinet became gradually involved in oil
'* Castillo's first article about oil can be found in Proceso 33 (20/6/77).
142
issues. At the end of the day, alliances within this cabinet proved crucial in 
counterbalancing the certainly excessive political power of PEMEX.
With the appointment of de la Madrid as head of the SPP, Oteyza gained a key 
political ally. A tacit alliance between them is suggested by their coincident views about 
the country's oil policy in the cabinet meetings. The debates over broader economic issues 
also reflected this interesting alignment. Though less intense than during Tello's months 
as head of the SPP, ideological confrontations over the economy continued. This time, 
they had the effect of polarising the Economic Cabinet around the duo Oteyza-de la 
Madrid, on the one hand, and the finance minister David Ibarra on the other (Lopez 
Portillo 1988: 861). Despite disagreements on fundam entals,the debates over the 
problems being faced by almost every sector but oil were followed by an increasing 
number of cabinet members becoming 'aware' of the flaws of the Diaz Serrano's oil 
programme.
There were several factors galvanising this growing consensus. One of them was 
Oteyza's persistent campaign against Diaz Serrano; while another was PEMEX 
encroaching upon other agencies' jurisdictions. One factor of still more significance, 
however, was the succession struggle and the perception that an 'outsider' may be the 
winner. The disastrous way Diaz Serrano negotiated the sale of gas to the US gave his 
bureaucratic foes the first serious opportunity to change this course of action.
The ’gas affair’
In February 1977, a group of American gas companies began negotiating with 
PEMEX the purchase of Mexican gas. Six months later, some of those companies, 
grouped as Border Gas, signed a 'letter of intent' in which they agreed to buy up to 2000 
million cubic feet per day at a price of $2.60 per thousand cubic feet. In November 1977, 
however, the US Energy Department refused to approve the agreed price (Keesing's 1979: 
29549). At the heart of the problem was PEMEX's involvement in the internal US policy. 
Initial over-enthusiasm may explain this bold action. Domestically, another fatal mistake 
had been made: Without assuring the approval of the US government for the terms of the
A good example is provided by the way the issue of Mexico's entry to GATT was voted in 
March 1980. In favour were Commerce (the promoter o f the idea), the SPP, and the Bank o f Mexico, while 
against the SHCP, SEPAFIN, Agriculture, and Foreign Relations, During the discussions, howeever, de la 
Madrid adopted a "cautious position", and complied with the decision o f not proceeding with the 
negotiations.
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deal, Diaz Serrano began the construction of a pipeline to the US border in mid-1977 
(Morales 1986). To be sure, in April that year, he had discussed the issue with James 
Schlesinger, his American counterpart, but no official statement was produced.
Nevertheless, Diaz Serrano not only got the presidential backing needed to build 
the pipeline, but turned the president himself into an ardent defender of the project. In his 
first address to the nation of September 1, 1977, Lopez Portillo considered the pipeline 
as "a correct decision", and the massive export of gas to the US as the only alternative to 
gas burning. Two months later, however, Schlesinger's announcement would bring the 
presidential enthusiasm to an end. Diaz Serrano's rush had transformed a minor business 
deal into a political imbroglio of colossal proportions. The fact that the original PEMEX's 
oil plan did not even mention gas exports makes this statement more evident.
As expected, the 'gas affair' had countless international and domestic 
repercussions.^® In 1978, the gas negotiations with the US came to a standstill. By January 
1979, president Lopez Portillo declared that because of internal demand there was not gas 
available for export. Domestically, the construction of the gas pipeline had touched deep 
nationalist feelings, which favoured the articulation of discontent against the whole oil 
policy. The 'gas affair' gave Heberto Castillo, an oil expert himself, plenty of ammunition 
to discredit all Diaz Serrano's technical arguments (see Castillo 1981). Almost every 
week a critical article mostly by Castillo against either PEMEX or the pipeline was 
published in Proceso?^ By 1979 all opposition parties were notoriously against the way 
both oil and gas were being exploited (Teichman 1988: 80). Moreover, voices of dissent 
were already apparent within government itself.
In September 1979, seven months after a visit of president Carter to Mexico, a gas 
agreement was eventually signed. The agreed price being higher than that originally 
opposed by the US government reflected not only the severity of world oil crisis, but also 
the ability of the Mexican negotiators. What needs to be underlined here is that since 
April 1979 officials of SEPAFIN had displaced the director of PEMEX and his team from 
the negotiations. The gas sale losing its commercial nature to become a critical political 
issue for both governments explains this fact. As noted by Morales, both the appointment
For extensive accounts o f the effects o f the 'gas affair', see Pellicer (1981), Morales (1986), and 
Grayson (1988).
Some of the earliest o f Castillo's articles against the gas pipeline may be found in Proceso 4 \ 
(15/7/77), Proceso 47 (26/9/77), and Proceso 48 (3/10/77).
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of the experienced diplomat Jorge Castaneda as minister of foreign relations in May and 
the blowout of the Ixtoc I  o\\ well in June (1986: 533) further weakened Diaz Serrano's 
role in the process. After the gas agreement, it became increasingly apparent that the 
Economic Cabinet had reasserted its authority over the oil policy.
By the middle of the sexenio, the principal area of dispute between Diaz Serrano 
and Oteyza was the level of oil production. Government critic Heberto Castillo had 
initiated the debate by arguing that hydrocarbons should be used to satisfy Mexico's own 
energy needs (cited in Levy and Szekely 1987: 232). A similar view, though much less 
radical, was held by Oteyza. Other government high-rank officials were opposed to over­
expansion on 'general equilibrium' grounds.^^ After some hesitation, president Lopez 
Portillo took an intermediate position on this issue (Camp 1984b: 42). It can be explained 
more in terms of political pressures, than in those of personal conviction.
PEMEX's six-year plan had established a goal of 2.25 million barrels per day 
(mbd) to be reached by 1982. In November 1979, Diaz Serrano announced that oil 
production had reached 1.8 mbd. Convinced that the 1982 target would be reached before 
schedule, he had already lobbied the president for the modification of the production 
ceiling. In response, he was instructed to submit his proposal of a 4-mbd ceiling in 1982 
to the Economic Cabinet for approval. Not surprisingly, the latter strongly and 
unanimously recommended the production ceiling not be raised. And the president 
agreed. It was a victory not only for the Economic Cabinet,^  ^but also for the duo Oteyza- 
de la Madrid, the architects of the bureaucratic coalition against the PEMEX general 
director.
An earlier indication of the already dominant role of SEPAFIN in oil policy­
making was the official launching of the National Energy Plan in November 1980. The 
plan emphasized that the fixed energy production ceiling would be only modified by 
domestic demand. Additionally, it not only imposed limits on oil exports, but 
recommended its diversification. Clearly, all these prescriptions challenged Diaz
This view was endorsed by presidential advisor Casio Luiselli (interviewed by Dr George Philip 
in January 1979),
^ Teichman (1988:105-107), from which this paragraph draws heavily, provides interesing data 
and probably the best description o f this episode.
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Serrano’s pro-American expansionist plans.^ "^  A similar picture was provided by the SPP. 
Though the 1980 Budget allocated PEMEX 23.77 percent of the total federal expenditure 
(DOF 31/12/79: 9-10), de la Madrid managed to reduce the actual amount of funds 
available to that agency (see Teichman 1988: 106). More openly, in the 1981 Budget, the 
SPP reduced the share of PEMEX to 16.15 percent of the total federal expenditure (DOF 
31/12/1980:16-17). Furthermore, as in the best days of the 'budgetary secrecy' era, de la 
Madrid continued benefitting other programmes at the expense of PEMEX's authorised 
budget.
Yet Diaz Serrano was far from being politically finished. On the one hand, the 
Ixtoc I, one of his major worries, had been eventually blocked in March 1980. On the 
other hand, some key political actors, including the president, were still on his side.
The political cost of a 'four-dollar* decision
By mid-1979, the campaign against Diaz Serrano was so intense that the president 
got the impression that it was orchestrated "either by insiders or outsiders, or a 
combination of both" (Lopez Portillo 1988: 864). Despite this view, it seemed clear that 
the major source of opposition was located within the federal bureaucracy, and specially 
within the Economic Cabinet. In this respect, the president was right when observing that 
"the economists of the regime and the technicians of PEMEX were divided" (Lopez 
Portillo 1988: 937). As the sexenio unfolded, the negative effects of the oil policy became 
increasingly apparent. By 1979, the Office of Presidential Economic Advisors began 
warning Lopez Portillo about the dangers of excessive reliance on oil to the economy, 
thus adopting a critical position regarding PEMEX’s policy
Institutionally, the effects of this policy turned out to have a direct negative impact 
on most cabinet agencies. For instance, the fact that by 1980 food production had sharply 
declined and "one-quarter of all foodstuffs" had to be imported affected badly the 
ministry of agriculture (Teichman 1988: 75). The peasant unrest caused by land 
expropriations for oil purposes had a similar effect on the ministry of agrarian reform and 
the PRI.
In late 1977, an officer o f the American embassy in Mexico said: "PEMEX is very, very 
orientated to the United States... " (quoted by Morales 1986: 525, from Wall Street Journal 26/10/77).
In 1980, this office elaborated a critical study o f the impact o f oil specially on the agricultural 
sector, a summary o f which was disclosed by Proceso (218, 5/1/81: 22-23).
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However, as earlier argued, the strongest reaction against PEMEX's expansionism 
came from the bureaucracies of both SEPANAL and SPP. There is certainly an irony 
here, for this strategy would have given de la Madrid and Oteyza more money to spend. 
However, what was really at stake were the country's economic and political prospects 
for the near future. Rising inflation and public deficits (see table 4.1 above), although 
they were not the direct result of PEMEX's operation but of government's spending 
policies, began to make the image of finance minister Ibarra look bad. As a result, the 
attitude of the SHCP towards PEMEX changed too. This 'efficiency triangle' would play 
a key role in articulating bureaucratic opposition against Diaz Serrano. In this sense, it 
can be argued that his oil strategy in combination with his presidential ambitions are 
responsible for eventually bringing Lopez Portillo's administrative reform into operation, 
though not exactly in the way originally envisaged.
Specially from late 1980 onwards, a tacit agreement within the federal 
bureaucracy seemed to be ''all against Diaz Serrano" (José Ramôn Lôpez Portillo, 
interview, London, 1/12/95). Still, Diaz Serrano had powerful supporters, among which 
there was the union of oil workers (STPRM). In the final analysis, there were the 
technicians and workers of PEMEX, mostly unionised, who made it possible to increase 
oil production to unprecedented levels. The alliance between Diaz Serrano and the 
STPRM was based totally on financial rewards to the union leaders, and to less extent to 
the oil workers as a whole. According to Grayson, between 1976 and 1983, PEMEX 
contributed $220 million (2 percent of all its investments) to its union (1984: 24). 
Moreover, though corrupt practices in PEMEX had a long tradition, they certainly grew 
during the oil bonanza.^^ These facts soon opened a new front for attack.
In late May \9%\^ Proceso (238,25/5/81: 6-10) revealed an internal study by SPP 
officials in which PEMEX was blamed for mismanagement and corruption. In brief, it 
argued that this agency's great autonomy prevented any correction by "the global and 
sectoral governmental levels" (read SPP and SEPAFIN). The fact usually neglected that 
analysts belonging to the three SPP divisions had participated in its formulation suggests 
that the study had been ordered, or at least encouraged, by the top echelons of the agency. 
Though the leakage was a dangerous move, it did not affect de la Madrid for one key
^ A great deal o f literature on these issues has been written. See, inter alia, Proceso numbers 327 
(7/2/83) and 333 (21/3/83), Grayson (1984), and Buendia (1985).
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reason: The SPP study upon which the article was based was produced in the area of the 
president's son, who incidently was close friend of Oteyza. Despite efforts to present the 
article as mere leak of "preliminary information", its intentional diffusion makes more 
sense considering Diaz Serrano's leading position in the presidential race.
President Lopez Portillo may have been informed of the study by his son, but he 
did not order its publication. From the perspective of the study, autonomy was the origin 
of the problems affecting PEMEX, and the president himself had encouraged that 
autonomy. At the end of the day, minister de la Madrid would emerged as the only 
beneficiary of the politically harmful 'leakage'.
Evidently, the importance of Proceso's article stemmed from both the source and 
the publisher, rather than from the information itself. As noted by George Philip, PEMEX 
had never been a financially disciplined agency "on the Weberian model", and it was 
mainly because of various political factors beyond the agency's control (1982: 363). They 
included highly subsidised prices of oil products for domestic consumption (not 
authorised by the agency); a policy of taxing away PEMEX's surplus, thus favouring its 
foreign indebtedness^^; and the role of the STPRM as a pillar of the ruling party. Sharply 
put, investment in PEMEX had never had the primary purpose of building a profitable, 
financially sound oil industry, but a politically-tuned supplier of cheap energy for rapid 
industrialisation.
Although the Proceso affair gave Diaz Serrano's foes additional ammunition, it 
did not have immediate consequences. It was so because he had total presidential 
backing. Things dramatically changed, however, when the international oil market 
weakened. As a response, Diaz Serrano reduced the price of crude for export by $4 per 
barrel on June 2, 1981. Though the decline of oil prices is at the heart of his leaving 
PEMEX, bureaucratic factors should not be neglected. According to the president, neither 
he nor the Economic Cabinet was consulted about the size of the reduction (Lopez 
Portillo 1988: 1059). This explanation was an unconvincing one. For PEMEX 
international prices had been customarily set by "an small group" of experienced 
technocrats according to the oil market (Teichman 1988: 67). In any event, fierce 
criticism of the "hasty decision" of "cheapening the nation's patrimony" came not only
For instance, in 1980 PEMEX increased its net borrowing by $2.7 billion, while paying taxes 
o f about $7 billion (Philip 1982: 361).
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from the usual cabinet actors, but from the broad and powerfiil bureaucratic coalition they 
had encouraged/^
Even though Diaz Serrano's 'four-dollar' decision proved commercially correct 
(Philip 1996: 20-21), the views voiced at the Economic Cabinet prevailed and few days 
later the president made PEMEX's director a "scapegoat for an unpopular but inevitable 
decision" (LAWR 25, 12/6/81: 3). The events leading to this outcome show the 
importance that the bureaucratic setting has in Mexico, in particular when the presidential 
transition approaches.
The Mexican mechanism of succession makes it only logical that the president 
places his right-hand men in the key ministries to his programme, and eventually supports 
one of them for the nomination. In the case of Lopez Portillo, these men were Tello and 
Moctezuma. In less than one year, however, he lost both of them. In addition, Oteyza was 
not eligible to the presidency because of his being son of a Spaniard. Oil, however, 
brought an emergent pre-candidate. Diaz Serrano's political stature grew as fast as oil 
production, and as high as oil prices. His major achievement was to supply a highly 
clientelist political system with an impressive inflow of financial resources. In late 1980, 
business leader Ernesto Atman publicly declared that the next president should not 
"change the pace nor the direction of Lopez Portillo's policy" (quoted by Arriola and 
Galindo 1984: 121).
This was the interpretation of Diaz Serrano becoming the central speaker at the 
'Fourth Meeting of the Republic' held in Hermosillo in February 1981. Lopez Portillo's 
speech at the meeting further suggested that Diaz Serrano was his candidate. The message 
was so obvious that José Angel Conchello, former PAN president, considered PEMEX 
director as the most probable PRI presidential candidate {Proceso 236,11/5/81: 22-23). 
Following the drop of oil prices, however, neither American vice-president George Bush 
(Diaz Serrano's former business partner), nor even the Mexican president could prevent 
the fall of Diaz Serrano from happening.
In the end, only minister Mujica Montoya (SCT), Moctezuma Cid, and a handful o f high-rank 
officials openly supported Diaz Serrano.
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4.4 THE SPP AND THE 1982 PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
This final section further develops the argument that that the oil debate 'was "the 
most significant feature of the increasingly intense struggle over the presidential 
succession process" (LAWR, 12/6/81: 3) by focusing on the causes and immediate effects 
of the choice of de la Madrid as the PRI candidate. From an institutional perspective, it 
is argued that the presidential struggle involved exclusively the economic-policy network, 
and in particular the Economic Cabinet, that is, the highest echelon of that network. In 
this context, the SPP's institutional resources, including the skillful way minister de la 
Madrid exercised them, proved crucial in gaining the nomination. On the whole, these 
developments meant a significant departure from the rules associated with the previous 
succession processes.
Succession and the network for political control
As earlier discussed, Lopez Portillo resorted to his inner circle when staffing the 
greatly reorganised economic-policy network. A fairly different pattern is observed in the 
way its counterpart was staffed. As head of Gobernacion, the president appointed liberal 
Jesus Reyes Heroles, his former classmate at UN AM and old fnend. It is worth noting 
that he was the only cabinet prospect who was given the chance to choose his post from 
among three ministries: interior, labour, and foreign relations (Lopez Portillo 1988: 473). 
It suggests that the president elect did not have clearly defined candidates for these 
important posts. In any event, Reyes Heroles' solid, impeccable political careeP^ made 
him an ideal interior minister, especially on the verge of Lopez Portillo's 'political 
reform'.
However, the appointment of Carlos Sansores Pérez, who was an 'old school', 
orthodox, traditional politician and regional boss as head of the PRI, showed that political 
change had not top priority in the presidential agenda. This fact, together with the 
'political reform' being carried out by Reyes Heroles, enhanced considerably the
He had been federal deputy from Veracruz (1961-64); general director o f both PEMEX (1964- 
70) and Complex Ciudad Sahagun (1970-72); president o f PRI (1972-76); and general director o f IMSS 
(76).
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traditional bickering between Gobernacion and PRI. Whether intended or not, the latter 
agency counteracted the role played by the former between 1977 and 1979.
Two elements in the curriculum vitae of Gobernacioris new head shed light on 
the role he was expected to play. The first was Reyes Heroles' well-known enmity for ex­
president Echeverria. This was not irrelevant considering the visible purpose of the latter 
to continue participating politically. Thus, the appointment of Reyes Heroles should be 
interpreted as an unmistakable warning sign to Echeverria and his followers. This 
interpretation is further supported by other appointments. As usual, some representatives 
of "relegated" camarillas were brought to cabinet. They included Hank Gonzalez (DDF) 
and Flores Sanchez (PGR) who were leaders of influential political groups in the States 
of Mexico and Chihuahua respectively. One common element, however, linked them: 
their dinXi-Echeverrism?^ Besides, Santiago Roel, the minister of foreign relations, had 
reportedly supported Martinez Manatou for the presidency in 1969.
Secondly, Reyes Heroles was constitutionally ineligible to the presidency for 
exactly the same reason as Oteyza. The political implication of this was obvious. Lopez 
Portillo himself would underline the advantages of having a "strong" secretary of 
Gobernacion "without presidential aspirations" (1988: 694). By early 1979, a purge of 
Echeverria's followers in government, instrumented by Reyes Heroles, had taken place.^’ 
Moreover, the ex-expresident Diaz Ordaz, a declared enemy of Echeverria, was appointed 
ambassador in April 1978. In mid-1979, however, Reyes Heroles was dismissed. If his 
appointment had been an early indication that Gobernacion would not play a relevant role 
in the presidential race as in the past, his replacement was a second indication, though for 
different reasons. Above all, Olivares Santana, a cautious career politician, was far from 
being one of the president's right-hand men.^^
As usual, the role of the policy network for political control was decided mostly 
by domestic factors as perceived by the president. On the whole, the Lopez Portillo
Both Hank Gonzâlez and Flores Sânchez had been governors during the Diaz Ordaz 
administration (1964-70).
The major casualties included the president o f the Chamber o f Deputies Gomez Villanueva 
(August 1977); the minister o f agrarian reform Rojo Lugo (November 1977); the education minister 
Porfirio Mufloz Ledo (December 1977); and the PRI's leader Sansores Pérez (January 1979) {Proceso, 
various issues).
The appointment o f Olivares Santana has been correctly interpreted as "a retreat from the 
political reform and the assertion o f the President in political matters" (Bailey 1988: 47).
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administration was characterised by high political stability and limited use of repression. 
Legislation broadening the political space to the opposition, both rightist and leftist, 
approved in December 1977 contributed to that outcome. And so did the early inflow of 
oil revenues and foreign credit. Paradoxically, the main source of political tension was 
located well inside the political system, and it had a name: Echeverria. It explains why 
holding back Echeverrism from the political arena was probably the major control task 
performed by the network under discussion.
To sum up, the way the network for political control was staffed and the modest 
role it was charged with accounts for its marginal participation in the succession process. 
President Lopez Portillo's main concerns were to manage the country's oil wealth and to 
plan what to do with its fruits. With this idea in mind, he placed his best men in the 
agencies most involved with these activities, thus delimiting from the outset the 
succession institutional framework to the economic-policy network.
De la Madrid: The presidential candidate
Various subtle indicators overshadowed by the oil boom may suggest that de la 
Madrid had not been totally discarded by the president as a serious presidential pre­
candidate. For instance, before the Hermosillo meeting, Lopez Portillo selected Alfredo 
del Mazo, a close friend of de la Madrid, as the PRI's candidate to the important State of 
Mexico. It is common wisdom that this decision announces who the next president will 
be. Was de la Madrid rather than Diaz Serrano the president's first choice at the peak of 
the succession process? Only the ex-president knows the answer. What is a fact is that 
de la Madrid's political stature steadily grew after his arrival at the SPP. In essence, his 
heading the centrepiece of Lopez Portillo's administrative reform accounts for this 
development. Overwhelming concentration of strategic resources, together with 
presidential support, gave de la Madrid a clear advantage over his competitors, including 
Diaz Serrano.
Providing for the advantageous institutional setting provided by the SPP, personal 
and camarilla factors played an important role in de la Madrid's growing strength. The 
first factors include his outstanding ability to manoeuvre in bureaucratic environments 
stemming from his long career within government. This helped him to gain the 
president's confidence. One episode can illustrate the point. In September 1980, SPP 
subsecretaria Rosa Luz Alegrfa was appointed minister of Tourism. To replace her, the
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president appointed his son José Ramon, partly at least, "because of de la Madrid's 
insistence" (Lopez Portillo 1988: 1006)/^ Equally important was the highly cohesive 
character of de la Madrid's inner group at the SPP (Hernandez 1987). The technical 
credentials of this 'efficiency cluster' saved Lopez Portillo's administrative reform from 
further discredit. A well publised seminar on planning organised by the SPP (see SPP 
1981) improved not only de la Madrid's relationships with the president, but also his own 
public image.
Apart from the fact that his heading the SPP made de la Madrid a strong 
presidential aspirant, he exercised to the full this agency's 'resources' to get the 
presidential nomination. By far, the greatest political success of the SPP was the 
launching of the National Global Plan (POD) in 1980. Achieving what neither Tello nor 
Garcia Sainz could increased de la Madrid's stature in the president's eyes. According to 
Lopez Portillo, having a national plan meant the outcome of a twenty-year effort (1988; 
952). From a technical perspective, however, the PGD was ill-bom. To begin with, by the 
time it was presented, PEMEX's oil programme and the abundant sectoral plans had 
inspired most economic policies of the administration (Bailey 1988: 47). More 
significant, assuming that the price of oil would continue its rapid rise and 'planning' 
development and social redistribution on this basis were the major technical shortcoming 
of the plan. In other words, the inherent unpredictability of oil was not allowed for. 
Nevertheless, the plan served the president and the SPP technocracy to legitimate their 
actions.
Diaz Serrano's resignation did not stop bureaucratic infighting. What it did was 
to bring the latter within the limits of the Economic Cabinet, which logically shattered 
the temporary coalition against him. In addition, the same resignation made again 
apparent the intrinsic conflict between planning and finance. Different from 1977, the 
correlation was far from being in relative equilibrium. In retrospect, it appears clear that 
the alliance SPP-SEPAFIN survived the firing of Diaz Serrano. The structuralist 
orientation of both ministries may partly explain why. Though Oteyza had no chance to 
succeed Lopez Portillo, that alliance would play an outstanding role in the eventual 
selection of de la Madrid as the PRI presidential candidate.
” This was the second time a similar proposal was made to the president. In February 1978, Garcia 
Sainz had failed to make José Ramon director o f programming (Lopez Portillo 1988: 692).
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It was obvious that the fall of oil prices in mid-1981, together with nominal US 
prime interest rates of around 19 percent, would have a devastating effect on the country's 
economy. Objectively, only two ministers held the technical resources and 'efficiency 
pockets' to tackle the imminent economic crisis: David Ibarra and Miguel de la Madrid. 
Apart from alliances, various political factors paved the way for the latter taking the lead. 
On his side, for example, was the president's self-confessed animosity towards the SHOP. 
In addition, the strategy of covering income shortfalls through "cuts in public spending 
and borrowing" (Bailey 1988: 53) enhanced not only the role to be played by the SPP in 
achieving the first goal, but also de la Madrid's personal expertise as borrower. Ironically, 
his expertise had been mastered at the SHOP. In these conditions, it seemed only logical 
that he became the PRI presidential candidate.
At first sight, the 'golden rules' of the presidential transition were punctually 
observed in September 1981, for the president did select one of his ministers as his 
successor. A more careful analysis, however, reveals a different picture. First, never since 
Madero's assassination had international factors so severely limited the president's room 
for manoeuvre in the succession process. Second, neither Ibarra nor de la Madrid 
belonged to the president's inner circle. Third, rather than free presidential choice, the 
interaction of contextual and bureaucratic factors played an outstanding role in the 
eventual selection of de la Madrid. This interpretation is supported by former president 
Lopez Portillo's recognition that "de la Madrid was my student, never my friend" 
(interview in Proceso 836, 9/11/92: 11).
In the Mexican context, the existence of fiiendship ties between the president and 
his successor used to perform the crucial function of smoothing the transition of power 
and the normal elite fractures involved in the process. This fact notwithstanding, cracks 
of substance emerged as in the Calles-Cardenas and Diaz Ordaz-Echeverria cases (see 
Chapters Two and Three). Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that de la Madrid, 
considering his SHOP background, wanted to disassociate himself from the government 
he had so diligently served.
Like Echeverria, de la Madrid went through two significant metamorphoses in a 
matter of a few years. His arrival at the SPP transformed a conservative, orthodox 
financial official into "a strong proponent of a government programme to promote 
employment and consumption and for increased state participation in the expansion of
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goals and services" (Teichman 1988: 98). One example illustrates our point. In a press 
conference held just a few days after his appointment as head of the SPP, de la Madrid 
regarded PEMEX as an exemplary public enterprise whose "faults have been minimal" 
(Memoria 1979: 191). Mismanagement and corruption, however, were not unknovm to 
him, for he had been that agency's finance director between 1970 and 1972. Beyond 
technicalities, the battles for the succession are at the heart of the rivalry between Diaz 
Serrano and de la Madrid going far beyond an ordinary political-bureaucratic conflict.^"*
According to Linz, in "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes the incumbents of 
technocratic roles tend to emphasize those aspects that their socialization has best taught 
them to measure and deal vrith" (1975:299). That was exactly what former SHCP official 
de la Madrid did regarding the unfolding economic crisis, but not before becoming the 
PRI presidential candidate. Apart from personal ideological factors, the interaction of 
institutional environments, broad contextual variables, and presidential ambitions, may 
account for de la Madrid's radical metamorphoses.
The selection of de la Madrid as the PRI presidential candidate created enormous 
tensions within the political system. It was made apparent by the overt confrontation 
between him and Garcia Paniagua, the PRI leader, which led to the resignation of the 
latter on October 14,1981. As if being the candidate were a bureaucratic promotion, de 
la Madrid had asked for the key PRI positions for his team.^  ^Aware of the consequences 
Garcia Paniagua reportedly answered him: Why do not you get "all" [the PRI] instead? 
{Proceso 258,12/10/81: 10, Scherer 1986: 93). After some unsuccessful reconciliation 
efforts, Lopez Portillo eventually supported the candidate's claim (1988: 1112). The 
appointment of Pedro Ojeda, a 'negotiated' PRI president, meant a radical departure from 
the rule that the outgoing president should be in control of the political campaign.
In essence, the events described reflected more significant inter-network tensions, 
namely, those resulting from the economic-policy network encroaching upon the 
traditional jurisdiction of its counterpart. In other words, de la Madrid's victory re-
The conflict became personal, and was dealt with on those terms. In early July 1983, seven 
months after the presidential transition, Diaz Serrano was in gaol charged with corruption (see Buendfa 
1985: 244-270).
The posts were the Campaign Coordination for Bartlett, the Press Office for Gonzalez Avelar, 
the Finance Secretary for Francisco Rojas, and the lEPES for Salinas.This request contrasts with the fact 
that in 1975 Lopez Portillo had got only a reduced number o f PRI positions, the lEPES being the most 
important.
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confirmed that the network for political control had lost its traditional involvement in the 
sucession process. Within the economic-policy network, the rise of de la Madrid is also 
responsible for generating another source of political stress. A first indication of this 
phenomenon is provided by the growing struggles between the SPP planners and the 
technocrats of the regime who gathered around the National College of Economists 
(CNE).^^ In both cases, elite permanency was at stake.
Economic (mis)management and succession
The 1976 administrative reform did not improve economic management. On the 
contrary, unprecedented levels of policy incoherence characterised the Lopez Portillo 
administration. Resource the dispersion of institutional resources brought about by the 
reform was at the heart of economic mismanagement. More specifically, the latter was 
associated with the "unnatural" separation between planning and finance (Bailey 1984: 
86). As already argued, the succession struggle magnified a problem that the Tello- 
Moctezuma affair had first made apparent. Therefore, though debates of substance 
spurred high levels of bureaucratic infighting and policy incoherence, institutional and 
political factors should not be neglected as relevant causes. For instance, the 
institutionally-grounded and politically-driven rivalries between Oteyza and Diaz Serrano 
cost the country $1 billion in June 1981 alone. The reason of the so-called "billion dollar 
dime" were differences over oil prices (Bailey 1988: 54).
On the verge of the economic crisis that followed the drop of oil prices, finance 
minister Ibarra asked the president to select a single person responsible for macro- 
economic decision making (Lopez Portillo 1988: 1074). Of course, his candidate was 
himself. This option was discarded, for accepting it would have meant returning to the 
institutional arrangement the president wanted to change. The country would pay for it. 
At the time, the estimations of the SPP and the SHCP of the impact that the declining oil 
prices would have on public finances did not match (Lopez Portillo 1988: 1093). Spurred 
by the succession struggle, the intrinsic problems between both ministries had come again 
to the surface.^^ On September 25, 1981, Miguel de la Madrid became the PRI
On this issue, see Proceso 196 (4/8/80). On the previously good relations between the SPP and 
the ONE, see Proceso 26 (30/4/77) and 27 (9/5/77).
In August 1979, for example, the Comision de Gasto-Financiamiento was created to improve 
the coordination between the SHCP and the SPP (DOF 29/8/79). The text o f the fiat explicitly recognises 
this problem.
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presidential candidate. Later Ramon Aguirre (his replacement at the SPP) would confirm 
that the SHCP's estimations of public deficit were right. Being with the president, Ibarra 
smiled as if he were saying "I told you" (Lopez Portillo 1988: 1123).
What Ibarra had really tried to tell the president was that de la Madrid was using 
his control over the budget for political purposes. The president, however, preferred to 
lend his ear to de la Madrid's 'politics-free', technically-sophisticated, optimistic macro- 
economic forecasts. After all, was not the president the first promoter of "public- 
expenditure-led growth" (Lustig 1992: 20), and the SPP his creation? At this point, some 
comments on de la Madrid's first metamorphosis are in order.
TABLE 4.5 Projected and actual central and parastate gross expenditure, 1971-1982^*^
(Millions of Pesos of 1950)
Percentage
Central expenditure change from 
Projected
Projected Actual to Actual
Percentage
Parastate expenditure change from
Projected
Projected Actual to Actual
1971 9,613 17,433 81.3 15,279 20,483 34.0
1972 16,101 22,715 41.1 20,187 21,041 4.2
1973 23,240 26,584 14.4 21,970 26,467 20.5
1974 24,164 28,752 19.0 24,737 29,788 20.4
1975 34,073 36,693 7.7 29,394 36,659 24.7
1976 36,493 42,153 15.5 30,906 37,569 21.6
1977 41,113 41,741 1.5 38,507 44,130 14.6
1978 43,701 44,523 1.9 48,113 49,845 3.6
1979 47,800 54,495 14.0 46,225 51,429 11.3
1980 54,535 65,129 19.4 54,884 66,077 20.4
1981 110,704 128,101 15.7 73,623 82,207 11.7
1982 70,239 107,175 52.6 34,996 67,598 93.3
Central expenditure includes amortization o f the debt and transfers to decentralised agencies, 
states, and local government. Apart from amortization o f the debt, parastate expenditure includes transfers 
from the central government and parastate transfers to the state and local government.
Sources: Wilkie (1985, table 3402: 872 and table 3404: 874), based on figures from the Cuenta 
Pûblica elaborated yearly by the SPP since 1977.
The arrival of de la Madrid at the SPP coincided with "the return in 1979 to a 
substantial overrun in public spending, which had been kept under tight control in 1977 
and 1978" (LAWR, 14/12/79: 75). This statement is supported by the data presented in 
table 4.5. It is particularly clear from there that the percentage changes between projected 
and actual central and parastate expenditures sharply increased in the period 1979-1980.
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The same table also reveals not only that public deficits, both central and parastate, Avere 
not significantly reduced after the drop of oil prices, but also that they reached 
astonishing proportions in 1982. From a technical perspective it meant that the SPP had 
either produced unrealistic expenditure estimations, or failed to control public spending, 
or both. Considering the economic expertise of de la Madrid's team, hov^ever, a political 
interpretation makes more sense. De la Madrid, like Lopez Portillo six years before, used 
public spending as a means to reach the presidential nomination. In both cases, the 
strategy worked beautifully.
Table 4.6 provides data about the deficit of the twenty-seven largest parastate 
entities during the Lopez Portillo administration. A steady reduction of PEMEX's 
percentage share in the total deficit may suggest an effort by the central authorities to 
improve this agency's finances during the peak of the oil boom (1979-1980). This fact 
sheds light on the growing tensions between the SPP and PEMEX. However, as the same 
table shows, the SPP did not stop the deficit of the whole controlled parastate sector from 
going up between 1977 and 1981. By contrast, a significant reduction of this sector's 
deficit was achieved in 1982 (as compared with that of the previous year). The main 
casualty was PEMEX. Apart from the ongoing economic crisis, the fact that after 
September 1981 a more SHCP-orientated PRI presidential candidate began to emerge 
may have accounted for this new approach to public finances.
TABLE 4.6 Deficit of the controlled parastate sector, 1977-1982^*^
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Controlled Decentralised entities and
public enterprises (millions o f Pesos 39.0 54.5 54.9 76.0 167.0 66.0
of 1950)
Percentage share in the total deficit
PEMEX 51.3 60.3 57.2 50.8 68.6 64.7
Different from PEMEX 48.7 39.7 42.8 49.2 31.4 35.3
The controlled parastate sector is composed o f the largest state-owned enterprises whose 
authorised expenditure is included in the annual federal budget.
Source: Calculated using data from NAFINSA (1990, cuadro 13.27: 629-630) and the deflactor 
index provided by Wilkie (1985, table 3401: 870).
Following the devaluation of the peso in February 1982, Jesus Silva-Herzog and 
Miguel Mancera were appointed heads of the SHCP and the central bank respectively.
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Both officials were closely identified with de la Madrid, and so was minister Ramon 
Aguirre (SPP). By giving the PRI candidate control over the main economic agencies, 
Lopez Portillo anticipated the presidential transition (Ramirez in Colmenares et al. 1982: 
110-118). On April 20, an IMF-inspired austerity programme was announced (see DGF 
20/4/82), and put in motion with limited success. Wage increases were at the heart of the 
failure of these and earlier post-devaluation measures. Four months later, minister Silva- 
Herzog made public the agreement of an emergency rescue package with the US 
authorities and the IMF.^* De la Madrid's relative control over the economic-policy 
making, however, did not last long.
The continued deterioration of the economy gave Oteyza and Tello, among 
others, the opportunity to convince the president to follow a different economic strategy 
from that being implemented by de la Madrid's team (see Tello 1984). This not only 
shattered the Oteyza-de la Madrid alliance, but led to unprecedented levels of policy 
incoherence. In his fifth address to the nation, Echeverria had said that his government 
could nationalise some sectors of private industry if demanded by "the national interest". 
On September 1, 1982, president Lopez Portillo went further when he announced the 
nationalisation of the domestic banking system. Abruptly, this and other measures that 
followed brought to an end president-elect de la Madrid's short-lived dominance on 
economic policy. Economic mismanagement not only was at the heart of the general 
crisis of confidence that characterised 1982, but also would greatly contribute to the 
deterioration of the Mexican presidency.
At the end of the Lopez Portillo administration, Mexico's total external debt 
amounted to around $90 billion. Because of government's decision to continue spending 
despite the fall of oil prices, borrowing accounted on average for 50 percent of central 
government total income between 1981-1982 (Wilkie 1985: 878). This spending pattern 
"had more to do with the momentum of the presidential succession struggle than with the 
influence of the quasi-populist faction" (Teichman 1988: 129).
See Heyman (1983: 35), Keesing's (1983: 32071), and Teichman (1988: 132-133) for details.
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CONCLUDING NOTE
During the presidency of Lopez Portillo, oil-related international developments 
played a fundamental role in shaping economic policy. The continued rise of oil prices 
not only made the recession that followed the 1976 crisis short-lived, but paved the way 
for an expansionist, oil-for-export strategy. Favourable geological conditions, together 
with the 1978-79 Iranian revolution, eased the full adoption of this strategy. With the 
petrolisation of the economy, however, the country's promising future was dangerously 
linked to the volatility of the oil market. When the oil prices collapsed in 1981, so did the 
Mexican economy. At bureaucratic level, these developments had significant political 
implications.
Increasing emphasis on oil changed in a significant way the balance of power 
within the federal government. The emerging picture was at odds with the institutional 
arrangement brought about by the 1976 administrative reform. At least until 1979, 
PEMEX, not the SPP, became an influential policy-maker and planner. Its oil programme 
shaped the government's key economic goals for almost the entire administration. 
PEMEX's major source of political power was presidential support in combination with 
its capacity to generate dollars.
A massive inflow of capital via oil revenues and foreign borrowing allowed Lopez 
Portillo to restore the system's traditional alliances, particularly that with the private 
sector. Paradoxically, the oil strategy would create growing tensions within the 
bureaucratic apparatus. The rising political star of the PEMEX director, together with his 
expansionist plan, was strongly opposed by a diminished Economic Cabinet. Debates of 
substance interlinked with succession issues not only unified the Economic Cabinet 
against PEMEX and his director. The increased institutional strength of this cabinet and 
its key constituent parts, not the fall of oil prices, explains Diaz Serrano's resignation.
Policy incoherence and economic mismanagement characterise the Lopez Portillo 
administration. At the heart of these problems was the artificial separation between 
finance and planning. More than one agency being in charge of economic-policy making, 
together with the regular use of cabinet meetings, prompted both bureaucratic infighting 
and economic mismanagement. The oil boom not only favoured a dramatic growth of the
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public deficit, but overshadowed its significance. Presidential aspirations underpinned 
the expansive spending policies of the SPP between 1979 and 1981. The disastrous way 
the 1981 drop in oil prices was dealt with was the root of the 1982 crisis.
A combination of international and institutional factors decided the 1981 
presidential succession. They considerably reduced the traditional role of the president 
in the process. Despite its importance, the drop of oil prices should not obscure the 
relevance of institutional and bureaucratic factors in the section of de la Madrid as the 
PRI candidate. The operation of the Economic Cabinet made more visible and intense 
than usual the bureaucratic struggle over the presidential succession. In this context, the 
overwhelming concentration of strategic 'resources' under the SPP umbrella proved 
decisive to succeed in the process. The way government dealt with the shortfall of income 
gave the SPP a crucial advantage over its more serious competitor: the SHCP.
As we will argue in the next chapter, the SPP's capacity to influence public 
spending is associated with its becoming the most powerful ministry in post- 
revolutionary Mexico. This particular power would allow the SPP shifting its role from 
a manager of the oil wealth to a expenditure cutter as the incoming administration 
engaged in the implementation of a radical austerity programme to tackle the economic 
and debt crises.
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Coping with the debt crisis: 
The SPP’s powerful years
Like that of his predecessor, the de la Madrid administration (1982-1988) was 
marked by oil developments. This time, however, the main characteristic would be the 
debt crisis that followed the short-lived oil boom. As argued by Grayson (1988), drastic 
oil developments transformed the role of the country from a "regional leader" to a 
"responsible debtor". In combination, falling oil prices, high interest rates (see table 5.2 
below), and persistent high levels of public expenditure are mostly responsible for 
Mexico's total external debt (both public and private) reaching the unprecedented figure 
of $92.4 billion by the end of 1982, thus becoming the world's second highest just after 
that of Brazil. The importance of oil prices declining is illustrated by the fact that in the 
same year, oil exports represented 77.6 percent of the country's total exports (Lustig 1992, 
table 2-2: 32).
De la Madrid's years can be divided into two distinctive periods. In the period 
1982-1985, the country had certainly an enormous debt problem, but also plenty of oil 
income to deal with it. Thus, though oil prices were still declining, the situation seemed 
redeemable. This fact enhanced the importance of adequate economic management. As 
argued in this chapter, the way government dealt with the debt crisis, together with policy 
incoherence having again institutional roots, aggravated the effects of that 1982 crisis. 
The sharp fall in oil prices in the first half of 1986 not only had disastrous effects on the 
public sector finances, but also created the perception that a radical policy change was 
inevitable. Intense confrontations between the heads of the SPP and the SHCP, greatly 
encouraged by presidential ambitions, surrounded the eventual adoption of more radical 
pro-market policies.
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The economic policies of the last months of the Lopez Portillo administration, 
including the banking nationalisation, not only alienated the domestic private sector in 
a way unseen since 1940, but also worsened government's relationships with its foreign 
creditors. Regaining the confidence of both sectors characterised de la Madrid's 
presidency. Essentially as a survival strategy, since mid-1985 minister Salinas began 
proposing more orthodox economics than his counterpart at the finance ministry. This 
made him friends not only in the domestic and external business circles, but also in 
Washington. This fact turned out to be decisive in his selection as the PRI presidential 
candidate in 1987. In the end, government becoming an exemplary 'responsible debtor', 
together with more radical austerity policies, would have the effect of putting the political 
system under increasing pressure.
This chapter analyses de la Madrid's austerity programme, its impact on the 
government machinery, and the general problems faced in its achievement. The central 
argument is that control over public spending in a context of austerity is at the heart of 
the SPP becoming the most powerful ministry. After describing the economic strategy, 
section two focuses on the application of the austerity programme, on the contextual 
factors hampering its application, and on the mid-term deterioration of government's 
relationships with domestic and foreign capital. Section three deals with the broad causes 
of the 1986 policy shift towards market policies and on the bureaucratic and political 
factors involved. The last section explores the immediate effects of the austerity 
programme on the presidential succession process, and the SPP's participation in that 
process.
5.1 DE LA MADRID’S ATTEMPT TO TACKLE THE CRISIS
The severity of the 1981-82 economic crisis' reduced considerably the policy 
options of the incoming administration. As six years before, the Mexican government had 
no choice but to sign a 'letter of intent' to the IMF as announced by the finance minister 
in early November 1982. Putting into effect an austerity stabilisation programme under
' The 1982 economic crisis has been extensively studied. A brief chronicle o f the crisis may be 
found in Heyman (1983). For more extensive analyses, see Colmenares et al. (1982), Newall and Rubio 
(1984), Looney (1985), Bailey and Cohen (1987), Teichman (1988: Chapter 6 and 7), and Lustig (1992: 
Chapter 1).
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the IMF's supervision was the key condition for getting new loans and rescheduling the 
repayment of existing ones. By the time de la Madrid assumed office in late 1982, he had 
already accepted the IMF's general recommendations. Thus, a medium-term programme 
to stabilise the economy along those lines was then announced. This move was president 
de la Madrid's first step to reestablish a working relationship with government's foreign 
creditors.
The debt problem
Apart from the domestic bankers, the unexpected shifts in economic policy 
announced by Lopez Portillo on September 1, 1982 had another victim: the IMF 
negotiations (Heyman 1983: 37). Since early 1982, it was clear that Mexico would hardly 
obtain all the money she urgently needed without the intervention of the IMF. The short 
period of financial autonomy enjoyed by the country was over. This fact was illustrated 
by the conditions underpinning the August rescue package agreed with the US 
government. For they included both the sale of an unspecified amount of oil for the 
American strategic reserve and the celebration of an agreement with the IMF to be 
reached by mid-October.^ Despite the SHCP's efforts to achieve the last goal, the bank 
nationalisation and the adoption of total exchange controls not only brought the 
negotiations with the IMF to a standstill, but further deteriorated the country's 
international credit rating.
Amid the reluctance of foreign private bankers to lend any more to Mexico, Silva- 
Herzog eventually announced the signing of a 'letter of intent' with the IMF on November 
9, 1982. The immediate costs of this course of action were high, though admittedly 
difficult to avoid. Because of the new rescue package, not only would 8.3 billion dollars 
be added to Mexico's gigantic foreign debt in 1983 alone, but complying with the IMF's 
policy prescriptions would severely reduced the incoming administration's room for 
manoeuvre. It is worth noting that for the first time the IMF made its support conditional 
on the lending banks' approval, and not vice versa (Heyman 1983: 37-38). The 
unprecedented decision further illustrates the degree of deterioration of Mexico's image
^Domestically, the terms of the agreement with the US government were kept secret until journalist 
Rafael Rodriguez disclosed them in mid-November 1982 {Proceso3\S, 15/11/82: 6-9). For a critique of  
Silva-Herzog's explanation before the Chamber of Deputies, which took place two days after the disclosure, 
see Proceso 2>\6 (22/11/82: 6-11).
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abroad. After its acceptance by the banks, the rescue package was eventually approved 
by the IMF in late December. Considering the adverse conditions, the agreement 
appeared to be a triumph for the Mexican negotiators. However, the issue of the Mexican 
debt crisis was far more complex.
TABLE 5.1 Mexican external debt and interest rates, 1976-1983 
(Billions o f dollars, unless otherwise specified)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
A. Global external debt 27.5 30.9 34.6 40.3 50.7 74.9 92.4 93.8
B. Total public debt 19.6 22.9 26.3 29.7 33.8 53.0 59.7 66.6
C. Short-term public debt^^ 18.9 11.8 4.6 4.7 4.4 20.4 15.8 15.6
D. US prime interest rates^ ^^ 6.8 6.8 9.1 12.7 15.3 18.9 14.9 10.8
Percent o f the total public debt; Percentages.
Source: A, Lustig (1992, table 1-5: 22; and table 2-2: 32); B, ECLA (1981, table 14: 554) for 
1976-80, and Lustig (1992,table 2-2: 32) for 1981-83; C, figures calculated using data from ECLA (1981, 
table 14: 554, and (1985, table 14: 432); D, SALA 24 (1985, table 3228: 807).
Table 5.1 shows the evolution of the Mexican external debt in the period 1976- 
1983. Though the figures provided are self-explanatory, the real size of the Mexican debt 
is best illustrated by the fact that in 1982 it represented 87 percent of that year's GDP (as 
compared with 20.9 percent in 1980) (Glade in Camp 1986: 52).^ From a different 
perspective, the same table reveals that public debt classified as short-term debt 
dramatically increased in 1981, while its levels remained high during 1982 and 1983. 
Amid high interest rates and declining oil prices, this was a major problem. For instance, 
it was estimated that a total of $20 billion was due in 1983 alone (Heyman 1983: 35). It 
explains why agreeing with the foreign creditors was probably the most urgent task of the 
incoming administration.
Rhetoric aside, the basic economic programme proposed by de la Madrid in his 
inauguration was in line with the 'letter of intent' with the IMF signed by Silva-Herzog 
one month before. Political considerations explain government efforts to show the 
programme's native origins. In Latin America, as noted by Silva-Herzog himself, 
"opposition will arise to any economic programme imposed or recommended by foreign
 ^The same source also notes that this percentage was higher than those o f Argentina (60%) and 
specially Brazil (26%), whose total debt was around the same size.
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sources" (1988: 13). In the same event, the incoming president criticized his two 
predecessors, both present, by stating that "financial populism" was the main factor 
responsible for the economic crisis, and proposing "economic realism" as the solution. 
A medium-term programme explained not only the latter notion, but the whole economic 
strategy. It was called Programa Inmediato de Reordenaciôn Economica (PIRE).'*
In essence, de la Madrid called for a drastic reduction in public expenditure. Apart 
from reducing its size in real terms, rigid administrative controls and combating 
corruption would ensure compliance with the spending limits. On the income side, a tax 
reform aimed at assuring a balanced budget was also announced. It included higher 
taxation and elimination of subsidised prices for public goods and services. As during the 
'stabilising development' era, curbing inflation was the ultimate goal of the whole 
economic strategy. So far, the IMF's shadow was obvious.
The negotiations with the IMF officially concluded on December 23,1982, and 
the longed-for financial aid began to be disbursed. By acting as a responsible debtor, 
president de la Madrid not only provided his administration with a breathing space, but 
restored, at least temporally, the country's relationships with the international community 
(see Grayson 1988). Domestically, however, PIRE was a bitter pill for most social 
sectors. First, the economic strategy endangered even further the living standards of 
millions of workers and peasants. Together with this fact, the IMF's involvement in 
domestic economic policy alienated the leftist parties and academic circles. By reducing 
their political participation and possibilities for enrichment, both budget cuts and 'moral 
renovation' also alienated broad sectors of the federal bureaucracy. In particular, those 
measures threatened the bureaucratic sectors benefitting from government expansion, and 
those dealing with political clienteles. Finally, the announcements of a radical tax reform 
and the end of fiscal subsidies and protectionist policies were not particularly good news 
for the business community.
There were, however, some contextual factors working in favour of de la Madrid's 
strategy. Since 1979 there was a worldwide loss of faith in state intervention (Hutton 
1996: 15). Public intervention in the economy began to be associated with 
nationalisation, subsidy, and waste, while deficit financing with inflation. In the
T or a summary of this programme's ten points see Keesing's (1983: 32072) and Proceso 
(6/12/82:6-11).
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developed world, times were moving towards the view that markets were the solution to 
economic difficulties. Besides, the size of the economic crisis inherited by de la Madrid 
helped him to convince the nation that there was no alternative but austerity to combat 
the crisis. Yet the way the burden would be spread among the social actors needed to be 
seen.
Dealing with domestic unrest
De la Madrid's inaugural speech contained a good dose of traditional ingredients. 
As usual, it included most aspirations of the 'revolutionary creed' (see Brandenburg 1964: 
8-18). For instance, there were many references to nationalism, federalism, and social 
justice.^ Explicitly, the economic programme aimed at protecting both employment and 
food programmes for the poor. It also offered investment in labour-intensive projects and 
job creation "in depressed areas". In brief, the need for political legitimacy was 
responsible for the incorporation of self-contradictory economic goals into the 
government's strategy. Clearly, de la Madrid resorted to the notion of 'Revolution' more 
than his predecessor (Suarez 1987:197) to legitimise an unpopular economic programme. 
It was not clear, however, how the new administration would defend the country's 
sovereignty as insisted in the speech, while allowing the IMF to watch over the "rapid and 
adequate progress" in the PIRE's application. Neither was it clear how a sociedad 
igualitaha was to be achieved within a context of Spartan austerity, and recessive 
policies.
The president's earliest economic measures began to show government's real 
priorities. In early December 1982, Miguel Mancera was reinstated as director of the 
central bank after having resigned because of his opposition to the establishment of a 
system of total exchange controls in September 1982.® Thus, he could announce on 
December 10,1992 that such a system would be removed, and a three-tier exchange rate 
was introduced ten days later. The new system allowed certain private-sector debts to be 
repayable at the cheapest fixed rate of exchange. In January 1983, a law regulating the 
nationalised banking system was passed. The law allowed that up to 34 percent of the
 ^These themes had been developed during the presidential campaign and articulated into seven 
'campaign thesis' (see Nationalismo Revolucionario 1982).
 ^In April 20, 1982, Miguel Mancera had published a document entitled "The inconvenience o f  
Exchange Controls" which predicted that once partial exchange control were adopted, the introduction o f  
total system was inevitable.
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shares of the state-owned banks could be sold to outside shareholders. This decision was 
at odds with de la Madrid's earlier announcement that the bank nationalisation was 
"irreversible". These policy reversals had the obvious purpose of restoring the 
international image of Mexico and, internally, the ruptured relationships between 
government and the business community.
Yet, there were some signals in the opposite direction. The PIRE announced a 
constitutional reform to clarify the functioning of the 'mixed economy' and to strengthen 
the role of the state in the economy. Constitutional amendments soon followed (see DOF 
7/2/83). The domestic private sector received with suspicion the raising of concepts such 
as 'government rectorship of the economy', 'planning', and 'social sector' to constitutional 
status. Less ideological measures proved more successful in the reconciliation between 
government and private sector. In 1983, the former began paying compensation to the ex­
owners of the banks, and did so on a very generous basis. Moreover, de la Madrid not 
only gave high priority to close and frequent consultations with big business, but was 
particularly careful to restore the traditional alliance with the powerful domestic-market- 
orientated private industrialists (Heredia in Serrano and Bulmer-Thomas 1996:136). This 
alliance meant that the opening of the economy had to wait for better times.
At the end of 1982, the private sector external debt was $32.7 billion (Lustig 
1992, table 2-2: 32), and the continued devaluation of the peso affected this sector's 
capacity to repay. In early 1983, the Trust for Exchange Risk Coverage (FICORCA) was 
established with the purpose of helping the private enterprises that had debts in dollars. 
Ernesto Zedillo, a middle-rank official at the Bank of Mexico, was appointed head of this 
trust. As put by Blanca Heredia, FICORCA "allowed government to forestall massive 
defaults and bankruptcies at a time when it was clearly unable to force owners to use their 
foreign savings to repay their firms' debts" (in Serrano and Bulmer-Thomas 1996: 136). 
In plainer terms, cheap dollars were offered to the private sector in exchange for political 
support (see Levy and Székely 1987: 166). In that way, the Mexican government was to 
absorb part of the losses sustained by that sector because of the economic crisis.^ This 
was possible because the price of oil was still high and the government had quite a lot of
 ^The established three-tier exchange rate comprised a preferential exchange rate o f 70 pesos to 
the dollar to repay certain private-sector debts; a rate o f around 95 pesos for essential imports and other 
debt repayments; and for ordinary transactions the peso was allowed to "float". During 1983, the last 
exchange rate was, on average, 150.30 pesos to the dollar (Wilkie 1988: 918).
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dollar income. By 1985, almost $14 billion had been refinanced through this innovative 
scheme (Glade in Camp 1986: 54).
Some concessions to the urban 'masses' were also carried out. On January 18, 
1983, the SPP minister announced a $2.7 billion scheme to create 700,000 new jobs. 
Evidently, this measure was a palliative. At the time, it was estimated that about 40 
percent of the working force was unemployed or underemployed.* In addition, the 
minimum wage was raised by 25 percent in early 1983. However, many price controls on 
basic commodities had been abolished or reduced in late December 1982, thus favouring 
prices going up. By mid-1983, because of wage ceilings, negotiations with organised 
labour had resulted in stalemate and confrontation (Camp 1984b: 51-52). At the same 
time, the price of bread was doubled and that of tortillas increased 40 percent. These 
developments showed that the self-contradictory goals of PIRE were impossible to 
conciliate.
As said earlier, a draconian reduction of public spending was the most important 
instrumental goal of PIRE. The priority granted to its achievement was clearly reflected 
in the way de la Madrid selected his cabinet, and in his proposal of public sector 
reorganisation.
The Cabinet and administrative reform
De la Madrid's cabinet can be regarded as highly technocratic, its most striking 
feature being the similar career profile and ideological orientation of most of its members 
(Hernandez 1987). Two main facts explain this homogeneity. First, de la Madrid drew 
his cabinet from a few bureaucratic clusters. Among them, that assembled by him in the 
SPP was the most important. As already seen, most of this cluster's members shared the 
SHCP's financial conservatism moderated by the three-year experience at the SPP. 
Second, he incorporated very few political forces into cabinet. Because of the turbulent 
end of the Lopez Portillo's presidency, he may have "felt no obligation to involve 
politicians from a discredited past order" (Bailey 1988: 57). As a result, the bureaucracies 
associated with the economic policy network were virtually the only source of ministers 
and high rank officials. It explains their lack of experience in the network for political
* According to business sources not only had 1.2 million workers lost their jobs in the second half 
of 1982, but a further 1 million redundancies were expected by the middle o f 1983 (Keesing's 1983: 
32073).
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control, electoral credentials, and strong ties to the PRI.’ The only true exception in de 
la Madrid's first cabinet was Reyes Heroles (education).
This way of integrating the cabinet not only accelerated ongoing trends, but 
introduced important innovations. First, the career formula Bank of Mexico-SHCP-SPP 
became the most important ascending path to high office, including the presidency. These 
were the areas in which the President had worked. Second, never before had so many 
ministers and high officials been drawn from a single agency. Excluding the military 
posts, the 'SPP-MMH cluster'’° occupied more than 30 percent of the first cabinet. By 
early 1986, around half of the cabinet came from this cluster. It is worth noting that the 
latter not only took control of key positions in the Economic Cabinet, but extended its 
presence to the Political Cabinet. The implication is obvious: Most ministries became 
dead-ends to their bureaucracies. An elite transformation comparable to that from military 
to civilian rule had taken place (see Camp 1976b). Theoretically at least, the academic 
qualifications, experience in government, and technical expertise of the key cabinet 
members provided ideal credentials for executing an adjustment economic programme 
(Camp 1984b: 51).
Not surprisingly, Silva-Herzog was confirmed as head of the SHCP. He was 
closely connected with de la Madrid as both were about the same age and UN AM 
graduates. In addition, Silva-Herzog had gone through almost the same posts as de la 
Madrid in the Bank of Mexico and later in the credit areas of the SHCP as discussed in 
the previous chapter (see also Grayson 1988: 46). Apparently, his academic and career 
credentials and especially his involvement in the negotiations with the IMF made him an 
ideal finance minister. However, despite his close links with the president, Silva-Herzog 
did not belong to the 'SPP-MMH cluster'. This fact would prove crucial in his future.
Carlos Salinas, a UN AM economist with graduate studies at Harvard, was 
appointed head of the SPP. Two facts forecast his appointment. First, Salinas had directed 
the PRI's think-tank, lEPES, during the presidential campaign. His central task was to
 ^ These three attributes characterised the background o f the Mexican presidents, including an 
important number o f ministers, between 1946 and 1970. Though Echeverria (1970-1976) never held 
elective offices, his working for the PRI and Gobernacion proved crucial to reach the presidency (see Story 
1986; 126-132).
The concept 'SPP-MMH cluster" is understood as comprising the personnel who worked for the 
SPP between 1979 and 1982. It stresses the small size o f the sample as compared with the total SPP 
personnel in the sexenio 1976-82 (see Appendix 2).
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prepare the national plan for the incoming administration. Before, he had headed the 
SPP's Direccion General de PoUtica Economica y  Social (DGPEyS) whose main 
achievement was writing the 1980-82 National Global Plan (PGD). The similarities 
between the functions of the DGPEyS and those the lEPES was charged with are so 
notable that Salinas only transferred part of his planning apparatus from one building to 
another. Second, Manuel Cavazos Lerma, a Salinas' assistant at both the DGPEyS and 
the lEPES, was first selected PRI deputy candidate in March 1982, and later president of 
the Programming and Budget Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. Salinas' 
appointment shed light on the real SPP's internal distribution of power between 1979 and 
1981.
Neither Labastida Ochoa nor Ramon Aguirre, de la Madrid's under-secretaries at 
the SPP, were considered for the post. It is worth noting that none of them participated 
in the presidential campaign. It provided a clear example of the importance of holding the 
right institutional resources at the right time. Salinas' were those over national planning. 
The success in elaborating the PGD, a priority in Lopez Portillo's eyes, was a crucial 
bureaucratic factor in de la Madrid's reaching the presidency and, in turn, Carlos Salinas' 
being promoted from a middle-rank post to cabinet level.
As usual, the incoming administration carried out changes in the government's 
machinery. Those introduced to the LOAPF in December 1982 (DOF 29/12/82) were the 
redefinition of the role of the key economic-guidance ministries, and the creation of the 
Secretariat of the General Comptroller (SECOGEF).‘‘ First, the SHCP and the SPP not 
only kept their core powers, but their leading role in policy making was further 
consolidated. The SHCP, for instance, was charged with projecting and calculating the 
annual revenues of the parastate entities, and with establishing the prices of the public- 
sector's goods and services. On the other hand, a new federal planning law (DOF 5/1/83) 
regarded the SPP as the supreme "governing national planning body", thus further 
enhancing its status. In addition, the powers over national industry were transferred from 
SEP AFIN to Commerce. As a result, the former became Secretariat of Energy, Mines and 
Parastate Industry (SEMIP), while the latter Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial 
Promotion (SECOFIN).
“ For details on these reforms and for the debates during the legislative process see Proceso 
Legislativo (n.d.).
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This change was consonant with the president's purpose of promoting the private 
industrial sector. It also meant the breakup of the powerful SEP AFIN. From a broader 
perspective, the limited powers left to SEMIP announced government's wish to reduce 
the intervention of the state in the economy to a few 'strategic' activities.
Hector Hernandez Cervantes, under-subsecretary of foreign trade since 1976, was 
appointed head of the new SECOFIN. He was the most outspoken defender of the 
opening of the economy within government. In early 1980, both Hernandez Cervantes 
and de la Madrid had unsuccessfully promoted Mexico's entering the GATT. Francisco 
Labastida Ochoa, former SPP's programming under-secretary, became head of the 
weakened SEMIP. Since 1982, the decline of this agency has contrasted with the leading 
policy role played by the SECOFIN. Because of being mainly used to control PEMEX, 
SEMIP was quite powerful until the fiasco of 1985, when the oil company was forced to 
keep oil prices up for OPEC 'solidarity'.
Second, the SECOGEF was created to enforce De la Madrid's campaign against 
corruption within government. Francisco Rojas, another member of the SPP-MMH 
cluster, was appointed head of the new ministry. In many respects, the SECOGEF 
resembled the SPP's Coordinacion de Control de Gestion, created by de la Madrid in 
1979 and headed by Rojas, whose main task was to supervise the SPP's internal 
programmes. It was soon noted that the new 'super-ministiy' invaded not only the sphere 
of action of the General Attorney, but that of Congress.
As six years before, the network for political control was not touched by the 
administrative reform. This time, however, the 'SPP-MMH cluster' took control of its key 
agencies. The more politically-orientated members of this cluster received Gobernacion 
(Manuel Bartlett) and the PRI (Adolfo Lugo Verduzco). After the death of Reyes Heroles 
in 1985, Gonzalez Avelar, the Senate leader, would become minister of education. 
Despite his lack of political credentials, Ramon Aguirre was appointed head of the DDF. 
Bernardo Sepulveda, hitherto ambassador to the US, was appointed head of Foreign 
Relations. Evidently, the way this network was staffed meant the displacement of many 
bureaucratic clusters that had survived the 1976 administrative reform. For instance, the 
arrival of Manuel Bartlett at Gobernacion forced the resignation of Gutierrez Barrios who 
since 1964 had headed that agency's police/ intelligence apparatus. The political 
consequences of actions of this sort would be felt in the years to come.
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5.2 ENFORCING AUSTERITY
The incoming president opted for a highly centralised economic apparatus to put 
into practice his adjustment programme. This apparatus was headed by two equally- 
ranked guidance ministries, namely the SPP and the SHCP. As never before, high 
standards of coordination between them were crucial to succeed in carrying out the PIRE. 
The fact that the president knew well both agencies, with the backgrounds of his 
appointees to these posts, appeared to assure those standards. Moreover, both agencies 
enjoyed this time total presidential support which might help balancing their 
relationships. While to the SHCP austerity meant exercising its traditional powers, to the 
SPP it implied a redefinition of its role. The way this was carried out was fundamental 
in this agency's survival.
Tuning the implementing apparatus
President de la Madrid went further than his predecessor in the use of the cabinet 
as a coordinating instance, and also in his emphasis on national planning. In early 1983, 
four specialised cabinets in economy, foreign trade, agriculture and health were created 
and their internal operation improved (see DOF 19/1/83). Chaired by the president and 
coordinated by the presidency, these cabinets were the fora in which sectoral policies 
were to be discussed and major options voted. Not only was the Economic Cabinet 
pivotal to this arrangement, but also two of its constituent parts: the SHCP and the SPP. 
As early as January 1983, a new planning law granted the state the power of planning the 
"national economic activity". It also allowed for the establishment of a "system of 
democratic planning of national development" responsible for the elaboration of the 
"national development plan".
One month later, these prescriptions had been incorporated into the federal 
constitution (DOF 3/2/83). This unprecedented emphasis on planning would enhance the 
role of the SPP in the policy making process, for the empowered institutional planning 
apparatus was left under the aegis of this agency.
The reorganisation of the SPP carried out in January 1983 had the purpose of 
putting this agency in line with the austerity strategy. The analysis of the SPP's new 
Reglamento Interior shows important changes not only in the agency's organisation chart.
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but in its internal resource distribution. As can be seen in figure 5.1 below, the former 
Subsecretaria de Programacion was replaced by the Subsecretaria de Planeacion del 
Desarrollo. Granting planning a higher status as compared with programming suggests 
a relevant role reorientation. Formally, planning became the primary function of the 
agency. However, other interpretations are possible. Until 1982, programming and 
budgeting were kept organically separated to make sure that the latter was based on the 
former. To some scholars, the creation of programming-budgeting directorates meant that 
SHCP-like budgeting displaced planning as the main SPP's function (Bailey 1988: 72; 
Hernandez 1993:160-163). This view, however, does not explain the president's planning 
emphasis, nor other organisational changes.
As shown in figure 5.1, the number of under-secretariats was increased from three 
to five. A fully-fledged Subsecretaria de Programacion y  Presupuesto Social and Rural 
was created, and so was the Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional also Avith 
programming and budgeting functions. In other words, strengthened programming- 
budgeting directorates were placed under the umbrella of three different under­
secretariats. Why was the traditional unity of the former under-secretariat of budgeting 
broken? A plausible explanation involves political rather than technical factors. Scarce 
resources would be allocated using two completely different criteria: A discretionary, 
selective, politically-orientated system would be applied to finance social and regional 
programmes, while a more rational, technically-based system to fund the core of 
government activity. This view is further supported by the way the SPP was staffed and 
by future evidence.
On May 30,1983, the National Development Plan (PND) was announced by de 
la Madrid. In essence, this plan confirmed every one of the policies, goals, and targets 
already made explicit. Clearly, the modest contribution of the plan to the economic 
strategy, together with limited "popular consultation", was at odds with government's 
emphasis on democratic planning. This deliberate contradiction sheds light on the way 
planning was used by the incoming administration. Pretending that 'democratic 
planning'’^  rather than austerity was orienting socioeconomic development served as a
Though candidate de la Madrid emphasized the notion of'democratic planning', the many PRI 
commissions established in mid-July 1982 and February 1983 with the purpose o f providing inputs to the 
1983-88 national plan were frequently dominated by members o f the Salinas' team (see Proceso 299, 
26/7/82; 24-27; Story 1986: 124 ).
FIGURE 5.1 SPP Organisation Chart, 1983-1985
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legitimising mechanism. Because plans span many years they allow to give something 
to everybody that is why their vocabulary is more attractive than that of budgets (Caiden 
and Wildavsky 1990: 256-257).
Like the PGD, its immediate antecedent, the PND roused fierce criticism (see 
Proceso 344, 6/6/83). Two months later, Carlos Salinas made perfectly clear, at the 
inauguration of the annual congress of economists organised by CNE that the economic 
strategy of the PND was the only realistic option for Mexico {Proceso 352, 1/8/83: 28- 
29). In plain terms, it meant that the structuralists of the system, who were a majority in 
the congress, would not participate in the new economic strategy. The early launching of 
the PND had forestalled the planning process.
Acknowledging that more efficient spending controls were crucial to the success 
of PIRE, the Subsecretaria de Evaluacion of Evaluation was replaced by that of Control 
Presupuestal and Contabilidad (see figure 5.1). The transference of the budgeting-policy 
directorate to this under-secretariat increased considerably its institutional resources. This 
reform, in combination with those already discussed, clarifies the expected role of the 
SPP in the accomplishment of the economic strategy summarised by the PIRE's ten 
points, and rhetorically expanded by the PND. The Subsecretaria de Planeaciôn del 
Desarrollo was to deal with macro-economic management, rather than with planning. As 
said earlier, the SPP's planning resources had been already fully exercised. In other 
words, the main task of this division was to monitor the reduction of the public sector 
deficit to the PIRE's targets. Preventing and correcting deviations from authorised 
budgets was the responsibility of the budget-control division.
Apparently, close coordination between the think-tanks of both divisions was 
cmcial. By contrast, apolitical role was expected from the Under-Secretariat for Regional 
Development. In broader terms, the reorganisation under discussion encouraged an 
ongoing process of functional differentiation within the SPP. The other two 
programming-budgeting divisions were to play an auxiliary role in this still embryonic 
twofold arrangement.
Unlike the SPP, the finance ministiy was not reorganised. The SHCP's traditional 
orientation and powers equipped it well to perform its expected role in the application of 
PIRE. As everywhere, finance ministries usually prefer stability to growth, and low 
spending to deficit financing (Caiden and Wildavsky 1990:241,245). Apart from holding
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the resources for negotiating the debt and controlling the level of taxation, the SHCP was 
responsible for the nationalised banking system since late 1982. Furthermore, Silva- 
Herzog was a well-connected, respected finance minister in Mexico and abroad.
Implementing the PIRE
Restraining public expenditure in a context of big government and scarce 
resources was the major challenge to the SPP. According to 'the letter of intent' to the 
IMF, public-sector deficit as a percentage of the GDP was to be reduced from 16.9 
percent in 1982 to 8.5 percent in 1983, to 5.5 percent in 1984, and to 3.5 percent in 1985. 
The financial deficit reaching 16.9 percent in 1982 illustrates the magnitude of the task 
ahead. Such cutbacks were expected to lower the pressures on domestic prices. It can be 
seen from table 5.2 that, regarding public-sector deficit and inflation, government's efforts 
produced encouraging results during both 1983 and 1984, though admittedly below 
target. Moreover, current account surpluses of $5.5 billion in 1983 and $4.2 billion in 
1984 ended three decades of continued current account deficits (Levy and Székely 1987: 
163, 140).
TABLE 5.2. Selected economic and public financial indicators, 1982-1988 
(Annual growth rates, unless otherwise specified)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
A. GDP -0.6 -5.2 3.6 2.7 -3.5 1.7 1.3
B. GDP per capita -3.3 -8.1 0.9 -0.2 -6.5 -1.1 -1.5
C. Inflation 98.8 80.0 59.2 63.7 105.7 159.2 51.6
D. Gross domestic investment -28.7 -24.9 6.1 10.3 -22.6 2.3 13.3
E. Federal spending 37.43 26.06 23.79 24.17 33.13 — - -
F. Public spending (% real -8.0 -17.3 0.8 -6.1 -13.3 -0.5 -10.3
increase)
G, Public investment 48.41 45.94 31.68 27.77 39.03 27.40 - -
H, Financial deficit 16.9 8.6 8.5 9.6 16.0 16.0 12.5
I. Primary deficit^) 2.5 -4.0 -4.8 -3.9 -2.5 -5.7 -8.1
J. Operational deficit 5.5 -0.4 0.3 0.8 2.4 -1.8 3.6
K. Actual central government 43.4 41.5 39.6 41.8 60.1 68.0 63.6
expenditure on the debt service
L. Change in M l money supply 43.5 44.1 53.2 53.7 51.3 98.8 —
(12-month average)
Notes: As percentage of the GDP; As percentage o f the total investment;^^  ^Percentage o f the
total central government expenditure (excludes service on the parastate debt), the percentage for 1988 is 
projected, not actual.
Source: A and C, Banco de México, Indicadores Economicos; B and D, Ramirez (1993: 179); E 
and G, Basafiez (1991:161,173 and 166); H and I, Carstens and Schwartz (in Serrano and Bulmer-Thomas 
1996: 114); F and J, Aspe (1993: 15); K, Wilkie (1989: 1096); and L, Wilkie (1988: 917).
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From the government's perspective, considering the distressing economic 
panorama in 1982 and the drop of oil prices in May 1983, "the initial efforts were largely 
successful" (Silva-Herzog 1988: 8; see also Cordoba Montoya 1991: 31-32). However, 
these achievements were bought at a very heavy price. As shown in table 5.2, there was 
in 1983 a marked decline in GDP to a negative 5.2 percent’^ , while the fall in GDP per 
capita was even more dramatic.
The sharp decrease of real public spending in 1983 was mostly done by an 
indiscriminate reduction of public investment. It is worth noting that the Expenditure 
Budget elaborated by Ramon Aguirre in the second half of 1982 was instrumental in 
achieving this goal. The impact of public investment in infrastructure and basic industry 
on private investment partly explains the low level of gross domestic investment 
(Ramirez 1993: 179-180). As table 5.2 shows, there were some more encouraging results 
during 1984. Above all, a positive rate of economic growth was achieved for the first 
time since 1981. This picture had, however, a negative side. First, the adjustment 
programme had devastating effects on the lower classes. Second, the 1983-84 surpluses 
in the current account were not the result of increasing exports or production, but of an 
astonishing 46 percent cut in imports (Keesing's 1985: 33392). Last, but not least, the 
lack of gross investment could not lead to sustained economic growth, but to economic 
stagnation.
A set of major fiscal measures was undertaken by the SHCP starting in late 
December 1982. They included adjustments in taxation and public sector prices and 
tariffs. However, its impact on the public finances was marginal as proved by the 
continued public sector deficits. Anyway, fiscal reform, with budget cuts and current- 
account surpluses, contributed to the extension of further foreign loans, and the 
rescheduling of existing debt in 1983 and 1984 (see Keesing's 1985: 33392-93 for 
details). In particular, the debt negotiations carried out by the SHCP in 1983 "provided 
important relief to the country well into 1985" (Glade in Camp 1986: 53). Furthermore, 
a Mexican proposal for rescheduling about half of the total public-sector debt was agreed 
"in principle" in September 1984.
The PND had forecast a decline in the GDP between 2 and 4 percent in 1983.
178
The way government's scarce resources were allocated illustrates the economic 
constraints imposed by the public debt. James W. Wilkie (1989) convincingly proves that 
the percentages devoted to the public debt service since 1983 were not manageable as 
domestically claimed by the government for political purposes. By calculating the total 
public debt payments as a share of the central public outlay rather than as a share of the 
entire public sector expenditure''*, he reveals that 41 percent of the total central spending, 
on average, went to repay the debt between 1983 and 1985 (see table 5.2). In other words, 
less than 60 percent of that spending was left "to cover the myriad of Mexico's needs". 
The sectoral allocations to agriculture, public works, and health were the major casualties 
of the excessive debt repayments.
By the end of 1984, because of the heartening economic indicators, there was an 
air of optimism within government. An unexpected expansion of the economy during the 
first half of 1985, which made likely an annual growth of around 6 percent, brought that 
optimism to an end. A moderate relaxation of the austerity programme in late 1984 had 
overheated the economy during the first quarter of 1985 (Cornelius 1986: 2-4; see also 
Glade in Camp 1986: 56). As shown in table 5.2, a fairly moderate rate of economic 
growth in 1985 was bought at a disproportionate cost.'^ Inflation began an upward trend, 
while public sector financial deficit rose nearly twice as much as the original target. By 
mid-1985, a 'maxi-devaluation' was carried out, a set of drastic cuts of public spending 
was implemented, and the access to domestic credit reduced. However, the correction 
came too late. A renewal of capital flight, a sharp decrease in the current-account surplus, 
and a depletion of government's foreign-exchange reserves further darkened the economic 
panorama during 1985.
To make things worse, in September 1985 two devastating earthquakes hit 
Mexico City causing damage estimated at $5 billion. In addition, in November 1985, 
world oil prices began to decline. From November 1985 to February 1986, crude oil 
prices fell 55 percent, and so did Mexico's oil sales from 1.4 to 1.1 million barrels per day 
in the same period (Cornelius 1986: 6). Even before the magnitude of the loss for this
His argument is that only central government has discretionary spending, while the main 
parastate entities collect its own revenue and expend it.
For an extensive analyses o f the performance o f the Mexican economy in the period 1985-86, 
see Cornelius (1986), Glade (in Camp 1986), Duran (in Philip 1988), and Ramirez (1993).
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concept was fully known, it was clear that government had to adjust drastically its 
economic strategy.
The fragile alliance built by president de la Madrid with both the domestic 
business community and the foreign sector began to unravel in 1985, and by 1986 it was 
virtually nonexistent. On the one hand, growing distrust of government's policies led to 
a capital flight estimated at $2.5 billion in 1984, and $5-6 billion in 1985 (Cornelius 
1986: 19). On the other hand, relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly during 
the first half of 1985 (Keesing's 1985: 33967). One reason was the murder in Mexico of 
Enrique Camarena, an agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration. By September 
1985, debt negotiations with the foreign creditors had stalled, while the IMF declared that 
Mexico had not complied with its contracted obligations (which suspended the 
disbursement of the last part of IMF credits).
During 1986 and 1987, the relationship with the United States worsened 
considerably, as new sources of tension entered the bilateral agenda (see Cornelius 1988 
for details). They ranged from allegations of fraudulent elections and police corruption 
to the worry that Mexico's economic debacle could lead to political instability. In the 
period 1983-1985, president de la Madrid needed some support from the left of the PRI. 
So, he could not overtly abandon his pro-Sandinismo stance. This annoyed Washington. 
The unpopularity of the government's policies led to limited (but unprecedented) 
opposition victories in 1983. The 1984 local elections were rigged to give the PRI 
victory. These 'system maintaining' policies were not welcomed by Washington. As a 
result, there was not any US desire to make life easier for Mexico. By 1986, the bilateral 
relations with the US had reached a dangerously high level of strain.
Why had government stepped up public spending in the second half of 1984, thus 
endangering the austerity programme? In particular, the local elections held in July 1983 
saw a significant increase in the electoral power of the rightist PAN.’^  Had president de 
la Madrid decided to boost public spending to tackle increasing electoral opposition? 
Manuel Camacho, a key member of Salinas' inner circle, sheds some light on these 
crucial issues (interview, London, 1/12/95). In his view, since 1983 the SPP's
This party won 10 out o f the 105 municipal councils contested. They included Ciudad Juârez 
and the state capitals o f Chihuahua and Durango. As a result, PAN had five out o f the 31 state capitals, the 
largest number controlled by an opposition party since 1929. (Keesing's 1985: 33396)
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Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional became a key institutional actor for three main 
reasons. First, both de la Madrid and Salinas encouraged this unit's active dealing with 
relevant "national and local political problems". Second, in a context of austerity "this 
Subsecretaria had abundance of resources, while there was scarcity of them everywhere 
else". Third, "there was flexibility [in their application] which allowed responding to 
'emergencies' and to support local governments where and when necessary".
Figure 5.2 shows the authorised expenditure on regional development {ramo 26) 
in the period 1982-1989. This budget line comprises government's investment 
programmes having a direct regional impaet. Because of its involvement in the 
agreements of collaboration between the federal and local governments (CUDs), the SPP 
could influence the allocation of resources belonging to this budget line. The table reveals 
that there was a significant increase in the projected outlays on regional development 
since 1983. Considering that 1985 and 1987 were two key years in the political calendar, 
the fluctuations shown by the graph suggest a link between regional expenditure and the 
electoral cycle. As Camacho's said, there were more authorised resources available at key 
points, which may have been used to face "emergencies". A more relevant problem 
regarding the austerity programme, however, was the "flexibility" with whieh, according 
to Camacho, those resources were used.
FIGURE 5.2 Projected expenditure on regional developm ent and 
the SPP B u d get, 1982-1989
(Percentages o f the Executive Branch total b u d g e t, see note)
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Source: Annual Federal Budgets.
181
The same figure also shows the evolution of the SPP administrative budget. It is 
clear from there that until 1986, this agency's budgets seem to reflect the same pattern 
described, though much less dramatically. However, their growth from 1983 to 1985 may 
be associated less with electoral factors and more with bureaucratic constraints 
hampering the efficient control of public expenditure. One example illustrates our point. 
To be in tone with austerity, the 1983 Reglamento Interior of the SPP lowered the 
number of general directorates by about 15 percent. But, it increased the number of 
under-secretaries, with much higher salaries, from three to five. Obviously, this situation 
implied the creation of several high-rank staff positions. If this stratagem was used by the 
SPP, what could be expected from the spending agencies whose priority was to keep, if 
not increase, their budget appropriations?
To sum up, stepping up public spending in 1984-85 was far from having a single 
cause. An effort at both restoring private-sector confidence to reduce the risk of capital 
flight and reducing social tensions surely contributed to that course of action (Cornelius 
1986: 4). Additionally, there were policy errors and miscalculations. It should be bom in 
mind that the immediate roots of the 1985-86 economic fiasco may be traced back to 
early 1984. Last, but not least, domestic political factors also played a relevant role, 
especially as the presidential succession approached.
5.3 BUREAUCRATIC IN-FIGHTING AND THE OPENING 
OF THE ECONOMY
By mid-1985 the PIRE had gone considerably off course. This fact was publicly 
recognised by minister Silva-Herzog, who in July 22 denounced "serious implementation 
problems". His speech at the annual national banking convention created tensions within 
the highest echelons of government. The Bank of Mexico's critical response showed 
strains in its usually friendly relationships with the SHCP. Above all, the speech 
represented a war declaration against the SPP minister Carlos Salinas. It showed the lack 
of coordination between both ministers. Despite the corrective measures adopted, the 
spending binge had been enough to collapse the stabilisation program (Grayson 1988: 
49). Amid bureaucratic in-fighting, and partly because of it, a new economic strategy 
emerged.
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The Silva-Herzog-Salinas confrontation: Again finance 
versus planning?
As in the past, institutional and political factors underlay the confrontation 
between the SHCP and the SPP in the period 1983-1986. This time, however, austerity 
would enhanced their traditional struggle to control the budget. Silva-Herzog and Salinas 
sharing similar economic perspectives and backgrounds did not temper the intensity of 
their power battles. Exactly like six years before, presidential aspirations underpinned 
debates of substance. According to SHCP under-secretary Francisco Suarez Davila, the 
overheating of the economy in the second half of 1984 was the result of a strong private- 
sector credit demand and private-sector investment that "became difficult to control" 
(quoted by Cornelius 1986: 4). In Silva-Herzog's view, the expansion of private 
investment was the positive result of fiscal incentives and the loosening of credit 
restrictions, though it "surpassed all expectations" (1988: 8).
If it is true the fact that "government underestimated the belated, but significant, 
private sector expenditures when devising its own spending strategy" (Grayson 1988:48- 
49) would suggest that the SPP's think-tanks were to be blamed for the overstimulation 
of the economy. At the heart of the problem, however, was that the SPP had "briefly 
implemented populist policies" during the second quarter of 1984 (Greene 1994: 64). In 
other words, government's "expenditures, already underestimated in the original versions 
of the appropriations budget, began to exceed anticipated levels", thus favouring the 
expansion of private investment (Silva-Herzog 1988: 8). Apart from the SHCP, the 
president seemed to share these views.
In mid-November 1984, a new system to keep public spending within controlled 
limits was announced: Public-sector borrowing requirements were to be decided in 
advance each year by a board made up by representatives from the SPP, the SHCP, and 
the SECOFIN, with coordination from the central bank (Keesing's 1985: 33394). 
Moreover, the Council of Economic Advisors of the Presidency was soon created. 
Composed of three main economists selected by the president, this council was to advise 
the president on the definition of long-term economic objectives, to analyse the 
performance of the economy and the behaviour of the main economic variables, and to 
elaborate the economic studies ordered by the president (DOF 2/1/85). These measures 
meant not only a substantial change in the economic policymaking process, but also a
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greater presidential involvement in that process. It is clear that they affected the SPP 
badly.
When the 1985 Expenditure Budget was proposed in December 1984, the finance 
minister "refused to sign it until expenditures were cut" (Greene 1994: 64). Like in 1977, 
the key problem between the SPP and the SHCP was the size of the budget. Though 
Silva-Herzog eventually signed after some expenditure adjustments, the economy did not 
improve. As a result, he announced a general austerity package on July 25, 1985 
(Keesing's 1985: 33966). It involved a further devaluation of about 20 percent'^ as well 
as across-the-board cuts in public spending, freezing of salaries, and other administrative 
savings at both central and parastate levels. Moreover, "decisive measures aimed at 
liberalizing business policies" were also included (Silva-Herzog 1988: 9).
These announcements suggest that Silva-Herzog not only was pushing his views 
through, but that he had taken the leadership in policy-making process. It was bad news 
for minister Salinas. The 1986 Expenditure Budget, announced in November 1985 by the 
SPP, limited public spending to a level comparable to that in 1983. By contrast with 
previous budgets, the cuts fell on current expenditures rather than on public investment 
(Cornelius 1986: 7). Further spending reductions were adopted in April 1986, after the 
size of the loss due to the oil prices fall was quantified. Yet, the public sector deficit 
would not reach 9 percent of GDP, as estimated by Salinas in April, but 16 percent.
The impact of the rapid decline of oil prices on the Mexican economy is hard to 
exaggerate. In 1985, such a trend, together with deficient management‘s, cost the country 
around $3.8 billion in revenues (Glade in Camp 1986: 58). However, it was not 
comparable with the effects of the sharp drop of prices in the first half of 1986. The loss 
in that year was estimated to be equivalent of 6 percent of the country's GDP, one-third 
of total export earnings, 20 percent of total government income, or the total public 
investment in 1986.'^ In money, it resulted in around $9 billion according to Pedro Aspe 
(1993: 16). This context not only enhanced the role of the Economic Cabinet, but also
‘’In late June 1985, the peso had been devaluated by 33 percent in an attempt to deal with a 
renewal o f speculation and capital flight,
‘T or instance, it was estimated that government lost $550 million because o f its tardiness in 
reducing export prices (Cornelius 1986: 6). It damaged Labastida and SEMIP badly.
‘These figures were provided by president de la Madrid in his annual address to the nation of 
September 1, 1986.
184
ignited intense debates among its members. Between June 1985 and June 1986, the 
Economic Cabinet met thirty-three times, that is, once every eleven days on average 
(Ibarra and Alberro 1989: 153).
During this period, the relationship between the SPP and the SHCP deteriorated 
at the same speed as the economic situation.^® Like in 1977, the ultimate cause of this 
development was related to institutionally-grounded, antagonistic agency orientations. 
According to Silva-Herzog (1988), the SPP's budgets invariably underestimated 
expenditures and failed to foresee "nascent phenomena"; many measures aimed at 
curbing public spending were only partially executed by the SPP; and the drop in oil 
prices "was used as justification for the deviations in economic policy". In brief, despite 
Salinas' strong SHCP background, the SPP tended to behave like any developing 
country's planning institute. By contrast, in Salinas’s view, the SHCP’s adjustment 
programme was "unreasonably strict" (Greene 1994: 67).
Following the 1986 drop of oil prices, the debates over the proper course to be 
taken eventually polarised the Economic Cabinet around the two ministries 
aforementioned. Silva-Herzog refers to the participants as "those who advocate more of 
the same and those who wanted a new domestic and foreign policy" (1988: 10). Apart 
from the succession struggle, two crucial economic issues were at the heart of the 
debates: the size of the expenditure cuts to be implemented (Greene 1994: 67) and the 
debt problem (LAWR 25, 3/7/86: 4).
The Plan Baker, enunciated in 1985 by Reagan's Treasury Secretary, encouraged 
US banks to lend only as a reward for 'structural reform': Moreover, the new money 
should be devoted not to investment, but to repay up to 50 percent of interest payments 
(Wilkie 1989: 1094). Because of the virtual impossibility to repay, it opened in some 
government circles the option of a unilateral moratorium on the debt payments in late 
1985. On the other hand, the view, endorsed mainly by the US Treasury Department, that 
the only solution to the debt problem was faster economic growth through direct foreign 
investment and free-market policies (Cornelius 1986: 12) gave momentum to the 
economic-opening option too.
“^Between 1983 and early-1984, few, if any, strong differences over policy between these 
ministries had been reported by the media Though suggested by its title, an article in Proceso 340 (9/5/83: 
8-9) did not provide evidence o f in-fighting involving the SHCP and the SPP.
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In February 1986, president de la Madrid made a speech on Mexican television 
in which he suggested that some sacrifices from the creditors were necessary to solve the 
debt problem. Later in Hermosillo, in another "uncharacteristically tough speech", he said 
that the "foreign creditors were choking Mexico to death". Though Silva-Herzog rejected 
the idea of a straight moratorium (LAWR 23, 13/6/86: 2), he was in favour of a more 
active position before the creditors. Despite their moderation, his views were not 
particularly welcomed by the foreign financial agents, nor by some Mexican quarters 
(including de la Madrid). During the first half of 1986, sharp cabinet confrontations had 
eventually changed the president's view on the debt. This problem was ultimately 
resolved through Silva-Herzog's forced resignation on June 17,1986.
According to the Centro de Estudios Economicos del Sector Privado, the first four 
months of 1986 were characterised by "a dramatic growth of the public deficit", and it 
forecast that because "government spending is not being reduced, the fall in oil revenue 
will have a devastating effect on the country’s internal finances" (LAWR 22, 6/6/86: 3). 
International factors, however, seemed to have played a more relevant role in June 1986. 
The SPP had again won another decisive battle.
The SPP’s survival strategy
Up to 1985, Salinas's political prospects were not highly regarded. The failure of 
the austerity programme had affected the SPP minister badly. Few days after the 
launching of the July 1985 austerity package, a new reorganisation of the SPP was 
announced. As can be seen in figure 5.3, the new SPP Reglamento Interior reduced 
considerably the size of this agency. The major changes were the fusion of the under­
secretariat for developmental planning and that for budget control and accounting, and 
the extinction of the general directorate for economic and social programming. These 
particular changes suggest that in the president's view the SPP had underestimated public 
outlays and failed to control spending, just as Silva-Herzog claimed. It was expected that 
merging the planning division with that in charge of the spending policy and the budget 
control would help to restrain public spending. To understand better the rationale and 
implications of these organic changes, it is necessary to look at the way the SPP was 
initially staffed.
Incoming minister Salinas had virtually free hand in staffing the SPP. In doing so, 
he resorted heavily to his team at the SPP's DGPEyS. This staffing style resembled the
FIGURE 5.3 SPP Organisation Chart, 1985-1986
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way the cabinet was selected in that the DGPEyS-Salinas team of planners and economic 
experts just spread out over the SPP structure. To begin with, Salinas could appoint four 
out of five under-secretaries. The only exception was Juan José Paramo (Industry and 
Services) who was a presidential appointee. It is worth noting that he received a 
weakened under-secretariat with only two general-directorates, the heads of which came 
to be members of Salinas' inner circle.^ ‘
As head of Planeaciôn del Desarrollo, the most important under-secretariat, 
Salinas appointed his friend and right-hand man Rogelio Montemayor, an economic 
expert with a PhD at Pennsylvania State U niversityW ithin this division, the powerful 
DGPEyS was given to José Cordoba Montoya, Salinas's former regional planning director 
(1980-81). Javier Castillo Ayala, like Montemayor another Salinas' fnend and associate 
since the SHCP's years, became head of the new under-secretariat of budget control and 
accounting. With the total backing of Salinas, both Montemayor and Castillo played a key 
role in the economic policy making within the SPP between 1983 and mid-1985. Not 
surprisingly, they were the first victims of the failure of the austerity programme, and also 
of the rivalry Salinas-Silva-Herzog. The fact that Montemayor was downgraded (he was 
appointed INEGI's director), while Castillo fired suggested that Salinas was blaming them 
for what was happening.
Some indicators had forecast these events. Montemayor's branch experienced a 
high rate of turnover (see Appendix 2). For instance, Cordoba Montoya, the head of the 
DGPEyS, was unexpectedly appointed Salinas' head of advisors in early 1983.^^  From this 
position, he became Montemayor and Castillo's major internal critic. Cabinet struggles 
and negative financial indicators gave Cordoba Montoya a lot of ammunition. Four 
months before the reorganisation, he was again appointed head of the DGPEyS. His 
relationship with both Montemayor and Castillo further worsened.^"*
They were Luis Raul Dominguez Terrazas, an ITESM graduate, and Bernardo Gomez Palacio 
Gastelum. Both had worked at the DGPEyS between 1979 and 1982 (see Appendix 2).
“  Salinas managed to make Rogelio Montemayor, his second in command, head o f the DGPEyS 
during de la Madrid's presidential campaign.
“  It has been argued that this was associated with Côrdoba still being a French citizen, his holding 
that position was therefore illegal as brought to mind by a Gobernacion's official letter sent to all public 
agencies at the beginning o f 1983 {Proceso 572, 19/10/87: 8-9)
‘^‘The statements contained in this paragraph are mostly based on interviews with five SPP officials 
closely associated with the events being analysed (see Appendix 1). They include interview A (Mexico 
City, 28/4/93) and interview B (Mexico City, 5/5/93).
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Pedro Aspe (the INEGI director since December 1982), replaced Montemayor. 
However, the former did not receive the same under-imdersecretariat, but a super-think- 
tank because of the 1985 merger. Aspe's appointment has some relevant implications. 
Like Montemayor, Aspe was a highly-trained economic expert. However, their academic 
backgrounds were different. While Montemayor got his first degree at the Technological 
Institute for Superior Studies of Monterrey (ITESM), Aspe did so at the Autonomous 
Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM). For the first time, Montemayor and his team 
had given the ITESM, a regionally-based institution, a politically significant presence in 
government's high echelons: Aspe's appointment not only had the same effect regarding 
the Mexico-City-based IT AM, but reduced the presence of ITESM.^^
These facts suggested the ongoing displacement of UN AM as the main source of 
government economic experts by private universities. In addition, they showed the 
importance of friendship links forged in both the universities and the halls of government 
in assembling government technical teams. Contextual factors and connections became 
crucial to the success of these new technocratic camarillas.
The mid-1985 reorganisation and reshuffle at the SPP were discussed by 
presidential advisors, and virtually ordered by the president. Salinas's intervention 
remains a matter of controversy. On the one hand, the reshuffle forced significant changes 
in the balance of power within Salinas' inner circle. Up to that point, the ITESM group 
had been a pivotal component of that circle. Though Montemayor, its leader, remained 
in the SPP, his group was dismantled. Similarly, most of Castillo's camarilla was purged 
from the SPP. On the other hand, not everything was bad news for Salinas. First, Aspe 
was not an outsider. He had joined Salinas' cluster at lEPES during de la Madrid's 
political campaign and the SPP in late 1982. Second, Aspe's promotion allowed Salinas 
to consolidate his external alliances with influential presidential advisers with whom 
Aspe was well-connected (see next chapter). Third, the selection of the PRI's candidates 
for federal deputy seats in early 1985 gave Salinas the opportunity to reduce tensions 
within the SPP, while expanding is influence to Congress.^^ Increasing criticism against
See table 1.1 in Chapter One.
^^ In contrast to the previous Legislature in which Salinas only gained one position (Cavazos 
Lerma), he managed to impose three high-ranked SPP officials as candidates: Marcela Gonzalez Salas, 
Socrates Rizzo, and Luis Donaldo Colosio, Both Rizzo and Colosio (ITESM) were closely associated with 
Montemayor,
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the economic policy by the opposition parties had justified a greater SPP legislative 
presence. For these combined reasons, it can be argued that the reshuffle worked in 
favour of Salinas rather than against him.
Key bureaucratic alliances played an important role in Salinas' survival. Minister 
Salinas took advantage of the traditionally close link between the presidency and the SPP. 
In particular, a strong alliance developed between him and Emilio Gamboa Patron, de la 
Madrid's powerful private secretary. The former had also belonged to the SPP's select 
club where their friendship started. In February 1986, Manuel Camacho, hitherto SPP's 
under-secretary and Salinas' close friend, was appointed head of the Secretariat of Urban 
Development and Ecology (SEDUE). When Salinas began to endorse the economic- 
opening option, a broader cabinet coalition began to emerge. The participants included 
the heads of SECOFIN (Hernandez Cervantes), the Bank of Mexico (Mancera), and 
NAFINSA (Petriccioli).
Not less important were Salinas' alliances at local level.^  ^They were the result of 
an extensive use of the SPP's ‘regional’ resources. De la Madrid's call for decentralisation 
enhanced the SPP's regional involvement. This development, including its political 
overtones, has been usually neglected.^* One crucial achievement of the SPP, in particular 
since 1979, was the Convenios Unicos de Desarrollo (CUDs) with the states. These 
agreements "formalised the transfer of federal resources to the states" (Rodriguez, V. 
1993: 136).
During his first three years in office, president de la Madrid "doubled the amount 
of resources in the hands of the state governors" (Cornelius 1986: 28). As suggested 
earlier, the fact that there were very limited funds to be allocated favoured the SPP 
structures in charge of regional development becoming a powerful patronage machinery. 
This new function of the SPP encroached upon the traditional jurisdiction of the network 
for political control, thus creating growing tensions between the SPP and the 
bureaucracies of both Gobernacion and PRI. In December 1982, Salinas appointed both 
Camacho Solis and Maria de los Angeles Moreno in areas related with 'regional
For a further discussion of Salinas' alliances, see Chavez (in Proceso 572 (19/10/87: 12-15) and 
Brito Lara (1988).
According to Aguilar-Barajas and Spence, the de la Madrid administration paid "little attention 
to regional policy as such". In their view, the economic conditions assigned this policy "only a marginal 
role" (in Philip 1988: 206). Another example is provided by Rogelio Hernandez who thinks that the SPP's 
structures dealing with regional development "were always marginal" (1993: 163-164).
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development'. Different from most of the members of Salinas' inner circle, they have 
more politically-orientated careers. After Camacho's appointment as head of SEDUE, the 
SPP was again restructured. As figure 5.4 shows, a merger similar to that involving the 
SPP's economic areas took place, and Moreno inherited a greatly strengthened patronage 
machine.
Last, but not least, Salinas' good relationship with the president was decisive to 
his survival. In 1985, when the tensions between the SHCP and the SPP became apparent, 
de la Madrid rebuked both Silva-Herzog and Salinas, and told them to come into line. 
The latter did, the former did not. Besides, de la Madrid was uncomfortable with Silva- 
Herzog's popularity (Centeno 1994: 163), and with his minister's overt efforts to raise his 
own political profile. During the cabinet crisis, the president was on the side of Salinas 
too (see Proceso 793, 13/1/92: 16).
Sole responsibility for economic policy
Gustavo Petricioli, the NAFINSA director, was appointed head of the SHCP in 
place of Silva-Herzog. Because of being more "flexible" than his predecessor, his choice 
was seen as an indication that de la Madrid wanted "to assume a direct role in the 
handling of Mexico's financial policies" (LAWR 25, 3/7/86:4). At cabinet level, the only 
beneficiary would be minister Salinas. For Petricioli's docile stance vis-à-vis the SPP 
allowed Salinas and his team to take total control of the economic policymaking, for the 
first time since this agency's inception. So, the SPP team would be instrumental in 
shaping and maintaining the policy direction that emerged after Silva-Herzog's 
resignation. Rather than a new economic policy, "the cabinet embraced an aggressive 
domestic financial programme" (Silva-Herzog 1988: 10). The devastating effects of the 
1986 oil shock in combination with cabinet struggles over policy had eventually given 
momentum to the apertura-economica oipiion.
After mid-June 1986, the cautious shift towards market policies since late 1982 
was greatly speeded up. Despite the collapse of the Mexican exports from 21.7 billion in 
1985 to 16 billion in 1986, a substantial change in the structure of Mexican exports took 
place (see Ramirez 1993: 184). This structure saw a remarkable growth of non-oil 
exports, and their diversification. On the import side, the removal of licenses, beginning 
in 1985, was continued.
FIGURE 5.4 SPP Organisation Chart, 1986-1988
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At the end of 1985, Mexico's total foreign debt amounted to $97.3 billion, and the 
country would need additional fresh funds to deal with the dramatic loss of oil revenues. 
The dismissal of Silva-Herzog seemed to have removed the last obstacle to unilateral 
action on the debt problem (Cornelius 1986: 13). Besides, probably because of such 
threats, the attitude of the US government was changing. At the time there was strong 
debate within the Reagan administration, and the moderates won out. After the fall of 
Silva-Herzog, Salinas independently made contact with James Baker, one of the 
moderates, and told him that Mexico would co-operate with the US.^  ^A new 'letter of 
intent' to the IMF was signed by Petricioli in Washington on July 22, 1986. The 
agreement was one of the first under the Plan Baker launched in October 1985, which 
was designed principally for Mexico.
As noted by Duran (in Philip 1988:101), there were powerful reasons explaining 
American government and IMF's interest in the agreement: Mexico had become the test- 
case for a new strategy for dealing with the debt problem in the developing world (see 
also Lustig 1992: 46). The original feature of the rescue package was that for the first 
time the loans were linked to oil prices and economic performance.^®
The 1986 rescue package was conditional upon Mexico's move towards further 
economic restructuring and trade liberalisation. As said earlier, the cautious (though 
relevant) steps towards an open-economy model since 1982, with the dismal performance 
of the economy, rapidly eroded de la Madrid's initial alliances with the inward-orientated 
sectors of the domestic private-sector, particularly that with the domestic industrialists. 
In addition, the economic developments and policies between 1982 and 1985 were 
responsible for important changes in the correlation of power within the domestic 
business community. It allowed president de la Madrid to seek membership of GATT in 
1985, which was achieved in July 1986 and eventually formalized in August 1987. A new 
arrangement between government and domestic business developed during the second 
part of the de la Madrid administration (Heredia in Serrano and Bulmer-Thomas 1996: 
138).
”  Interview material by Dr George Philip.
On the 1986 debt negotiations and the rescue package see Cornelius (1986: 10-18), Keesing's 
(1986: 34733-34), Durân (in Philip 1988), and Lustig (1992: 46-47).
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By mid-1987, some signs of economic recovery generated an air of optimism and 
even euphoria within the government. In this context, Carlos Salinas, the architect of the 
new economic strategy, was 'unveiled' as the PRI presidential candidate in early October 
1987. The SPP's institutional resources that allowed Salinas to "underestimate deficits 
and costs" (Centeno 1994: 163) proved to be, for the second time, fundamental in 
reaching the presidency. Like in 1986, public sector deficit amounted to 16 percent of 
GDP in 1987 (as compared with the target of 3 percent agreed with the IMF).
5.4 A DIVISIVE SUCCESSION PROCESS:
THE SPP AND THE PRI’s SPLIT
Since the middle of the de la Madrid administration, some observers expected the 
process of presidential succession "to be extraordinarily divisive" (Cornelius 1986: 2-3). 
The actual size of the fracture, however, came to be worse than anticipated. Although 
many factors account for this outcome, the austerity policies stemming from the debt 
crisis should be regarded as one of its major causes. In particular, Salinas' possible 
nomination was perceived as "more of the same", even within some government's circles. 
As this possibility developed, normal tensions within the ruling party because of the 
succession struggle reached unprecedented levels. The PRI's splitting in 1987 not only 
is linked to the way de la Madrid resolved his succession, but would have deep effects 
on the operation of the political system as a whole.
Austerity and succession
Between 1982 and 1986, there was, on average, a negative rate of economic 
growth of -0.7 percent, while the average rate of inflation was around 80 percent (106 
percent in 1986 alone) (see table 5.2 above). Nothing similar had happened since the 
1930s. The de la Madrid administration failed to control money supply (Wilkie 1988: 
914). For example, the rate of growth in M, steadily increased since 1982, reaching an 
astonishing 90.8 percent in 1987 (see table 5.2 above). These increases in money supply, 
the highest in decades, influenced the observed rates of inflation. At the heart of these 
economic problems, however, was the burden of the foreign debt and its service. As 
pointed out by some Mexican officials, during the first half of de la Madrid's presidency.
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Mexico"transferred abroad $21 billion, having paid $29 billion and received only $8 
billion in new credits" (quoted by Cornelius 1986: 12).
This handling of the debt problem "put the central government budget on a 
disastrous course" (Wilkie 1989: 1094). Central government's share of spending devoted 
to debt, which averaged 40 percent in the period 1983-85, rose to 64 percent in the period 
1986-88 (see table 5.2 above). The most serious economic effect of reducing public 
spending was the sharp decline of public investment in infrastructure, basic industry, and 
agriculture. These developments had paramount social and political implications.
By the middle of the administration, all social indicators showed the devastating 
effects of four years of austerity, rampant inflation, and elusive economic growth. Wages 
were among the first casualties. Figure 5.5 shows the dramatic decline in the real 
minimum wages in Mexico City, the country's largest city, from 1982 onwards. 
Nationwide, the periodic wage increases were, invariably, well below the rate of inflation. 
It was estimated that in early 1985 about half of Mexico's work force earned the 
minimum wage (Keesing's 1985: 33395). By the end of that year, real wages had dropped 
to mid-1960 levels (Cornelius 1986: 32). The employment picture was equally dreary.
Index
FIGURE 5.5 Real wage in Mexico City, 1980-1990 
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Officially, in early 1985 unemployment was estimated at 8.5 percent, while 
underemployment was thought to affect 40 percent of the work force (Keesing's 1985: 
33395). Unofficial sources gave much higher estimates. Things worsened during de la 
Madrid's last years in office. In 1987, a 17.6 percent rate of unemployment was estimated 
(Middlebrook in Cornelius et al. 1989: 292). According to Corboba Montoya, a Salinas' 
spokesman, "How could it be different in the face of the brusque change in our 
relationships with the exterior?" {La Jornada 8/6/87: 9). There seemed to be, however, 
a beneficiary. As can be seen in table 5.3, government's levels of employment did not 
suffer great changes because of austerity, though the salaries of low- and middle-rank 
officials certainly did. There is no doubt that de la Madrid's austerity policies worsened 
not only the living standards of the vast majority of Mexicans, but also the already highly 
unequal distribution of income.
TABLE 5.3 People employed by the public sector, 1982-1988
(Annual averages)
Public sector
Selected indicators share in the
Controlled the total o f
Central Public Parastate people employed
Total government enterprises Sector (percentage)
1982 3,668,618 2,032,914 885,220 367,252 17.1
1983 3,943,374 2,138,265 1,000,169 388,409 18.8
1984 4,186,550 2,284,541 1,042,035 447,633 19.5
1985 4,292,408 2,326,321 1,057,106 468,210 19.5
1986 4,344,392 2,380,193 1,028,002 503,439 20.1
1987 4,377,739 2,412,219 1,031,289 503,956 20.0
1988 4,365,351 2,400,159 1,016,935 496,069 19.9
Source: NAFINSA (1990, cuadrol3.31: 633-634).
As social dissatisfaction rapidly grew, signs of political unrest began to surface 
with dramatic force. Between 1983 and 1987, there was a steady increase in street 
demonstrations against the government's economic policy, and no few strikes and threats 
of national strikes.^' The implications of these developments were far from being limited 
to the labour market: They involved the political system as a whole. The period 1983-85
It was noted by the president himself that nearly 1,000 street demonstrations took place in 
Mexico City alone during 1983 (quoted in Keesing's 1985: 33395). The earliest strikes included those at 
the Metropolitan University and Diesel Nacional in early 1983. In June 1983, the CTM withdrew its call 
for a general strike after accepting a 15.6 percent wage increase (see Middlebrook in Cornelius et al. 1989: 
293-294).
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witnessed a deterioration of government's relationships with one of the PRI core pillars: 
the organised labour movement. Austerity was hitting the state's own corporative bases 
of support, and the political risks were evident
The major points of tension included the CTM, the country's largest union, and 
the powerful oil union. The CTM's early demands for wage increases were harshly 
spurned by de la Madrid: "... the national interest is above all other considerations; my 
position will not be affected by old styles of negotiation or pretensions to influence" 
(quoted by Middlebrook in Cornelius et al. 1989: 293). In late January 1984, the SPP 
published an acuerdo intended to cancel subcontracting of public contracts to third 
parties (DOF 30/1/84). The same agency was responsible for enforcing the fiat. Although 
the measure had across-the-board effects, it had been evidently drawn up having the oil 
union (STPRM) in mind. The measure not only cost La Quina's economic empire some 
$165 million in 1984 alone, but affected the STPRM's major source of income.
Barragân Camacho, the union's formal secretary general from 1980 to 1984, 
declared: "The secretariat [SPP] once again has adopted a plan that benefits the higher 
interests of the country." {New York Times 6/2/84). Beneath the surface, this challenging 
decision by the SPP would further erode the already strained relations between this 
ministry and the STPRM. This development was part of a broader presidential strategy 
to modernise PEMEX (see Grayson 1988: Chapter 3). In the case of La Quina and 
Salinas, like in that of Diaz Serrano and de la Madrid, the political would turn personal.
Paradoxically, de la Madrid had no option but to rely on the traditional PRI's 
corporative machinery to tackle both wage demands and the electoral advances by PAN, 
and he used it to its limit. The organised labour movement, despite its tensions with 
government, played a fundamental role in keeping labour militancy and wages under tight 
control. By 1987, the succession year, the wage share of national income had declined to 
26.6 percent as compared with 35.9 percent in 1982 (Middlebrook in Cornelius et al. 
1989:293). The overwhelming victory of the PRI in the 1985 middle-term electionsP  ^was 
surrounded by high public scepticism, fraud allegations, and violence. Apart from further 
deteriorating government's image at home, the engineered electoral results created an 
international scandal (Cornelius 1986: 38). Despite these facts, this course of action was
The PRI won all seven governorships contended, 289 out o f 300 elected seats in the Chamber 
of Deputies, and almost all 845 mayoral elections (Keesing's 1985: 33965).
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not changed during the 1986 local elections in Chihuahua, Durango and Oaxaca. To the 
president, after all, "Mexico was not ready for democracy" as he told Roderic Ai Camp 
in 1986.
Government's disastrous response to the September 1985 earthquakes acted as a 
powerful catalyst to articulate popular opposition in Mexico City metropolitan area (see 
Cornelius 1986: 35-37; Gil 1992: 48-57).^^ De la Madrid was widely and fiercely 
criticised for failing to provide a strong political leadership, and also a quick, sound 
emergency programme. To begin with, the SDN was not instructed to apply its DN-III 
plan for natural disasters, maybe because this would have implied giving the military total 
control of the rescue operation. In a letter published by a newspaper, journalist Mauricio 
Gonzalez de Garza told de la Madrid: "That morning of September 19, we thought that 
you would become the nation's leader. . .  But no - for forty-eight hours, you shut yourself 
up in Los Pinos, overwhelmed (acorralado) by anxiety (angustia) and beset (asediado) 
by the fear of losing power", (cited in Trueba 1994: 16)
In addition, the earthquakes exhibited not only a weak presidency, but the political 
inexperience of the DDF head Ramon Aguirre. Not surprisingly, the prevailing 
bureaucratic approach to the tragedy triggered unprecedented civil mobilisation, and 
favoured its political organisation. After Silva-Herzog's firing, minister Salinas began to 
be perceived as a serious contender for the presidency. For vast sectors of the population, 
it was difficult to ignore that he had been an architect of Mexico's economic strategy. 
Opposition to his nomination included not only independent organisations and political 
parties, but some sectors within both the government and the ruling party.
Tensions within the PRI
In October 1983, Euromoney magazine named Jesus Silva-Herzog "finance 
minister of the year". In Mexico, due to his political skills and charisma, he was 
considered by many not only a good minister, but a strong contender for the presidential 
nomination (Ayala 1995: 35). Partly because of it, he left cabinet in July 1986. There is 
a clear parallel between the causes deciding the fall of Silva-Herzog and Diaz Serrano 
(see chapter 4). Both of them were very early on perceived as front-runners in the
"In an interview with Greene, Silva-Herzog said that Mexico was ‘fortunate’ to have had the 
earthquakes, for attention was "drawn away from the mismanagement o f the economy as the government 
was able to blame the economic deviations on this external occurrence" (1994: 66).
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presidential race, thus favouring the emergence of bureaucratic coalitions against them. 
Like the former PEMEX director, Silva-Herzog was not a 'team player', and did not 
cement strong alliances at cabinet level. This fact played a crucial role in deciding their 
fates: In both cases, the SPP would benefit from the outcomes. In brief, Silva-Herzog's 
personal style, his overt confrontation with Salinas, and his strategy in seeking the 
presidency were crucial in his fall.
In April 1986, Alfredo del Mazo, governor of the State of Mexico, replaced 
Labastida Ochoa at SEMIP.Considering the time of his appointment and his strong 
friendship ties with the president, del Mazo was perceived as a strong presidential 
contender race. Silva-Herzog did not like this, despite his being still viewed as the front- 
runner (LAWR 17, 8/5/86: 5). The problem was that he showed it too much. Sharply put, 
Silva-Herzog was opening opposition fronts within the bureaucracy, but without building 
enough bureaucratic alliances to counterbalance those fronts. As discussed earlier, Salinas 
was doing exactly the opposite.
During the mid-term economic setback, Silva-Herzog underwent a political 
metamorphosis. At first, he was widely perceived as a moderating force within cabinet, 
thus enjoying the confidence of the US government and foreign creditors (Cornelius 
1986: 13). This, however, began to change as a more outspoken and progressive finance 
minister gradually emerged. Presidential aspirations were an important driving force in 
this transformation. De la Madrid's February 1986 speech gave him a chance to advocate 
a "new foreign policy". In May, a PRI meeting set up to discuss economic issues endorsed 
the view of a more "aggressive" debt policy. A partnership between Silva-Herzog and the 
left-of-centre PRI's members developed further. The latter's growing opposition to 
Salinas' nomination suited well Silva-Herzog's political aspirations.^"* However, as already 
said, the president would change his view on the debt.
According to Porfirio Munoz Ledo (interview in Gil 1992: 196), neither "Silva 
Herzog's words nor the party resolutions were taken into account". In his view, "an 
internal political shift took place and . . .  the technocrats won the battle". They "did not 
want Silva Herzog to raise the banner of change and benefit from it politically". Ironically 
enough, Silva-Herzog's closing ranks with PRI members created tension between him and
This alliance resembled that between Diaz Serrano and 'La Quina' six years before.
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another reputedly strong presidential candidate, namely the head of Gobernacion Manuel 
Bartlett.
As usual, the PRI began well in advance gearing up for the forthcoming 
presidential campaign. The context was, however, different from previous occasions. 
Following the resignation of Lugo Verduzco, Jorge de la Vega was appointed head of PRI 
in early October 1986. President De la Madrid resorted to his political experience in 
coping with increasing unrest within the party. Since its annual convention held in August 
1984, some PRI's members had been accusing their leaders of driving the party to the 
right. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and Porfirio Munoz Ledo, well-known national politicians, 
soon took the leadership of the discontented faction. After the Silva-Herzog dismissal, 
this faction's stances radicalised. De la Vega's efforts could not prevent the eventual 
creation, within the party, of the Corriente Democratica (CD) in late 1986.1n brief, this 
group asked for an open internal selection of the presidential candidate.
It was the first time some organised PRI's members had dared to question the very 
basis of the Mexican political system, namely the presidencialismo and its "anti­
democratic excesses". Following a period of highly strained relationships between the 
PRI leadership and the CD, the former issued a bulletin saying that Cardenas had decided 
"not to collaborate further with the party" in March 1987. Three months later, the PRI's 
CEN would decide to withdraw recognition of the CD.^  ^The level of opposition within 
the party had been unprecedented, and so was the president's radical response to struggles 
over the presidential nomination. De la Madrid, making extensive use of the presidency's 
powers, opted for suppressing the source of protest. This authoritarian decision would 
have a high political cost.
The Salmas nomination and the PRI split
In October 1986, Jesus Salazar Toledano, the PRI leader in Mexico City, 
uncovered the names of four Cabinet members from whom, in 'his' view, the presidential 
candidate would be selected. They were del Mazo (SBMIP), Manuel Bartlett 
(Gobernacion), Carlos Salinas (SPP), and Gonzalez Avelar (SEP).^^ Outstandingly,
An extensive description of these developments may be found in Garrido (1993). The views o f  
both Cârdenas and Mufloz Ledo on this issue are contained in the interviews given to Gil (1992: 149-172, 
173-211).
^^The later inclusion of Ramôn Aguirre (DDF) and Garcia Ramirez (PGR) did not change the 
perception that Salazar had delimited the scope for the presidential selection.
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Petricioli (SHCP) was excluded from the list of 'distinguidos priistas'. Since most 
observers gave Gonzalez Avelar no serious chances, this meant that there were only three 
real contenders for the nomination as later recognised by de la Madrid himself (interview 
with Borge 1993; 141). It not only reduced considerably the expectations traditionally 
surrounding the process, but also favoured more intense succession struggles.
After Silva-Herzog's resignation, Alfredo del Mazo was perceived as the front- 
runner in the presidential race (LAWR 25, 3/7/86: 4). As noted by Centeno, he was 
widely considered "the perfect compromise candidate" because of his ties to both the 
government's financial circles and the old 'politicos' (1994: 164). Unlike Salinas, del 
Mazo had the support of the CTM leader Fidel Velazquez. However, the radical shift to 
market-orientated policies in mid-1986 worked against del Mazo's political expectations. 
As argued in previous chapters, SEMIP was historically associated with state 
intervention. A new approach to the latter had decided this agency lost its powers over 
national industrial policy in early 1983. Moreover, SEMIP witnessed the gradual 
reduction of the parastate entities under its control (Marum in Alonso et al.1992: 225- 
231).
This process was accelerated by the policy of further "structural reform" embraced 
by the cabinet since mid-1986. Though del Mazo's programme of 'industrial 
modernisation' of the parastate sector was widely and much publicized, it could not 
obscure those trends. Indeed, the programme was difficult to harmonise with the 
declining role of public ownership. More importantly, no radical policy shift was 
expected as suggested by de la Madrid in his fifth address to the nation: "... we will not 
change course in mid-passage." (quoted by Centeno 1994: 164). In brief, SEMIP was not 
the ideal platform from which to campaign for the nomination.
There were more serious factors hampering Manuel Bartlett's presidential 
aspirations. First, Moya Palencia's defeat as presidential candidate decided Bartlett's 
incorporation to de la Madrid's team of financiers and planners in 1979. Yet he was never 
considered by this team as a real member. Second, president de la Madrid discouraged 
Bartlett from exercising Gobernacion's traditional political powers by increasingly relying 
on the head of the SPP regional machinery, Manuel Camacho, to solve selected political
201
problems at both national and local levels/^ Camacho himself provides an example that 
illustrates the declining role of Gobernacion. "Once Manuel Bartlett phoned me to tell 
me: 'I want you to know that there is only one Secretario de Gobernacion. Despite being 
a subsecretario, he already saw me as a competior!" (interview, London, 1/12/95). Third, 
allegations of ballot-rigging, of human rights violations, and of police involvement in 
drug trafficking affected badly Bartlett’s reputation not only in Mexico, but abroad.^* As 
said earlier, these issues reached the bilateral agenda in a period of strained relations with 
the United States.
The most plausible explanation of the eventual selection of Carlos Salinas as the 
PRI candidate is de la Madrid’s wish to continue at any cost his economic programme and 
his feeling that the SPP minister, nobody else, could do it. It has been argued that 
disagreements over economic policy, rather than the pace of political modernisation, were 
at the heart of the PRI’s fissure (Camp in Rodriguez, J. 1993: 249). But, why? Apart fi-om 
ideological and doctrinal arguments, political factors played a relevant role in articulating 
opposition, the most important being the succession struggle. As argued in the previous 
chapter, the 1982 presidential transition provoked the displacement of many bureaucratic 
camarillas from the two existing policy networks. As a result, the PRI not only gradually 
brought together radical structuralists, displaced politicians, and dissatisfied union 
leaders, but also became a critical forum. In the final analysis, they were struggling for 
survival, while making use of virtually the only arena available: their political party.
In June 1987, José Corboba published an article in La Jornada (8/6/87: 1, 8-9). 
More than a mere response to Ifigenia Martinez, a CD’s member, this article was an 
abbreviated version of Salinas’ economic programme in case of being nominated, namely, 
six-years of more ’economic realism’. In other words, the elites displaced by these policies 
will not return to politics. It was the first time in decades that the way of thinking of a 
presidential pre-candidate was so well known in advance. For the PRI critical vring.
Since 1983, Camacho began to frequently join the president's trips around the country. This was 
explained by the SPP's involvement in the relations with the states. Gradually, he received from de la 
Madrid more political tasks such as "once being mediator between Reyes Heroles and La Quina" and the 
solution o f numerous labour and agrarian conflicts, (interview, London, 1/12/95)
At the time, some evidence suggested the participation o f  DFS agents in the assassination of  
Manuel Buendia in May 1984 (see Proceso 660,26/6/89: 12-19), and also the involvement o f that agency 
in providing ID cards to the drug smugglers linked to the assassination o f the DEA's agent Camarena in 
early 1985.
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survival within the system implied fighting continuity, and the latter had a name: Carlos 
Salinas.
This interpretation is supported by the gradual shift of the Cardenista group from 
moderation to radicalism. Despite his de facto expulsion, Cardenas sought the PRI 
presidential nomination from July to September 1987. A week after the Salinas' 
"unveiling" on October 5,1987, he accepted becoming the FARM presidential candidate 
on October 12, 1987. According to Munoz Ledo, this party was selected "because its 
ideology was closest to the PRI's. Actually it didn't have a distinct ideology." (interview 
in Gil 1992: 196). In addition to his nomination by a PRI satellite party, Cardenas' 
rejecting overtures from the newly-formed Mexican Socialist Party (PMT) suggests that 
he had decided to play according to 'the rules of the game'. At this point neither the PRI 
nor its candidate saw Cardenas as a challenge. Furthermore, it could help counteracting 
the rightist PAN candidate Manuel Clothier. In March 1988, José Cordoba gave abroad 
the following forecast: PRI 60%, PAN 20%, Cardenas 15%, other parties 5%.^^
TABLE 5.4 National electoral polls, May-July 1988 
( Main presidential candidates, vote percentages)
Author (date) Salinas (PRI) Clouthier (PAN) Cârdenas (FDN)
UNAM/FCPyS (May) 61.4 15.7 15.20
El Universal (5 May) 57.1 17.0 20 .80
El Colegio de Mexico (undated) 61.4 21.0 17.5
El Universal (12 May) 56.2 18.1 21.6
The Gallup Organisation (May-June) 56.0 19.0 23.0
El Universal (26 June) 54.1 22.0 19.1
El Universal (3 July) 57.2 21.0 18.0
Notes; Includes voting o f the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS); This percentage is for the 
National Democratic Front.
Source: El Cotidiano 25 (September-October 1988: 34).
Without foreseeing any problem in winning the presidential election, the PRI 
carried out the Salinas campaign along traditional lines.''® As in the past, the task of 
winning votes was left mostly to the PRI's corporative machinery. On the whole, the 
campaign was orientated "less to win votes than to negotiating positions in the future
Interviewed in London by George Philip.
For a detailed account o f the 1988 PRI's presidential campaign see Adler et al. (1993).
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government" (Adler et al. 1993: 393). Cardenas' campaign was neglected even after the 
PMS supported the candidature of the former PRI's member. After all, the Mexican Left 
had rarely attracted many voters. Moreover, the various national electoral polls invariably 
showed Salinas as the likely winner even on the eve of the election as can seen fi-om table 
5.4.
The official results released one week after the elections gave Salinas around 50 
percent of the vote, while around 31 percent went to Cardenas. A few days before, the 
latter had announced his victory based on preliminary results fiom one third of the total 
vote counted fiom official documentation (Reding 1988b: 616). A widespread impression 
of ballot-rigging and of a giant electoral fiaud stained Salinas' declared victory. In any 
event, one thing was clear: The period of PRI hegemony was gone as incoming president 
Salinas would later point out.
CONCLUDING NOTE
Policy incoherence during the last year of the Lôpez Portillo administration not 
only aggravated the economic effects of the mid-1981 drop of oil prices, but also severely 
worsened the government's relations with the domestic private sector. It also affected the 
negotiations with foreign creditors. Restoring both relationships was a priority for the 
incoming president de la Madrid. Because of the country's dire need of fresh funds, he 
had no option but to agree a medium-term austerity programme with the IMF. A strategy 
of aid schemes, tax incentives, and private investment promotion was used in restoring 
business confidence. In particular, an alliance was built with the domestic inward- 
orientated industrialists. This strategy proved to be relatively successful until 1984.
The way the problem of foreign debt was handled put government spending on 
a catastrophic course. Because of the debt service, Mexico became a net exporter of 
capital at the expense of public investment and social programmes. The limited access 
to foreign credit, with pressing internal demands, triggered a process of high inflation and 
economic stagnation. A moderate increase in public spending and higher private 
investment overheated the economy in 1985, thus making the austerity programme's 
targets meaningless. This development strained again government's relations with both 
foreign creditors and domestic business.
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Stepping up public spending was not the result of a single factor. A long list of 
them conspired against the austerity measures. They included domestic opposition, social 
pressures, spending miscalculations, the midterm elections, policy incoherence, cabinet 
in-fighting, implementation problems, the September earthquakes, the 1985-86 oil shock, 
and the succession process. In a combined fashion, they decided the course of the 
economy from 1986 onwards. The severity of the oil price decline in early 1986 not only 
intensified cabinet debates over economic policy, but gave momentum to the economic- 
opening option. The latter had been postponed by the government's alliance with the 
domestic industrial sector.
Austerity enhanced the institutional rivalry between the SHCP and the SPP. The 
succession struggle further aggravated their traditional claims on the budget. As in the 
previous succession process, bureaucratic and extra-bureaucratic alliances greatly 
influenced the outcome. The tensions and shifts in the correlation of forces at cabinet 
level reflected similar phenomena at the societal level. Personal factors and survival 
strategies played a relevant role in the fate of both Silva-Herzog and Salinas. The former 
left the cabinet not only because of his position on the debt problem, but also because of 
the bureaucratic coalition his being the front-runner in the presidential race had 
encouraged.
De la Madrid's austerity programme imposed a large part of the crisis burden on 
the most vulnerable social sectors. Inflation and economic stagnation brought a 
significant deterioration of living standards for most of the population. The 1985 
earthquakes acted as a catalyst to social discontent. During the de la Madrid's years, the 
relation between labour and government suffered from strain. Patronage and austerity 
were mutually excluding. Tensions within the ruling party reflected these developments, 
and also opposition to Salinas' nomination. Continuity and Salinas became synonymous 
concepts. The results of the 1988 elections showed, beyond doubt, the link between 
austerity and social dissatisfaction.
As will be argued in the next chapter, Salinas's economic programme began to 
develop in mid-1986, and was not altered by the 1988 elections. The roots of his social 
programme can be traced even earlier. A revival ofpresidentialism along traditional lines 
would be Salinas's major response to the unprecedented political crisis caused by his 
reaching power.
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Amid neoliberalism and Solidaridad: 
The decline of the SPP
The economic course followed during the first half of the Salinas administration 
(1988-1991) cannot be fully understood without going back to 1987. Following a short­
lived recovery, the Mexican economy was again in alarming disarray by the third quarter 
of 1987. Further deterioration was precipitated by the collapse of the stock market, and 
the resulting capital flight. By the end of the year, government had no alternative but to 
attempt a radical change in its way of carrying out pro-market structural adjustments. The 
main feature of the stabilisation programme adopted was to bring the state's corporative 
machinery deeper inside the economic policy making. Though the Economic Solidarity 
Pact (FSE) proved highly successful in bringing inflation down, the improvements came 
too late to save the July 1988 presidential elections as the dramatic swing against the PRI 
showed. The adoption of the core policies and implementation mechanism of the PSE 
explains much of Salinas's so-called ‘economic miracle’.
As the administration unfolded, it became increasingly apparent that the existing 
levels of external funding were the main constraint to higher rates of economic growth. 
With this idea in mind and after a failed tour to Europe in search of investment, president 
Salinas unexpectedly sought a free trade agreement with the United States in early 1990. 
The expectations raised by this possibility, together with a radical privatisation 
programme of large enterprises, would provide amply the longed-for funds. By the end 
of 1991, public finances had been substantially corrected, the economy was growing, 
inflation was declining, and dollars were entering the country in impressive amounts. 
Moreover, the negotiations on the trade agreement were at their zenith, and on a 
promising course.
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On the political side, the success of the PRI in winning with relative ease the mid­
term congressional elections suggested the popularity of president Salinas and his 
policies. In this particular context, a brief press release from the presidency announced 
that the SHCP and the SPP would be merged. This decision meant the institutional death 
of the latter ministry. As argued in this chapter, various factors explain the demise of the 
SPP. From a broad economic perspective, it can be argued that neoliberalism itself 
conspired against an agency originally designed to operate in a statist context already 
gone, while strengthening the finance ministry. This explanation, however, is only partly 
correct. For political factors also played a fundamental part in the decision-making 
process, in the way the reform was conceived, and even in the timing.
More than his two predecessors, president Salinas made extensive use of the vast 
powers of the Mexican presidency. This style of ruling had a dramatic impact on the 
bureaucratic setting. For the federal bureaucracy was not only called to play a 
subordinate, instrumental role, but its internal balance of power substantially altered. In 
particular, president Salinas was careful to prevent any single ministry from becoming 
dominant in economic policy-making. This strategy enabled him to impose, in record 
time, his economic programme over usually recalcitrant and, more important, antagonistic 
bureaucratic interests.
The central purpose of this chapter is to analyse the context surrounding the death 
of the SPP, and to spell out the causes explaining the latter event. While paying special 
attention to the exceptional conditions in which the Salinas administration opened, the 
first section describes and discusses the economic strategy proposed, and the factors 
underpinning government's economic success. Section two analyses the impact of the 
manner in which economic policy was designed and implemented on the institutional and 
bureaucratic settings. The following section is devoted entirely to PRONASOL. Here, it 
is argued that there is a direct connection between the way this all-encompassing social 
programme was carried out and the rapid decline of the SPP. The last section focuses on 
the major causes that may account for the death of this ministry in January 1992.
6.1 SALINAS'S NEOLIBERAL STRATEGY
The Salinas administration opened amid a climate of cautious confidence on the 
Mexican economy, and extended political unrest stemming from the stormy July 1988
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electoral process. By the end of 1991, this gloomy picture had dramatically changed. On 
the one hand, a rapid succession of bold and skillful actions by the incoming president 
helped restore the presidency's legitimacy, and gained wide political support for its action. 
On the other hand, the country's economy had made considerable progress. Moreover, the 
negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada raised optimistic 
expectations about the country's future. In only three years, Carlos Salinas had achieved 
what some months before his inauguration seemed impossible.
From electoral failure to economic success
The first half of the Salinas administration was marked by both an upturn in 
economic growth and a substantial decline in inflation. Moreover, remarkable progress 
in the efficiency of public sector expenditures was achieved. This encouraging picture 
contrasted with that of the previous years. At the beginning of the second quarter of 1987, 
the Mexican economy experienced a moderate recovery as a result of the long-term 
rescue package negotiated in the second half of 1986, a fall of international interest rates, 
and a rise in oil prices. Besides, the favourable peso exchange rate encouraged the return 
of capital that had fled the country in the past. The Mexican stock market (BMV) was 
particularly attractive to investors seeking quick profits. Between March and September 
1987, the BMV index grew 250 percent (Wilkie 1988, table 3503: 920).
Government officials did not lose a chance to reinforce a positive view of the 
economy. By September, an atmosphere of "triumph, euphoria, and optimism" prevailed 
(Silva-Herzog 1988: 10). In this context, Carlos Salinas, the architect of the sudden 
boom, was 'unveiled' as the PRI presidential candidate. Soon, the economic reality would 
emerge with explosive force. Just a few days after the '’destape^ in mid-October, the 
Mexican stock market collapsed. The value of the stocks on the BMV had outpaced the 
rate of inflation, and by early October 1987 it was "more overvalued than Wall Street" 
(Wilkie 1988: 917). Apart from external factors, this development was aggravated by 
domestic "administrative errors" (Aspe 1993: 19).
The fact that finance minister Gustavo Petricioli knew well the operation of the 
Mexican stock market* suggests that these errors had been, at least partly, deliberate. If 
true, it means that an artificial stock-market boom had been tolerated with the aim of
'Minister Petricioli had been president of the Comision Nacional de Valores, government's 
supervisory body of the stock market under the SHCP's axis, between 1976 and 1982.
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serving as a part of the stage design for the 'unveiling'? After the stock market crash, 
people rushed to switch their assets to dollars, and an intense capital flight followed. In 
November 1987 alone, the peso was devalued by about 20 percent, and prices soared. It 
was the first 'present' of the PRI candidate to the electorate. By December, the BMV had 
fallen 70 percent. The official 1987 economic indicators, released in early 1988, would 
show a quite different picture from that publicized before October. In spite of their 
impressive academic qualifications, government economists had plainly failed to control 
the money supply^, hyperinflation, and public spending. Together with economic 
variables, factors associated with the presidential transition underlay this poor 
performance.
The financial crisis precipitated by the stock market crash had three major effects. 
First, it made the 1988 Budget, presented to Congress in late November, "patently 
unreal". Second, it forced government to attempt a new economic strategy before the 
budget came into effect. In the view of the policy-makers, "the administration faced the 
serious problem of implementing new initiatives in its last year of government" (Aspe 
1993; 20). From a electoral viewpoint, it was not the ideal time to do so either. Third, it 
dramatically changed the way government had planned to deal with the forthcoming 
presidential elections. For example, it had been forecast in the budget statement that in 
1988 the country would have a financial deficit of 18.5 percent of GDP and a rate of 
inflation of 135 percent! (Whitehead in Cornelius et al. 1989: 183)
President de la Madrid launched the Pacto de Solidaridad Economica (PSE) in 
mid-december 1987. The central objective of this innovative set of economic policies was 
to drastically reduce inertial inflation, while using the exchange rate as "the nominal 
anchor of the disinflation programme" (Carstens and Schwartz in Serrano and Bulmer- 
Thomas 1996: 113). In addition, the PSE brought together, for the first time ever in an 
explicit fashion, the private sector as well as the organised labour and peasantry into the 
policy-making and bargaining processes. The results of this strategy in controlling the 
wage-price spiral were beyond any expectation. Inflation, on monthly basis, dropped from 
15 percent in December 1987 to 2 percent in July 1988, the month of the presidential
^See "Petricioli protegiô ilicitos bursatiies con la anuencia de De la Madrid", Proceso 642 
(20/2/89: 12-15).
^According to the central bank, the rate o f increase in M, reached a historic 139 percent in 
November 1987 alone (as compared with the annual rate o f 90,8 percent).
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election. While spectacular, this outcome came too late to influence the electoral results. 
Apart from political factors, the high social costs involved in bringing inflation down 
explain why.
Candidate Salinas adopted the PSE as part of his political campaign, and 
presented its success in dealing with inflation as the best proof of the merits of his overall 
economic programme.'^ In his PhD thesis, he had written; "the state hopes to capitalise in 
the ballot boxes its economic effort because the competition for the vote will be much 
harder in the next years" (quoted by Borge 1993: 127). Electorally, however, the PSE 
proved to be an "economic effort" difficult to sell, especially after six years of austerity. 
In other words, the promise to advance president de la Madrid’s economic reform (see 
Salinas 1988: 114-115) represented the Achilles heel of Salinas’s electoral discourse. In 
the eyes of an important part of the electorate, this course of action meant further 
deterioration of their living standards. By and large, this worry was reflected in the 
massive popular rejection of the PRI and its presidential candidate. In these 
circumstances, Cardenas’s candidature, supported by the centre-left National Democratic 
Front (FDN), proved fundamental not only in articulating discontent, but in providing an 
additional electoral option.
As shown in table 6.1, the presidential election held on July 6,1988 was the most 
disputed polls in contemporary Mexican history up to that year.  ^According to the official 
results, Salinas won 50.36 percent of the vote (around 9.6 million votes). Furthermore, 
the 1988 elections still remain as the most questioned. For their results were denounced 
as fraudulent by six of the seven registered opposition parties (Reding 1988b: 615), and 
by countless civil organisations. Not surprisingly, wide sectors of the electorate were left 
with the impression that Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was the true winner, as claimed by the 
FDN.^ Regarding the congressional elections, the PRI was attributed, amid more selective 
but not less intense fraud allegations, 260 out of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
(the lowest number up to 1988) and 60 out of 64 seats in the Senate.
In his famous Nuevo Le6n speech on May 19, 1988, candidate Salinas not only recognised that 
the PSE was working, but promised to continue it (Salinas 1988: 121).
* For a further discussion on these elections, see Barbarân et al. (1988) and Reding (1988b).
® A tabulation o f 54.09 percent of the total votes in the presidential election carried out by the FDN 
gave Cardenas (FDN) 39.40 percent, Salinas (PRI) 35.76 percent, and Clouthier (PAN) 21.38 percent as 
to July 12, 1988 (SALA 29, 1992, part 1:311).
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TABLE 6.1 Presidential election results, 1952-1994 
(Percentages of the total vote)
Year Candidate (party) Percentage Year Candidate (party) Percentage
1952 Ruiz Cortines (PRI) 74.31 1976 Lôpez Portillo (PRI) 100.0
Gonzalez Luna (PAN) 7.82
Other 17.87
1958 Lopez Mateos (PRI) 90.43 1982 De la Madrid (PRI) 70.9
Luis H. Alvarez (PAN) 9.42 Pablo E. Madero (PAN) 15.7
Other 0.13 Other 13.4
1964 Diaz Ordaz (PRI) 88.82 1988 Carlos Salinas (PRI) 50.36
Gonzâlez Torres (PAN) 10.98 C. Cârdenas (FDN) 31.12
Other 0.20 Clouthier (PAN) 17.07
Other 1.46
1970 Echeverria (PRI) 86.02 1994 Ernesto Zedillo (PRI) 50.18
Gonzalez Morfin (PAN) 13.98 Diego Femândez (PAN) 26.69
C. Cârdenas (PRD) 17.08
Other 6.05
Source: La Jornada (6/7/88); El Dia (16/7/88); Unomdsuno (28/8/94).
Even admitting the official results, ratified by the Colegio Electoral on September 
10, some data further cast doubts on the legitimacy of Salinas's triumph. Amid about 50 
percent abstention, the 9.6 million votes for the PRI candidate represented only 25.3 
percent of the registered voters (as compared with 53.1 percent in the de la Madrid's 
election) {El Cotidiano 25, Sept./Oct. 1988: 15). In this adverse context, Salinas assumed 
power on December 1,1988.
According to some scholars, the 1988 elections had a relevant effect on Salinas's 
neoliberal project in the sense that his first economic decisions were made with the aim 
of re-conquering the lost constituencies (Alvarez and Mendoza 1993: 34-36; Castaheda, 
1993b: 60). However, a careful comparison between the PRI candidate's economic 
programme and that announced at his inauguration shows no relevant policy shifts.^ The 
presidential decision of continuing the PSE -by far the most important early economic 
measure- had been taken well before the elections. Therefore, Salinas's economic reform 
should be seen as a case of policy maintenance rather than one of policy innovation (as 
defined by Hogwood and Peters 1982).
’ This comparison is based on Salinas's key campaign speeches (Salinas 1988) and his inauguration 
speech in La Jornada (special supplement) (2/12/88).
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A good example is provided by the changes affecting government’s structure. 
Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of the parastate sector in the period 1982-1992. Here, two 
stages can be distinguished. Up to 1985, the privatisation policy of president de la Madrid 
was more rhetorical than real, for it was virtually limited to the fusion of parastate 
entities. A significant policy shift, however, is observed after that year. As can be seen 
in the same figure, the privatisation process was speeded up between 1986 and 1988. 
Triggered mostly by contextual economic factors, this policy shift coincides with minister 
Salinas’s metamorphosis from a conventional planner to an orthodox financier after 
Silva-Herzog’s resignation. The continuity of a radical privatisation programme after 
December 1988 is illustrated less by the number of entities put on sale, and more by their 
being the largest and most strategic. In May 1990, for example, the Congress (by 
presidential initiative) approved the return of the banks nationalised in 1982 to private 
ownership. Nevertheless, Vernon’s ‘familiar trinity’ and other powerful entities (e.g., 
CONASUPO) would remain under public ownership.
FIGURE 6.1 Number of parastate entities, 1982-1992
1,400
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Year
Source: Banco de M exico (1992: 167).
As explicitly promised during his political campaign, the incoming president not 
only kept "irreversible" other significant reforms initiated by his predecessor, but went 
much further. Moreover, he did it at an extraordinary speed. Apart from the privatisation 
of key public enterprises, the changes includes a further elimination of subsidies and trade
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barriers, the relaxation of the rules on foreign investment in such politically sensitive 
areas as mining and exploration, and the reform of the tax code.* More remarkable than 
the changes themselves was that "there was no substantive criticism" (Carlos Rico quoted 
by Pastor 1990: 5). By 1991 almost nobody questioned government's commitment to the 
free market. What had allowed Salinas to carry out his economic programme so 
successfully not only in such a short period, but amid the "crisis of legitimacy" reflected 
by the 1988 electoral results?
Factors underpinning Salinas's 'miracle'
Soon after the 1988 elections, Andrew Reding wrote: "Though the PRI may be 
still able to inaugurate Salinas . . .  it will likely confront an ungovernable Mexico." 
(1988b: 644) This and other pesimistic forecasts did not materialise. A complex 
combination of political and economic factors explain why. To begin with, though many 
constituencies did not back Salinas at the polls, his taking power put in his hands the 
extensive powers of the Mexican presidency. More important, since the first minute in 
office, he exercised them to the full. Because of his research and practical experience, 
Salinas had become well aware of the importance of leadership in gaining political 
support (see Borge 1993: 134-135). A successful leader, he wrote, "must have the 
authority to put into effect" his programmes (in Aspe and Sigmund 1984: 539).
As president, Salinas acted quickly to gain that authority by projecting an alluring 
image of a strong president. Interesting enough, this image of decisiveness and 'iron fist', 
absent during the de la Madrid administration, not only worked extremely well, but 
proved fundamental particularly at the very beginning of the administration. By 1992, 
president Salinas had reestablished the authority of the presidency in virtually all spheres 
of public life (Centeno 1994: 95).
As suggested by Roberto A. Pastor, Salinas' impressive achievements cannot be 
understood without considering "his first hundred days" in office (1990: 4-5). However 
heterogenous they may look, most of presidential decisions during this period had an 
unmistakable purpose, namely to show who was in power. This message was primarily 
directed to the country's most influential political actors rather than to the electorate. A 
few weeks after his inauguration, the president sent not the police, but the army to arrest
*For an extensive discussion of these changes, see Pastor (1990), Grayson (1991), Kaufman 
Purcell (1992), and Aspe (1993).
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La Quina, the powerful Oil Union leader (see Loyola 1990). Before long, not only union 
leaders, drug traffickers and corrupt ex-police agents, but also prominent businessmen 
were brought to justice under different charges (see Proceso 678, 23/10/89: 6-13).
In particular, the arrest of entrepreneur Eduardo Legorreta, who was brother of the 
president of the influential Business Coordinating Council (CCE) at the time, for crimes 
related with the stock market 'crash' meant that anybody could be confronted if necessary. 
This extensive and bold exercise of presidential power not only provided the political 
environment required by further economic restructuring, but helped to build support 
around the pro-market option.
Because of the lack of a competitive party system, presidential elections in 
Mexico have traditionally played a legitimating role (Santana 1996). In simpler words, 
they have served to validate at the polls the president's choice of his successor. Evidently, 
this was not the case in the 1988 elections, for the first time in decades. This situation 
made the forthcoming administration highly dependent upon the explicit backing of key 
foreign and domestic agents as an alternative source of legitimacy. Two linked factors, 
however, facilitated the support building around the PRI candidate's doubtful victory, 
namely these agents' shared fear of the Cardenista option (which was associated with 
socialism or at least 'populism'), and Salinas's pro-market orientation. Internationally, 
president Ronald Reagan was among the first heads of state to congratulate Salinas, and 
he did it even before the latter was declared the winner by the electoral authorities in 
Mexico. It is worth noting that a good personal relation between Salinas and future US 
president George Bush made getting the early American support easier.^
Domestically, a similar validating role was played by the business community 
(specially those sectors benefitting from economic liberalisation), and the Catholic 
Church (see Castaheda 1993b: 59). It is worth noting that for the first time since the 1910 
Revolution representatives of this Church were invited to Salinas's inauguration. In 
general, the role of these miscellaneous supporters not only provided the regime with a 
good dose of legitimity, but also contributed to restore confidence.
’ Since his political campaign, if not before, Salinas had built a good working relationship with 
George Bush and some members o f his team. It should be recalled that Bush and Salinas met in Houston 
when both were presidents-elect, and that they met three more times up to mid-1990.
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On the economic side, the continuation of the PSE after December 1988 is at the 
heart of Salinas's success in both controlling inflation and reorganising public finances. 
As shown in table 6.2, inflation dropped from 51.6 percent in 1988 to 18.8 percent in 
1991, while the financial deficit plummeted from 12.5 percent GDP to a 1.5 percent 
surplus in the same period. As said earlier, this programme had been introduced by 
president de la Madrid one year before. The economic policies underpinning this 
programme constituted a rather complex and well-integrated package aimed primarily to 
bring inflation down (Whitehead in Cornelius et al. 1989: 183). In essence, the PSE did 
not change the government's main neoliberal goals since 1982, but the way of achieving 
them (see Cordoba Montoya 1991).
TABLE 6.2 Selected economic and public financial indicators, 1988-1994
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
A. G D P  (annual growth rates) 1.3 3.3 4.4 3.6 2.8 0.6 3.5
B, Inflation (annual growth rates) 51.6 19.7 29.9 18.8 11.9 8.0 7.1
C. Gross domestic investment^') 17.6 17.8 18.9 19.6 21.8 21.0 21.9
D . Total foreign investments^) 2.88 3.69 4.62 17.5 22.4 33.3 - -
E. Foreign portfolio investments^) 0.0 13.37 43.10 72.79 80.38 85.29 —
F. Current accounts^) -2.5 -6.0 -8.7 -15.0 -24.9 -23.5 -29.2
G. Total public spendingS') 40.0 34.4 28.5 27.0 — — —
H. Public investments') 4.4 3.9 5.0 5.2 - - - - - -
I. Financial deficits') 12.5 5.6 1.0 -1.5 -0.5 -0.7 0.3
J. Primary deficits') -8.1 -8.6 -10.8 -5.6 -5.9 -3.7 -2.3
K. Operational deficits') 3.6 1.7 -2.3 -2.7 —
percentage of GDP; Billions o f dollars; As percentage o f  the total foreign investment.
Source: A, B, C, and F, ESLA (1995: 256-257), figures for 1994 are preliminary; D, Heredia (in 
Serrano and Bulmer-Thomas 1996: 143); E, calculated from Bank o f  Mexico data provided by Heredia 
(Idem); 0 ,  H, and K, Aspe (1993: 14, 15, 32); 1 and J, Carstens and Schwartz (in Serrano and Bulmer- 
Thomas 1996: 114),
According to the policy-makers, the PSE was set in motion without the help of 
the IMF, thus suggesting its domestic-inspired nature (Aspe 1993: 34). The proximity of 
the elections may have convinced them of the need to introduce some innovative 
elements -generally seen with suspicion by foreign investors- into an essentially orthodox 
stabilisation programme. The most important was its corporative ingredient. As claimed 
by president de la Madrid, the PSE was not really a 'shock plan' because it did not freeze 
prices; rather, it was aimed at controlling both wages and prices on a negotiated basis. In 
other words, the 'pact' component of the programme inhibited the use of shock measures.
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Four main factors account for the success of the PSE in reducing inflation during 
1988. First, it was the first time such an economic programme dealt with the various 
components of inflation simultaneously (Roxborough 1992: 656). Second, this 
programme's key policies and goals had the total approval of both president de la Madrid 
and candidate Salinas. Moreover, they not only fully supported the agencies charged with 
its implementation, but participated actively in its monitoring.'® In other words, no 
conflicting signals were sent to the economic agents. Third, despite having notoriously 
failed to win votes in July 1988, the PSE was not adjusted in any significant way, thus 
providing a rare example of policy coherence under severe political pressures. Last, but 
not least, the peculiarities of the Mexican political system facilitated the corporative 
arrangements under the PSE (Alvarez and Mendoza 1993: 35). In addition, these 
particular arrangements improved, in turn, the system's traditional capacity to prevent 
wage-price spirals (see Philip 1996: 14).
In his inaugural speech, president Salinas not only made clear his intention of 
taking full advantage of the proven effectiveness of the PSE, but announced its 
institutionalisation. Accordingly, the Consejo Nacional de Concertacion Economica was 
created a few days later. As will be discussed in the next section, these decisions 
consolidated significant changes in the economic policy making. In late December 1988, 
the PSE was renamed Pacto para la Estabilidady  el Crecimiento Economico (PECE). 
Making government's fiscal policy consistent with lower inflation and gradual economic 
recovery (see Aspe 1993: 25) justified the renaming. As in the past, however, these 
agreed adjustments did not imply major changes in the basic modus operandi of the Pact. 
Comparatively speaking, the Mexican pact formula would prove more successful in 
bringing inflation down than its counterparts in Brazil and Argentina (see Roxborough 
1992; Alvarez and Mendoza 1993).
A different set of factors underpinning economic success were related with the 
shrewd way the Salinas administration dealt with the problem of how to finance its 
economic programme. Considering that recession "was not the natural state of our 
economy", candidate Salinas proposed four driving forces for sustained growth (Salinas 
1988: 109). They were private investment, non-oil exports, public investment in
In the months that followed the creation o f the PSE, for example, the economic cabinet met three 
times a week in the presence of the president (Aspe 1993: 22).
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infrastructure, and expansion of the internal market. To begin with, he was certain that 
without reducing the debt's heavy burden government could hardly increase public 
investment, or contribute to the expansion of the internal market. As noted by Wilkie, 
Porfirio Diaz's expenditure on the debt averaged only 30 percent compared with more 
than 50 percent during de la Madrid's years (68 percent in 1987) (1989: 1102).
This explains Salinas's campaign promise of adopting a clearer position on this 
issue than his predecessor: "If we do not grow because of the weight of the debt, we do 
not pay" (Salinas 1988: 110).
Towards a free trade agreement
As with other issues having top priority in the presidential agenda, Carlos Salinas 
did not waste time in facing the debt constraint. In early 1989, the Mexican government 
announced to the IMF its intent to reduce payments on its foreign debt by 60 percent over 
the next three years (see Los Angeles Times 9/3/89: 6; La Jornada 12/4/89: 20-21). The 
international conditions seemed to be on its side, for severe criticism of the Baker Plan 
had been voiced during World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In particular, the 
proposal of an alternate debt plan by president Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela made 
clear that the Baker Plan was no longer acceptable to the developing world. 
Acknowledging the failure of this plan, a new formula was swiftly outlined by US 
Treasury in March 1989. The so-called Brady Plan aimed at reducing the total Third 
World debt by an average of 20 percent through 'debt swaps' and other financial schemes 
(see Wilkie 1989: 1098-1100). Mexico was picked out in 1989 as "the first beneficiary 
of the Brady initiative" (Whitehead in Roett 1991: 256). As under the Baker Plan, the 
country became again a guinea pig.
Because of the agreement reached in February 1990, Mexico's foreign debt was 
reduced from around $100 billion in 1988 to $85.8 in 1990. In addition, it was estimated 
that about $4 billion in debt service would be saved each year fi*om 1990 to 1994 (Pastor 
1990: 4). Although these unimpressive reductions were much lower than expected by the 
government, they allowed some funds to be diverted to investment. Together with the 
debt negotiations and a renewed access to international credit, the whole package of 
economic reforms had the effect of generating confidence. This was reflected by both 
capital repatriation and higher investment which allowed the country to return to positive 
growth, thus reinforcing expectations. In its issue of July 1990, the influential Forbes
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magazine informed investors about the "great economic miracle. . .  [that] will take place 
right on our borders".
Despite this optimistic forecast, the moderate rate of economic growth achieved 
in 1989 (3.1%) had made apparent the insufficiency of both domestic and foreign 
investment to finance Salinas's ambitious economic program m e.It led government to 
pursue alternatives that would "shake up" expectations (Lustig 1992: 56-57).
Until February 1,1990, at least in public, president Salinas did not include a free 
trade agreement with the US in his political agenda as he categorically stated in Davos, 
Switzerland (Borge 1993: 209). Three months later, however, he expressed publicly his 
sympathy for that course of action. In late September, 1990 the US Congress was already 
studying granting president George Bush 'fast track' authority to officially start 
negotiations with Mexico (Grayson 1991: 109). Despite these events, foreign direct 
investment actually declined from $3.1 billion in 1989 to $2.6 billion in 1990, while there 
was only a moderate increase in portfolio investment. This cautious response is mostly 
responsible for the large-scale privatisations announced in 1991 (Castaneda 1993b: 61). 
By the end of 1991, more than 80 percent of the parastate entities that existed in 1982 
were no longer in the hands of the government (Aspe 1993: 31).
Eventually, the combination of the policies discussed so far produced the results 
so eagerly sought by government. Apart from the huge revenues generated by the 
divestiture of public enterprises, Mexico would receive massive inflows of foreign capital 
from 1991 onwards. Despite a slight drop in GDP, it seemed as if the country had 
returned to the path of sustained economic growth abandoned in 1982, and even better 
with declining levels of inflation. The picture was, of course, more complex.
Four facts made the country's economic prospects particularly worrisome. First, 
the current account deficit in 1991 reached alarming levels (see table 6.2). Second, the 
impressive amounts of foreign investment were mostly in the form of short-term portfolio 
investment. Third, because the Pact was "anchored" in the exchange rate, the possible 
overvaluation of the peso was neglected (see Carstens and Schwartz in Serrano and 
Bulmer-Thomas 1996). Fourth, the steady decline of public investment in basic industries 
still in public ownership severely handicapped their operation, thus affecting the whole
"The National Development Plan 1989-1994, for instance, had forecast annual rates o f  GDP 
ranging from 5.3 to 6.0 percent in the period 1992-1994 (Plan 1989: 139).
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development strategy.’^  These factors would have important economic and political 
consequences in the years to come.
6.2 ECONOMIC POLICY AND BUREAUCRACY
Though president Salinas did not begin his term announcing spectacular reforms 
to the public sector in the manner of his two predecessors, he affected the operation of 
this sector in a significant way. This was the result of several factors of which two of 
them need to be underlined: higher concentration of power in the presidency and the 
institutionalisation of the Pact's operative arrangement. The creation of the presidency's 
Oficina de Coordinacion in December 1992, a usually neglected reform, is the best 
physical evidence of the two developments, and also of the link between them. After 
exploring the manner in which the Economic Cabinet was staffed, this section discusses 
the impact of both centralisation of decision making and institutional change on the 
existing distribution of institutional resources within this cabinet, and on the status of its 
constituent parts.
The 'SPP-Salinas cluster* and the Economic Cabinet
According to Camp, the "most notable feature of Salinas's collaborators is the 
diversity of their camarilla affiliations" (1990: 101). The fact that more than half of the 
cabinet appointees did not belong to Salinas's inner circle, however, should not obscure 
two more relevant fac ts .F irs t, about 37 percent of the ministries were given to key 
members of Salinas's camarilla. Second, by and large, they received the most important 
cabinet positions. Before going further, some comments on the Salinas camarilla are in 
order. Table 6.3 shows the members of his cluster, while suggesting the importance that 
the institutional setting had in shaping the composition of this camarilla. As was argued 
regarding those of Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid, the institutionally-grounded character 
of Salinas’s inner circle was associated with its developing within the economic-policy 
network.
For instance, because o f production constraints due to anemic investment since 1982, PEMEX 
could only increase its daily oil production 12.3 percent in late 1990, thus missing the opportunity provided 
by the invasion o f Kuwait (Grayson 1991: 110).
This percentage excludes the heads o f the military posts and Manuel Bartlett (SEP), who was 
associated with the 'SPP-De la Madrid' cluster, but includes the president o f  PRI (7 posts out o f 19).
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The same figure reveals that, more clearly than in the case of de la Madrid's 
camarilla, Salinas's was made up almost entirely of his associates at the SPP. These 
individuals becoming synonymous with the former cluster was the result of Salinas's long 
stay within this agency in combination with his extensive appointment powers as 
discussed in the previous chapter. These facts account for the relative cohesiveness and 
homogeneity of the 'SPP-Salinas cluster', as the Salinas camarilla will be called. As 
stressed by Camp (1990), members of various political groups were ratified in their posts 
or allowed to join the cabinet. Nevertheless, the real 'president's men' were those drawn 
almost exclusively from the cluster aforementioned. The way the Economic Cabinet was 
staffed illustrates our point. In this regard, four appointments deserve special attention.
TABLE 6.3 Salinas's institutional camarilla, 1977-1988
(Individuals who worked with Salinas at different stages^)
SHCP SPP lEPES SPP') Key post in the Salinas
1977-79 1979-81 1981-82 1982-88 Administration
Rogelio Montemayor Y Y Y Y E,G
Olga Elena Peha Martinez Y Y Y Y P
Ernesto Senties Hoyos Y Y Y Y P
Sôcrates Rizzo Garcia Y Y Y? Y E,G
Carlos Altamirano Toledo Y Y Y? Y L
Luis Raùl Dominguez Terrazas Y Y N Y M
Humberto de Jesus M olina M. Y Y N Y M
Javier Castillo Ayala Y Y N Y M
Aarôn Dychter Poltolarek Y Y N Y L
Amalia Lucila Adame Nifio Y Y N N N
Juân Mariano Acotzin Vidal Y Y N N S
Maria Elena Vazquez Nava Y? Y N Y c
Marco Antonio Bernal N Y Y Y M
Manuel Camacho Solis N Y Y Y C
José Cordoba M ontoya N Y Y Y P
Manuel Cavazos Lerma N Y Y N E,G
Luis Donaldo Colosio N Y N Y E,C
José Bernardo Gômez Palacio G. N Y N Y L
Maria de los Angeles Moreno N N Y Y C,E
Pedro Aspe Armella N N Y Y C
Bruno Kiehle Mutzenbeche N N Y Y M
Rubén Valdez Abascal N N Y Y P
Patricio Chirinos Calero N N N Y C,G
Otto Granados Roldan N N N Y P,G
Y= Yes N= No
P= Offices o f  the Presidency E= Elective posts (mayor, diputy, senator)
C= Cabinet post G= Governor
M= High-rank post at the executive branch S= Position at the state level
L= Director General at the executive branch ?= Not totally clear from the source
For the posts held at the SPP, see appendix 2,
Source: SPP 1 and SPP 2; Diccionario Biogràfico (1984,1992); Plan Basico (n.d.: inner cover).
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José Cordoba Montoya, a Salinas collaborator at the SPP since 1979, was 
appointed head of the presidency's Oficina de Coordinacion. This new office replaced 
both the Directorate of the Technical Cabinet Secretariat and the Committee of Economic 
Advisors created during the de la Madrid administration. From this obscure office and 
with the president's consent, Cordoba would emerge as an extremely influential 
bureaucratic actor. In retrospect, it seems clear that Salinas himself did favour the 
emergence of a strong intermediary unit between the presidency and the ministries. But, 
what for? An earlier piece of writing by Salinas sheds some light on this question: "It is 
essential that. . .  economic policy considers suitable mechanisms that will guarantee not 
only . . .  the efficient implementation of programmes, but also strict control o f  the 
institutions and persons in charge of carrying them out" (in Aspe and Sigmund 1984: 
538, the emphasis is ours).’"*
Pedro Aspe, another member of the 'SPP-Salinas cluster', was appointed finance 
minister. SPP's under-secretary between 1985 and 1987, Aspe had replaced Salinas after 
the 'unveiling'. By far, Aspe's major achievement as head of the SPP was his participation 
in the design and implementation of the PSE. This fact enlarged his stature and prestige. 
Aspe was linked to Cordoba for three reasons. First, the reshuffle that the struggles 
between Silva-Herzog and Salinas caused inside the SPP in 1985 had the effect of 
strengthening their status and power within Salinas's inner circle. It was only logical, 
considering that their economic advice had played a fimdamental role in Salinas's 
survival. Second, both of them were the most committed to the restructuring of the 
Mexican economy within the SPP. Their contributions to Salinas's economic policy 
proposals since the 1986 cabinet crisis are not difficult to find (see Aspe 1992; Cordoba 
Montoya 1987).
Finally, they shared the same basic connections with the influential bureaucratic 
financial network outside the SPP. This network, called Advisory Cluster from here 
onwards, was a new phenomenon in Mexican politics. Figure 6.2 attempts to identify the 
most notable members of this c luster.M iguel Mancera, Gustavo Petricioli, and 
Leopoldo Solis, three old fiiends of de la Madrid, made up the core of this cluster. Their
‘'’It is worth noting that the new role o f  Côrdoba resembled that he had played within the SPP 
between 1983 and 1985 as Salinas's chief economic advisor.
Much o f the analysis that follows is based on data from the Dicccionario Biogràfico (1992),
FIGURE 6.2 Advisory Cluster, 1958-1994 
(Main academic and institutional links)
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friendship had started in the corridors of the Bank of Mexico, and had been cemented 
throughout de la Madrid's long stay at the SHCP. Two key elements linked the careers 
of economists Mancera, Petricioli, and Solis, namely their being Yale postgraduates and 
their association with the Bank of Mexico. During the Echeverria presidency, the three 
of them had already reached key middle-rank positions within the government's financial 
network.
Petricioli, an ITAM graduate, was SHCP income under-secretary from 1970 to 
1974; while Mancera, also an ITAM graduate, became the second in command at the 
Bank of Mexico in 1973. Leopoldo Solis worked as head of the directorate of economic 
and social programming at the Secretana de la Presidencia from 1971 to 1975. Little by 
little, new members joined this exclusive cluster. For instance, Solis brought Francisco 
Gil Diaz (ITAM) from the central bank and recruited economist Ernesto Zedillo (IPN) 
in 1971. While being manager at the Bank of Mexico, Gil Diaz, who was under the 
command of Mancera, recruited Cordoba Montoya in 1978.
The Advisory Cluster gained momentum during de la Madrid's years. To begin 
with, in early December 1982 president de la Madrid re-appointed Mancera as head of 
the bank of Mexico, while appointing Petricioli as head of the influential NAFINSA. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the mid-term economic problems, including the 
tensions between Silva-Herzog and Salinas, are responsible for Solis becoming de la 
Madrid's chief economic advisor between 1985 and 1988. The arrival of Petricioli at the 
SHCP in mid-1986 in place of Silva-Herzog suggests the notable influence already 
enjoyed by this cluster. At a less visible level, Aspe's connections with this cluster had 
played a decisive role in his joining the Salinas's lEPES team in 1981, and in his 1985 
and 1987 promotions.
The same connections were also associated with the arrival of Ernesto Zedillo at 
the SPP, and his meteoric promotion as head of this ministry in December 1988. Strictly 
speaking, he did not belong to the Salinas-SPP cluster. Zedillo not only held exactly the 
same posts than Aspe within the SPP (excluding INEGl), but twice in a row the latter 
secured his promotion. Following Aspe becoming head of the SPP in October 1987, 
Zedillo was brought from FICORCA to occupy the under-secretariat left by Aspe. Some 
antecedents clarify this move. Zedillo's career was closely associated with the heads of 
the Advisory Cluster, namely Leopoldo Solis and Miguel Mancera Aguayo (see figure
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6,1). After finishing his Phd courses at Yale in 1978, Zedillo joined the Bank of Mexico. 
In 1983, both Solis and Mancera proposed Zedillo to president de la Madrid as candidate 
to head FICORCA (Ayala 1995: 32).
The importance reached by this trust is illustrated by the following fact: The 1986 
rescue financial package included the refinancing of $11 billion in private sector debt, 
thus covering the FICORCA's loans (Duran in Philip 1988: 103). The close institutional 
relations between the SPP and FICORCA favoured the emergence of a strong friendship 
between Zedillo and Cordoba.'^ As with Aspe earlier, Cordoba played a fundamental role 
in introducing Zedillo deep into the Salinas' inner circle, thus strengthening his own 
position within it. It has been contended that, with Cordoba's support, Zedillo was 
candidate Salinas's personal representative during the first stages of the PSE (Ayala 1995: 
37).
Finally, Salinas appointed Jaime Serra Puche, the only SHCP official to become 
minister during the Salinas years'^, as head of SECOFI (Commerce and Industrial 
Promotion). He complemented the nucleus of Salinas's young, highly cohesive, and 
ideologically homogeneous Economic Cabinet.'* Unlike Cordoba and Aspe, Serra Puche 
was not a member of the 'SPP-Salinas cluster'. Moreover, he had never worked for the 
SPP. His ascending career is mostly explained by his connections with both the Advisory 
Cluster and some members of the 'SPP-Salinas cluster' (see figure 6.2). It is worth noting 
that when Petricioli became head of the SHCP, he promoted Serra Puche to the post of 
income under-secretaiy despite his having been Silva-Herzog's economic advisor between 
1982 and 1986.
Division of labour within the Economic Cabinet
The way the PSE was implemented from December 1987 is responsible for 
significant changes in the economic policy-making process. To begin with, it brought to 
a sudden end the system of cabinet agreements, usually based on behind-the-scenes 
political alliances, in operation since 1977. In addition, the PSE operation had an
According to Ayala (1995:32), the latter helped the former finish his PhD thesis in this period.
In the de la Madrid first Cabinet the SHCP personnel got two posts, namely the SHCP (Silva- 
Herzog) and Tourism (Savignac).
The exception was seventy-five-years-old Fernando Hiriart, another non-member o f the SPP- 
Salinas cluster', whose ratification as head of SEMIP (Energy, Mines and Parastate Industry) further 
confirmed the steady decline o f this agency since 1983.
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important impact on the operation of the Economic Cabinet. Salinas's intitutionalisation 
of the PSE modus operandi gave those changes a permanent, formal character. After the 
fall of Silva-Herzog in mid-1986, the SPP became dominant in economic policy-making 
for the first time since its inception. This institutional dominance was assured by the 
SPP's guidance role in designing the PSE, and in gathering consensus around the new 
stabilisation programme. Moreover, the SPP was also charged with its implementation 
and periodic evaluation (see Aspe 1993: 20-27).
Three combined factors inhibited the emergence of strong bureaucratic opposition 
against this unprecedented concentration of power, namely its informal nature (no legal 
changes were carried out), the forthcoming presidential transition, and the total support 
given to the SPP minister by both president de la Madrid and candidate Salinas.
Without doubt, the most notable feature of the PSE modus operandi was its 
tripartite nature that brought together SPP officials, business, and unions and peasants 
representatives at the same negotiation table (Roxborough 1992: 659-660). It implied an 
important shift in the way government had traditionally dealt with both its corporative 
support bases and the private sector. First, the PSE brought to an end the informal 
(usually secret) character of these relationships. Second, the economic-policy network not 
only continued being the main liaison between government and the business community, 
but became involved in the bargaining process with the system's corporative machinery. 
In the past, this process mostly involved the PRI, and three federal ministries: 
Gohernacion, Labour, and Agrarian Reform. This two-fold arrangement allowed 
presidents since Cardenas to lean on either sector for political support as required.
Bringing the organised labour and peasantry, two of the three PRI major pillars, 
into the virtually day-to-day Pact negotiations had noteworthy political implications. 
First, it changed their traditional political role, which had mostly been limited to political 
control (e.g., strike prevention) and electoral functions. Second, these corporative 
structures being brought closer to the sphere of influence of economic agencies weakened 
not only the relative unity and autonomy of the network for political control, but also the 
authority of Gobernacion and the PRI within this network. Something similar can be said 
regarding the Labour Ministry, another key actor within the PSE operative apparatus. 
Third, the deliberate exclusion of political criteria from the Pact negotiations led to the 
gradual technocratisation of the decision making process. Four, the visible involvement
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of the unions, grouped under the umbrella of the Congreso del Trabajo, in bringing 
inflation down made more apparent than ever their traditionally camouflaged role in 
controlling wages. It appears to be clear that these developments reduced the PRI unions' 
electoral power in the 1988 elections.
Figure 6.3 shows the PSE original institutional arrangement, and is useful to 
discuss the two major changes introduced by president Salinas. First, the Oficina de 
Coordinacwn came to replace the Committee of Economic Advisors. Its emergence 
represented the peak of a process of growing presidential involvement in economic policy 
making that began in 1970 (see Ibarra and Alberro 1989: 159). President de la Madrid 
allowed Leopoldo Solis, the head of that committee, to play an influential advisory role 
to the presidency between 1985 and 1988. However, Salinas went much further by 
permitting Cordoba to exercise extensive executive power on his behalf. Though this 
situation increased presidential control over the economic policy-making, it had a 
significant consequence. Because of his unrestricted access to the president, his holding 
a supra-ministerial position, and his extensive de facto and de jure powers, Cordoba came 
to be "known as the second most powerful man in Mexico" (Centeno 1994: 96, see also 
Ortuzar's article in Proceso 1064,23/3/97).
Second, the SHCP came to replace the SPP in the arrangement. This was the 
result of Salinas's decisions of appointing Aspe as head of SHCP'^ and charging him with 
exactly the same responsibility in the implementation of the PECE he had had as SPP 
minister. One question arises: Why was Aspe moved to the SHCP when the PSE had 
been successfully implemented within the SPP setting? Two plausible explanations are 
possible: (a) In a context of radical pro-market reform, the finance minister offered a 
more suitable home for the forthcoming PECE; (b) the institutional links between the 
SPP and the fledgling PRONASOL would have made it difficult to insulate the Pact 
negotiations from social and political pressures. In any event, Aspe's appointment would 
have the effect of displacing for good the locus of macro-economic management from the 
SPP to the SHCP. Although within the new context, Aspe emerged as a powerful finance 
minister, his action was still greatly dependent on Cordoba's sanction.
’’Gustavo Petricioli, the outgoing finance minister, was appointed Ambassador to the United States 
in December 1988.
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FIGURE 6.3 The Economie Solidarity Pact (PSE), December 1987-November 1988 
(Institutional arrangements and authority lines)
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The rest of the arrangement under discussion remained unaltered. Significantly, 
president Salinas ratified both Arsenio Pareil (Labour) and Mancera (Bank of Mexico), 
two key actors associated with the Pact, in the same posts they held since 1982?° These 
appointments, including that of Aspe, are the best evidence of both the smoothness of the 
presidential transition and the wish to maintain the same economic-policy course. They 
also exhibited the high degree of influence candidate Salinas had had over the policy­
making process through his indirect control over the PSE. On the whole, the latter 
exhibited a crucial paradox: To stabilise and modernise the Mexican economy, 
government had little option but to made extensive use of the old, state-coopted, 
patronage-based, undemocratic labour organisations. The relationship that developed 
between Pedro Aspe and Fidel Velazquez because of the PSE, illustrates the symbiosis 
of these antagonist forces.
6.3 PRONASOL: TARGETING THE POOREST
Soon after his inauguration, president Salinas set in motion the Programa 
Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) under the umbrella of the SPP. This programme 
was designed to improve the living conditions of the rural and urban poor and their access 
to basic services. In this way, government attempted to address the negative social effects 
of austerity. From its inception, however, it became increasingly apparent that 
PRONASOL was more than just a poverty alleviation strategy. Its complexity stemmed 
from this programme's multi-dimensional character. Functionally, two key features 
characterised PRONASOL: its direct control by the president and its insulation from 
economic policy-making. Drawing a clear-cut dividing line between economic and 
political management suggested Salinas's intention of modernising presidential centralism 
along similar pre-1976 lines.
PRONASOL: An all-encompassing, multi-dimensional programme
Less than two months before the elections, candidate Salinas sketched his social 
policy in a speech pronounced in Chaleo, a shanty town of about one million people on 
the periphery of Mexico City (Salinas 1988: 73-90). In his inaugural speech, he not only
A similar phenomenon happened during the 'desarrollo estabilizador' era when Antonio Ortiz 
Mena (Finance), Salomôn Gonzalez Blanco (Labour), and Rodrigo Gômez (central bank) served under 
presidents Lôpez Mateos (1958-1964) and Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970).
228
reiterated his promise of reducing "extreme inequalities" through "a frontal attack to 
poverty", but announced the birth of PRONASOL (see La Jornada 2/12/88). Numerous 
scholars have argued that this programme was Salinas's response to the legitimacy crisis 
caused by the 1980s economic crisis and the shift to a market-orientated economy (e.g., 
Cornelius et al. 1994; Guevara in Serrano and Bulmer Thomas 1996). Officially, 
PRONASOL was aimed at benefitting not only specific groups that had been or were hurt 
by structural adjustment, but "17 million Mexicans living in extreme poverty" (Dresser 
1991: 1).
From this perspective, Salinas's ambitious social programme can be regarded as 
a member of the family of'compensatory' programmes implemented at the time in many 
other developing countries (see Graham in Cornelius et al. 1994). These programmes had 
the purpose of facing the strongest critique against neoliberal stabilisation strategies, 
namely their scant concern for the high social costs involved. PRONASOL's palliative 
nature, however, should be considered as one of its many facets.
Strictly speaking, PRONASOL was not a single, well-articulated programme on 
its own. It is better characterised as an 'umbrella' concept containing dozens of 
heterogeneous programmes categorised under the subheadings 'social welfare', 
'production', 'regional development', and 'special'.^' It is worth noting that most of these 
specific programmes were not totally new (see Bailey and Boone in Cornelius et al. 
1994). For this reason, it could be argued that the real innovation was bringing them 
together under the same institutional roof, while allowing for the creation of new 
programmes. Not surprisingly, PRONASOL's all-encompassing character and multiple 
objectives have generated considerable confusion and skepticism about its true objectives 
(Cornelius et al. 1994: 3).
A critical feature of PRONASOL is its partisan-political dimension. It is hard to 
deny that reversing the PRD victories became a part of the programme's political agenda 
(Dresser 1991). However, to conclude that PRONASOL emerged as a response to the PRI
For example, the specific programmes o f PRONASOL dealt with matters ranging from 
urbanisation to education; from welfare to ecology; from staple food production to small-scale mining; from 
federal to local public services. Their recipients included unions, peasants, retired teachers, children, 
Mexicans working in the United States, women, and even prisoners. For a detailed description o f each of 
these programmes, see PRONASOL (1994: 165-208).
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electoral setback in July 1988 is an oversimplification.^^ At this point, the origins of the 
programme comes into picture. As put by Pedro Aspe, Salinas's 1978 doctoral 
dissertation at Harvard "is the seed" of what came to be PRONASOL (interviewed by 
Borge 1993: 135). More important, it gave it its core conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings. In brief, Salinas's dissertation explores the relationship between public 
spending and political support to the political system in the Mexican context (quoted by 
Borge 1993: 125-138). It finds that higher investment in rural programmes does not lead 
necessarily to higher support. As result, some changes are suggested to make the formula 
work. They include less bureaucratic red tape, higher decentralisation of decision making, 
and greater popular participation. A special breed of public officials, 'extension agents' 
as Salinas called them, was key in "stimulating" the recipients' participation in the 
programmes and their support for the regime.
Salinas's arrival at the SPP in 1979 gave him a unique opportunity to put his thesis 
about "how to buy political support" to the test. For this ministry was responsible for 
allocating public funds and designing investment programmes. Various factors favoured 
Salinas's building and operating a powerful regional support machinery along the lines 
of his PhD dissertation. Apart from his long stay within the SPP, they include this 
ministry's extensive powers over regional development and its financing, president de la 
Madrid's emphasis on decentralisation^^, the electoral advances of the rightist PAN at 
local level, and the context of forced austerity since 1982. Understandably, this 
machinery's ultimate political goals was carefully camouflaged behind modernising 
concepts such as 'social and rural development' and 'regional development'. '^* In any event, 
it could plausibly be argued that while Salinas's dissertation gave PRONASOL its 
theoretical foundations, the SPP institutional setting gave the programme a decisive 
finishing touch to its operative mechanisms and eventual objectives.
During de la Madrid's presidency, the SPP's rapidly growing regional machinery 
was extensively used with electoral purposes, with two main results. On aggregate levels.
This view was suggested not only by some opposition leaders, but also by some scholars. See, 
for example, Alvarez and Mendoza (1993:33), Castafieda (1993b: 60), and Santiago (in Castro 1993: 146).
^^ An interesting analysis o f the links between De la Madrid's decentralization policies and Salinas's 
SOLIDARIDAD can be found in V. Rodriguez (1993).
In 1984, for instance, minister Salinas published an article in English entitled "Production and 
Participation in Rural Areas" (in Aspe and Sigmund 1984). Although it was a summary o f his PhD thesis, 
he avoided using the term "support to the system" in the title as in the original document.
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its success in gaining votes for the PRI proved marginal. Paradoxically enough, this 
machinery proved highly effective in winning more targeted elections.^  ^The nature of the 
patron-client relationships encouraged by a more selective allocation of financial 
resources may explain these paradoxical outcomes. In simpler words, while failing to 
bring support to the regime, the SPP patronage machinery proved highly efficient in 
enhancing the political prestige of individual bureaucratic patrons. This fact would be 
fully exploited by Salinas after his appalling electoral performance. Apart from 
explaining his becoming PRONASOL's first and more active 'extension agent', it sheds 
light on the cosmetically improved clientelistic facet of the programme.
Beyond doubt, the most important innovative elements of PRONASOL are related 
not to its 'compensatory' goals, but to the proposed structures and mechanisms to achieve 
them. No programme gave Salinas a better chance to fully put into practice his doctoral 
contents-free, implementation model, and he did so with few adjustments. According to 
this model, successful programmes required: (i) bypassing traditional mechanisms of 
representation; (ii) being aware that if a programme is "introduced late or incompletely 
. . .  the results will be counterproductive in terms of [political] support"; and (iii) 
decentralising "the disbursement of funds" to a group of "receptive" development 
administrators (Salinas in Aspe and Sigmund 1984: 536-538).
In addition, a key ingredient of the model was granting the direct beneficiaries of 
the programme a more active role in its design, execution, and supervision. Consonant 
with this idea PRONASOL introduced important innovations such as respect for local 
initiatives, active grassroots participation in the projects, and the notion of co­
responsibility (Mendez 1994: 191). The unprecedented leverage of PRONASOL's 
recipients in their dealings with the state added more complex political and even 
ideological facets to the programme.
An equally critical characteristic of Salinas's social strategy was its deliberate 
insulation from his aggressive neoliberal programme. The operation of the PSE 
throughout 1988 had made increasingly apparent the difficulties in harmonizing 
economic reform with 'social justice'. Sharply put, the pact formula proved more 
successful in controlling wages than in controlling prices (Roxborough 1992: 660).
A good example is provided by ex-SPP official Luis Donaldo Colosio's indisputable victories 
as federal deputy in 1985, and as a senator in 1988.
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Including selected subsidies and price controls to protect the poorest within the same list 
of economic goals not only did not prevent the further decline of their living standards, 
but also hampered the process of structural adjustment. Thus, the insulation of the latter 
process from social pressures became a prerequisite for achieving "a healthy and strong 
economy", Salinas's real top priority.
This separation was carried out by renaming the PSE, and borrowing the word 
solidarity from its title to christen the fledgling social programme. It would imply the 
emergence of two parallel policy processes, and also two bureaucratic structures. 
Interesting enough, they both had been already developed within the SPP as it will be 
discussed later.
PRONASOL in action
Nowhere was Salinas's personal governing style clearer than in the way he 
administered PRONASOL. It is illustrated by the central role he granted himself in its 
execution and supervision. Salinas's poor performance in the 1988 elections played a 
significant role in this decision as well as in raising the profile of the programme in the 
future president's eyes. In early December 1988, the National Commission of 
PRONASOL was created (DOF 6/12/88). This commission was headed by the president 
and composed of selected ministers and directors of welfare agencies: Its decisions were 
to be implemented by a general-coordinator appointed by the president (see Guevara in 
Serrano and Bulmer Thomas 1996:156-157). Still, PRONASOL was formally considered 
as a part of the SPP. From the very beginning, however, president Salinas centralised A  
facto the top decision making by actively participating in the process. In addition, he 
became the programme's "most visible and tireless advocate, spending nearly every 
weekend visiting urban neighborhoods and rural communities were Solidarity projects 
were under way" (Cornelius et al. 1994: 8, the stress is ours).
The so-called Comités de Solidaridad represented the bottom of the 
PRONASOL's structure. These committees were made up by democratically-elected 
representatives of the projects' recipients. On paper at least, PRONASOL did not require 
the creation of "bureaucratic apparatuses". For they would be provided by the existing 
SPP's Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional and its state-based network. Salinas's 
deliberate attempt to keep "traditional bureaucracies" at arm's length from PRONASOL 
deserves special attention. One of the conclusions of Salinas's PhD dissertation was that
2 3 2
the red-tape, waste, inefficience, and corruption associated with these bureaucracies were 
mostly responsible for programme failure. Therefore, they should be replaced by non- 
bureaucratic, programme-committed promoters.
Apart from great presidential involvement, the lack of visible, well-defined 
intermediary bureaucratic structures put Salinas virtually in a direct line with the 
programme's beneficiaries. It allowed him to profit, in an unprecedented way since the 
Cardenas's years, from "the patron-client relationship that traditionally has linked the 
most successful Presidents to their countrymen" (Grayson 1991: 136).
As shown in figure 6.4, PRONASOL's budget rose impressively.^^ In US dollars, 
it was estimated that this budget increased from $680 million in 1989 to $2.1 billion in 
1992 (Dresser in Cornelius et al. 1994: 149). Nothing illustrates better the growing 
importance of the programme in the presidential agenda. Partly as a result, government's 
total social spending grew, though less impressively. For example, expenditures for 
health, education, and social security rose from 14.9 percent of the federal budget in 1988 
to 26.5 percent in 1991 (Centeno 1994: 207). In any event, Salinas was able to reverse 
the downward trend in social spending since the late 1970s.^  ^PRONASOL grew not only 
in budgetary terms, but also in the number of specific programmes under its sphere of 
action.
FIGURE 6.4 PRONASOL Expenditure, 1989-1992
Expenditure
(Thousands o f millions o f pesos)
6,800  6 ,992.1
6,000
5 117.4 5,185
4 ,0 0 0 3 ,667.4
2 ,629.2
2,000 1,645.9
1,333.1
1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2
Y ear
I □  Projected ■  Actual 
Data source: PRONASOL (1994: Cuadro A2)
is w orth noting that the 'um brella ' character o f  the program m e also gave its im plem entors 
control "over an unquantifiable percentage o f  o ther agencies' budgets" (C enteno  1994: 65-66).
For statistics from 1972 to 1988, see (W ard in C ornelius et. al. 1994: 51).
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Moreover, its reputed efficiency in dealing with the poverty problem was further 
overemphasized by both the president's discourse and an extensive publicity campaign. 
Even the visit of pope John Paul II in May 1990 to Mexico, an overwhelmingly Catholic 
country, would be shrewdly used by the Salinas administration to legitimize PRONASOL 
(Grayson 1991: 136).
In his third annual address to Nation, president Salinas reported that between 1989 
and 1991 more than 150, 000 projects had been carried by the already 64,000 Comités de 
Solidaridad. This meant, according to him, that 6 million people had been incorporated 
into health services, eight million had got access to drinking water while eleven million 
in 10,000 communities to electricity, among other impressive material outputs. Whether 
we believe these figures or not, the achievements of PRONASOL as a 'compensatory' 
programme are difficult to deny. Many factors explain its success. They include the fact 
that the programme provided "smaller amounts of benefits through more targeted 
mechanisms" (Bailey in Cornelius et al. 1994: 99), higher participation of the local 
communities, and lower levels of red-tape and corruption. However, the operation of the 
programme also made apparent its other not less significant facets.
There is agreement in that PRONASOL funds were frequently allocated using 
primarily political and/or partisan criteria with the ultimate goal of marginalising 
opposition.^* In not a few cases, these funds were used to build or reinforce patron-client 
relationships involving mostly members of the Salinas's inner circle. In Nuevo Leon, for 
instance, the prime beneficiary of the programme was Monterrey Mayor Socrates Rizzo 
(1986-1991), who was subsequently elected governor of Nuevo Leon (Bailey in Cornelius 
et al. 1994: 112). In other cases, the objective was almost exclusively winning votes for 
the PRI. Two successful examples are the Alvaro Obregon District of Mexico City and 
the state of Michoacan as a result of the 1991 congressional elections and the 1992 
gubernatorial elections respectively (Dresser in Cornelius er a/. 1994:155-156,158-159). 
In some other cases, the aim was to co-opt independent civil organisations for electoral 
and/or political control purposes (e.g., COCEI in the state of Oaxaca). It appears clear 
that the 'umbrella' character of PRONASOL played a significant role in achieving 
simultaneously such contrasting objectives.
See, inter alia. Dresser (1991), Alvarez and Mendoza (1993), Castafieda (1993b), Centeno
( 1994).
234
Figure 6.4 shows that government was, by and large, able to keep PRONASOL 
spending to its authorised levels. It was especially significant in 1991 because of this 
year's mid-term congressional elections. Apart from substantial budget increases, a better 
coordination between the SHCP and the SPP and more efficient spending controls 
account for this fact. The funding process of PRONASOL involved three main stages. 
First, the SPP set the budget 'roofs' for the programme and its specific projects following 
the economic guidelines determined by the PECE. Second, the discussion of these 'roofs' 
was normally excluded from the negotiations over resource allocation between 
PRONASOL officials and the states and municipalities. Third, the SPP, under SHCP 
supervision, exercised strict controls over spending, and did the periodic audit of the 
corresponding accounts.
The process described suggests a clear-cut division between economic and 
political management within the SPP. As will be discussed next, the institutional 
arrangements underpinning this division of labour shed enormous light on the decline of 
this ministry and its eventual end.
6.4 SPELLING OUT THE CAUSES OF THE SPP DECLINE
As suggested above, many factors contributed to the rapid decline of the SPP from 
December 1988. Clarifying their role and importance is the unique purpose of this closing 
section. Salinas's campaign phrase "growth without inflation and with equity" gives the 
best summary of his economic strategy as president (Salinas 1988:107). As things turned 
out, the SPP played a modest role in achieving each of those broad goals. It is argued here 
that the immediate causes of this phenomenon had more to do with a combination of 
random political and institutional factors than with Salinas's deliberate programme of 
structural adjustment. They include a significant redistribution of institutional resources 
within the executive branch which was largely intended by a process oriented to reinforce 
presidential power even further.
SPP’s internal poliey-networks
Neither the rise nor the decline of the SPP can be fully understood without 
considering a significant, though often neglected, internal development. Because of the 
1976 administrative reform, the SPP was legally engaged in critical policy areas from its
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inception. This fact triggered an internal process of "fragmentation between the technical 
and political bases for public policies" (Desveaux 1994: 32), which would have important 
organisational consequences. Gradually, two distinctive, parallel bureaucratic 
machineries began to develop within the SPP. On the one hand, the 'planning/budgeting' 
apparatus was composed of the SPP technical areas, and dealt with the on-the-desk 
elaboration of budgets, statistics, and macro-economic analyses. On the other hand, the 
‘regional development' network was in charge of the more pragmatic relations and 
negotiations with governors, mayors, PRI officials, and local interest groups.
Table 6.4 provides empirical evidence of marked differences in the educational 
and bureaucratic backgrounds of the personnel associated with these bureaucratic 
machineries in the period 1982-1992. It is clear from there that, as compared with the 
'planning/budgeting' apparatus, the 'regional development' network recruited or promoted 
more UN AM graduates, more engineers, and less highly-trained economic experts. 
Another feature is their weak connection with the finance ministry and a stronger link 
with the PRI. Finally, the same table reveals that, unlike their counterparts, many of them 
occupied high-rank positions at PRI and/or electoral posts after leaving the SPP. These 
findings suggest the importance of specialisation in the integration of SPP elites.^^
The strategic role played by each machinery under discussion is at the heart of the 
SPP's ever-growing political success since 1979. Ironically, the dramatic impact that this 
bifurcated institutional setting had on its personnel, together with the arrival of the 'SPP- 
Salinas cluster' at power in December 1988, would eventually conspire against the two 
key power pillars of the SPP. A closer look at Salinas's originally technical camarilla 
clarifies how these developments took place.
In 1979, Salinas and his team of economic experts arrived at the SPP's most 
critical unit: the DGPEyS. The extensive powers of this think-tank gave its members the 
opportunity to become involved in most SPP policies, including regional development.^® 
Salinas's appointment as head of the SPP in December 1982 speeded up this embryonic 
process of functional differentiation. The same effect had the recruitment of more
Lawyer Eduardo Pesqueira, head of the Coordinacwn de Delegaciones between 1979 and 1982, 
provides an early example. An SHCP official for 14 years, and even Mexican representative to the World 
Bank (1977-78), Pesqueira became General Director o f BANRURAL (1982-84) and head o f the SARH 
(1984-88), two agencies with a strong regional involvement.
During this period, for instance, Salinas appointed Côrdoba as Regional Planning Director, and 
later recruited Luis Donaldo Colosio, an expert on regional development (see Proceso 632, 12/12/88: 24),
236
TABLE 6.4 Profile of the SPP high-rank personnel by speciality, 1982-1992
(Percentages o f selected samples)
Planning/Budgeting Regional Development
(N=40) (N=37)
Place o f  birth
Mexico City 57 59
First degree
UN AM 30 64
IPN 17 0
State universities 17 9
ITAM 13 9
ITESM 13 4
Other 10 14
Profession
Economics 67 41
Engineering 13 32
Accounting 10 0
Law 10 4
Other 0 23
Post-graduate studies
Yes 73 60
Master's degree (economics) 53 (50) 55 (9)
PhD (economics) 47 (40) 28 (9)
Post-graduate studies in the US
Master's degree 70 33
PhD 100 40
SHCP background
In the SHCP at any time
before joining the SPP 67 14
SHCP dominant in career 20 0
First post in the SHCP 30 4
In SHCP before Joining the SPP 60 0
Political activity
Posts in PRI before SPP 27 54
Electoral posts before SPP 0 0
High-rank posts in PRI after SPP 10 39
Electoral posts after SPP
(excluding the presidency) 10 27
The 'Planning-Budgeting' sample includes personnel who held the post o f director de ârea or 
higher in the following under-secretaries: planning, budget control and accountancy, and programming and 
budgeting for the industrial and service sectors. The 'Regional Development' sample comprises personnel 
o f the same levels in the following under-secretaries: regional development and social programming and 
budgeting.
Source: SPP 1 and SPP 2 (see Appendix 2).
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politically-orientated individuals to staff the 'regional development' network.^* This 
phenomenon, which would eventually split Salinas's relatively compact camarilla into 
two groups, gives many insights into the role played by the 'SPP-Salinas cluster' during 
the de la Madrid administration, and beyond.
In the period 1983-1988, internal structural reform greatly encouraged not only 
the SPP dual organisation, but the development of a nationwide, bureaucratic machinery 
for 'regional development'. One early indication of minister Salinas's plans is provided 
by transferring the Direccion General de Programacion y  Presupuesto Regional 
(DGPyPR) from the 'planning/budgeting' apparatus to the Subsecretaria de Desarrollo 
Regional in early 1983. The new location of the unit in charge of funding regional 
programmes gave its hosting network relative financial autonomy. In addition, it would 
have the effect of politicking an originally technical area. This phenomenon is clearly 
illustrated by the future career of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the head of the DGPyPR under 
the new arrangement. In May 1985, he was selected PRI deputy candidate, and later 
President of the Commission for Programming and Budget of the Chamber of Deputies^^ 
(see table 6.5 below).
Between 1983 and 1986, under-secretary Manuel Camacho emerged as the 
indisputable leader of the ‘regional development' network. Furthermore, as he told the 
author, "because of my role in the president's trips around the country, I became in 
practice a sort of coordinator of under-secretaries within the SPP . . . "  (interview, 
London, 1/12/95). Two facts, however, would substantially change this picture: the 1985 
internal reshuffles within the 'planning/budgeting' apparatus and Camacho's appointment 
as head of SEDUE in February 1986.^^
The way these two key issues were dealt with had the effect of widening the gap 
between the technical and political machineries of the SPP. On the one hand, the
Apart from Maria de les Angeles Moreno, they include former PRI and Labour official Patricio 
Chirinos, and Gobernacion official Alejandra Moreno Toscano.
According to Proceso (29/11/93: 11), Sôcrates Rizzo, the head o f the DGPEyS, was Salinas's 
candidate for this post, but his triumph being questioned by PAN was the reason for choosing Colosio. An 
alternative interpretation is that Rizzo's performance at the SPP had been internally questioned during the 
events which led to Montemayor's leaving his post in 1985 (see Chapter 5).
”  This appointment made apparent not only the salient position o f Salinas, but also the rising 
political status of tiie SPP 'regional development' network. According to Camacho, he was sent to SEDUE 
because, in the president's eyes, the effects o f the 1985 earthquakes had become "government's most 
important political problem" (interview, London, 1/12/95).
238
technocratie credentials of Aspe and his team, together with the ongoing cabinet debates 
over economic policy, enhanced the technical role of the 'planning/budgeting' apparatus. 
On the other hand, though Maria de los Angeles Moreno formally replaced Camacho, in 
practice minister Salinas took over the leadership of the 'regional development' network. 
His being well aware of the political potential of this network explains this decision. 
Clearer than with de la Madrid, Salinas extensively used 'regional' clientelistic patronage 
to get the presidential nomination (see Proceso 572,19/10/87: 12-15; Lara Brito 1988).
Like in the previous presidential campaign, the candidate's men took total control 
of the PRI machinery (see Adler et al. 1993). By then, the impact of the SPP institutional 
setting on Salinas's camarilla was apparent.^ "* As observed by Proceso (608, 27/6/88: 6- 
9), this cluster constituted not one, but two distinctive groups. The first group, headed by 
Cordoba, dealt with preparing the candidate's economic programme and with lobbying 
foreign financial circles. Its main liaison with government was SPP minister Aspe. 
Differently, the second group, led by Manuel Camacho, took charge of the political tasks. 
Linked to this group, PRI Oficial Mayor Luis Donaldo Colosio became de facto the 
campaign head. The way Salinas integrated his cabinet would reveal the existing balance 
of power within its bifurcated camarilla.
As Centeno argues, "Salinas was masterful in balancing institutional powers with 
personal influence in his distribution of cabinet seats" (1994: 95). Regarding the SPP, the 
creation of the Oficina de Coordinacwn was the first indication that this ministry would 
not be longer the main liaison between the presidency and the federal bureaucracy. 
Moreover, Salinas's presidency-dominant, centralist style meant that no ministry would 
be called to play a leading role. Cordoba's appointment, however, suggested that the 
former SPP 'planning/budgeting' cluster had consolidated its power as a group.
Neoliberal reform and the SPP
Between 1986 and 1988, the SPP helped rather than hampered neoliberal reform. 
Why did this ministry have to conspire against the latter afterwards? The centralist 
character of the PSE is associated with the peak of the SPP power, and also with its 
decline. During Salinas's political campaign, Zedillo became Aspe's right-hand man at 
the SPP. Simultaneously, the line of authority Salinas-Cordoba-Aspe-Zedillo in economic
It should be bom in mind that Salinas was the head o f the SPP who came to spend more time 
within the ministry (around 8 years).
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matters began to develop. This was so because of candidate Salinas's direct involvement 
in the PSE through his main economic advisor Cordoba. After December 1988, this 
authority line was fully adopted with a critical difference. Aspe's appointment as head of 
the SHCP, with Salinas's decision to keeping him responsible for the PSE, meant that the 
SPP (now headed by Zedillo) would occupy the last link of the chain.
More than anybody, incoming president Salinas was aware of "the inherently 
conflictual relationship" between planning and finance (Greene 1994: 64). For he himself 
had been a key participant in the struggles since 1979. In addition, he knew well that 
having one minister responsible for the economic policy had been crucial to the success 
of the PSE. Clearer authority lines and better institutional coordination not only "eased 
the instrumentation of the economic policies", but reduced the margin of policy error 
(Cordoba 1991:4). If Salinas wanted, as he did, to take advantage of these improvements 
meant that two potentially powerful economic ministries could no longer coexist. His 
reaching power allowed him to put into practice a measure that as SPP official he had 
opposed for political reasons: the neat separation between economic management and 
politics.
One example of president Salinas's early attempts to weaken the SPP is provided 
by his reorganisation of this ministry in January 1989. Figure 6.5 shows the resulting 
organisation chart. Regarding the 'planning/budgeting' apparatus, one change deserves 
special attention. The creation of the Subsecretaria de Programacion y  Presupuesto 
brought under its umbrella all the direcciones générales directly associated with the 
budgeting process. As can be seen in the same figure, the only exception was that dealing 
with regional development. The rationale for this reform was clear: In the future, this 
ministry's central economic role would be limited to the formulation and supervision of 
the annual expenditure budget. As Hernandez put it, the SPP was transformed ever since 
into "effectively, an under-secretariat for budgeting" (1993: 167).
Unlike ministers de la Madrid and Salinas, Zedillo did not have a free hand in 
staffing the SPP. At the highest echelons, he only managed to appoint one under-secretary 
out of three, and the Oficial Mayor. They were Pascual Garcia Alba^  ^ {Planeacion y
Zedillo and Garcia Alba attended Yale together from 1975-1978. When in 1983 Sôcrates Rizzo 
replaced Côrdoba as head o f the DGPEyS, Garcia Alba, who was a Côrdoba's associate, left the SPP. In 
1985, he became de la Madrid's adviser, and later head of the powerful DGPEyS (1987-88) under Zedillo.
FIGURE 6.5 SPP Organisation Chart, 1989-1992
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Control Presupuestal) and Esteban Moctezuma respectively. At lower levels, many key 
officials identified with either Salinas or Aspe remained in office. They include José 
Gômez Palacio (responsible for the coordination between the SPP and the SHCP since 
1985) and Carlos Altamirano (director general of PoUtica Presupuestal also since 1985). 
Similarly, the DGPEyS was headed by Carlos Hurtado, an ITAM graduate identified with 
Aspe. A weak control over these critical areas may explain why some of Zedillo's 
'coyuntura' economic studies were made within the area of the Oficial Mayor Moctezuma 
(interview C, London, 12/4/95).
During the Zedillo years, the SPP was particularly efficient in keeping public 
spending under tight control for the first time since its inception (see table 6.2 above). 
Though the presidential measures described and the logic of the PSE greatly reduced the 
SPP discretionary power over the expenditure budget, it would be hard to deny that 
Zedillo's personal commitment to structural adjustment contributed to that outcome. This 
may also account for the few, minor tensions between the SHCP and the SPP that would 
be reported by the media.^  ^Ironically enough, Zedillo and his economic team's balanced- 
budget approach to public finances would become an additional cause for the SPP 
decline, and the consequent rise of the SHCP.
From the outset, finance minister Aspe began to play an outstanding role in 
economic policymaking. Apart from his ratified involvement in the Pact, two facts 
explain this. First, he received notable support from the president. In December 1988, for 
instance. Ana Paula Virginia Gerard was appointed Technical Secretary of the Economic 
Cabinet (the same post held by Salinas during the Lopez Portillo administration). This 
ITAM graduate had worked with Aspe at the SPP between 1983 and 1987. Second, 
Aspe's arrival at the SHCP gave him access to the institutional resources of the SHCP, 
which would prove fundamental in implementing Salinas's neoliberal programme. Some 
examples clarify our point. With the president's backing, Aspe could raise tax revenues 
by 13.4 percent by simply enforcing the tax laws for the first time in Mexican history 
(Pastor 1990: 4, see also Elizondo 1994).
The only examples found by the author can be found in Proceso 682 (27/11/89: 12-19) and El 
Universal (8/1/92: 2), In part, the reason was that the SPP personnel had Zedillo's instruction to have good 
relations with the SHCP (interview C, London, 12/4/95).
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In his inaugural speech, Salinas instructed Aspe to begin negotiations with those 
creditors. Access to foreign creditors has traditionally been an SHCP's source of power. 
Leading a team that outclassed that of George Bush, Aspe worked hard and moved 
swiftly to achieve that goal.^  ^The preliminary agreement on the debt signed in July 23, 
1989 gave Salinas the opportunity to triumphantly declare on television that the debt 
crisis was over (see Proceso 665, 31/7/89: 6-10). The same institutional resources also 
put in Aspe's hands the privatisation programme, whose importance derived not fi'om the 
number of enterprises put on sale (around 100 between 1989 and 1990), but from their 
size and economic importance. They include, for instance, Cananea (one of the world's 
largest copper mines), TELMEX (the national telephone monopoly), and the major 
commercial banks.
Aspe's growing prestige and political stature essentially stemmed from two facts: 
his capacity to generate the financial resources so anxiously needed by the Salinas 
administration and his leading role in the PECE that allowed him to influence nearly all 
policies having an impact on the economic programme, including PRONASOL. From 
this perspective, it looked as if neoliberal policies had inherently strengthened the finance 
ministry, just as in other countries undergoing similar processes (e.g., Brazil, Israel, Great 
Britain). From a political perspective, however, the situation was more complex. Aspe's 
dominance over the economic decision making was far from being absolute, for his action 
was still greatly dependent upon the sanction of the presidency, through its Oficina de 
Coordinacwn. Moreover, the NAFTA negotiations had brought a new political actor to 
the fore: SECOFI.
Despite its economic dimensions, both the decline of the SPP (as an economic 
agency) and the rise of the SHCP needs to be seen as the result of a highly centralised 
presidential strategy to restructure the Mexican economy along neoliberal lines, while 
reducing the risks of bureaucratic disruptions. In this sense, it could be argued that 
president Salinas successfully culminated the process of presidential direct involvement 
in the economic policy making that had begun during Echeverria's years.
For a critique of the debt renegotiation and agreement, see Castafieda's articles "Mexico's IMF 
credit may only make thing harder still" in Los Angeles Times (16/4/1989), and "Mexico's dismal debt deal" 
in The New York Times (25/2/1990).
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PRONASOL and the end of the SPP
The decline of the SPP cannot be fully understood without having in mind the 
institutional antecedents of PRONASOL. Despite its unquestionable innovations, the 
latter programme was not as original and innovative as claimed by its main advocate: the 
president. Seen as a set of specific programmes, it represented the last of a long series of 
attempts to deal with a historical process of highly distorted development.^* The 
introduction of centralised planning in 1976 turned the SPP into government's most 
important agent of social and regional development. Elaborated by Ramon Aguirre during 
de la Madrid's presidential campaign, the 1982 Expenditure Budget was the first to 
include the line 'Regional Development', also known as Ramo 26 (DOF 31/12/81). This 
budget line contained the programmatic elements that later evolved into PRONASOL 
(Bailey in Cornelius et al. 1994: 109).
As table 6.5 shows, the SPP emerged early as an important stepping stone to 
elective office, which indicated that its sphere of influence extended to PRI and Congress 
(interview D, London, 4/5/96). When this party's lists for Congress were known in early 
1985, politicians joked that the PRI had a fourth sector: the SPP (Bailey in Grayson 1990: 
27). A closer look at the background of the individuals listed in table 6.5 reveals that 
what those politicians were talking about was not the SPP, but its 'regional development' 
network. This fact sheds light on Story's observation that PRI and government "have 
become closely intertwined at the local level" (1986:131). What needs to be stressed here 
is that the influential network aforementioned was the political-bureaucratic apparatus 
in charge of implementing not only the SPP's social and regional policies up to 1988, but 
also PRONASOL afterwards.
How did president Salinas so successfully transform a structural and functional 
component of the SPP into an original, non-bureaucratic presidential programme? Apart 
from his becoming the most visible advocate of PRONASOL, a plausible answer 
involves his translating the locus of decision making firom the SPP to the presidency, and 
his deliberate attempts to de-emphasize the role of bureaucracy in the programme. The 
best evidence of the 'présidentialisation' of PRONASOL is the fact that after December
See Aguilar-Barajas and Spence (in Philip 1988). These authors convincingly demostrate that 
Echeverria was the first to incorporate the "regional problem" into the presidential agenda.
TABLE 6.5 SPP presence in the Chamber of Deputies, 1982-1994 
(Ex-SPP officials by selected com m ittees)
Lll LEGISLATURE 
(1982-1985)
Lill LEGISLATURE 
(1985-1988)
LIV LEGISLATURE 
(1988-91)
LV LEGISLATURE 
(1991-1994)
Comisidn de Programacion y 
Presupuesto
President
Manuel Cavazos Lerma 
Members
Genaro Ëorrego Estrada 
Du Ice Maria Sauri Riancho 
Juan Mariano Acotzin 
Luz Lajous Vargas 
Antonio Fabila Meléndez
President
Luis Donaldo Colosio 
Members 
Sdcrates Rizzo 
Marcela Gonzalez Salas 
Gilberto Nieves Jenkin 
Noé Garza Flores
President
Rogelio Montemayor 
Members
Manuel Cavazos Lerma 
Melchor de los Santos 
Javier Bonilla 
Narciso Amador Leal 
Marfa del Rosario Guerra D. 
Jesus Oscar Navarro
President
Mana de los Angeles Moreno 
Secretary
Eioy Cantu Segovia 
Members 
Guillermo Hopkins 
Oscar Luebbert Gutiérrez 
Laura Alicia Garza Galindo 
Tomés Yarrigngton Ruvalcaba
Comisidn de Hacienda y Crédite 
Pûblico
Members
Juan Mariano Acotzin 
Antonio Fabila Meléndez
Members
Luis Donaldo Colosio 
Marcela Gonzalez Salas 
Hdctor Ulibarri P^rez
President
Manuel Cavazos Lerma 
Members
Rogelio Montemayor 
Javier Bonilla 
Narciso Amador Leal
Members
Maria de los Angeles Moreno 
Laura Alicia Garza Galindo 
Tomâs Yarrigngton Ruvalcaba
Comisidn de Vigilancia de la 
Contadurla Mayor de Hacienda
President
Rogelio Carballo Milisîh
Secretary 
Sdcrates Rizzo
Secretary
Melchor de los Santos
Members
Javier Bonilla
President
Laura Alicia Garza Galindo 
Members
Tomâs Yarrigngton Ruvalcaba
Comisidn de Gobemacidn y 
Puntos Constitucionales Members
Genaro Ôorrego Estrada 
José Antonio Alvarez Uma 
EmestoLuque Feregrino
Members
Rogelio Montemayor 
Manuel Cavazos Lerma
Members
Oscar Pimentel Gonzalez
I
Source: Diccionario Biogrâjîco {\9M, 1987, 1989, 1992).
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1988 the headquarters of the Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional were given a new 
physical location: Los Pinos (Cornelius et al. 1994: 14). Yet, PRONASOL was kept, at 
least formally, under the umbrella of the SPP. This agency still being responsible for 
public spending explains why.
The SPP organisation chart, approved in January 1989, showed a de­
bureaucratised Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional (see figure 6.5 above). Where had 
the 'regional development' network gone? Since it was not touched by the reorganisation, 
its 'disappearance' illustrated Salinas's views of bureaucracy as well as his plan to 
personally benefit from PRONASOL. His animosity to bureaucracy was clearly showed 
in an interview with Borge: "Neither the people nor I use the term Pronasol but 
solidaridad, the former is used only by bureaucracies" (1993: 137). Someone, however, 
had to administer the programme. According to Salinas, those involved were not 
bureaucrats but 'extension agents' who should act outside traditional bureaucratic 
structures, this time in an anonymous way.
Interesting enough is the fact that both Camacho and Moreno, the ex-SPP officials 
most identified with the 'regional development' network up to 1988, were deliberately 
keep at arm's length from the fledgling PRONASOL. This is suggested by their 
appointments as heads of the DDF and Fisheries respectively. Instead, president Salinas 
deliberately chose an unknown, grey SPP official to head the Subsecretaria de Desarrollo 
Regional. Carlos Rojas, a former low-rank associate of Camacho, had been 'social acts' 
coordinator during the Salinas's campaign. Before July 1988, his activities scored low in 
the candidate's eyes. However, as an interviewee close to Rojas told Dresser: "After the 
elections, when all hell broke loose, Rojas's programs became crucial" (in Cornelius et 
al. 1994: 154). Despite this fact, Salinas's dominating and overbearing personality mostly 
explains why Rojas did not become an influential actor in his own right.
Institutionally, the SPP was the major casualty of president Salinas's personal 
control over PRONASOL. In camarilla terms, the victims were minister Zedillo and his 
team. The limited role they were allowed to play in the achievement of this programme 
is illustrated by the fact that none of the high- and middle-rank officials of the 
Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional, apart from one or two state delegados, were 
members of Zedillo's group. Not surprisingly, this situation created permanently internal 
tensions between SPP minister's weakened 'planning/budgeting' apparatus and Rojas's
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strengthened team (interview C, London, April 12,1995). Paradoxically, the technocratic 
credentials of minister Zedillo's camarilla or their scant resemblance to Salinas's 
'extension agents' had prevented them profiting politically from PRONASOL.
On January 6,1992, Salinas confidentially told Bartlett that he would be replaced 
by Zedillo at the Secretariat of Education {Proceso 793, 13/1/92: 6). Next day the most 
important national newspapers (e.g.. La Jornada: 1; Unomasuno: 1) circulated the "not 
scotched" rumour that senator and PRI leader Luis Donaldo Colosio would become the 
new head of the SPP. To stop speculation going further, a brief press bulletin from the 
presidency announced that "to strength the cohesion of the fiscal and financial policy" the 
SPP and the SHCP would be fused. With this euphemism, the death of the SPP was 
announced. News associated with the defunct agency, however, did not stop coming out. 
In April 1992, the Secretaria de Desarollo Social (SEDESOL) was created and Colosio 
appointed head of it. Having the Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional as its backbone, 
this ministry was charged with the implementation of PRONASOL. After its short-lived 
'disappearance', the SPP 'regional development' network was on view again.
Salinas's set of decisions posed a central question: Why were they taken in the 
middle of the sexenio, not at the beginning when major reforms to the public sector are 
usually carried out.^  ^The existing economic and political conditions at the end of 1991 
provide a plausible explanation. On the one hand, this particular year marked the peak of 
Salinas's economic achievements (see table 6.2 above).'^® Moreover, the NAFTA 
negotiations were on a promising course. On the other hand, the PRI managed to win 
with ease the August midterm elections, thus reversing historical trends."*' Apart from 
Salinas popularity, the causes for this included the success of the duo PRONASOL-PRI 
in "buying political support", and Colosio's effective work at building up the PRI 
machinery after 1988.
The only exception is Echeverria's transformation o f the departments o f  agrarian affairs and 
tourism into secretariats in 1975.
Even good luck seemed to be on his side as proved by the Gulf-War-related mini-oil boom, 
which lifted international reserves to nearly $8.5-billion worth o f oil by early 1991 (Grayson 1991: 111).
This party got 320 seats out o f 500 at the Chamber o f  Deputies and 62 seats out o f  64 at the
Senate.
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This favourable context allowed president Salinas to prepare his own succession. 
Despite the opinion of some PRI politicians/^ it was clear that SEDESOL had been 
created having this objective in mind as observed by Luis H. Alvarez (PAN) {Unomasuno 
8/1/92:4). The separation of the two structures of the SPP made it apparent that Salinas's 
successor would be a member of either the 'planning/budgeting' apparatus or the 'regional 
development' network. By providing the settings and the players, the SPP once again 
played a crucial political role in January 1992, though admittedly for the last time.
CONCLUDING NOTE
Contextual political factors are at the heart of the decline and death of the SPP. 
President Salinas's overall policies are best defined by the terms "presidential, executive- 
dominant, and centralist" (Bailey in Cornelius et al. 1994: 104). Though it accounts for 
the so-called 'Salinas's economic miracle', this personal style had significant political 
implications. First, de facto rather than de jure, the president substantially altered the 
existing distribution of institutional resources within the cabinet, thus modifying the role 
to be played by the federal bureaucracy. Second, the shift from a ministerial government 
to a presidential government meant significant changes in policymaking. Third, it brought 
to a sudden end the role of the SPP as the main liaison between the presidency and the 
federal bureaucracy.
In retrospect, there is little doubt that exercising political power was one of 
Salinas's obsessions.'*^ This driving force had been carefully hidden behind a facade of 
a modernising, competent, young economist. Ideological considerations aside, a clear 
parallel between presidents Echeverria and Salinas emerged (see Schmidt 1991; Reyes 
Heroles 1991:168-180). Both of them would extensively use the presidency's powers not 
to rescue the political system from discredit, but to strengthen their own leadership to 
impose their programmes. In both cases, a renewal of presidencialismo was associated 
with the loss of legitimacy stemming from deep political crises, namely, the 1968 
massacre and the 1987 PRI split respectively.
For instance, Juan José Osorio {Unomasuno 8/1/92:4), and Maria de los Angeles Moreno {El 
Dia 9/1/92: 3).
The best biography of Carlos Salinas is provided by the ex-Sandinista Tomâs Borge (1993). It 
is clear from this account the important role played by Salinas's father, old-school politician Raul Salinas, 
in moulding his personality and conceptions. See also Ayala (1995).
248
Because of his own experience, president Salinas was well aware of the immense 
power of the SPP. He himself had used it as minister "to overshadow de la Madrid, 
specially, after 1986" (Centeno 1994: 96). In essence, control over public spending was 
the key source of this power. By 1988, it was apparent that the SPP had reproduced, 
internally, the 'dual policy-network system' in operation until 1976. Budgeting control 
was responsible for the emergence of two bureaucratic machineries within the SPP. One 
gave technocratic legitimacy to the regime, the other reinforced the most traditional 
features of the system. After December 1988, minister Zedillo did not have access to 
these institutional resources, for Salinas had decided to transfer them to Los Pinos.
The death of the SPP is associated with the way president Salinas wanted to solve 
his succession. Insofar as it involved the economic-policy network and the network for  
political control in the process, his strategy resembled that of Echeverria. There was, 
however, a crucial difference. Excepting Zedillo, the strongest presidential candidates 
included only key members of Salinas's institutional camarilla. The Mexican ruling elite 
continued shrinking.
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Fifteen years of SPP: Conclusions
"Nothing is so permanent as a temporary government bureau."
(Gortner 1981: 17)
By focusing on the life-cycle of a federal ministry, this thesis has examined the 
connection between politics and bureaucracy in the period 1976-1992. Because this link 
is still neither well understood nor widely appreciated by scholars, there is not much 
agreement on what kind of approach to use in addressing it. While focusing on both the 
presidency and political elites, most literature on Mexican politics emphasizes the 
importance of "the fluid world of group politics" (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 155). On 
the other hand, Mexican bureaucracy has traditionally been analysed using a descriptive, 
legalistic approach.* As invaluable as these works are, the lack of a common theoretical 
perspective makes it difficult to integrate their observations and conclusions into a 
coherent body of knowledge.
Conventional literature on Mexican politics usually sees politics as "a market of 
trades in which individual and group interests are pursued by rational actors" (March and 
Olsen 1996: 248). It stresses bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation, and exchange, 
while paying little attention to the institutional setting. Despite its virtues, this perspective 
leaves many crucial questions unanswered. For instance: Is there a relationship between 
de la Madrid, Salinas and Zedillo reaching the presidency and their having headed the 
SPP? Was the critical role of this agency in shaping public policy exclusively the result 
of group politics, coalitions, and conjunctural factors? What is the impact of the 
institutional settings in which bureaucracy operates on group formation and camarilla 
performance?
' See bibliographies in Certifias (1988 and 1992) and SECOGEF/FCE (1995).
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Though the new statist theory enriches our understanding of the institutional 
foundations of economic performance, it has two serious limitations: While failing to 
uncover the workings of the state's constituent parts, it equates "the state with 
bureaucrats" (Moon and Prasad 1994: 364-365). Therefore, this theory is not particularly 
useful in exploring specific bureaucratic dimensions and their interplay. Also under the 
umbrella of new institutionalism, a theoretical alternative assumes that the state structure 
is not an coherent, unitary entity. As a result, it emphasizes the need to deconstruct the 
state when analysing the role of identifiable institutions and public organisations in 
structuring and shaping political life.
By adopting the second theoretical and analytical perspective, the thesis seeks to 
show that this approach can be of greatest use in exploring the link between bureaucracy 
and politics. The originality of this work, including some distinctive views of its author, 
stems from this re-emerging approach in political science. As a whole, the evidence 
provided by this thesis tends to confirm the hypothesis that the study of specific 
bureaucratic organisations and settings can shed light not only on intra-bureaucratic 
dynamics, but also on broader political processes. Thus, by addressing the issue of 
executive leadership in Mexico from a bureaucratic perspective, the thesis contributes to 
the knowledge of Mexican presidentialism.
This final chapter is divided into three brief sections. The first section summarises 
and integrates the analysis and the partial conclusions developed throughout the thesis. 
It identifies the main implications of the fifteen-year existence of the SPP. The following 
section discusses their relevance in understanding some key developments after the 
demise of the SPP. In both sections some aggregated data is presented to further support 
our views. The chapter ends with some general remarks on the implications of 
technocratisation of politics in the country's democratic prospects.
7.1 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SPP: MAIN IMPLICATIONS
The most obvious conclusion of the thesis is that the SPP was created by 
presidentialism and ended by it. Both decisions illustrate the significant impact that 
presidential action may have on bureaucracy. However, as the same work argues, this 
important variable was only a part of the story of the SPP. For structural, institutional and 
bureaucratic factors also played a significant role in this agency's becoming an influential
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political agent. More specifically, the case of the SPP suggests that concentration of 
strategic institutional resources in as highly centralised a setting as the Mexican one can 
be a source of considerable bureaucratic power and autonomy in its own right. In some 
respects, this fact challenges conventional views of Mexican presidentialism.
Policy networks and institutional reorganisation
As compared with its Western counterparts, the Mexican federal bureaucracy has 
a greater control over political and policy agendas. This has been the result of its being 
embedded in the presidency, the country's most influential political institution, in a 
context of limited pluralism. This fact does not necessarily mean that the presidency's 
interests and those of its bureaucracy should coincide. On the contrary, the evidence 
presented in this thesis suggests that this has rarely been the case. The tensions between 
both institutions shed light on the abundant presidential efforts to contain the technical 
and political power of bureaucracy by manipulating the public sector. As a result, it can 
safely be concluded that public sector reorganisation in Mexico does not have a cosmetic 
nature. The implication of this is that the study of institutional reform may provide useful 
insights into the nature of politics more broadly conceived (March and Olsen 1989: 70).
Post-revolutionary Mexico witnessed the emergence of two distinctive policy 
networks in charge of economic and political management. Insulating economic 
policymaking from political influences proved a highly efficient formula until president 
Echeverria decided to make the economic policy at Los Pinos. Higher presidential 
involvement in shaping economic policy inaugurated an era that has been called 
'economic presidency' (Zaid 1990; Erfani 1995: 166). This move represented a relevant 
stage in a long process o f centralisation o f institutional resources in the office o f  the 
presidency. This time the major victim was the finance ministry. The arrival of self- 
declared anti-SHCP Lopez Portillo at the presidency not only gave continuity to this 
policy, but allowed its institutionalisation. Unexpectedly, his ambitious and innovative 
administrative reform turned out to have an dramatic impact on the existing dual policy- 
network system.
Up to 1976, the network for political control was left virtually untouched, while 
most presidential efforts to reform the public sector were directed to the economic-policy 
network. As the 1958 and 1976 reforms clearly show, these efforts had the central
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purpose of dealing with the issue of bureaucratic concentration of power stemming from 
ever-expanding state intervention in the economy. After 1976, the network for political 
control began to experience significant changes in its operation and role, though in a way 
not immediately visible to the naked eye. Two linked factors are at the heart of this 
development: the 'economic presidency' and the SPP. By bringing the economic-policy 
network to the fore, they would alter the delicate balance of power between the two 
networks.
President Lopez Portillo presented the SPP, the centrepiece of his reform, as a 
breakthrough in budgeting and programme evaluation. This view was consonant with the 
theories characterising bureaucracy as an instrument for scientific, neutral, modem 
administration in fashion during the 1960s. However, the SPP was also conceived as a 
political contrivance designed to promote executive control along traditional lines. It was 
thought that this ministry could overcome existing bureaucratic constraints to presidential 
action, while performing effectively under the president's direction. Neither of these goals 
was fully achieved. More significant, the artificial separation of ‘planning’ and ‘finance’ 
proved to be highly disruptive. To begin with, the Tello-Moctezuma affair reproduced in 
1977 a policy deadlock comparable to that caused by the institutional bickering between 
ministers Flores de la Pena and Margain between 1970 and 1973. Ironically, 
centralisation made the president highly dependent upon the adequate functioning of the 
SPP.
Before the creation of the SPP, presidential control over the federal bureaucracy 
was partly done by a deliberate fragmentation between the technical and political bases 
for public policies. In essence, this was the central role of the dual policy-network system. 
By blurring this fragmentation, the 1976 administrative reform introduced significant 
changes into the presidency-bureaucracy relationship. The SPP case illustrates clearly 
this point. Though belonging to a long tradition of imaginative presidential centralism, 
this agency was different fi'om past experiments in the sense that it did not emerge as an 
ordinary supervisory presidential office, but as a fully-fledged ministry for control. 
Sharply put, president Lopez Portillo attempted to control bureaucracy by using a 
'modem' instrument, but what he created was a super-bureaucratic apparatus capable of 
pursuing its own interests.
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At the beginning, president de la Madrid relied heavily on the institutional 
changes introduced by his predecessor. In particular, he made an extensive use of cabinet 
meetings and planning mechanisms and rhetoric. However, a departing point was 
observed in 1985, mostly because of the intrinsic difficulties associated with the 
institutional separation of finance and planning. Similar backgrounds and ideological 
orientations did not make the confrontation between ministers Silva-Herzog and Salinas 
less virulent than in the past. De la Madrid's response was further presidential 
intervention in economic policymaking. This is proved by his creating the Council of 
Economic Advisors in 1985. This strategy, however, could not prevent the SPP gaining 
total control of economic decision-making after Silva-Herzog's resignation in mid-1986.
This centralisation trend reached its peak during the Salinas administration when 
the Oficina de Coordinacion was charged with the general supervision of the economic 
policymaking process. Because of losing access to its institutional resources, the SPP 
would emerge as the main casualty of Salinas's revival of presidentialism. Interesting 
enough is the fact that both the creation and the death of this ministry had the same basic 
purpose: strengthening the role of the presidency.
The SPP: Amid efficiency-orientated goals and politics
Soon after the 1976 administrative reform was introduced, it became apparent 
that its modernising promises far exceeded its outcomes. During most of Lopez Portillo's 
presidency, oil revenues rather than his improved bureaucratic apparatus allowed high 
rates of economic growth under an 'economic presidency'. Many factors account for the 
gaps between the expectations raised by the creation of the SPP and its performance, but 
one stands out: the symbiotic relationship in Mexico between politics and bureaucracy. 
As everywhere, Mexican bureaucrats are expected to deliver technically feasible solutions 
to critical problems within a political framework. The features of this firamework in 
Mexico, together with the SPP's involvement in critical policy areas, mostly explains why 
an agency originally charged with technical tasks rapidly encroached upon the political 
realm.
Because of notable differences in terms of status and power between ministries, 
the Mexican cabinet has always been a ‘cabinet of unequals’.^  The dual policy-network
 ^This term is borrowed from Cronin (in Rourke 1986), who uses it in reference to the American
Cabinet.
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system, however, prevented any ministry from concentrating excessive institutional 
resources by limiting intra-network interaction. The SPP came to alter this arrangement 
in a significant way. The sequence of events leading to this outcome began with president 
Lopez Portillo’s use of this ministry to revive the ideal of a strong state in charge not only 
of the promotion of the private sector, but also of the provision of social welfare. 
Concentration of critical resources under the SPP umbrella placed this ministry where 
virtually all lines of public policy converged. Because of this fact alone, the role of the 
SPP would have a significant impact not only on the operation of the economic-policy 
network, but on that of its counterpart.
One example illustrates how the second development began. The elaboration of 
the 1980-82 national plan by the SPP is responsible for the widespread use of the concept 
'national security' among government's planners. Until then, the open discussion of this 
issue had been a taboo subject. The following national plan, launched in 1983, went much 
further by defining the concept of'security' and the role of the armed forces (Plan 1983: 
61). Even more, it announced that an "integral security policy" would be formulated, 
though without indicating by who. Particularly after 1982, the 'conceptual' encroachment 
of the SPP upon the traditional functions of the network Go6er«flc/d«-PRI-Congress 
would reach an operational level as the thesis has shown.
Because of its broad policy powers, the SPP developed "bifurcated strategies, one 
designed to satisfy social and political expectations, and the other geared toward technical 
problems" (Desveaux 1994: 50). This hybrid character is at the heart of this agency’s 
mixed performance, for "policy outcomes depend not only on linkages between agencies 
and elective bodies, but also on the shape of bureaucratic structures themselves" 
(idem:32). Theoretically at least, the SPP was to supervise and control increased public 
spending. As can be seen in figure 7.1, this ministry failed almost invariably to achieve 
its expected role of keeping spending to its authorised levels. This failure was particularly 
notable in the periods 1981-1982 and 1986-1987 when unprecedented financial deficits 
were observed.^ The fact that these deficits were mostly the result of external economic 
variables should not obscure the impact of deficiencies in managing public finances.
^For instance, the amount spent in excess o f its projected budget by PEMEX in 1982 was 
equivalent to 56 percent o f the entire parastate sector as originally projected! (Wilkie 1985, table 3404: 
874)
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FIGURE 7.1 Public sector financial deficits, 1970-1994 
(A s a  pe rcen tag e  o f  G D P )
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Y e a r
S ource: 1968-1975 , W ilkie (1988 : 921); 1976-1994 , as in T ab le  4 .1 , T ab le  5 .2 , 
and  T ab le  6.2 o f  the thesis.
One of the most important single questions about the record of the SPP was its 
failure to prevent the economic debacle that followed the 1981 drop in oil prices. In many 
respects the 1982 crisis was worse handled that the 1976 crisis despite greater 
bureaucracy and educational qualifications of those involved. As the thesis argues, 
economic mismanagement was not limited to the SPP. The fact that the giant end-of- 
administration deficits were financed with short-term foreign debt suggests that the 
decline of oil prices, or at least its economic shock, was thought by the SHCP to be 
temporary.
From a political perspective, the SPP provides a totally different picture. Although 
its economic estimations were often misleading (Greene 1994: 64), this ministry proved 
highly successful in influencing presidential decisions, in shaping public policy, and in 
serving as a significant stepping stone to high office. At the heart of the political success 
of the SPP, in spite of its appalling technical record, was its also h yb rid , critical 
resources. The rapid rise of the SPP challenges conventional views about the sources of 
agency status in many respects. In the case of this ministry, the latter sources were not, 
say, agency budget, seniority, or size, bu t the co m b in a tio n  o f  m ore  so p h is tic a te d  
in stitu tional a n d  p o litic a l resources. They include its role as the main liaison between the
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presidency and the bureaucracy, the backing it received from the presidency as a result, 
and above all its control over public spending.
From the outset, contextual factors enhanced the political role of the SPP. An 
expansionist oil strategy gave this ministry plenty of oil revenue not only to ‘plan’ with, 
but to allocate. After the 1982 collapse of the oil/debt boom, social spending was reduced 
by cutting generalised clientelistic patronage, while strengthening more targeted 
programmes (Fox 1994: 165). As with expansion, its control over public spending 
enabled the SPP to successfully manage contraction after the 1982 crisis (Erfani 1995: 
143). The main implication of these facts is that its institutional resources had placed the 
SPP at the centre of the system’s patronage network. Lopez Portillo’s selection of his 
successor would reflect the importance of this development.
Bureaucracy and the presidential succession
Up to 1970, the ministry in charge of administering the budgetary system was 
deliberately kept away from the struggles associated with the presidential succession. As 
shown in figure 7.2 below, the policy network for political control produced all the 
presidents between 1940 and 1970. This system, together with the presidency's limited 
role in macro-economic management, prevented sharp policy shifts, while reducing 
uncertainty during the transfer of political power. Echeverria's 'economic presidency’ and 
his selection of finance minister Lopez Portillo as his successor brought this practice to 
an end. The shift was bought at a high cost. As can be seen in figure 7.1 above, financial 
deficits began to increase, in a significant way, in 1973, 1979 and 1985. It was not 
accidental that these years marked exactly the middle of the corresponding presidential 
terms.
As argued in this thesis, relaxation of spending controls was successfully used by 
the three ministers responsible for public expenditure in each of those years to get the 
presidential nomination. After 1976, the critical succession battles took place within the 
economic policy network. Not surprisingly, ministers in charge of managing the economy 
being perceived as strong contenders for the presidency greatly distorted the whole 
economic policymaking process. This disruptive phenomenon was particularly marked 
throughout the period 1977-1986. The developments under discussion had relevant, long- 
lasting political implications. First, they technocratised the process of selection of the PRI
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presidential candidate, and important segments of the political process as a result (Erfani 
1995: 167).
Second, they caused significant intra-network tensions which would reach its peak 
during de la Madrid's presidency. Beneath disagreements over economic policy, the issue 
of elite displacement was at the core of these tensions. In essence, it accounts for the 
fissure ofPRIin 1987. As a PRI official put it: "A group of marginalized politicians saw 
that the arrival of [Salinas] at power would extend their own marginalization for another 
six, if not twelve years." (interview with Dresser in Cook et al. 1994: 132). One of them 
regarded Salinas's selection as "a bloodless coup d'état" (Munoz Ledo interview with Gil 
1992: 187). What he really meant was that the network for political control had 
eventually been displaced by its counterpart as the only ascending path to the presidency.
FIGURE 7.2 Ministries producing the PRI presidential candidate, 1940-1994
ECONOMIC MINISTRIES POLITICAL M INISTRIES
EDUCATION 
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) 
SEDESOL 
Luis Donaldb Gblpsio (murdered)
SPP
Carlos Salinas (1988-1994)
SPP
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988)
SHCP
José Lopez Portillo (1976-1982)
GOBERNACIÔN 
Luis Echeverria (1970-1976)
GOBERNACIÔN 
Gustavo Diaz Ordàz (1964-1970
LABOUR 
Adolfo Lôpez Mateos (1958:^1964) i
GOBERNACIÔN 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958)
GOBERNACIÔN 
Miguel Alemân Velasco (1946- 
1952)
DEFENCE 
Manuel Avila Camacho (1940^ : 
1946)
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Third, de la Madrid and Salinas's accession to the presidency altered the balance 
of power within government's technocracy. The SPP was instrumental in this 
development. To begin with, Lopez Portillo coming to power and the creation of this 
ministry made the distinction between the 'technocrats of the presidency' and the 
'technocrats of the system' meaningful (Adler in Adler et al. 1993: 360). Even though in 
the period 1976-1979 the first group was dominated by 'structuralists', a key presidential 
decision would invert this picture. In order to save his administrative reform, Lopez 
Portillo handed the SPP not to the 'technocrats of the system', but to the tiny group of 
SHCP orthodox financiers led by de la Madrid.'* Since December 1982 onwards, the 
ideological spectrum of the technocratic governmental elite has steadily shrunk.
It is clear from figure 7.2 that the SPP came to replace Gobernacion as the main 
factory of presidents. What factors decided the selection of de la Madrid and Salinas? It 
was not friendship, according to the individuals who chose them. Like Lopez Portillo, de 
la Madrid thinks that "the decision is guided by objective conditions and qualities rather 
than by friendship" (interview with Borge 1993: 141-142). This thesis has argued that, 
together with economic variables, institutional and bureaucratic factors played a 
fundamental role. Apart from those already mentioned, they include alliance/coalition 
behaviour (resource addition) and ‘bureaucratic imperialism’^  (resource extraction). Their 
relevance in influencing the selection o f the PRI candidate was a new phenomenon in 
Mexican politics. In combination, these factors showed the president’s limits to decide 
his ovm decision as well as the new ‘rules of the game’ of the technocratic rule.
Before December 1976, cabinet meetings held with the purpose of discussing 
macroeconomic policy were rare. The separation of ‘planning’ and ‘finance’ made the 
holding of frequent collective meetings inevitable. In Lopez Portillo's view, they did not 
pose any danger to presidential government, for the president could serve as the final 
decision maker (1988: 540). Reality proved this view wrong. Almost as a rule, cabinet 
meetings became highly divisive and confrontational, thus favouring alliance/coalition 
building. The result was often the incorporation of conflicting policy proposals into the
''Lôpez Portillo wrote in his memoirs; "De la Madrid in Programming [SPP] is making good 
proposals. This is the last opportunity I have to bring off the axis o f the administrative reform" (1988: 839).
* The term and its definition is borrowed from Holden (in Rourke 1986: 28 ,44). It applies either 
when “two or more agencies try to assert control over the same Jurisdiction”, or when ’’one agency actually 
seeks to take over another agency”.
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same economic strategy. The SPP not only encouraged cabinet polarisation, but "tilted 
the bureaucratic balance in favor of the dependencies inclined towards spending" (Ibarra 
and Alberro 1989: 161).
TABLE 7.1 The SPP and the cabinet, 1982-1994 
(SPP ex-officials occupying cabinet posts/'^
De la Madrid's cabinet Salinas's cabinet
Economic-policv
Network
SPP
H acienda  
Parastate Industry 
Communications 
Agriculture 
Fisheries
Policy Network for 
Political Control
Gobernacion
PRI
Foreign Relations 
Federal District
Carlos Salinas (1982-87)
Pedro Aspe (1987-88)
Francisco Labastida (1982-86)
Eduardo Pesqueira (1984-88)
Manuel Bartlett (1982-88)
Adolfo Lugo Verduzco (1982-86)
Bernardo Sepulveda (1982-88) 
Ramôn Agurirre (1982-88)
SECOGEF
SEDUE/SEDESOL
Francisco Rojas (1982-87) 
Manuel Camacho (1986-88)
Ernesto Zedillo (1988-92)
Pedro Aspe (1988-94)
Emilio Gamboa Patrôn (1993-94)
Maria de los Angeles Moreno (1988-91)
Public Education Miguel Gonzâlez Avelar ( 1985-88)
Luis Donaldo Colosio (1988-92) 
Genaro Borrego (1992-93)
Manuel Camacho (1993-94) 
Manuel Camacho (1988-93) 
Manuel Aguilera G6mez (1993-94) 
Manuel Bartlett (1988-92)
Ernesto Zedillo (1992-93)
Maria Elena Vâzquez N. (1988-94) 
Patricio Chirinos (1988-92)
Luis Donaldo Colosio (1992-93) 
Carlos Rojas (1993-94)
Source: Keesing's (various years), Proceso (several issues), and SPPl (see Appendix 2).
The ruling elite has significantly changed after 1976. Elite change, however has 
not been erratic, but consonant with clear historic trends (see table 1.1. in chapter one). 
Conventional wisdom regards the president, together with camarilla politics, as the most 
important single factor shaping elite composition. The findings of the thesis suggests that 
there is an alternative way to look at this. It emphasizes the importance that the 
bureaucratic settings associated with the economic-policy network have on camarilla 
integration. This is proved by the heterogeneity in terms of both professions and ages of 
the inner-circles of the presidents since 1976. These approaches are, of course, not 
mutually exclusive. The arrival of Lopez Portillo at the presidency greatly accelerated
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ongoing elite trends (see table 1.1 in chapter 1). However, it was so for two reasons: the 
institutionally-shaped character of his camarilla and the across-the-board adoption of the 
PPB technique which enhanced the role of government’s technicians. After 1976, the SPP 
would emerge as the most important single path to high office.
A closer look at the cases of the two SPP-presidents par excellence illustrates 
more clearly our point. Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas resorted to their camarillas 
to staff the key cabinet posts. What made this special was the connection o f  these 
bureaucratic clusters with the SPP. As can be seen in table 7.1 above, what really 
happened was that the SPP personnel spread twice in a row throughout the cabinet. In 
elite mobility and political terms, this unprecedented development was far from being 
irrelevant. There are three major implications. First, by confirming ongoing elite trends, 
it made the rise of the techno-bureaucratic elite even more apparent. Second, this elite's 
steady arrival at the network for political control reduced the previously sharp differences 
between economic and political managers (see table 7.1). Third, the fact that each new 
minister often arrived with his own SPP camarilla reconfirmed the influential role of the 
SPP in shaping the composition of the ruling elite.
For these reasons, it is interesting to know who arrived at the SPP in the first 
place. Table 7.2 presents data showing the evolution of the background of the SPP high- 
rank personnel in the period 1976-1992. It is clear from there that a low number of SPP 
officials held the post of Director General or higher before joining the SPP. This means 
either that their arrival at the SPP implied a promotion, or that they were promoted while 
in the SPP. Another interesting feature of the SPP personnel is their steadily growing 
political background. To sum up our point, the background of these personnel was not 
only a consequence of historical political elite trends, but a crucial reinforcing factor as 
well.
7.2 RECENT EVENTS AND THE SPP's SHADOW
The role played by the SPP cannot be fully understood without considering at 
least three key political developments that took place immediately after the death of this 
ministry. They are the most complex, turbulent, and disconcerting presidential transition 
in memory (Cansino 1995: 60), the so-called ‘failed fiesta’ (Conger 1995), and the failure 
of the state’s intelligence/police apparatus to forecast the Chiapas uprising. A brief
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TABLE 7.2 Background of the SPP high-rank personnel, 1976-1992 
(Percentages, unless otherwise specified )
Joined the SPP 
between December 
1976 and April 1979
Joined the SPP 
between May 1979 
and November 1982
Joined the SPP 
after November 
1982
Place o f birth 
Mexico City
First degree 
UN AM 
ITAM 
IPN 
UIA 
ITESM 
U.Anahuac 
Other
(N=74)
60.0
71.4
0.0
8.9 
3.6 
1.8 
5.3
8.9
(N=60)
60.0
61.1
5.5
1 1 . 1
7.4
7.4 
0.0
7.4
(N=71)
59.7
53.6
15.9
7.2
4.3
2.9
2.9 
13.0
Subject studied 
Economics 
Engineering 
Law
Accounting
Business
Other
37.9
18.2
12.1
18.2
4.5
9.1
37.3 
6.8
18.6
25.4 
1.7
10.2
43.7
12.7 
23.9
4.2
2.8
12.7
Post-graduate studies 
Masters or higher 37.5
Master's degree 27.0
PhD 9.5
Post-graduate studies in the U S '^^  
Master's degree 7
PhD 2
43.6
40.0
13.3
12
6
53.7
40.8
26.8
16
14
Director General before
joining the SPP 30.5
Promoted while in the SPP 36.5
32.1
53.3
22.7
47.9
Political activitv before 
joining the SPP 
A PRI member 
Posts in PRI 
Electoral office
73.6
24.4
0.0
78.4
33.3
0.0
89.4
50.0
2.3
Absolute data 
Source: SPP 1 (see Appendix 1).
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discussion of them may also further support the main conclusions of this thesis, while 
showing the analytical potential of the theoretical framework used.
The SPP and the 1994 presidential transition
There is a double link between the SPP and the 1994 succession process. First, 
the presidential decision to eliminate the former ministry was taken with the latter process 
in mind. Second, the SPP served as stepping stone to the strongest presidential aspirants. 
This was the case of both frustrated presidential candidate Colosio and current president 
Zedillo. A great deal of scholarly political literature on recent events in Mexico focuses 
on Salinismo. As usual, authors’ main interest was to analyse group politics. In our view, 
a more fruitful approach to the Salinas succession would underscore the importance of 
assessing the economic, political, and institutional context before and after the selection 
as well as Colosio’s SPP bureaucratic background. Let us begin by discussing these 
issues in reverse order.
The thesis has shown the dramatic impact that the SPP institutional setting had 
on Salinas’s camarilla. The split of this cluster into two distinctive groups played a 
fundamental role in the 1994 succession process. Colosio, a member of Montemayor’s 
team at the SPP, joined in 1982 the ‘regional development’ network headed by Camacho. 
This fact and his becoming federal deputy in 1985 protected him from bureaucratic in­
fighting within the ‘planning/budgeting apparatus of the SPP which affected Montemayor 
and other friends of Colosio badly. When minister Salinas was selected as the PRI 
presidential candidate, Colosio was no longer an operative technocrat but a first-class 
‘extension agent’. Meanwhile, Camacho, his former boss, had lost the latter title. 
Ironically, the reason was mostly his promotion as head of SEDUE. A shift of 
institutional settings sheds light on both developments.^
The posts they received at the beginning of the Salinas administration supports 
this interpretation. Camacho's becoming PRI General Secretary in August 1988 made his 
appointment as head of Gobernacion only logical. This, however, did not happen. 
According to Camacho, the president gave him the task of tackling "the country's major
®In the case o f Camacho, for instance, his leaving the SPP created a conflict between him and those 
who could not followed him (interview with Camacho, London, 1/12/95).
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political problem", namely, Mexico City "If you govern this city well and win the 1991 
elections . . .  you can move to any other place" (interview, London, December 1,1995). 
He did not. In contrast, Colosio was given what was called an ‘impossible mission’: 
reforming the PRI ( Rodriguez and Ward in Aitken et al. 1996: 92).
By the end of 1991, PRONASOL had become the most well-known programme 
of the administration (Mendez 1994: 192). It had passed its real test during the mid-term 
elections held in August that year.* Reversing historical trends, the PRI got 320 out of 
500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 62 out of 64 seats in the Senate. Though the 
popularity of both Salinas and his policies is at the core of these results (Centeno 1994: 
67), two other contributing factors should not be neglected. First, the PRI normally does 
better in mid-term congressional elections because the party machine counts for more. 
Second, there is no doubt that the party's leader Colosio worked effectively to build up 
the PRI machinery after 1988.
This encouraging panorama, together with a booming economy, allowed 
president Salinas to prepare well in advance his own succession. Both the death of the 
SPP and the creation of SEDESOL had this central purpose. This move, together with 
Colosio’s appointment as head of the latter ministry, strengthened considerably his 
position in the presidential race. The death of the SPP had another beneficiary: finance 
minister Aspe. At the same time, it counterbalanced the overt presidential aspirations of 
his old friend Manuel Camacho. The interior minister Gutierrez Barrios leaving the 
Cabinet in January 1993 made it clear that the fiiture president would be chosen from this 
trinity (see Proceso 891, 29/11/93). One fact linked them: their belonging to the SPP- 
Salinas cluster, or more precisely to Salinas institutional camarilla. With three 'strong' 
pre-candidates, president Salinas reduced bureaucratic pressures, and kept the succession 
struggle under relative control.
After the demise of the SPP, however, the country's panorama began to change. 
This development is crucial to understanding the process under discussion. As the thesis 
has showed regarding the period 1970-1988, environmental factors have always played
 ^In the 1988 elections, Carlos Salinas received only 27.25% of the vote in Mexico City (Federal 
District) as compared with 49.22% got by Cardenas in the same entity {El Cotidiano 25, September- 
October 1988: 16).
®For a further discussion on these elections see Cornelius (1991) and Valdéz (in Castro, 1993: 163-
176).
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a relevant role in this process. While the country's economic prospects began clouding 
(see table 6.2 in chapter 6), the elections in the United States and their result brought the 
NAFTA negotiations to a halt. Moreover, there was a significant political mobilisation 
in several states, which "seems to have taken the president by surprise" (Mendez 1994: 
198).  ^ Additionally, an agreement between PAN and PRD to push for greater 
démocratisation was reached. This changing context not only enhanced the succession 
battles, but made them more visible to the naked eye.
The key succession struggles were not fought either within the dual policy- 
network, partly reactivated by the separation of the economic and political structures of 
the SPP, or within either of its networks. The real battles were fought by the key members 
of Salinas’s institutional camarilla. Despite this fact, each of the three factions in which 
this camarilla was divided offered different 'projects of nation'. The first of them, led by 
the president's star economic advisor José Cordoba, based its project on NAFTA. In his 
meeting with members of president-elect Clinton's team held in Washington in November 
1992, Cordoba said: "To us times are very important. . .  the ideal is to have it finished 
[NAFTA] before August. . .  at the most before December. . .  In December 1993, we will 
have a presidential candidate" (quoted in Proceso 839, 30/11/92: 9).
Apart from broad economic and political arguments, he had particular reasons for 
wanting things to happen along that timetable. As noted by American academic John D. 
Lindau, it was clear that the success or failure of NAFTA would have a decisive impact 
on the succession process: "If it fails and the relationships [with the US] become distant 
the destapado will be an individual able to deal with the traditional Mexican nationalism" 
(interview with Correa in Proceso 874, 2/8/93). This individual was no other than 
Manuel Camacho. For Cordoba’s group the candidate could be anybody but the head of 
the DDF.
As in the two previous succession processes, bureaucratic coalitions played a 
fundamental role in the process under scrutiny. The importance of these coalitions 
depended on the institutional resources held by their individual constituents. On 
Camacho’s side were his long friendship with Salinas, a nation-wide network of 
supporters, and the extensive powers he exercised. Though his jurisdiction was formally
T or an extensive discussion o f the political developments during 1992 and 1993, see Ayala 
(1995), Quintero and Rodriguez (1994).
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reduced to the limits of the country's capital city, his influence went far beyond those 
limits. In brief, he had become a de facto minister of Gobernacion. This did not go 
unchallenged. Camacho's presidential aspirations aroused the hostility of Cordoba. On 
the side of the latter were his closeness to the president, his holding the influential 
Oficina de Coordinacion, his being a member of the Advisory Cluster, and his 
international connections. Colosio, on the other hand, had Salinas’s total backing and his 
favourite patronage machinery: PRONASOL.
Just as in the cases of Diaz Serrano and Silva-Herzog, a powerful and huge 
bureaucratic coalition was built against Camacho. This was a fundamental factor in his 
not gaining the presidential nomination. President Salinas astutely capitalised upon the 
rivalry between Camacho and Cordoba to hide, till the last moment, his own choice. On 
November 28,1993, Colosio was 'unveiled' as the PRI presidential candidate. During his 
political campaign, Salinas had said in Chaleo that since the 1980s had been a decade of 
"severe drop in living standards", the next decade "has to be the one of explicit equity 
promotion" and "deliberate justice" (Salinas 1988: 89). It worth stressing that the 1990s 
included not only his administration but the following one. Near the "unveiling", Salinas 
gave a picture of his successor: He should be "[a] politician with solid technical capacity" 
(interviewed by Borge 1993: 145).
Camacho, an experienced political operator, was far from being a "solid" 
economic expert, while exactly the opposite applied to Aspe. The only minister holding 
both attributes was Colosio. Many factors combined to make Colosio Salinas’s choice. 
First, Colosio assured more than Camacho the continuation of the Salinas's economic 
reform. After his selection, for instance, he was often referred to as ‘Mr. Continuity’ 
(Russell 1995: 54). Second, like Echeverria, his major goal was to secure an outstanding 
place in Mexican history. PRONASOL, a programme totally identified with Salinismo, 
could assure this. Three, Salinas had shaped Colosio's career, like nobody else's, to meet 
his personal interests. Last, but not least, Colosio's candidature was supported by the 
'financial cluster' because it precluded that of Camacho.
Up to this point, Salinas's strong leadership had effectively contained overt 
bureaucratic in-fighting: His dominance over the succession process had been total, and 
managed masterly. Although its candidate was not chosen, Cordoba's group was granted 
an important concession: Zedillo would be responsible for Colosio's political campaign.
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which guaranteed him a ministerial post in the incoming administration. The uprising of 
peasants in the state of Chiapas on January 1,1994 would alter dramatically this happy 
end of administration. This event not only threatened each of Salinas's achievements, but 
put Camacho again in a position to fulfil his presidential aspirations. This possibility 
triggered an explosive, fierce reaction from those who had opposed him. Candidate 
Colosio was caught in the middle of this bureaucratic in-fighting. On March 23,1994, he 
was assassinated in Tijuana. Since the fatal shooting of the president-elect Obregon in 
1928, nothing similar had occurred in Mexico.
In very delicate political circumstances, Salinas opted for Zedillo. It has often 
been suggested that the president was able to choose his successor not once but twice. A 
more plausible interpretation of Zedillo's selection relates to the power of the coalition 
led by Cordoba and its economic allies both national and foreign. It exhibited, once more, 
the president's constraints in influencing his succession. Borge had asked minister 
Zedillo, if he and Carlos Salinas were friends, he answered: "It could be vain to say that 
we are friends... My relationship with the president has been a working one" (interviewed 
by Borge 1993: 171-172).
Economic management without the SPP
As argued earlier, a worrying economic panorama began to emerge in 1992. In 
this year, the current account deficit grew 72.7 percent, to reach over 6 percent of GDP 
(about $22.8 billion) as compared vrith 4.7 percent in 1991 {El Financiero, 22/4/93: 4; 
Castafieda 1993b: 63). Economic growth continued to decline, reaching in 1993 its lowest 
level since 1988 (less than 0.5 percent) as a result of a self-induced recession. Moreover, 
80 percent of the total foreign investment in 1992 was speculative, short-term portfolio 
investment. This in particular left the country "highly vulnerable to shocks that could lead 
to interruption of the inflows of capital" (Weintraub 1995: 109). And these shocks 
materialised in 1994.
The December 1994 balance-of-payments crisis provides the most recent example 
of economic mismanagement (see Proceso 959,20/3/95: 6-15).'° Particularly after 1990, 
president Salinas and his team of economic experts assumed that foreign investment 
would continue pouring into the country mainly because of the NAFTA negotiations.
'“For extensive analyses o f this crisis see Castafieda (1995); Springer and Molina (1995); 
Weintraub (1995); Carstens and Schwartz (in Serrano and Bulmer-Thomas 1996); Philip (1996).
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Thus, oil expectations during the Lopez Portillo administration were paralleled by trade 
expectations during the Salinas one. Within this optimistic scenario, the unprecedented 
deficit of the current account would seem somehow manageable, and any corrective 
measures could well wait till the next presidential administration. A series of shocking 
political events throughout 1994, not only proved government's assumptions wrong, but 
destroyed the myths surrounding Salinas's economic 'miracle'.
Since 1976 Mexico has experienced periodic economic crises (Basanez 1991). 
The fact that these events have generally ocurred at the end of a presidential term make 
their partial explanation in political terms plausible (Philip 1996). Traditionally, the 
cyclical nature of the Mexican political process had increased uncertainty as the 
presidential term came to an end. This fact, however, was magnified during the 1976, 
1982, and 1994 economic crises. Something similar can be said about the financial crisis 
precipitated by the 1987 stock market crash. In the period 1976-1994, as a result, 
expectations about the future course of the economy became increasingly sensitive to the 
president's last decisions, including the selection of the PRI presidential candidate.
High academic qualifications and efficient economic management had become 
synonymous concepts within government. In spite of their comparing favourably with 
those of any developed country, the cabinets of the last three presidents have not 
prevented economic mismanagement. This fact questions the link between managerial 
efficiency and Weberian bureaucracy. As the Mexican case shows, one of the causes of 
economic mismanagement is the ongoing symbiosis between politics and the 
bureaucracies in charge of economic policy during the SPP years and after them.
Institutional change and political instability
This thesis suggests a link between institutional change and political instability. 
More specifically, it has argued that the manipulation and/or dismantling of much of the 
state apparatus had the effect of undermining the pre-existing institutional order v^thout 
providing a suitable replacement. Partly at least, this may account for the system’s 
growing incapacity to tackle the challenges to its authority stemming, in part, from an 
abysmal economic performance. This interpretation coincides with that endorsed by 
president Zedillo and his team. In his inauguration speech, president Zedillo denounced 
not only the "growing climate of insecurity" the country was experiencing, but "the 
deficient performance of the institutions in charge of public security". A few months
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later, Gobernacion officials would publicly blame "the previous administrations" for 
having dismantled the national security apparatus {La Jornada 12/7/95: 1).
From de la Madrid’s presidency onwards, the aforementioned apparatus began to 
be dismantled rather than modernised.^^ In part, this was a consequence of the 
technocratic background of presidents de la Madrid and Salinas. In part, it was the result 
of government’s use of targeted patronage rather than repression. As the thesis has 
argued, the SPP was the beneficiary of this policy. Institutional reform also conspired 
against Gobernacion's traditional intelligence role. The same accord that created the 
Oficina de Coordinacion established a National Security Cabinet for the first time in 
Mexican history (Aguayo in Roett 1991: 60). More important, this cabinet was placed 
"functionally and operatively" under the authority of that office (DOF 7/12/88: 4). This 
meant that decisions over internal security would be reached by technocratic consensus.
According to Carlos Montemayor, the bureaucratic in-fighting between Camacho 
and Corboba had the effect of taking some of Gobernacion's powers away from this 
ministry, and tranferring "national security" to the desk of the presidential advisor (in La 
Jornada 30/8/96). This was, however, only partly true because Camacho had reproduced, 
albeit with limited success, Gobernacion's police/intelligence apparatus within the DDF. 
In early December 1988, Camacho, with Salinas's approval, appointed Javier Garcia 
Paniagua to head the Federal District's police.'^ This decision sheds light on Salinas's 
plans to tackle political opposition in Mexico City (Reding 1989: 708). The nationwide 
character of Camacho’s repressive apparatus is proved by the early use of the group 
Zorros, Garcia Paniagua's paramilitary unit, to crush a prison uprising in the State of 
Nayarit (see Proceso 635, 2/1/89: 7-13).
Not surprisingly, the existence of various agencies with claims over ‘national 
security’ threw them into disarray. The effects of this would be felt during the shocking 
events of 1994. As noted by various scholars, the Chiapas rebellion caught the Mexican 
government by surprise (Springer and Molina 1995; Wager and Schulz 1995). For the 
first time in decades, government’s intelligence/police apparatus had failed to foresee an
' ' For instance, the DDF’s secret police unit was closed in 1983 as a response to its criminal abuses 
during Durazo's years as chief o f the metropolitan police. Later, the role o f the intelligence-police offices 
of Gobernacion would be substantially reduced.
A few days later, he named Miguel Nazar Haro to the newly created direction o f intelligence 
services within the capital's police. It is worth noting that both Garcia Paniagua and Nazar Haro had been 
successive heads o f Gobernacion's Federal Security Directorate (DFS) between 1977 and 1980.
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event predicted by many other observers!'^ On August 23, 1993, for instance, Proceso 
(877, 23/8/93: 14-16) revealed that, after some attacks on soldiers in Ocotzingo, the 
government of Chiapas had confirmed the existence of armed groups and training camps 
in the State since May 1993. According to head of Gobernacion Patrocinio Gonzalez, 
who had been governor of Chiapas immediately before becoming interior ministry in 
January 1993, the existence of guerillas in Chiapas was a rumor"..
TABLE 7.3. Ministerial turnover per presidential administration, 1958-1996
(Number o f ministers per agency^)
1958-64 1964-70 1970-76 1976-82 1982-88 1988-94 1994-97 Total
General Attorney (PGR) 2 2 2 1 1 5 2 15
Hacienda 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 13
Parastate industry 1 2 2 1 3 2 2 13
Foreign Relations 2 1 2 2 1 3 2 13
Labour 1 1 3 3 1 2 2 13
Turism 3 1 2 2 1 3 1 13
Urban development 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 12
Agrarian Reform 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 12
Education 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 12
Gobernacion 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 11
Agriculture 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 11
Federal District (DDF) 1 2 1 1 2 1 10
Communications 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 10
Public Health 1 2 2 1 1 1 10
PresidencialSV’'? 1 1 2 3 1 1 9
Commerce 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 9
Navy 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 8
Defence (SDN) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Fisheries - - - - 1 1 2 1 5
Comptroller (SECOGEF) — — — 2 1 2 5
Hydraulic Resources 1 1 2 — — — — 4
R ate o f  tu rn o v er 1.21 
(N u m b er o f  m in isters d iv ided  
by th e  n u m b er o f  m in istries)
1.26 1.74 1.79 1.55 2.05 1.53
This excludes the changes provoked by the selection o f ministers as PRI presidential
candidates.
Source: Table elaborated with data from Camp (1982), Keesing's (various years), and Proceso 
(several issues).
At the heart of the aforementioned failure was the way presidents de la Madrid 
and especially Salinas managed government’s intelligence/police apparatus. As table 7.3 
shows, in the period 1988-1994 there were five general attorneys, and three heads of
The emergence o f a number o f independent peasant organisations in Chiapas since the 1970s 
has been a common topic for research. See, for instance, Alvarez (1988), Harvey (1988), and Harvey (in 
Foweraker and Craig 1990: 183-198).
270
Gobernaciônl In the past, low rates of turnover had characterised these agencies. Here 
a broader remark is in order. Because the president is free to integrate his cabinet, 
turnover is a good indicator of bureaucratic and extra-bureaucratic problems. During the 
presidencies of Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, the ministerial rates of turnover increased 
considerably as compared with those of previous administrations. This phenomenon was, 
in large part, associated with bureaucratic factors. As the same table reveals, the highest 
rate of turnover was observed during the Salinas years, and this had mostly political 
causes
Only one institution has escaped from presidential institutional manipulation: the 
army. As can be seem in table 7.3, excluding the abolished and newest agencies, the SDN 
has had the lowest ministerial turnover. Both facts suggests that "the armed forces have 
shown an important degree of independence from the turbulence underlying the political 
system" (Serrano 1995: 446). This, however, could change for this institution has 
significantly increased its role within that system. Moreover, it has been argued that both 
government and the opposition have favoured the "politicization" of the armed forces by 
encouraging their policing of electoral processes (Camp in Rodriguez 1993: 256)}^
7.3 TECHNOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: FRIENDS OR FOES?
Dramatic changes in the Mexican economic structure characterise the last two 
decades. They include a transformation of the role of the state, including that of its 
machinery, and a significant shift in the country’s developmental model. Two broad 
stages can be distinguished. First, the Lopez Portillo presidency represented the peak of 
a long statist process greatly encouraged by oil developments. Second, the steady decline 
of oil prices, together vrith the economic crisis it triggered, led to the eventual adoption 
of radical pro-market policies from 1986 onwards. The direction of these relevant 
developments was neither associated with social movements or with democratic 
practices. Apart from international factors, the principal driving force of policy change 
was the techno-bureaucratic elite in power since December 1976.
From the Diaz Ordaz administration onwards, fewer and fewer top cabinet 
ministers have held elective office. This was a clear indication that bureaucracy had
See "Alemân politizô al Ejército, Salinas lo lleva a determinar los comicios" by Enrique Maza 
(in Proceso 810, 11/5/92: 6-11).
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eventually replaced the PRI as the main pillar of presidentialism. In any event, the 
Mexican political system still retained some internal pluralistic elements. The rise of the 
techno-bureaucratic elite came to change this picture of limited pluralism in a significant 
way. As a PRI official told Denise Dresser: "The technocrats gained access to the political 
class, not through the wide door of political struggle, but through the narrow door of 
technical expertise" (in Cook et al. 1994: 131). As the case of the SPP shows, they 
reproduced the rules of recruitment and promotion of government’s ‘efficiency pockets’. 
This has not only slowed down renewal of leadership, but enthroned a system of ‘rule by 
purge’. I n  any event, technocratic rule has had important policymaking consequences.
In authoritarian regimes, the style of leadership involves "mentalities" rather than 
ideologies (Linz 1970: 257-259). Mexico’s recent experience, however, tends to prove 
the link between a highly professionalised federal bureaucracy and the emergence of a 
system of ‘ideological corporativism’ as defined by Dunleavy (1981). In his view, the 
unified view of the world and ideological cohesion of the dominant ‘professional 
community’ is "likely to have major and direct implications for the substantive content 
of public policies" (ibid: 8). Within nondemocratic contexts, as the Mexican case shows, 
it may also enhance insulation from environmental political influences. In the final 
analysis, the disrepute that economics and economists have gradually fallen into reflects 
"the increasing isolation in which economic policy discussion and decision making are 
carried out" (Ibarra and Alberro 1989: 167).
There has been a great deal of debate on whether or not technocratic elites pose 
a danger to democracy.*^ According to Pedro Aspe, "without well-trained politicians and 
economists" no modernisation programme could be successful (1993: 55-56). In his view, 
these "top-grade people" should be "in areas of budget control, domestic and international 
trade, privatization, industrial regulation, social security, labour management, social 
development, taxation, and financial policy". In other words, they should rule the country. 
There is certainly an irony here. To rule, some electoral legitimacy is required. This sheds 
light on the ‘unhappy marriage' between technocratic elites and the PRI since 1981. Any
As the thesis shows, the casualties of this system were first traditional ‘politicians’, and later an 
increasing number o f rival technocratic elites. The most extreme expression o f this phenomenon is provided 
by the struggles within Salinas’s ‘compact’ inner circle. The term ‘rule by purge’ is borrowed from 
Sandschneider (in Calvert 1987).
For a summary o f this debate see Centeno (1993: 308).
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recent attempt to build up the ruling party beyond a certain point has encountered 
opposition not only from its own constituents, but from the ruling technocratic elites 
themselves,'^ In essence, broader electoral reform has been fiercely opposed by the latter 
elites because their survival is also at stake.
Partly as a reaction to the developments under discussion, Mexican elections have 
become more competitive. This fact has not, however, been sufficient for the 
consolidation of democracy. Elections have some impact only if government can be 
controlled ( Krasner 1972:160), and this has not yet been the case in Mexico. Despite the 
unquestionable electoral advances of the opposition, the ruling elite have repeatedly 
managed to keep their congressional majority (see Dominguez and McCann 1995). 
Moreover, this elite has proved successful in replacing "rigid, antiquated controls with 
new, more sophisticated clientelistic arrangements without necessarily moving towards 
democracy" (Fox 1994: 155). To be sure, the electoral system has been modified 
countless times, but these efforts have never been primarily directed to building solid 
democratic institutions. At the heart of this historical persistence is the prevalent 
mechanism of presidential succession.
In December 1993, the director of the foreign trade bank José Angel Gurrla (today 
minister of foreign relations) assured a group of Japanese investors that the selection of 
Colosio as the PRI candidate guaranteed 24 years of continuity of the Salinas's economic 
policies (quoted in Proceso 892, 6/12/93: 13). For the president in the year 2000 would 
emerge from president Colosio's economic team. When making this forecast, Gurria was 
most probably thinking of Ernesto Zedillo, who some days before had been appointed 
coordinator of the presidential campaign by Salinas. Because of Colosio’s death, there 
was no need to wait six years to see that Gurria was right. Apparently, the possibility of 
such accurate predictions questions the feasibility of a simultaneous transition towards 
both democracy and the market.
At first sight, the turbulent nature of the 1976-1994 period gives the observer the 
impression that an ‘old bureaucratic order’ had been replaced by a new one. As this thesis 
has argued, it was not exactly the case. Rather there was a mixture of old and new 
patterns, ideological principles, practices, rules of the game, and trends. Nowhere was this
” See, for instance, Hemândez (1991), Dresser (in Cook et al. 1994), and Rodriguez and Ward 
(in Aiken et al. 1996).
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confusing mixture clearer in government’s attempts at economic reform amid a context 
of political inertia. The major casualty of this was the highly institutionalised pre-1976 
dual policy-network system. Since 1982, the Mexican state has been dismantled rather 
than modernised. The crucial problem here is that to replace what is gone will depend on 
a delicate, long-term process of institution building. What still needs to be seen is 
whether this process will reinforce authoritarianism or engender more democracy (Davis 
1994: 380).
Because of its leading role in the ‘technocratic revolution’, the SPP will 
necessarily be associated with the outcome of this process whatever it turns out to be. 
Regarding this ministry, Gortner was totally right when writing that nothing may be so 
permanent as a temporary government bureau.
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Appendix 1: A note on primary sources and methodology
1. PRIMARY SOURCES
This first section explains the primary sources of the data used in the thesis. The 
term primary source is understood as comprising "deliberate", "unadverted", and non- 
interpretative sources of data "which came into existence in the period under research".’ 
Here, they are grouped into two broad categories: documentary sources and interviews. 
We refer the reader to the general bibliography for the complete references of the 
documents cited.
1.1 Documentary sources
Official publications and other written sources
The thesis considers the SPP original structure and all the organisational changes 
undergone by the ministry to its end. They are presented in seven charts throughout the 
thesis (see List of Tables and Figures). The data comes fi-om the various versions of the 
Reglamento Interior de la SPP and Manual de Organizacion de la SPP, and also from 
several administrative fiats (see selected laws and fiats in Bibliography). Additionally, 
these official documents provided relevant information about the agency's legal powers 
and formal operation. Gathering the data under discussion implied extensive documentary 
search in the Diario Oficial de la Federacion (DOF)^. Archival work was carried out in 
the library of the Secretarla de Gobernacion and in the Archiva General de la Nacion.
Regarding the rationale for the creation of the SPP, various official publications 
were consulted. They include speeches pronounced during the 1975-76 presidential 
campaign as published by the PRI, Filosofia (1980) on the president's view of his 
administrative reform, and Bases Jurldicas (1977) on the legal changes this reform 
implied. The four volumes of the Memoria Institucional de la SPP (1981) provided 
useful insights not only on this issue, but also on the performance of the SPP during its 
first four years, the problems and constraints its personnel faced, the rationale for internal 
organisational change, and key internal procedures (e.g., budget elaboration).
For the fifteen-year existence of the SPP, empirical evidence is provided by a 
wide-array of governmental and non-govemmental documents. Official addresses include 
informes presidenciales (annual presidential addresses to the nation) and speeches 
pronounced by the head of the SPP contained in Memoria Institucional de la SPP (1981) 
and other written sources (e.g., newspapers). Other sources of data are the various SPP's 
periodic publications and ad hoc publications such as national plans, academic papers 
(e.g., SPP 1981), and documents of institutional enhancement (e.g., SPP 1986;
' Bell, Judith (1987), Doing Your Research Project (Milton Keynes: Open University Press): 53-
54.
 ^The DCF is a daily official publication, whose central task is to publicise new federal legislation
as well as changes in the existing legislation.
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PRONASOL 1990). Statistics on projected expenditure by agency come from the annual 
budget annually published in the DOF, while those on actual expenditure from NAFINSA 
(1986, 1990).
The thesis includes only a few deliberate sources? Ex-president Lopez Portillo's 
two-volume memoirs (1988) shed enormous light on crucial bureaucratic events and 
political processes involving the SPP up to 1982. Considering the self-vindicating 
character of this book, the data used in the thesis is balanced, or compared, with evidence 
from other sources as far as possible. The same applies to academic documents produced 
by other participants partly with a similar purpose or where bias is detected (e.g., Silva 
Herzog 1988; Ibarra and Alberro 1989).
Qualitative and quantitative data for the period under study is provided by various 
periodical publications. Comprehensive research involved the following: Keessing's 
Records o f  World Events {Keesing's Contemporary Archives until 1986), Statistical 
Abstract o f  Latin America (SALA), and Economic Survey o f  Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ESLA). The collection of Latin America Newsletters at the Institute of Latin 
American Studies (ILAS) was also consulted, though in a less extensive way. Other 
general sources of economic indicators, including descriptions of the country's economy, 
are Country Report: Mexico produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the annual 
report of the Bank of Mexico. On institutional change involving the entire federal public 
sector, the thesis relies on the DOF (see selected laws and fiats in Bibliography).
Magazines and newspapers
Journalistic material proved to be a valuable primary source. Many interviews, 
biographies, speeches, behind-the-scenes information, leaked documents, and 
bureaucratic coalition/infighting evidence examined by or quoted in the thesis comes 
from this source. The weekly magazine Proceso? was systematically researched for the 
period 1976-92. In a first stage, the author relied on his own collection up to 1990. 
Missing and more recent issues were consulted in the collections at the Biblioteca 
México, ILAS, or via Internet. Similarly, the Mexican newspapers La Jornada and 
Reforma were systematically consulted via Internet in the last year and a half of the 
research project. La Jornada and the other magazines and newspapers listed in the 
bibliography were consulted mostly in Mexico for specific periods, events or issues. 
Relevant inferences were also drawn from journalistic political analysis.
Biographical data
The biographical data examined or presented in the thesis comes from various 
sources. First, Roderic Ai Camp's Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1981 (1982) and 
Who is Who in Mexico Today (1988) provides information only for the individuals in the 
position of Oficial Major or higher (high-rank officials), mostly up to the beginning of 
the Lopez Portillo administration. Second, auxiliary historical sources of names of lower- 
rank officials are the Directorio del Poder Ejecutivo Federal (1971) and Directorio de 
la Administraciôn Publica Centralizaday  Parastatal (1978,1979,1980). Third, for more
 ^Bell (1987: 54) defines these kinds o f primary sources as those produced with self-vindication 
or reputation enhancement purposes for the attention o f future researchers.
This influential magazine was launched simultaneously with creation o f the SPP, which offered 
the advantage o f covering the whole period under study.
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recent and better organised data, the thesis relies specially on Quien es Quien en la 
Administraciôn Publica de México (1982), and on the four editions of the Diccionario 
Biografico del Gobierno Mexicano (1984, 1987, 1989, and 1992). The last official 
publications contain complete biographical information of individuals holding the post 
of director general or higher (middle-rank and high-rank officials).
In addition, the thesis relies on the relatively abundant aggregated data on 
Mexican 'political elites' provided by secondary sources to make inferences. Examples 
include Centeno (1990, 1992 and 1994) on general trends, and Galindo (1993), who 
presents the latest findings on educational background of high-level government officials 
following an impeccable methodology.
1.2 Interviews
Some empirical evidence examined in the thesis comes fi'om eighteen 
unstructured interviews. They were conducted by the author in Mexico City (April-May 
and September 1993), Madrid (July 1994), and London (April 1995, May and December 
1995; May 1996). The interviewees include four high-rank SPP ex-officials, seven 
middle-rank ex-officials, six low-rank ex-officials, and one ex-member of Congress. As 
the condition of most interviewees was a pledge of absolute confidentiality, only the 
following material obtained in this way is identified and quoted in the thesis:
Manuel Camacho Solis: SPP low-rank official (1979-1981) and Under-secretary 
for Regional Development (1982-1986), London, December 1, 1995.
José Ramon Lopez Portillo: SPP director general (1977-1980) and Under­
secretary for Evaluation (1980-1982), London, April 29,1994 and December 1,1995.
Interviewee A: SPP director general (1983-1985), Mexico City, April 28, 1993.
Interviewee B: SPP director de area (1984-1985), Mexico City, May 5, 1993.
Interviewee C: Member of staff in the office of SPP minister Ernesto Zedillo 
(1990-1992), London, April 12,1995.
Interviewee D: Federal deputy (1976-1979) and member of the Commission of 
Programming and Budget, London, May 4,1996.
Though many interviews are not identified, they provided many insights into 
agency operation, internal political processes generally invisible to the naked eye, intra- 
bureaucratic infighting, 'resource' distribution, organisational attitudes, and institutional 
relations with the exterior. Interview material different fi*om that discussed above either 
comes from official publications and newspapers and magazines, or is borrowed from 
secondary sources.
2. METHODOLOGY
Although the thesis focuses on one ministry, testing its main hypotheses implies 
the analysis of a complex multidimensional phenomenon. Neither is there nor can there 
be a single method to deal with that phenomenon in its entirety. This explains the eclectic 
character of the methodology used in the thesis. Thus it is acknowledged that the nature 
of each issue, event and process to be explored demands the selection of suitable methods 
and techniques of data collection and analysis. Frequently, the causes and implications
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of the phenomena under observation are subject to different, if not conflicting, 
interpretations. Alas, usually because of the lack of data, testing counterfactual 
hypotheses is not always possible. Thus, more often than not the analysis carried out in 
the thesis is speculative, based on inferences drawn from both primary and secondary 
sources.
In general, only the biographical data of the SPP personnel required complex 
elaboration. Among other things, the thesis attempts to investigate the relationship 
between the organisational setting provided by the ministry under study and the personnel 
associated with this setting. This demanded building a suitable biographical database. The 
rest of this section explains the way the data was collected (including its sources and 
characteristics), the particular methods and techniques employed for organising and 
analysing it, and the problems encountered when doing so.
2.1 Listing the SPP personnel
In an early research phase, a preliminary list of around 180 SPP officials in the 
position of director general or higher (middle- and high-rank officials) for the period 
December 1976-January 1992 was created. This was the result of three months of 
archival work at various libraries in Mexico City. The sources for this list are Directorio 
de la Administraciôn Publica Centralizada y  Parastatal (1978, 1979, 1980); Memoria 
Institucional de la SPP (1981); Quien es Quien en la Administraciôn Publica de México 
(1982); and the four editions of the Diccionario Biografico del Gobierno Mexicano 
(1984, 1987, 1989, and 1992). At this stage, one problem became apparent. The 
information provided by these works was limited to those individuals in office when the 
source was produced. Obviously, this fact made it difficult to estimate the size of the total 
population at the higher echelons of the SPP.
To tackle these problems, complementary sources such as non-specialised official 
publications, newspapers, magazines, interview material, and secondary sources were 
researched. After time-consuming efforts to perfect the preliminary list, it was possible 
to integrate a final list of 205 middle- and high-rank officials. In addition, a careful 
review of the data eventually allowed the author to estimate the total population at not 
more than 300 individuals. Appendix 2 presents this list in hierarchical order, indicating 
the name of the post held by each official among other information.
There were several problems in developing a sample of SPP officials holding 
positions below the level of director general, the most important being the lack of data. 
This problem was partly overcome in two ways. First, the analysis of the sample 
mentioned in the previous paragraph showed that around 30 percent of the cases included 
had held lower positions before being promoted (see Appendix 2). Second, it was 
possible to widen this sample by searching in the available sources of data for individuals 
who never occupied middle-rank positions or higher within the SPP, but who would do 
so outside the agency. To make the sample as representative as possible, the author 
included personnel from most of the areas of the SPP. The list of personnel obtained in 
this way (68 individuals) is presented at the end of Appendix 2.
2.2 Designing and building a database
Having located the data, the next step was to plan the creation of a database, and 
to decide what specific data it was to contain. Two relational tables, called SPP 1 and 
SPP 2, were built using Paradox for Windows (version 1.0). The data assembled for each
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record can be grouped into four broad categories: personal and educational background; 
bureaucratic and political career before joining the SPP; information while working in 
the SPP; bureaucratic and political career after leaving the SPP. More specifically, these 
categories are composed of 53 fields, mostly alphanumeric.
Two main problems emerged when assembling the data, namely, the lack of data 
involving often many fields and the contradictions found when more than one source was 
available. In particular, collecting personal and educational data for the period 1977-1978 
was hindered by the lack of information. Complete data for specific years was readily 
available fi’om both Quien es Quien (1982) and the Diccionario Biografico (1984, 1987, 
1989, and 1992). As already said, missing data comes ftrom a wide-range of primary and 
secondary sources.
2.3 Analysing the data and presenting the findings
Searching for required data was done by performing query operations. The query 
system allowed constructing time series for specific SPP administrations. It worth noting 
that all the analysis of the SPP personnel carried out in chapters four to seven is based on 
data obtained in this way. The most relevant findings are presented in six tables presented 
throughout those chapters (see List of Tables and Figures). Regarding these tables, a final 
remark is necessary. Not available data for specific categories was redistributed to the 
other categories according to their proportional representation in the total.
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Appendix 2: List of the SPP personnel, 1976-1992’
1. High-rank personnel
1.1 Secretarios (including some key staff)
1ÎErnesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1 December 1988-7 February 1992)
- tEduardo Almeyda Armenta (1988-92), private secretary
- 1 Carlos Mancera Corcuera (1988-92), chief of advisers
f Pedro Aspe Armella (6 October 1987-30 November 1988)
- t Alejandro Moreno Walter (1987-88), private secretary
- tLuis Tellez (1987-88), chief of advisers
IÎCarlos Salinas de Gortari (1 December 1982-5 October 1987)
- Bruno Kiehnle Mutzenbecher (1982-87), private secretary
- =*José Cordoba Montoya-» (1983-85), chief of advisers
#Ramon Aguirre Velazquez (25 September 1981-30 November 1982)
- tFernando Hernandez Valenzuela (1981-82), private secretary
Miguel de La Madrid Hurtado (16 May 1979-25 September 1981)
- Alfonso Munoz de Cote (1979-81), private secretary
- HEmilio Gamboa Patron (1981), private secretary
- Manuel Bartlett Diaz (1979-81), political advisor
- Bernardo Sepulveda Amor (1981), economic adviser
Ricardo Garcia Sainz (16 November 1977-16 May 1979)
- Genaro Borrego Estrada (1977-79), private secretary
- Emilio Gamboa PatronH (1977-79), auxiliary secretary
Carlos Tello Macias (1 December 1976-16 November 1977)
- Marco Antonio Pascual Moncayo (1977), private secretary
- Sergio Mota Marini (1976-77), chief of advisers
'See the previous appendix, for an explanation o f the sources, size and characteristics o f the 
sample contained in headings one and two.
^An upward arrow next to some names means promotion within the SPP, while the horizontal 
arrow continuation in a position similar in rank. The lack o f arrows indicates that the official arrived and 
left the agency holding the same post. In all cases, their tenure o f the corresponding post is showed within 
brackets after the name.
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1.2 Subsecretarios (including some key staff)
Planeacion y Control Presupuestal; Planeacion 
del Desarrollo; Programacion
iPascual Garcia Alba Idunate (1988-92)
-H Hector R.Orozco Vazquez1 (1988-91)
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon I (1987-88)
- Carlos Mancera Corcuera! (1987-88), adviser
! Pedro Aspe Armella! (1985-87)
- ! Alejandro Moreno Walter! (1985-87), private secretary
- ! Antonio Sanchez Gochicoa!, chief of advisers
- !Fermfn Carpio Suarez! (1985-87), administrative coordinator
!Rogelio Montemayor Seguy! (1982-85)
- Melchor de los Santos Ordonez! (1982-85), administrative coordinator
Francisco Labastida Ochoa (1979-82)
- Mario Barreido Pereira (1979-82), administrative coordinator
José Alfonso Cebreros (1978-79)
Eduardo Pascual Moncayo (1976-78)
Presupuesto 
! Miguel Angel Davila Mendoza (1981-82)
Ramon Aguirre Velazquez! (1979-81)
- =»Carlos E. Solorzano Juarez! (1979-81), chief of advisors
Miguel Rico Ramirez (1977-79)
- Carlos E. Solorzano Juarez-» (1977-79), chief of advisors
Control Presupuestal y Contabilidad;
Evaluacion
! Javier Castillo Ayala (1983-85)
- !Luis Raul Dominguez Terrazas! (1983), administrative coordinator
!José Ramon Lopez Portillo (1980-82)
- !Guillermo Ruiz de Teresa (1979-81), private secretary
Rosa Luz Alegria Escamilla (1976-80)
Programacion y Presupuesto de 
Desarrollo Industrial y de Servicios
Juan José Paramo Diaz (82-88)
Programacion y Presupuesto de 
Desarrollo Social y Rural
Maria de los Angeles Moreno (82-88)
- Cristina Ramos, chief of advisers
- Yolanda Cedillo, administrative coordinator
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Desarrollo Regional
It Carlos Rojas Gutierrez (1988-92)
- It Gerardo Huerta (1988-92), chief of adviser
It Manuel Camacho Solis (1982-86)
- I Fernando Silva Nieto (1984-86), private secretary
-  It Carlos Rojas Gutierrez It (1985), chief of advisers
- Juan Bueno Zirion (1983-86), administrative coordinator
Programacion y Presupuesto
Rogelio Gasca Neril (1988-92)
- Jorge Gutierrez Padroni! (1988; 1990-92), private secretary
- Luis Ramirez de Arellano# (1989-91), "
-Aaron Dychter Poltolarek (1990-92), chief of advisers
1.3 O ficiales Mavores
Esteban Moctezuma Barragân (1988-92)
I José Ruben Valdez Abascal (1987-88)
Otto Granados Roldan (1986-87)
# Salvador Gabrieli Cruz (1985)
Marcela Gonzalez Salas (1982-85)
I José Bustani Hid (1981-82)
Adolfo Lugo Verduzco (1979-81)
Sergio Alardin Azuara (1978-79)
Eleazar Cota Izaguirre (1976-78)
1.4 Coordinadores Générales (and some key staff)
Programa Nacionai del Desarrollo de 
Franjas Fronterizas
Manuel Calderon de la Barca (1979)
Manuel Aguilera Gomez (1977-78)
Delegaciones
Eduardo Pesqueira Olea (1979-82)
- Luis Saenz Arroyo Trejo (1981-82), private secretary
- Héctor Ulibarri Pérez (1979-81), private secretary
Alfonso Murillo Guerrero (1978-79)
Control de Gestion
#01ga Elena Pena Martinez (1983-85)
# Javier Castillo Ayala (1982-83)
#Carlos Enrique Solorzano Juarez (1981-82)
Francisco Rojas Gutiérrez (1980-81)
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INEGI; Sistema Nacionai 
de Informacion
f Carlos Jarque Uribe (1988-92)
-  If Fernando Zepeda Bermudez11 ( 1 9 8 8 - 9 1 ) ,  private secretary
-  If Mario Rodante Esquivel-» (1989-90), chief of advisers
- If Antonio Puig Escudero (1991-92), chief of advisers
If Humberto de Jesus Molina Medina (1988)
I Rogelio Montemayor Seguy (1985-88)
Pedro Aspe Armella! (1982-85)
! Sergio Mota Marin (1978-82)
René Iturriaga de la Puente (1976-78)
2. Middle-rank personnel
2,1 Secretario's in-line directores générales
Asuntos Juridicos 
-♦Marfa de la Luz Ruiz Mariscal (1992)
German Fernandez Aguirre (1991-92)
!01ga Hernandez Espindola (1987-90)
!José Ruben Valdez Abascal! (1982-87)
José Manuel Villagordoa (1978-82)
Urbano Farias Hernandez (1977)
Difusion
Héctor Morales Corrales (1988-92)
Salvador Gonzalez Pérez (1987-88)
Julio Pomar Jiménez (1985-87)
Demetrio Ruiz Malerva (1982-85)
Antonio Ibarra Gonzalez (1981-82)
Miguel Gonzalez Avelar (1979-81)
Luis Linares Zapata (1978-79)
Luis Felipe Duarte Moguel (1977)
Documentacion y Analisis
José Ramon Lopez Portillo! (1977-80)
Unidad de Organizacion 
y Métodos
! Carlos Ortiz y Farfan (1978-81)
Eduardo Philibert Mendoza (1978)
Oscar Reyes Retana Marquez (1977)
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Centro de Capacitaciôn para 
el Desarrollo
! Amalia Lucila Adame Nine (1982-83)
Mauricio Campillo Illanes (1978- )
Rolando Cordera Campos (1977)
Unidad de Modernizaciôn de la 
Administraciôn Püblica Federal
H Salvador Gabrieli Cruz (1984-85)
1ÎCarlos Sierra Olivares (1983-84)
Unidad de Finanzas Publicas
Javier Castillo Ayala# (1980)
Contralor Interno
“♦Eduardo Agustm Montano Resa (1983-88)
2.2 Directores Générales
Polftica Ëconômica y Social
Carlos Hurtado Lopez (1989-92)
Pascual Garcia Alba Idunatef (1987-88)
-►José Cordoba Montoya (1985-87)
H Socrates Rizzo Garcia (1983-85)
lîJosé Cordoba Montoya-* (1982-83)
If Rogelio Montemayor Seguy If (1981-82)
Carlos Salinas de Gortari If (1979-81)
- Rogelio Montemayor Seguy I (1979-81), Subdirector general
Alejandro Castillon Garcini (1976-79)
Programacion
If Melchor de los Santos Ordonez If (1984-85)
tCelso Cartas Contreras (1983-85)
If Socrates Rizzo Garcia-* (1982-83)
Federico Torres Arroyo (1979-82)
Jorge J. Izquierdo Rodriguez (1978-79)
Julio Boltvinik Kalinka (1976-78)
Analisis de Ramas Economicas
José Humberto Mosconi Castillo (1980-82)
Inversiones Publicas
Eduardo Gonzalez Gonzalez (1979-80)
Felipe Rivapalacio Guerrero (1977-79)
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Polftica Presupuestal; 
Egresos
“*Carlos Altamirano Toledo (1985-92) 
i Pedro Fabela Espinosa (1982-85) 
fJavier Castillo AyalaH (1981-82)
Miguel Angel Dâvila Mendozall (1979-81)
José Luis Vives Parroquin (1977-79)
Pages
f Julio César Ruiz Ferro-^ (1983-84)
It Antonio Rodriguez Hernandez-* (1981-83)
Fernando E. Hernandez Valenzuela! (1979-81)
René Ortega Sanvicente (1977-79)
Administraciôn de Personal 
del Gobierno Federal
! Salvador Gabrieli Cruzt( 1982-84)
José Bustani Hid! (1979-81)
Servicio Civil
!Hugo Barojas Beltran (1988-92)
-*Luis Ignacio Vazquez Cano (1985-88)
!Manuel G. de Léon Maza (1983-84)
Programacion y Presupuesto 
Energético e Industrial; Presupuesto 
Energético e Industrial
Luis Raul Almeida Duran (1989-92)
=*Julio César Ruiz Ferro (1984-88)
!Luis Raul Dominguez Terrazas (1983-85)
Üssac Osorio Corpi (1980-83)
Presupuesto, Agropecuario 
y Pesca
!Guillermo Castellanos Guzman (1980-82)
Presupuesto, Desarrollo Social
!Gilberto Nieves Jenkin (1980-82)
Presupuesto, Administraciôn 
y Finanzas
! Eduardo Agustin Montano Resa-* (1982-83) 
Enrique Gonzalez de Aragon (1980-81)
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Programacion y Presupuesto 
de Servicios
=»Victor Manuel Lôpez Gonzalez (1991-92)
lî Jésus Alberto Cano Vêlez (1988-91)
îfRolando Bon Lôpez (1987-88)
If Julio César Ruiz Ferro-* (1984)
lîJose Bernardo Gômez Palaciolî (1983-84)
Programacion y Presupuesto 
de Desarrollo Agropecuario,
Pesquero y Abasto
II Héctor Raul Orozco Vazquez (1991-92)
=*Flavio Avilez Gonzalez (1988-91)
Programacion y Presupuesto 
de los Sectores Salud,
Educaciôn y Trabajo
ÎLuis F. Ramirez de Arellano Haro (1991-92)
Victor Manuel Lôpez Gonzalez-* (1988-91)
Programacion y Presupuesto de 
Desarrollo Social y Rural Integral
iGilberto Andrés Zârate Tristan (1987-88)
#Rolando Rodriguez Camara (1986-87)
If Alejandro Jaimes Escobedo (1983-85)
I  Jaime Federico de la Mora Gômez (1982-83)
Programacion y Presupuesto de 
Desarrollo Social
It Gustavo Adolfo Guerrero Ramos (1983-85)
Infraestructura y Desarrollo Urbano; 
Infraestructura y Desarrollo Social; Programacion 
y Presupuesto de Infraestructura Basica
Jorge Col lard de la Rocha (1992)
José Reynoso Bonilla (1990)
II Carlos Mier y Terân Ordiales (1982-88)
Contabilidad Gubernamental; 
Contadurfa de la Federacion
IIMauro I. Martinez y Martinez (1989-92)
(IDaniel Robles Ferrer (1985-89)
IICarlos Altamirano Toledo-* (1982-85)
Luis Arevalo Perez (1977-79)
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Analisis para la Evaluacion
HGuillermo Ruiz de Teresa (1980-81)
Pedro Velazquez Pena (1978-80)
José Antonio Aguilera (1977)
Documentacion y Analisis
t Miguel Alejandro Sandoval Lara (1982-86)
lîLarry Levin Kosberg (1980-82)
Auditoria Gubernamental
If Jorge E. Contreras Alatorre (1982)
Rogelio Carballo Millan (1979-81)
Normas sobre Adquisiciones, 
Almacenes y Obras Publicas
lî Maria de la Luz Ruiz Mariscal (1991-92)
lî Jorge Luis Gutiérrez Padroni (1989-90)
lîFlavio Avilez Gonzalez-* (1987-88)
lî Antonio Gilberto Scheleske Farah (1985-87)
lî Maria Elena Vazquez Nava-» (1982-85)
Francisco Gonzalez Rubio (1980)
lî Enrique Ibarra Iriondo (1978-79)
Gustavo Cortés Fuentes (1977)
Promociôn y Operaciôn Regional; 
Programacion Regional
Luis Antonio de Pablo Sema (1979-82)
Carlos Vidali Carbajal (1976-78)
Centro de Investigaciôn para 
el Desarrollo Rural
Clara Jusidman Rapoport (1983-84)
Arturo Warman Gryj (1978-79)
Fomento al Desarrollo Estatal; Apoyo a 
la Operaciôn de las Delegaciones
iNarciso Acevedo Valenzuela (1979-82)
Control Operativo de las Delegaciones; 
Informacion Operativa de las Delegaciones
lîMario Alberto Zubieta Lôpez (1979-82)
Arturo Olvera Cortez (1978-79)
Desarrollo Rural Integral
lî Marco Antonio Morelos Chon (1980-82)
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Programa de Zonas Fronterizas
Oscar E. Victoria Mascorro (1980-82)
Delegaciones
Patricio Chirinos Caiero (1982-87)
lî Jorge Espinosa de los Reyes (1988)
Programacion y Presupuesto Regional
îîMario Luis Fuentes Alcalâ (1991-92)
Guillermo Hopkins Gamez (1988-91)
lî Antonio Sanchez Gochicoa (1987-88)
1 Fernando del Villar Moreno (1985-87)
lîLuis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta (1982-85)
Polftica de Descentralizaciôn para 
el Desarrollo Regional
Margarita Gonzalez Gamio (1986-88)
Alejandra Moreno Toscano (1982-86)
Sécréta riado Técnico de Integraciôn 
Sectorial del PRONASOL
Juventino Pineda Pinto (1989-92)
Diseno e Implantaciôn del Sistema 
Nacionai de Informacion
lîCarlos Enriquez Alcaraz-* (1978-81)
Luis M. de la Hoz (1977)
Sistemas y Procesos Electrônicos
Enrique Calderon Alzati (1977-80)
Estadfstica
Miguel Cervera Flores (1988-92)
lîHumberto de Jésus Molina Medina# (1987-88)
#Carlos Jarque Uribel (1984-86)
Carlos Camacho Gaos (1982-84)
Luis Eduardo Rosas Landa (1978-82)
José Manuel Gil Padilla (1977-78)
Polftica Informàtica
Victor Bustos y de la Tijera (1991-92)
Raul Hudlet Yânez (1989-91)
tJosé Luis Soberanes Reyes (1985-88)
Luis Pablo Grijalva Lôpez (1983-85)
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-♦Carlos Enriquez Alcaraz (1980-82)
Integraciôn y Analisis de la 
Informacion
If Fernando A. Zepeda Bermudez (1991-92)
If Lucila Oralia Cuellar Tamez (1987-90)
If José Luis Martinez Hurtado-* (1980-87)
Geografia; Estudios del 
Territorio Nacionai
José Alberto Villasana Lyon (1979-82)
Nestor Duch Gary (1982-92)
Juan B. Puig De La Parra (1977-79)
Programacion, Organizacion y 
Presupuesto; Administraciôn
José Fernando Agraz Rojas (1988-92)
IfFermin Carpio Suarez (1987-88)
I Ernesto Sentiez Hoyos (1982-87)
Jorge Thompson Aguilar (1980-82)
José Murillo Alvirez (1978-79)
Mario Miguel Abraham (1977)
Personal
Raul Almanza S. (1991-92)
Francisco Javier Bravo Ramirez (1989-90)
-♦Antonio Rodriguez Hernandez (1983-88)
Angela Vazquez Hernandez (1983)
Carlos Sierra Olivares-* (1979-82)
Ladislao Solares y Vera (1978-79)
Octavio Pena Torres (1977)
Recursos Materiales y Servicios 
Générales; Servicios
Fernando Solis Camara (1988-92)
Rolando Torres Monroy (1982-88)
If German Villar Martinez (1981-82)
José Luis Turveno Retana (1979-81)
Ricardo Flores P. de la Cueva (1977-79)
Servicios Sociales
Maria Eugenia Sthephan Otto (1982-85)
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! Carlos Rivera Borbôn (1981-82)
Juan Saldana (1979-81)
A uditoria  G eneral 
Carlos Hernandez Rodriguez (1991-92) 
R odolfo Héctor Lara Ponte (1988-91)
C ontre! de G estion  
Jésus Franco Guerrero (1979-81)
P rogram as E sp ecia les  
Fernando Paz Sanchez (1981-82)
E stud ios A d m in istratives  
lî Guillerm o Rojas Ortiz (1981-82)
3. Low-rank personnel
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Juan Mariano Acoltzin Vidal (1979-81)
José Alberro Semerena (1985-87)
Carlos Luis Alvarado Châvez (1978-80) 
Narciso Amador Leal (1986-87)
Abel Gerardo Arreguin Meza (1983-87) 
Juan Enrique Azuara Olascoaga (1983-87) 
Armando Ballinas Mayes (1978-81)
Marco Antonio Bernal Gutiérrez (1979) 
Javier Bonilla (1983-88)
Lorenzo Cabrera Valderrabano (1983-86) 
Eloy Cantu Segovia (1983-85)
Manuel Cavazos Lerma (1979)
Luis Antonio Chagoya Rivera (1981-82) 
José Ignacio Chapela Castanares (1977-82) 
Luis Antonio Chagoya Rivera (1983-84) 
Antonio Chumacero Gômez (1977-78) 
Benito Coquet Ramos (1981-82) 
Cuauhtémoc Cuenca Dardôn (1979)
Serafin Dominguez Fermân (1979-81) 
Aarôn Dychter Poltolanek (1979-81) 
Marcelo Ebrard (1984)
Lino Espinosa Palacios (1981-82)
Ricardo A. Ferrari Gleason (1979-81) 
Gabino Fraga Mouret (1980-81)
Adolfo Galvân Ulloa (1978-79)
Laura Alicia Garza Galindo (1983-86)
Noé Garza Flores (1985-87)
Ana Paula Virginia Gerard (1986-87) 
Joaquin Gonzalez Castro (1979-80) 
Alejandro Gonzalez Durân Juârez (1981-82) 
Napoleôn Gômez Urrutia (1977-78) 
Federico Graf Campos (1982)
Maria del Rosario Guerra (1983-88)
Alfredo Hemândez Tôriz (1988)
Eugénio Hinojosa Cuellar (1983-87)
Roberto Jiménez Alba (1981-82)
Guillermo Kelly Novoa (1980-81)
Juan José Larriva Sahd (1981-82)
Héctor Lie Verduzco (1980-81)
Ernesto Luque Feregrino (1981-82)
José Luis Marzal Ruiz (1983-88)
Rafael Antonio Mendivil Rojo (1981)
Marco Antonio Michel Diaz (1980-81)
Uriel de Jesus Montesano Rodriguez (1982-83) 
Arturo Morales Isunza (1979-82)
Mario Antonio Morelos Chon (1980-82)
Jesus Oscar Navarro Gârate (1982-88)
Miguel Angel Olea Sisneaga (1981)
Octavio Javier Ornelas Esquinca (1982-85) 
Armando Ortega Mârquez (1980-82)
Adriana Ortega Vila (1981)
Oscar Pimentel Gonzalez ((1983-88)
Roberto Pefia Villanueva (1981)
Silvia Piso Joo (1977-79)
Arturo Publita Pelesio (1980-82)
Agustin Quintanilla Ochoa (1982-86)
Enrique Quiroz (1988-92)
Maria Eugenia Reyes Guerrero (1983-85) 
Sergio Reyes Osorio (1983-84)
Martin Reyes Vayssade (1979-81)
Jaime Sancho y Cervera (1983-85)
Roberto Salcedo Aquino (1983-87)
Dulce Maria Sauri Riancho (1979-81)
Carlos Sobrino Sierra (1989-91)
Jorge Salomôn Azar (1989-91)
Juan Ignacio Villafranca Andrade (1979-81) 
Tomâs Jesus Yarrignton Ruvalcaba (1979-90) 
Sergio Zavala Soto (1979-82)
 ^This is sample o f officials who never occupied posts above the level o f director general within 
the SPP, but who would occupy positions o f  that level or above in other agencies o f the federal executive 
branch and/or elective federal offices (see Appendix 1)..
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